U.S. Invades Grenada—Nicaragua Next?
Editorial

The catastrophic events in Grenada have shocked the world, proving further that this administration is capable of almost anything. At a time when both Central America and the Middle East are on the brink of massive conflagrations, and when the horrors of nuclear war are uppermost in our minds, such knee-jerk, ideological aggressiveness is terrifying. We stare in disbelief as eminent scientists debate whether the nuclear devastation will mean the end of the human race or merely throw us back to the Stone Age.

We are convinced that the single, most frightening threat to humanity is the present U.S. government. All our efforts to expose its lies and deceptions must be redoubled.

Grenada and Nicaragua
The delay in producing and presenting this issue was due to our efforts to analyze as thoroughly as possible the campaign of destabilization and warmongering which led to the crushing of the Grenadian Revolution. We have also summarized the events of the past few months in Nicaragua, events which have convinced most observers that a wider war in Central America is imminent. For those whose greatest concern is nuclear confrontation—and who among us does not fear that?—it is crucial to be aware that such a confrontation will likely grow out of conventional war. The first step is stopping regional conflicts. Whether greater knowledge of the machinations of the Pentagon, the CIA, and their surrogates will help, remains to be seen. We believe our role is to provide as much information as we can.

Our Fifth Anniversary
While the discouraging world scene acts as a slight restraint on our otherwise boundless enthusiasm, we are nevertheless proud that we have survived five years of publishing Covert Action Information Bulletin—despite the U.S. government's attempts to suppress our research and information through the Intelligence Identities Protection Act. We have entered our sixth year meeting, we think, our goal of steadily improving the Bulletin. We have not been immune—like the CIA—to the economic constrictions of the current recession. As we struggle to keep our small office and tiny staff going, we learn that the CIA received $75.5 million in the recent Intelligence Authorization Act for a new building at its Headquarters—this separate and apart from a secret budget for its heinous activities. Such impressive growth is of course due to expanded CIA covert actions around the globe, about which we will continue to keep you informed.

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Grenada—No Bishop, No Revo:

U.S. Crushes Caribbean Jewel

By Ellen Ray and Bill Schaap

In retrospect the tragic and horrifying events in Grenada were almost predictable. They will one day provide yet another historical perspective of the devastating outcome when an imperialist intelligence system penetrates an internally divided, fledgling socialist government, unable to defend itself, and brings down upon it the might of a massive military machine.

In the case of Chile, the country's military was used by U.S. intelligence before and during the overthrow of Salvador Allende, and enjoys its backing to this day. In Grenada such backing may have been the expectation of at least some of the members of the Revolutionary Military Council which plotted the coup against Maurice Bishop, leading to his brutal death. Those collaborators, however, were used and double-crossed by the Reagan administration.

In both Chile and Grenada, the leadership of the regimes which were toppled did not have enough trust in the people to arm them, a fatal mistake. (In Grenada, the People's Militia, established under Bishop, had been dismantled by his opponents while he was off the island on a trip shortly before the coup.)

Where Is the CIA?

The most curious aspect of the coverage of the coup against Bishop and the subsequent U.S. invasion—Operation Urgent Fury—is the near absence in the press of any mention of the CIA or speculation about a CIA hand in the events. One would think William Casey was not present at George Bush's National Security Council meetings deciding to divert the fleet after the death of Bishop, advancing the incursion plans at a frenzied pace after the Beirut bombing—plotting each step of the invasion. One would think there were no CIA agents on Grenada after four and a half years of urgent and persistent endeavors to place them there. One would think there were no intelligence officers on the island, directing the Marines and Rangers, or aboard the U.S.S. Guam directing part of the invasion operation itself.

And yet we know that from the moment of the March 13, 1979 revolution in Grenada the CIA has relentlessly used every trick in its dirty bag to destroy that tiny island's government and to eliminate that great threat to the U.S.—a charismatic black leader, loved by his own people and respected by all who knew him.

Indeed, in looking for comparisons to the murder of Bishop and his supporters and the destruction of the New Jewel Movement and the Grenadian Revolution, one thinks not so much of Chile as the liquidation of the Black Panther Party and its leaders during the late 1960s and early 1970s. This was accomplished not simply from internal political or personal disputes, but by a scientifically executed operation known as COINTELPRO, through the combined efforts of the FBI, military intelligence, local police forces, and in some instances, the CIA itself. Ironically it was the Black Power movement in the United States which had been an inspiration for most of the leaders of the New Jewel Movement, when they were university students, labor leaders, and political activists.

It is hard, and it is painful, to try to understand how sophisticated, politically conscious people who aspire to revolutionary leadership fall prey time and again to the machinations of those bent on their destruction. It is not as if there had been no warning. It is now clear that for more than two years the U.S. government had been moving inexorably toward the military overthrow of the People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada. Early on, President Reagan's advisers recognized that a simple continuation of the Carter administration's destabilization campaign would not suffice.

The Carter Destabilization Campaign

Within days of the overthrow of the autocratic Eric M. Gairy, the New Jewel Movement government was bluntly told by the U.S. not to establish diplomatic relations with Cuba, to stay out of the socialist camp or else. At the same time, the paltry sum of $5,000 was offered to counter the open threat of invasion by Gairy, who was recruiting mercenaries in the Cuban exile community in Miami. Bishop not only rebuffed the insulting proposals of Frank Ortiz, the U.S. Ambassador based in Barbados, but he described his discussions in detail in a radio broadcast to the Grenadian people. Less than two months later Grenada was subjected to the opening salvo in what was to be an unending U.S. campaign of economic, psychological, and openly violent
destabilization. Two fires, both of suspicious origin, broke out simultaneously in the heart of the tourist area, a direct attack on Grenada’s economy. (See CAIB Number 5.)

Bishop again went to the people in a broadcast which explained the events, in language poignantly prophetic:

Sisters and brothers of Free Grenada: ... Destabilization is the name given the most recently developed or newest method of controlling and exploiting the lives and resources of a country and its people by a bigger and more powerful country through bullying, intimidation, and violence. In the old days such countries—the colonialist and imperialist powers—sent in gunboats or marines directly to take over the country by sheer force. Later on mercenaries were often used in place of soldiers, navy and marines. Today more and more the new weapon and the new menace is destabilization.... Destabilization takes many forms; there is propaganda destabilization, when the foreign media, and sometimes our own Caribbean press, prints lies and distortions against us; there is economic destabilization, when our trade and our industries are sabotaged and disrupted; and there is violent destabilization, criminal acts of death and destruction, such as we have witnessed on Sunday night with the fires. All of these vicious tactics have been used before, in the recent past in countries close to us, and in countries far away. As we the people of Grenada show the world, clearly and unflinchingly, that we intend to remain free and independent, that we intend to consolidate and strengthen the principles and goals of our Revolution, as we show this to the world, there will be attacks upon us.

In late 1979 an actual coup attempt was nipped in the bud when mercenaries’ boats were sighted and prevented from landing the same day that an unsuccessful, AIFLD-inspired power plant strike was intended to paralyze the island and leave the entire country that night in darkness. Sophisticated explosives theretofore unknown on Grenada and collections of rifles were discovered in the possession of members of a small gang which had been operating on the island. In raids on their homes, notes were found denouncing the Revolution and extolling the benefits of NATO membership—hardly a concern of most Grenadians or anyone else in the Caribbean.

In June 1980 a bomb was planted under the grandstand at Queens Park just before a rally at which Bishop and the rest of the NJM leadership were to appear. During the rally the powerful bomb went off below the gathered officials, but due to inaccurate placement its force was directed downward toward a group of spectators under the grandstand, rather than upward toward its intended targets. Three young girls were killed and scores were injured. In a subsequent shootout with the remnants of the gang mentioned above, several of its members were killed. A recent item in the Periscope column of Newsweek magazine (November 7, 1983) may well relate to that gang. Intended to support the CIA’s incredible claim that it had no agents on Grenada, the item said:

... a number of knowledgeable sources point to the reduction in Caribbean intelligence operations made during the Carter administration. Those cuts left the United States with no agents based in Grenada. After the Marxist coup in 1979, the Central Intelligence Agency tried to remedy that situation. Several operatives died trying to infiltrate the island.

Of course, under Gairy there was little reason to have agents on Grenada other than the run-of-the-mill AIFLD hacks. But all of the incidents noted above occurred after the revolution and during the Carter administration; they do not suggest an unwillingness to act forcefully against Grenada. Moreover, the only known deaths during the period in question, other than the victims of the Queens Park bombing, were gang members.

Two victims of CIA/counterrevolutionary bombing. The human reality of U.S. destabilization against Grenada.

Just before these attacks, a new U.S. ambassador replaced the crude Ortiz in Barbados—a replacement he had told the NJM would be “the velvet glove” in the Caribbean. Sally Shelton, an ambitious former secretary to the reactionary Texas Senator Lloyd Bentsen (see CAIB Number 10), deported herself no better, however. After two trips there she refused to visit further. She sent in her place a seemingly unprepossessing political officer, Ashley Wills, whom Bishop soon suspected of involvement in CIA activities on the island. At a government reception Wills smugly announced to a CAIB editor that the U.S. did not need the CIA in the Eastern Caribbean because the local people told them everything they wanted to know. As noted below, Wills later turned up on the U.S.S. Guam assisting the invasion force with his extensive knowledge of the island and its people—having visited often under both Carter and Reagan. No modest bureaucrat, Wills, who had been assigned
previously to South Africa and Romania, took credit during Shelton’s tenure for establishing the Voice of America on Antigua, handling the “political” duties for the area, and writing Shelton’s speeches. It would be interesting to know the extent of his more recent involvement with Shelton when she, Peter Bourne, and Robert Pastor were advising Hudson Austin’s RMC government after the death of Bishop. It would be extremely interesting to know what interrogation or debriefing duties he might have had on board the Guam

With this background, it is helpful to review the developments during the Reagan administration.

The Changing Plan of Reagan

At the end of his term, in a futile bid for reelection, President Carter created the Caribbean Rapid Deployment Force, which staged exercises at Guantanamo Naval Base on Cuba—military posturing which Bishop denounced at the United Nations as a return to gunboat diplomacy and a revival of the Monroe Doctrine. The American people did not forgive the Tehran hostage rescue debacle, however, and the next month Carter lost the election. Shortly thereafter, when Reagan took over, he embarked on a game plan which would lead to the actual use of those forces.

Promising to shore up the CIA and to stop the “Marxists” in Grenada from threatening their democratic “neighbors” Trinidad and Tobago (a single country, a fact of which Reagan was apparently not aware), Reagan nevertheless kept his campaign promises. Shortly after he took office, he sent Jeane Kirkpatrick to Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay to urge the fascist countries of the Southern Cone to develop a joint security treaty. This persistent preoccupation of the administration with organizing unity among right-wing countries eventually culminated in the formation of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the revival of the Central American Defense Council (Condeca).

Some of the steps leading up to the military invasion of Grenada were:

- On April 27, 1981 an odd and rather motley collection of ten Ku Klux Klansmen and Nazis were arrested in New Orleans just as they were about to depart with a plan to invade Dominica. They were quietly rushed to trial and convicted. (See CAIB Numbers 13 and 16.) Some of the testimony revealed that their original intention was to invade Grenada but that the goal was too difficult a military undertaking. A recent interview in the Jackson, Mississippi Clarion-Ledger (October 30, 1983) with one of the participants, George Malvaney, is instructive. “I wonder how the government can get away with doing the same thing I spent 18 months in jail for?” he mused. “I really thought it would help this country to overthrow that government, which was kind of Marxist oriented, and replace it with a government more friendly to ours.” Apparently whoever promised George $3,000 for the action never told him that Dominica already had a government favorable to the U.S. in the person of Prime Minister Eugenia Charles, who appeared with President Reagan when he announced the Grenada invasion on television, shortly after it had begun. Charles’s manipulation and use by the President was so blatant that she was described on the floor of Congress by Rep. Gus Savage (Dem.-Ill.) as “this puppet of our President [who] represents ‘Aunt Jemimaism’ in geopolitics.” Eugenia Charles’s Freedom Party had been elected in Dominica with considerable support from the U.S. Embassy in Barbados (see CAIB Number 10). After the arrest of the would-be invaders, she clamored for a regional security treaty to protect against mercenaries, and at her urging the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States was inaugurated on June 18, 1981. As we later discover, the only reason for this organization seems to have been to provide an entity to be told by the U.S. to ask for a U.S. invasion.

- A number of leaks to journalists in 1983 confirmed that in the summer of 1981, CIA Director Casey had proposed a
covert action plan against both Grenada and Suriname (see sidebar) which was, in the words of one Senator, so "off the wall" that it was dropped. According to the Washington Post (February 27, 1983), it was members of the Senate Intelligence Committee who objected so strenuously. However, it was clear from the leaks and the context and timing in which they arose that the plan for Grenada was never dropped, but was just sent back to the drawing board. In fact, the recent leaks were probably designed to test the waters. The covert action plan which was postponed was apparently connected with the next step of the overall plan—military maneuvers which were capable of becoming an actual invasion.

- Over a six-week period in the fall of 1981, according to Grenadian security forces, there were seven incidents of sabotage, suspected to have been of CIA origin, which could have been connected to an invasion plan.
- In October 1981 a massive U.S. naval exercise, Ocean Venture '81, was conducted in the Caribbean, including a mock invasion of "Amber and the Amberdines," an open reference to Grenada and the Grenadines. The Amber operation involved a rescue of Americans being held hostage by the Amber government, and its mission was "to install a regime favorable to the way of life we espouse," according to Pentagon literature. Grenada denounced the naval maneuvers, suggesting that a real invasion was imminent. The parallels to what happened two years later are inescapable. Pentagon rumors at the outset of the October 1983 invasion—which later found their way into print, keeping everyone on edge—even stated that General Austin was holding hostages (two "non-American" women). And although the medical school students were neither hostages nor in danger, President Reagan, with inexorable logic, noted that they might have been.
- In order to make the invasion of Grenada a "sure thing," Reagan visited Barbados Prime Minister Tom Adams in April 1982 to discuss the "spread of the virus of communism" from Grenada. According to Karen DeYoung of the Washington Post (October 26, 1983), Adams said at the time he did not feel that either Grenada or Cuba posed a military threat to his island. Not so with another participant at the meeting, Jamaica Prime Minister Edward Seaga, who owed his own election victory over Michael Manley to considerable U.S. intelligence collaboration. Shortly thereafter Seaga was awarded a medal by Reagan at the White House. In November that year Seaga led an unsuccessful

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**Pressure in Paramaribo**

"U.S. diplomats in the capital of Paramaribo made sure to keep Bouterse current on evidence that Cuba had aided the Grenadian coup, and the rest was left to his well-prepped paranoia." — Newsweek, November 7, 1983.

The fact is that for more than two years the U.S. had been working to force Suriname's military government, headed by Lt. Col. Desi Bouterse, to bow to American demands that they distance themselves from Cuba. Although two CIA paramilitary plans to overthrow his regime, in 1981 and 1982, were shelved because of congressional opposition, they were replaced by a campaign of massive economic and political pressure. The campaign went into high gear in May of this year.

Relations between Bouterse and western governments were at a low in December 1982 after the killing of 14 opposition leaders in Suriname. The Netherlands quickly suspended its massive aid program (of more than $100 million per year, with ten years to run). Then Brazil, with U.S. backing, began to make overtures to Bouterse and, ultimately, to provide, with conditions, some desperately needed economic and military assistance. Pressure was put on the regime to reduce its relations with Cuba and Grenada, and, contrary to the subsequent media disinformation and despite the suspicious timing, agreement to curtail drastically relations with Cuba had been reached before the arrest and murder of Maurice Bishop.

In late September an advance team went from Suriname to the U.S. to prepare for Bouterse's October address to the U.N. The level of U.S. influence was revealed when Suriname quietly acceded to American insistence that left-leaning Foreign Minister Harvey Naarendorp not be a member of the delegation. Prime Minister Errol Alibux handled most of the negotiations, meeting with Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, Langhorne A. Motley.

At the U.N., Alibux was invited to attend a reception by President Reagan and was greeted by Secretary of State Shultz. The contrast with Bishop's frustrating U.S. visit a few months earlier could not have been more evident. Moreover, it was clear from Bouterse's later speech at the U.N. that he had already recognized the stark necessity of toeing the U.S. line. His call for the removal of foreign troops from Kampuchea and Afghanistan (but not from El Salvador or Honduras) was hardly independent thinking.

When Bouterse expelled virtually all Cubans the very day the Rangers landed in Grenada, U.S. officials and Latin American allies were elated. "All of a sudden," one Surinamese diplomat told a reporter, "the Americans at the United Nations are smiling at us and patting us on the backs." Elliott Abrams, Reagan's human rights expert, pointed to Suriname as an example of the effectiveness of the administration's policies in that area. But Bouterse is above all a pragmatist who has fended off numerous coup attempts in nearly four years in power, carefully balancing his political alliances. Yielding, for the time being, to overwhelming pressure does not mean embracing the imperialist banner, and it must be hoped that time and historical imperatives will bring Suriname back into the progressive camp.
attack against Grenada at the meeting of the Caribbean Community (Caricom), by which the U.S. had hoped to embarrass the Bishop government.

- By the spring of 1983 the invasion plan was in high gear. In March Reagan fulminated over the Cuban help for the international airport construction in a TV address to the nation, replete with sinister satellite photographs. As Grenada’s U.N. Ambassador Caldwell Taylor pointed out at the time, spy photographs were hardly necessary, as picnickers and joggers from the medical school, as well as the general public, had open access to the airport site. Although no one knowledgeable on the subject ever bought the President’s argument that the airport was “too big” for mere tourism, or that it was a secret military installation, the media continued to play up the charge, and the American public was taken in with the big lie that tiny Grenada was a threat to U.S. security. At the same time, authoritative military journals were decrying the threat to the chokepoints of U.S. oil tanker lanes, another myth, since Grenada had no navy. President Reagan, during this TV address, had the audacity to joke, “What is at stake in Grenada is not nutmeg. It is U.S. national security.” (See CAIB Number 19.)

- In April, after the President’s dog and pony show, the leaders of Barbados apparently were still not convinced of the necessity of a military solution. Though Barbados had obvious enmity for the Bishop government, Foreign Minister Louis Tull told Edward Cody of the Washington Post (April 24, 1983), in a remarkable interview, “We cannot resolve it with the more extreme position that the United States might be disposed to take. I don’t expect the government of Grenada to back off. They’ve gone too far. You have to live with them.” Still, Tull spoke highly of the Regional Defense System agreement (from which Grenada was excluded) to share intelligence and promote military cooperation. He contrasted this development with the failure of the U.S. to provide any aid under the Caribbean Basin Initiative. “I would say that all the countries of the Eastern Caribbean are very concerned about security matters, more concerned than they have been in a number of years,” he confided. But they were still more interested in the fact that Grenada had received over $23 million in foreign aid in 1982—from Cuba, East Germany, the Soviet Union, the EEC, and Canada. “It does create a feeling of disillusionment among the micro Caribbean states when they find they are getting relatively—I want to be fair—relatively less aid than Cuba or Grenada,” he concluded.

- Shortly thereafter the Barbados Defense Forces, according to a Caribbean Contact expose by editor Ricky Singh, began to receive training in the United States under the direction of the CIA.

- Then, a few months before Bishop’s assassination and the invasion, U.S. diplomats traveled to Jamaica and Barbados to finalize military intervention plans. According to unnamed high government officials of those two countries, “unidentified U.S. officials had been seeking for several months to . . . isolate Grenada, and had urged the regional governments to consider military action against Grenada.” (Washington Post, October 28, 1983.) And, as noted more fully below, two weeks before the house arrest of Bishop, U.S. Army Rangers in Seattle were practicing parachute landings and the takeover of an airfield. In a moment of weakness Tom Adams almost gave the plan away when he tried to convince Grenadian Foreign Minister Whiteman not to return to Grenada while Bishop was under house arrest. Later Adams claimed that the U.S. had approached him with a vague plan to rescue Bishop.

Several observations stem from this review of events preceding the invasion. First of all, it is abundantly clear that there were U.S. intelligence agents active on Grenada; a military operation of that size would never have been undertaken otherwise. This was clear from the October 28 New York Times story about the CIA agents brought out in the airlift of the medical students. Newsweek (November 7, 1983) confirmed the presence of at least one of them in its carefully worded report:

MYSTERY MAN: At the Grand Anse campus an older student named Jim Pfister assured everyone that help was on the way. Pfister was a thin man with a moustache, probably in his late 30s, and even his fellow students found him unusual. He claimed to be a West Point graduate and former Foreign Service officer, a U.S. consul in Laos during the Vietnam War, who had quit the State Department to go to medical school. Once the invasion started, he was in constant shortwave radio contact with the advancing troops, and seemed to know their moves in advance. Before they arrived, he instructed the other students to prepare for evacuation by putting on long pants and running shoes.

Indeed it appears likely that there were one or more “mole” high in the New Jewel Movement itself. This should not be either shocking or improbable. The CIA and military intelligence had four and a half years to accomplish this task, and there is hardly a country in the world where there are no mercenary collaborators to be found. The temptations of an unlimited expense account are great. But, as has happened before, the collaborators in Grenada were doublecrossed. Moreover, there were more than 1,000 Americans on the island—students, teachers, businessmen, retirees, and a constant influx of tourists.

The Medical School
The St. George’s Medical School, established in Grenada in 1977 by Charles Modica, the son of a conservative Long Island Republican, formed immediate and close ties with the
government of Eric Gairy. The vice-chancellor of the school, Dr. Geoffrey Bourne, prides himself today for having been an "adviser" to all the governments of Grenada, including that of the short-lived Revolutionary Military Council of General Austin.

In fact, members of the New Jewel Movement, particularly Maurice Bishop, were suspicious of the school from its inception. Long portrayed by the American and European press as a harmless despot interested only in flying saucers, Gairy was in reality a vicious dictator who was the only Caribbean leader to maintain diplomatic relations with Pinochet's Chile, and who sent a dozen or more members of his notorious security forces there for training. When they returned to Grenada, "disappearances" became frequent, the best known case involving a police chief who was friendly to the NJM. And, Bishop told CAIB on a visit to the U.S. in 1978, accompanying the newly trained security forces on their return from Chile were coffins which were unloaded and shipped to the medical school. Bishop said that his movement believed the coffins contained the cadavers of "disappeared" people from Chile, and that Gairy was planning a body trade-off with the fascist Junta. He did not get the chance, however, because a few months later, on March 13, 1979, the criminal Gairy dictatorship was overthrown.

Over the next four years there occurred a series of suspicious incidents involving the medical school, but the Bishop government, unwisely as it turned out, opted to allow the school to remain. This was partly because of the revenue it represented to Grenada (20% of its foreign exchange, according to Peter Bourne, son of the school's vice-chancellor) and partly because the new government thought it would be relatively easy to keep an eye on the overwhelmingly white, middle-class students and faculty. (See sidebar.) This was perhaps a fatal mistake of the Bishop government; the school's presence gave perfect cover to intelligence officers who had ample time to recruit their local collaborators.

A stunning admission regarding the school's connection with the Reagan administration appeared as a throwaway line in a long Washington Post analysis on November 23, 1983. When Bishop met with then National Security Adviser William Clark on June 7, 1983, he was informed, according to the Post's sources, that if he did not tone down his anti-American rhetoric, Grenada could lose the school—and its foreign exchange. "Consideration was being given to providing surplus U.S. property on Antigua as another site." So much for the private nature of the institution. And four months later, of course, the school became the excuse for the U.S. invasion.

The Fires

On May 6, 1979, less than two months after the revolution in Grenada and just a few weeks after Bishop's confrontation over Cuba with the U.S. Ambassador, two fires were set within an hour of one another. The first burned down a tourist cottage across from the medical school's Grand Anse beach campus. When neighbors rushed to get the school's fire-fighting wagon, they discovered it had been sabotaged. By the time St. George's only fire truck had driven from the center of town to the cottage, it was completely destroyed. And while the truck was at Grand Anse, a building just two blocks from the fire station downtown began to burn. It housed the leading travel agency and tour operation. When the firefighters got back to town, extensive damage had already been done—tickets and tour arrangements for the coming year had been burned. Nearby kerosene cans confirmed a case of arson.

At Grand Anse later that evening security personnel arrested a young, drug-addicted medical school student who had lived in the burned cottage. Upon questioning, he admitted he had set the fire, but first insisted the "devil" made him do it. Later he admitted that it was two men from New Jersey, possibly Cuban exiles.

Carter Administration Ties

The school itself has always had interesting ties to U.S. politics, both Democrat and Republican. One of its founders, vice-chancellor Dr. Geoffrey Bourne, is the father...
of Dr. Peter G. Bourne, who was a special White House adviser on drug abuse during the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations, until he was forced to resign in 1979 in a drug scandal, accused of writing Quaalude prescriptions for staffers and their friends. In 1978, Peter Bourne had been implicated by political activists in New York in the mysterious death of a progressive doctor working for a Lincoln Hospital drug detoxification program which was opposed to the methadone maintenance programs of Nelson Rockefeller. Bourne was the last person known to have seen the doctor alive, but as far as is known his involvement was never investigated.

In 1977, CAIB staff members saw documentary proof that Peter Bourne provided debriefing reports to the CIA after taking trips abroad, including to Southeast Asia and Pakistan. The details of this story later appeared in the Chicago Sun-Times (July 23, 1978).

The Strategy Paper

The Bournes were deeply involved with the short-lived Austin regime, and after the U.S. invasion, Peter Bourne rushed to tell their side of the story. In a long piece in the November 6 Los Angeles Times and in interviews on National Public Radio, Bourne claimed he was against the invasion. He also insisted that a U.S. intelligence team on Grenada could have obtained the same information he did, by playing softball with the Cuban construction workers and by having dinner with the Cuban Ambassador and his American-born wife, information which, according to Bourne, included “the numbers of Cuban military and civilian personnel, the extent to which Grenada was being armed, and Cuba’s intentions on the island.” This sort of information was just the kind Bourne had in the past transmitted to the CIA after his travels. (Bourne never notes that an invasion might have endangered the school’s multi-million dollar investment on Grenada.)

While Bishop was under house arrest, Bourne claimed, his father, Dr. Geoffrey Bourne, began to meet with Bernard Coard, who guaranteed the safety of the students. Even after Bishop’s death, for which the Bournes evidently shed no tears, Bourne senior continued to meet with Coard, arranging for government vehicles so the students could travel freely from campus to campus. Then, curiously, the elder Dr. Bourne began to meet with Gen. Austin on government policy matters and told his son that Austin was not so bad, that he did not seem “particularly sympathetic to the Marxist cause,” and, in an interesting choice of words, he seemed to be “on the right,” wanting to “move the country back toward democracy.”

Of Bishop, the kindest words Peter Bourne could conjure up were that “his early Marxist-tinged rhetoric reflected as much his inexperience as his ideological commitment.”

Meanwhile, the State Department and the U.S. Ambassador to Barbados, Milan Bish, began to pressure both Charles Modica, who was in New York on a visit, and a “distinguished and conservative” trustee of the medical school, to claim publicly that students in Grenada were in danger, in order to give the administration a pretext to invade. Peter Bourne counseled both men that the school might be liable for any injuries suffered by the students if they complied. Still, the “distinguished and conservative” trustee, who can only be New York Senator Alfonse D’Amato, later an apologist for the invasion, muttered that he would like to “kick out the commies” anyway. (D’Amato, it will be recalled, spearheaded the disinformation campaign against Cuba, falsely accusing its government of drug trafficking. See CAIB Number 19.)

According to Bourne, his father then interceded with Austin to allow U.S. representatives onto the island to meet with the students. This is corroborated by medical students and an American observer invited on campus for the U.S. Embassy briefing. According to the November 11 Militant, Akinyele, an American living in Grenada and working for Radio Free Grenada until he was evacuated with the students, explained that the two U.S. representatives sought to calm the fears of the students. One derided a rumor that parents of the students in New York were trying to organize charter flights to rescue their children. He also assured the students that Gen. Austin had said they could leave any time they wanted and that the airport would be open the following day. This accords with Bourne’s account that the U.S. government was actually meeting with Austin. But, although the airport was open the next day, U.S. officials in Barbados would not allow scheduled commercial planes to fly to Grenada, having already made final plans for the invasion.

Despite such assurances on Sunday, the previous Friday, according to Newsday (October 26, 1983), “U.S. intelligence was providing information about the landing sites, the location of coral reefs, and the bashing of Grenada’s security forces. The aircraft carrier U.S.S. Independence, heading toward Lebanon, was told to swing by Grenada.”

On Monday, Peter Bourne said, his father contacted him a last time, asking him to help provide Austin with some guidance to move his country “back toward democracy.” The younger Bourne spent the day with former Carter National Security Council member Robert Pastor and with help from Carter’s former Ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean, Sally Shelton, they drafted a position paper for Austin—suggesting how he could distance himself from the Bishop government and pander to U.S. demands. Apparently having been assured by the Reagan administration that an invasion was not imminent, Bourne had a summary of the paper read to his father by phone, intending to have the full text telexed the next day. This never happened, as by dawn the next morning the invasion was under way.

In the various subsequent accounts of the writing of the strategy paper for General Austin, the participants minimize, or fail to mention, their own roles, rushing to cover their tracks. Robert Pastor, in a Washington Post piece the day after the invasion, neglected to mention his connection with the RMC government. And in a puff piece interview with Sally Shelton in the New York Times society section (November 3, 1983), she too fails to take credit where credit is due. She is far more disingenuous than Pastor, who did criticize the invasion. “Large quantities of arms and caches of documents in Grenada,” she said, “have just about convinced me that the invasion was justified.” [Emphasis added.] She will testify to that effect, she confided to the interviewer, to the House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs.

Perhaps an impending government job will convince the ambitious Ambassador completely. Currently, she is Caribbean director of International Business-Government Counsellors, Inc., a risk assessment service for which former CIA Director William Colby is senior adviser.
An outrageous “expose” of the whole affair was presented by a White House aide, writing under the pseudonym Val Victorson, in Reverend Moon’s Washington Times (November 10, 1983). Taking both Pastor and Bourne to task for advising Austin—a doublecross if ever there was one—the White House aide failed to mention Shelton’s collaboration on the strategy paper.

Finally there is the matter of Charles Modica’s conversion. Only after the students had returned to a maudlin, media-hyped reception did he “realize” that Reagan’s invasion—which he had been criticizing constantly—was justified. “I found out that the people I had been dealing with were not fully in charge of that government,” he said on emerging from a special State Department briefing.

The “Internal” Struggles

Who was “fully in charge” of the government of Grenada at the time of the coup and the invasion? Certainly not, as U.S. officials and much of the media would have it, Bernard Coard or even Hudson Austin. It was, as one State Department spokesman claimed, “a floating crap game,” but one in which the U.S. was doing the rolling.

We may never know exactly what happened the day Bishop was killed, or who gave what orders. We may never know who were the moles on the Central Committee (though it will be interesting to see who fades from sight during the show trials sure to come). But progressive people must examine and openly criticize the horrendous errors which were made by the opponents of Maurice Bishop, to learn from those fatal mistakes. What happened in Grenada has affected the entire socialist world.

That there was such a deep split within the leadership of the New Jewel Movement—and clearly there was—was not as well known to insiders, friends of Grenada and even some of its ambassadors, as it was to the recipients of intelligence “leaks.” For example, a front-page story by Barbara Crossette in the August 7, 1983 Sunday New York Times sought to play on the racist fears of establishment conservatives as well as anti-communist liberals, while pointing out, for the first time, rumors of a split. It warned that Bishop “spoke about... the need to reject the system of government inherited from the British and to build a new society on Grenada.” Bishop, she pointed out, “is not alone in the Caribbean in seeking to reject Western European political and economic models. . . Intellectuals in many Caribbean islands—raised in an age of civil rights and black power and educated at some of Europe’s and North America’s best universities—are speaking and writing on this theme.” The article encourages near hysteria on the part of the establishment: “John Compton, who pushed back a strong challenge from the left to become Prime Minister of St. Lucia, said that he believed the democratic governments of the region, with the help of North America and Western Europe, had only three or four years to prove themselves economically.”

But Crossette had some hope for the establishment too: “Public support for the Government of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop,” she said, “is diminishing rapidly as Cuban and Soviet influence here grows, according to many Grenadians.” Finally she noted, “Mr. Coard, Deputy Prime Minister, and Mrs. Coard, head of the National Women’s Organization, are considered by many Grenadians to be among the most radical members of the Government, and there are rumors of a rift between the Coards and Mr. Bishop.”

She was totally wrong in her account of Bishop’s lack of popularity, and as for the Coards being “more Marxist,” a favorite media refrain, there is no evidence of this. On the contrary, events have proved that Bishop was far more in touch with the people and far more interested in their welfare. The graffiti on a truck, shown in many U.S. newspapers after the invasion, told it all: “No Bishop, No Work, No Revo.”

A most fundamental mistake was made when Coard and his followers ordered Bishop placed under house arrest. If they did not at the time see the enormity of the act, the dissident Central Committee members should have understood the meaning of the tremendous crowd which freed Bishop.

Events leading up to the liberation of Bishop from house arrest bear close scrutiny. It was clear to Coard and his followers that the populace did not support them, so they were striving, even at that late date, for a compromise with Bishop. He had said that he would decide by 10 o’clock that night whether to accept their demands. However, curiously, shortly before 8 p.m. a huge, well organized crowd approached Bishop’s house, with many participants who were not known Bishop supporters, including counter-revolutionary elements and contingents with anti-communist banners and slogans. This crowd materialized even though

Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and Army Commander Hudson Austin during celebration of second anniversary of revolution.
some of Bishop’s main supporters were already in jail for organizing other demonstrations in his support, and his followers were generally in disarray.

Bishop partisans, such as Einstein Louison, even refused to participate in the march when they saw the nature of the crowd. Well known businessmen were leading it, men who never had supported Bishop, as well as a truckload of demonstrators from the Coca-Cola company. Bishop allowed himself to be freed by this crowd because, he said, he felt he could control them, and he decided to make a critical speech at the market square where there were no soldiers. Some of his followers took Bishop in a car, but, because he was so weak from the days of house arrest they decided to go first to the hospital. However, apparently the car never reached the hospital, but turned up the road to Fort Rupert.

Subsequent reports which gave the impression that Fort Rupert was a well armed fortification are in error. It was essentially an administrative post, with no more than 20 rifles in the entire installation, a fact well known on the island.

At the fort, Bishop, Jacqueline Creft, and a few others went into a small building, the “situation room.” According to a friend of Creft’s, who arrived at the fort accompanied by Creft’s parents, bringing food for the group, they knew nothing about what was happening outside the fort until the fighting began. According to witnesses, the first indication Bishop and the others had of armed conflict was when three explosions were heard, sounding like grenades or small bombs. They cracked the walls and ceiling of the situation room and the people inside fell to the floor.

Outside, three armored personnel carriers had arrived. They had been sent to Fort Rupert by the members of the Central Committee who had rushed to Fort Frederick, the real army arsenal, after Bishop had been freed. As the massive crowd gathered outside Fort Rupert the soldiers, apparently panicked by the explosions, opened fire on them, killing and wounding large numbers. Although the demonstrators were apparently unarmed, three soldiers who had been sent to Fort Rupert from Fort Frederick were killed, suggesting the presence of provocateurs.

There are a number of unanswered questions. Why was a rally set for 8 o’clock when there was a deadline for a decision on compromise of 10 o’clock? Who organized this rally, planned so well, and in advance? Why did the car go to Fort Rupert, which was an indefensible position? The rally set for the market square might have been peaceful; Bishop had told the people freeing him that he did not want anyone hurt. A key statement to the population might have set the stage for some sort of return to normalcy. But the rally never took place. Instead, troops were sent to confront the crowd and something provoked them, leading to a massacre followed by assassinations.

The executions of Bishop, Jacqueline Creft, Unison Whiteman, Vincent Noel, Fitzroy Bain, and Noel Bain which followed the murderous attack on the people at Fort Rupert were not accidents. Though the initial firing on the crowd might not have been premeditated, at least 15 minutes elapsed from the time Bishop and his supporters surrendered to the Army men and the time they were assassinated. While this was not time enough for an RMC meeting, it was time enough to radio for instructions.

There could have been communications with Coard or with Austin or with the intelligence officers at the medical school, or with anyone else for that matter. What happened and how many people died at Fort Rupert will be the subject of a bitterly contested show trial to be organized by the U.S. against Coard, Austin, et al. “A Sandhurst graduate” who sources identify as the MI-6 officer on the island claimed to Newsday (November 13, 1983) that he watched the shooting through an 80-power telescope and, though he did not see the aftermath, estimated that at least 50 people died. He will undoubtedly be called as a witness. Verdicts reached in the trial will always be suspect, and the events of October 19 a horrible shadowy nightmare. But if the reports are true that Bernard Coard said when captured he was “not responsible”—this was an unconscionable attempt to avoid accountability.

Don Rojas, Bishop’s former press secretary, put it best (Washington Post, October 31, 1983):

Perhaps the biggest historical irony is that the man considered the most developed, best ideologue in the Grenada revolution, a brilliant man, through a funda-

Maurice Bishop and Deputy Bernard Coard.

State Secrets

In late October a local Washington, DC television station revealed that inmates of nearby Lorton Reformatory had in their possession photocopies of numerous highly secret State Department documents. In the ensuing scandal it was revealed that the documents had been left inadvertently in a used safe sent to the prison for repairs. The news coverage centered on the lax security measures which allowed the shipment of the documents, but never discussed the contents of the documents themselves. CAIB has learned that many of the documents related directly to the proposed overthrow of the government of Grenada, but that reporters aware of this were cowed into suppressing the information.
mental error of judgment and personal ambition, in the end gave the Grenadian revolution on a platter to the U.S. with all the trimmings.

That the Coards and their allies and the members of the RMC did not fight to the death against the U.S. invaders underscores the fact that they had no idea what they were doing after Bishop was dead, indeed from the time they placed him under house arrest. The people of Grenada were done a terrible disservice by these ultra-leftists; it will take years to revivify the Grenadian Revolution and reinstate the promise of Maurice Bishop, a hero and a martyr.

**Crocodile Tears Over Bishop**

The hypocrisy of the U.S. government and its official media after the coup against Bishop was beyond belief, suggesting a definite method to its madness. The day after Bishop was placed under house arrest, the Voice of America broadcast to Latin America and the Caribbean profiles of Bishop and Coard, portraying Bishop as a world-renowned, moderate, civil rights hero—the same Bishop it had excoriated relentlessly for four years, and picturing Coard as a brutal Stalinist. In fact, the VOA’s report on Bishop could only be described as an obituary, an ominous suggestion of things to come. And, the reports said, there was “mounting evidence” that Cuba was behind the downfall of Bishop. The networks followed suit; both NBC and ABC referred to a “leftist” regime being overthrown by a “Marxist” regime, as Alex Cockburn noted in the November 8 Village Voice.

Don Rojas told the Washington Post that Bishop had instructed him the night of his death “to tell the world that Cuba had nothing to do with the regime’s internal dispute.”
Curiously, while many journalists were printing the Reagan administration's disinformation about the "mounting evidence" of Cuban involvement, Cuban exiles in Miami were regaling the New York Times (November 4, 1983) with the story that Cuban Colonel Tortola had flown to Grenada the day before the U.S. invasion to topple Austin's Revolutionary Military Council.

The references to Austin were also peculiar. Hudson Austin, trained by the British in Jamaica as a prison guard and constable, is consistently referred to by the media as a "Marxist," and as a close supporter of Bernard Coard, allegedly the most hard-line of all. Yet when the statements of the RMC are reviewed they do not appear at all hard-line. According to the summary of the RMC statements in the October 24 Washington Post, they stressed representation of "all social classes and interests" and emphasized economic development, a mixed economy, and the encouragement of foreign investment—rather bizarre goals, considering the bloodshed they had just caused.

Moreover, CA1B has learned that in 1981 the CIA viewed Maurice Bishop as an admirer of Fidel Castro who frequently consulted Cuba's Ambassador to Grenada on matters of policy. At the same time, according to the CIA, General Hudson Austin attempted to resign from his Army post in protest over Cuban influence. Two years later the positions are supposedly reversed, with General Austin a Cuban stooge overthrowing and murdering the disen-chanted Bishop.

More than hypocritical was an alleged discussion between unnamed U.S. officials and Barbados Prime Minister Tom Adams of mounting a rescue operation to take Bishop out of Grenada. Adams is quoted in the October 28 Washington Post as having said, "Whatever our difference in the past, Mr. Bishop deserved the support of the Caribbean governments." Adams had only contempt for Bishop and was clearly perpetuating the cover for an invasion already in the works.

The day after the invasion began the hypocrisy was pointed out by John Goshko of the Washington Post: "This revisionist view of Bishop as a moderate within the context of Grenada's internal politics appears to have provided part of the justification for the United States and six Caribbean countries to band together in the invasion against what Reagan yesterday called a 'brutal group of leftist thugs.'"

Pre-Invasion Manipulations

There were plans for a military invasion two years before it actually occurred, and serious moves toward it many weeks before Bishop's assassination. A few days before the invasion, administration officials admitted that the Pentagon had been "dusting off contingency plans." (Washington Post, October 23, 1983.) None of the facts, as it happens, is consistent with the U.S. line that an invasion was not seriously contemplated until the OECS requested it.

Most telling were the Ranger exercises which came to light in early November. It was then reported that from September 23 to October 2, the 2d Battalion of the 75th Rangers Division, stationed at Fort Lewis, Washington—one of the two Ranger units which participated in the actual invasion—spent six days practicing taking over an airport, complete with parachute jumps onto runways, capturing airport buildings, taking captives, and liberating hostages. Although an Army spokesman referred to the exercises as occurring "regularly" at Ephrata Municipal Airport—which happened to have a runway the same length as the Point Salines runway—an airport official told reporters, "It would be pretty farfetched to say it's done on a regular basis. They've done it twice to my knowledge—in 1981 and this time." (Cleveland Plain Dealer, November 3, 1983.) The 1981 exercise can only refer to the CIA plans and military maneuvers postponed that year by the opposition of the Senate Intelligence Committee. Moreover, the Pentagon had requested that the recent practice not be given any publicity.

This dry run, and the discussions with various Caribbean officials, all took place before the overthrow of Bishop, added proof that the Americans knew that events in Grenada were coming to a head. (As noted above, a congressional source has said the Pentagon admitted in a secret briefing that it knew of the coup against Bishop two weeks in advance.)

The reported "slip of the tongue" of the U.S. Ambassador to France, Evan Galbraith, is further evidence. He said on French television on October 26 that the invasion was "an action which had begun two weeks ago," leading many to suspect that the administration thought of bringing France into the plan. When later confronted, Galbraith said that he had "misspoken," that it would be "ridiculous to suggest" that the invasion had been planned before the overthrow of Bishop. (New York Times, November 6, 1983.)

Another interesting report, noted earlier, was in the October 1983 issue of Caribbean Contact, the newspaper of the Caribbean Council of Churches, published in Barbados. An article by editor Ricky Singh discussed at length opposition charges that the government of Prime Minister Tom Adams was having a contingent of the fledgling Barbados Defense Force trained in Washington by the CIA. Adams did not directly deny the charges, but simply responded glibly that, "So far as I know, the Central Intelligence Agency is not a military organization." Errol Barrow, leader of the opposition, countered this with a caustic reference to the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries. Additionally, a month before the invasion, Barrow complained that the stockpiling of medical supplies suggested ominous preparations for war. In a move which only gave more credence to the reports, Singh, a Guyanese exile, was told by the Adams government on November 1 that his work permit was revoked "immediately" and that he had to leave Barbados, unless he recanted his outspoken opposition to the U.S. invasion.

The Imminent Invasion

As the time for the invasion approached, pressures from the U.S. intensified to the point that Caribbean leaders who were opposed to it, such as Trinidad and Tobago Prime Minister George Chambers and Guyana Prime Minister Forbes Burnham, were being excluded from meetings and kept misinformed. Ironically, Chambers, a conservative, is facing criticism from his even more conservative rivals for failing to support the invasion, and there is talk of U.S. economic retaliation, including the threatened removal of U.S. oil refineries.

State Department spokesman, such as Deputy Assistant Secretary James H. Michel at an October 28 briefing, insisted that the decision to invade was made by the OECS, who "came to us." But the suggestion is fatuous. Reported incidents clarify who was calling the shots.

The urgency of timing was underscored when Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State Charles Gillespie (now "Ambassador" to Grenada) surfaced in Barbados at meetings between OECS leaders and Prime Minister Seaga of Jamaica and Adams of Barbados—meetings at which those countries allegedly decided to ask for U.S. aid. The Washington Post noted that Gillespie was in Barbados "on a previously scheduled visit" when the regional talks turned to the discussion of invasion. The "previously" scheduled visit, according to Newsday, was "a trip to the region with Vice President George Bush on the weekend of October 15," just after Bishop was placed under house arrest, and the same time that Adams said "a U.S. official" approached him with the idea of a "rescue" mission for Bishop.

The U.S. line surely strains credulity. Ironically, as the Post also reported, even as these top level officials were later pressuring and dictating to their Caribbean allies, "diplomatic efforts by Caribbean nations were under way that were aimed at lifting the island's curfew and allowing planes to come in and evacuate anyone who wanted to leave." These efforts did not square with the U.S. scenario, of course.

Yet spokesperson Michel, with little regard for his credibility, reiterated, "I will say to you categorically, we did not propose action to the Eastern Caribbean nations. They proposed it to us." Such is the spineless nature of the Washington media that although not a single journalist believed this, no one would call Michel a liar.

Stage Managing the Invasion
The almost unbelievably strict press censorship imposed by the U.S. for the first several days of the invasion was clever on two accounts. As could be expected, it prevented anyone from confirming or refuting whatever official statements issued forth from the Pentagon, the State Department, and the White House, many of which, it later transpired, were outright lies. But it also deflected media scrutiny by making the censorship as big a story for the media as the invasion. Half the precious minutes on the nightly TV news programs were devoted to the adventures of small bands of correspondents trying by air and water to break the blockade. Media pundits waxed self-righteous over the Pentagon spokesman's gaffe that "we learned a lesson from the British in the Falklands," where independent reporters were kept completely away from the operation.

What is so disturbing is that despite the blustering about censorship, most of the U.S. media accepted supinely every tidbit they were handed, and rarely concerned themselves with what they were not being told. It was a war of images, and the first images to reach the American public were controlled by the administration: a gaggle of groveling medical school students kissing an airport runway, instead of a mental hospital blasted to smithereens, patients and all.

A few reporters who did get on the island during the invasion were taken by American forces to the U.S.S. Guam and held incommunicado for a day to prevent them from filing stories. After their release, the American reporters seemed to toe the U.S. line. The London Observer's Hugh O'Shaughnessy told quite a different story. He found out what the U.S. thought of his presence as he was flown out a few days later to Barbados and working telephones. The U.S. public affairs officer remarked, "You really threw a wrench in the works. We were expecting to have the story to ourselves."

The only contemporaneous reporting of the invasion came from two American ham radio operators on the island, one a medical school student, Mark B. Barettella, the other a 12-year resident, Don Atkinson. As the newspapers, which made Barettella a hero and virtually ignored Atkinson, noted, they "transmitted dramatically different views of the situation on Grenada." Atkinson was a vocal critic of the Reagan administration's position and he stressed that the students had not been in any danger until the U.S. invaded. During the transmissions, Atkinson's house was strafed in an apparent attempt to destroy his antenna. Barettella referred repeatedly to sniper fire near the school campus, asking that helicopters divert around the school to draw the fire, and reporting that the students were lying low, waiting to be rescued. Interestingly, as was noted in the October 28 New York Times, hams monitoring the transmissions "puzzled... over the cryptic, coded responses Mr. Barettella made about troop movements." There was no explanation of this reference to code, but it should be remembered that Barettella was at the same medical school complex as Newsweek's "mystery man," the "retired" Foreign Service officer who had served in Laos.

The Lies
Of course the censorship was not imposed by the administration and the military merely to suppress information. It was also used to peddle lies and half-truths, while they were complacent in the knowledge that no one on Grenada could reach the media effectively to expose the nature and extent of the disinformation. (A good review of much of the "official misinformation" can be found in Stuart Taylor's full
The first lies surfaced even before the invasion had begun and censorship had been imposed. When the fleet bound for Lebanon was diverted after the murder of Bishop, it was described as a "precautionary move," and as late as the night before the invasion reporters were told by the President's press secretary, Larry Speakes, that the fleet was to "monitor" the situation, that there were "no plans for U.S. military action in Grenada." That rumors of an invasion were "preposterous." Yet the fact of the invasion was hardly a secret to anyone except the American people. Detailed rumors were flying at the Caricom and OECS meetings; and Radio Free Grenada was denouncing an imminent attack.

Official lies about the composition of the attacking force abounded. Both President Reagan and Eugenia Charles referred to a "multinational force." But every single soldier involved in the invasion was American. After the island was occupied, the other members of the "multinational" force were flown in and comfortably ensconced in police jobs. As Hugh O'Shaughnessy pointed out, "It was clear to anyone on the island however that no Jamaican or Barbadian or St. Lucian or Antiguan or Dominican or Vincentian, whether in military uniform or dressed as a policeman, had had any part in the fighting whatsoever. We saw nothing but U.S. troops." And, he was told, "Admiral Metcalf commands the ships, the island, and the aircraft."

The Cuban on Grenada

Some of the most outrageous lies concerned the Cubans on Grenada. The first was the notion that the Rangers parachuted into heavy Cuban fire. As the Cuban government statements published here, and common sense, demonstrate, the Cubans did not fire upon the descending Rangers. They had orders not to fire unless attacked. (See sidebar.)

The Cubans were sandbagged twice. Even before the invasion, they had made it clear to the world in general and the U.S. Interests Section in particular that they were appalled by the actions of the Revolutionary Military Council, and that they did not intend to get involved in internal Grenadian affairs. They wished to cooperate in ensuring the safety of U.S. residents on Grenada and, later, in the return of their own people. The Cuban government had refused to supply arms or reinforcements to the RMC, but had determined that it would be dishonorable to evacuate its citizens just as an invasion was imminent. Cuba even tried to advise the RMC how to prevent an invasion. They suggested that the area around the airport and the medical school be completely demilitarized so that a pretext of danger to the students would be eliminated, a suggestion which was not followed, but which shows the falsity of U.S. suggestions that the Cubans were planning to take students hostage.

The fact is that the Cubans did not even obstruct the Ranger landings. They were in their barracks at the far end of the site, assuming they would not be involved in the subsequent battle. The Rangers did meet some hostile fire as 350 of them parachuted onto the field from a low 500 feet, but that was Grenadian anti-aircraft fire. Returning Rangers who were interviewed by the media spoke only of anti-aircraft fire, not of any shooting from the Cuban construction workers at the other end of the field. And, given the Cubans' position there, it is impossible that, had they been trying to shoot the descending Rangers, none would have been hit. Yet, shortly after landing and clearing the runway for additional troop landings, the Rangers attacked the Cubans, commencing a day's fierce fighting.

That night the Cubans and the Americans exchanged diplomatic notes again and the Cubans were assured that they were "not a target" and that their ultimate evacuation would not be considered a "surrender." The following morning, the reassured Cubans remaining in defensive positions were directly attacked by helicopter gunships.

The Numbers Game

The numbers game played by the U.S. was audacious. Though the Cuban government had always admitted there were between seven and eight hundred Cubans on Grenada, almost all of them construction workers, the U.S. insisted, even two days after the invasion was launched, that there were at least 1,100 and perhaps 2,000 Cubans on the island, and that they were all trained soldiers, most of them "impersonating" construction workers. As late as the 28th, Vice Admiral Metcalf said that "several hundred Cubans had escaped into Grenada's hills and could cause problems for U.S. troops in the coming weeks." (Washington Post, October 30, 1983.) He also said that a search party had been sent to the tiny island of Cariacou, north of Grenada, to hunt for missing Cubans. None was ever found.

The next day the U.S. admitted that a "closer reading" of captured documents, which had supposedly led to the high estimates, actually confirmed the figures released by the Cuban government. Moreover, they finally admitted that the construction workers appeared to be construction workers. Other similar errors were made. During the first week of the invasion the U.S. said there were 30 Soviet and an unspecified number of East German military advisers on the island. None ever materialized.

The President's speech to the nation, while fighting was in progress, stressed the inflated figures. He spoke of documents which indicated an imminent influx of thousands of Cubans. The next day Pentagon officials reiterated this, noting that 4,341 troops from Cuba were expected. "We got there just in time," the President said. Later it transpired that the documents related to a proposed expansion of the Grenadian army and had nothing to do with Cuba.

The President also referred to warehouses "stacked to the ceiling" with weapons and ammunition, "enough to supply thousands of terrorists." This was typically perverse Reagan rhetoric. The weapons were sufficient to supply the militia too, the purpose for which virtually all observers now admit they were intended. Moreover, as Stuart Taylor noted, "the warehouses were no more than half-full, and many weapons were antiquated." The arms merchant and ex-CIA employee, Sam Cummings, whose Virginia and Britain-based Interarms operation commands a corner on 90% of all "private" weapons trade in the world, called the Pentagon's captured material "a very mixed and relatively miserable bag." The Christian Science Monitor (November 7, 1983) was more specific: "Administration officials had said there were enough Cuban arms in Grenada to maintain a 14,000 to 17,000 man expeditionary force. But the U.S. government's own figures show: 6,323 rifles, 13 antiaircraft guns, 111 machine guns, 78 RPGs (shoulder rocket launchers), and 12 Soviet-made armored personnel carriers." And of the 6,000 rifles, only about 400 to 800 were "reasonably modern;" the rest were very old, including many "antiques," some from the Nineteenth Century.
The Body Counts

The reports of American casualties incurred in the invasion were total fabrications. Even at CAIB press time, weeks after the invasion, it is not known how many Americans died or were wounded. For one thing, the Pentagon does not count as casualties anyone not killed or wounded by enemy fire, and now it appears that dozens of GIs were victims of "friendly fire," U.S. mistakes.

While President Reagan and other officials prided themselves on the "surgical precision" of the operation, what really happened was that Americans strafed other Americans; helicopters crashed into each other; landing craft overturned and sank. For example, four commandos drowned in the operation to rescue the Governor General before they even hit the shore. Early reports said that 6 or 8 Americans were killed in the fighting, a figure later amended to 18. But the London Guardian of November 10 reported that at least 42 Americans had died, and some reports suggested the figure may be as high as 70. And numbers of Americans wounded are equally inconclusive.

Official figures relating to Cuban deaths and injuries were also outrageous—inflated, rather than understated. Initial reports suggested that only Cubans were resisting the invasion, which was untrue, and the first U.S. figures of Cubans captured and killed added up to more than all the Cubans on the island, as Vice Admiral Metcalf learned to his later embarrassment when he scoffed at Cuban statements that there were less than 800 Cubans on the island. "That's patently false," he told reporters. "If you believe that, we've already killed and captured more people than they have here." And Metcalf did not make this statement in the heat of battle, but five days after the invasion.

Grenadian Resistance and Casualties

The greatest inaccuracies, lies, and coverups related to the Grenadians. From the outset, the U.S. portrayed all the resistance as Cuban, all the fighting as between Cubans and Americans. But there was considerable Grenadian resistance to the invasion, from the initial antiaircraft fire directed at the Rangers to the sniper attacks still being reported at press time. Only four days after the initial assault did Vice Admiral Metcalf admit that any of the combatants were Grenadian.

For two weeks the occupying Americans refused to provide any accounting whatsoever of Grenadian casualties. Despite reports of large numbers of deaths, of fields of bodies, of overcrowded hospitals and clinics, of heavy fighting in many locations, U.S. officials continue to deny high Grenadian casualties. On November 11 a public information officer finally chalked up on a blackboard, under "Grenadian casualties," "21 killed in action, 111 wounded." Reporters rushed to copy down the figures. Within a few hours the figures had been erased and a new notice was posted: "No figures at this time." (Washington Post, November 12, 1983.) Only two days before, the deputy commander of the invasion had told reporters that "roughly" 160 Grenadian soldiers had been killed. But observers on the scene all indicated that hundreds of islanders met their deaths in the invasion.

While the Americans were announcing, and displaying, every single bullet (5,615,682), shotgun (300), and flare (24,768) allegedly captured on Grenada (United Press International, November 12, 1983), they professed no idea how many Grenadians had been killed or wounded. The excuses given ranged from the ludicrous to the morbid. Larry Speakes, the President's press secretary, announced first that it was impossible to tell how many Grenadians had been killed because they had a religious custom of immediate burial of the dead. When it was pointed out that most Grenadians are Roman Catholics, he corrected his account, admitting the obvious, that although no religious custom was involved, the dead are buried quickly in tropical climates. However, he did not explain why no inquiries were made of priests, funeral directors and cemetery personnel, who would have had no reason to hide the number of recent burials.

Vice Admiral Metcalf was more macabre: "I know the figure will be higher when we get a final count," he told journalists. "Why, just this morning we found a field near here full of bodies. These people have been in that field a long time, and no one feels particularly good about counting them." Weeks after the invasion, in fact, Grenadians were still dealing with the gruesome task of locating, usually by smell, and burying the bodies which lay all over the island. The full casualty figures will never be known.

Another short-lived news story concerned the existence of a "mass grave" on the southern shore of the island, with some 100 to 200 bodies in it. The initial reports suggested that perhaps the grave contained people killed in the massacre at Fort Rupert which led to the death of Bishop. However, the next day U.S. officials were forced to admit a "mistake." The State Department was actually holding press conferences in Washington based on rumors!

It remains unknown how many people did die in the coup before the invasion, but it has been suggested by a number of informed sources that the U.S. may be trying to inflate the
number of those killed at Fort Rupert to hide the extent of deaths from the invasion.

The "Intelligence Failure"

A further lie was the so-called intelligence failure, discussed in the early aftermath of the invasion. Originally officials expressed chagrin that the military did not know there were nearly twice as many Cubans on Grenada as had been reported by intelligence sources, or that most of them were trained soldiers, not construction workers. However, since this information turned out to be false, and the original estimates correct, it is unclear how this was an intelligence "failure." Moreover, what actually seems to have irked the Pentagon most was how tenaciously the Grenadians and the Cubans fought. The resistance was, as the Canadian magazine *MacLean's* put it, "stiffer than expected." One wonders why it was unexpected, since the Grenadians and the Cubans had always said they would fight fiercely and to the death against any Yankee aggression.

An interesting reason for the "confusion" over the number of Cubans on Grenada emerged in Canadian media, suggesting that an inflated Cuban presence was a CIA media disinformation operation planned well before the invasion which may have misled some Pentagon analysts not in on the scam. An "authoritative" article on Cubans in Grenada had been written for the November issue of *Naval Institute Proceedings* by Timothy Ashby, described in the Toronto *Globe and Mail* (October 29, 1983) as "a visiting scholar at the Hoover Institute at Stanford University who lived in Grenada on and off for 13 years." In fact, Ashby prepared an October 26, 1983 preliminary draft report on Grenada for The Conservative Caucus Research, Analysis & Education Foundation, Inc., with much the same hysterical misinformation. An advance copy of the naval magazine article was provided to Reuters shortly before the invasion, and described in its wire service dispatches. The article not only insisted that there were more than 1,000 Cubans on Grenada, and that more than 300 of them were trained, full-time military, but also faulted anyone who did not know this for not keeping their eyes open. Much of the equipment involved, the author asserted, was on display in a March 1983 parade in Grenada.

The disinformationists were hoist by their own petard. The article was touted in the media to demonstrate that there should not have been the intelligence failure which at the time was thought to have occurred. The irony is that the invasion provided positive proof that the so-called facts of the authoritative article were themselves untrue, deliberate disinformation intended to be part of the ongoing propaganda war against Grenada. The unfortunate author had no idea that his lies were going to be exposed so quickly.

The highly touted intelligence failure was nothing more than a smokescreen to hide the fact that a few hundred Cubans and several hundred Grenadians were fiercely resisting some 6,000 to 8,000 elite U.S. troops on the island and more than 10,000 more on ships off the coast.

**International Condemnation and Domestic Accolades**

Perhaps the biggest lie asserted was the contention that what the United States was doing was lawful. (See sidebar.) But the Reagan administration evidently cared nothing for international law or world opinion. More than a hundred nations condemned the invasion, including most of the United States's closest and most important allies, and the President responded that "it didn't upset my breakfast." The British and West Germans were most concerned because of the impending arrival of U.S. nuclear missiles, over which they expect some share of control. The curt dismissal of Prime Minister Thatcher's objections to the invasion led European allies to wonder about whose finger will be on the button.

What Reagan really cared about was domestic reaction, and his carefully staged and managed affair appeared to have worked, at least in the short run. Hours after the invasion, street interviewees were saying, "I hope the Marines get 'em," without knowing who "'em" was. Polls showed a rise in the President's popularity and support for the invasion, all of which stemmed from a steady diet of lies. As Senator Paul Tsongas (Dem.-Mass.) pointed out, "most people, once they saw the polls come out, went underground."

The invasion of Grenada instantly unified Republicans and divided Democrats, as one pollster observed. This could hardly have been a coincidence: The President had been in trouble domestically over the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, a political problem which almost evaporated with his invasion of Grenada. Moreover, the victory of the U.S. media operation has led to further military maneuvers in the Caribbean and deep fears in Nicaragua, Cuba, and El Salvador.

Any suggestion of self-determination for the new Grenadian "government" was quickly dispelled by the clear relationship of dependence on its U.S. mentors. It was the Americans, in the person of Ashley Wills aboard the U.S.S. Guam and Charles Gillespie waiting expectantly in Barbados, not the Grenadians, who were deciding on the makeup of the new puppet government. A "cabinet-in-exile" sat hunched over shortwave radios in Barbados as the fighting raged; the prospective quislings had been brought there by the U.S. and were staying in blocks of condominiums rented by the U.S. Embassy there.

Perhaps the only idea the Americans got from a Grenadian was how to characterize the invasion. Associated Press stringer, Grenadian Alister Hughes, a constant critic of the Bishop government, said on television, "Thank God for the Americans. I don't regard it as an invasion. I regard it as a rescue operation." Several days later, President Reagan, who had himself called the operation an invasion, chided reporters at a press conference: "Incidentally, I know your frequent use of the word invasion; this was a rescue mission."

**The "Liberators"**

Virtually all the media have given extensive coverage to the apparent relief with which many Grenadians greeted the invaders. But as a London *Sunday Times* writer noted, in 1969 the Catholics in Northern Ireland welcomed the British soldiers into Londonderry, seeing them as protectors against Protestant violence. Former Grenadian U.N. Ambassador Kenrick Radix said that after the coup, the massacre at Fort Rupert, and the murder of Bishop and his supporters, the people would have welcomed the Devil himself. The *Washington Times*, an organ of Reverend Sun Myung Moon's Unification Church, ran a shockingly insensitive front-page interview with Maurice Bishop's mother and Jacqueline Creft's parents, obviously overjoyed at the U.S. overthrow of the RMC. But to infer that they therefore
supported Ronald Reagan and gunboat intervention is completely unjustified. The *Washington Times*, incidentally, had its reporters and photographer included in the first Pentagon-sponsored flights to Grenada, bumping more

**International Law and the Invasion**

Until public opinion jelled favorably for the President, at least temporarily, it was important for the administration to insist that its actions had some validity under international law. Although the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of American States flatly prohibit armed intervention against another state, self-defense is a recognized exception to the prohibitions on the use of force. The initial U.S. position—which waffled considerably—was that Grenada’s neighbors feared an imminent invasion by Grenada, a rationale which now seems fatuous, or that Grenada, in the person of the Governor General, had joined in a unanimous request by the OECS members for intervention to help him restore order. The latter assertion is untrue, since the Governor General has admitted that he did not send such a request until after the invasion was already in its final countdown (and in any event the message was not received). The U.S. was forced to argue next that the Revolutionary Military Council was not a government, even though they had been negotiating with it over the safety of the students, and that there was no government on Grenada except the Governor General, who wanted an invasion, even if he couldn’t get a message out to that effect.

This argument is somewhat dampened by the fact that the Governor General is a representative of the Queen of England, whose government opposed the invasion. Nor is there any British constitutional precedent for this line. Moreover, the OECS treaty referred to threats from outside the region, and it required unanimous consent for intervention. No matter who or what was the government of Grenada, neither St. Kitts-Nevis nor Montserrat approved of the invasion. Further, despite what the OECS treaty might have allowed, the United States, and Grenada for that matter, both subscribed to the U.N. Charter and the OAS Charter, both of which absolutely prohibit armed intervention.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., no dove, argued eloquently in the *Wall Street Journal* (November 9, 1983) that the “sneak attack” was alien to U.S. heritage and tradition. He destroyed each of the justifications given by the administration: As for the students, “there was no evidence that these students were in danger or were detained against their will.” On the necessity to avert chaos: “No evidence had been submitted that there was chaos in Grenada.” Beyond the killings of some officials by other officials. As for the contention that the request had come from the OECS states, he noted that “‘the formal request,’ according to the *New York Times*, was drafted in Washington and conveyed to the Caribbean leaders by special American emissaries.” With regard to the assertion that intervention was necessary to “restore order and democracy in Grenada,” he remarked that this “would have a little more plausibility if we showed an equal determination to restore order and democracy in... say, Haiti or Chile.”

The legal scholars differed, to say the least, but it appears that only a few of the most reactionary could find support for the President’s actions. Some “justifications” were ludicrous. Professor Anthony D’Amato of Northwestern, in a letter to the *New York Times*, posited a doctrine of “constructive invitation.” “If Prime Minister Maurice Bishop had survived the attack on his life, he might well have invited the United States into Grenada to protect him against the coup by Gen. Hudson Austin. Should the fact that Austin succeeded in murdering Bishop erase an invitation that otherwise surely would have been extended?”

This errant claptrap was attacked in a followup letter to the *Times* from Professor Josef Silverstein of Rutgers. He pointed out that the suggestion could only be valid, if then, had there been no government whatsoever after the coup. But, he noted, there was a ruling RMC with which the United States was talking and negotiating. What is more, the notion that Maurice Bishop ever would have welcomed, much less called for, a U.S. invasion of Grenada is an insult to his memory.

Other scholars, such as Professor Burns Weston of the University of Iowa, have dismissed the administration’s alleged concern for the human rights of the Grenadians as “laughable,” considering the governments which it supports, like El Salvador. And it is difficult to quibble with the language of the OAS Charter (Article 17) that no state can occupy another’s territory “even temporarily . . . on any grounds whatsoever.”

An interesting legal sidelong was exposed in the November 6 London *Sunday Telegraph*, which discovered that 27 U.S. military policemen had sworn an oath of allegiance to Queen Elizabeth II in order to serve under the Grenada Police Commissioner and thus have legal authority to arrest and detain Grenadians. The MPs evidently found it humorous, telling reporters it was “no big deal.” “We have a father in America—Ronnie Reagan,” one of them said, “and now we have a mother in England.”

It also transpired that even during the invasion and its aftermath the U.S. violated international law regarding both the law of war and the treatment of prisoners. During the initial fighting at the airport, the Rangers had advanced on a Cuban position using some captured Cubans as human shields, a blatant violation of international law. The bombing of the mental hospital and obvious civilian sites, assertedly errors, also suggest violations. And, as front page pictures in the U.S. media attested, key Grenadian prisoners such as Austin and the Coards were shackled and blindfolded as they were transferred from the Guam to Richmond Hill prison, a violation of the 1949 Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war.
experienced reporters from established newspapers. This more than suggested U.S. government cooperation in getting to Mrs. Bishop and the Crefts. (See also “Pak in the Saddle” article.)

Another major media manipulation involves the slow release of “captured” documents, some 6,000 pounds worth, according to U.S. officials, although only five pounds had been released at press time. It will be almost impossible to know for sure whether each document is genuine or altered or forged, although the few already released do not, on close reading, support the broad and sweeping generalizations which the government says they prove. Many documents released by the State Department to prove “communist interference in El Salvador” turned out to be forgeries, and the others did not say what they were alleged to say, or demonstrate the “facts” the government said they proved.

Psychological Operations

Already U.S. imperialism, aided by American intelligence agencies, is commencing a mind control operation on Grenada. Symbols of the New Jewel Movement and of the Revolution have been bombed out of existence, like Butler House, Radio Free Grenada, and even Bishop’s mother’s house (which the State Department said was hit by accident, like the mental hospital).

Army PSYOPS (psychological operations) teams are hard at work, with the CIA, interrogating everyone on the island, not merely to discover members of the Peoples Revolutionary Army or the Revolutionary Military Council, but all of Bishop’s supporters as well. The PSYOPS people are caught in a contradiction, however. Recognizing the respect and love the vast majority of the Grenadian people had for Bishop, they must give lip service to his memory at the same time they attempt to eradicate anything connected to his programs.

The suggestion that Bishop supporters have not been as suspect as anyone else in what remained of the Grenada government is belied by the massive witchhunt that went into effect immediately after the invasion. Hundreds of Grenadians—including Kenrick Radix, who had been jailed by the RMC for leading a pro-Bishop demonstration—were being rounded up by U.S. forces and interrogated if “suspected or accused of sympathizing or having had ties with the government of slain prime minister Maurice Bishop or the short-lived military council that replaced him.” (Washington Post, November 13, 1983.)

Soldiers at roadblocks and at the airports carry notebooks filled with long lists of such alleged sympathizers. Assisting the U.S. troops in the roadblocks and in house to house searching, according to the London Guardian (November 5, 1983), are former members of Eric Gairy’s notorious Mongoose Gang, who were released from prison by the invaders, and who have an obvious axe to grind with anyone connected with the Bishop government.

The PSYOPS teams have been very heavy-handed. They are operating a radio station on the old RFG frequency, called Spice Island Radio, which alternates pure propaganda with American rock and roll. Col. Jim Ashworth, the PSYOPS commander, told the New York Times they would turn over the operation when Grenadians are “ready to resume operating the station.”

The PSYOPS teams are also plastering the island with posters and bulletin boards from which many islanders get their only local news. Posters show Bernard Coard and

Hudson Austin in custody, in various states of undress, above text which reads, “These criminals attempted to sell Grenada out to the communists. Now they have surrendered. The Grenadian people will never again allow such characters to assume power and cause such hardship. Support democracy in Grenada.”

CIA interrogations are sweeping, almost unrelated to realities in Grenada, or to any security needs. Regina Fuchs, a West German nurse who had been working at a clinic in Grenada for a year and a half, told the Washington Post (November 21, 1983) that she was kept in Richmond Hill jail for two days and interrogated relentlessly about whether she had ever demonstrated against the Vietnam War, whom she knew when she attended medical school, whether she had ever met Philip Agee in Germany, and the like. She was falsely accused of harboring fugitives by two Americans, one named Ed and the other named Frank Gonzales, who identified himself to her as CIA.

It remains unclear under what authority the Americans are rounding up civilians, arresting and interrogating them. For a time, the U.S. said they were detaining people for their own safety, which strained belief. They then said that under international law they had the right to detain combatants until the cessation of actual hostilities; but they continued to arrest combatants and non-combatants long after the shooting was over. Finally they have suggested they are detaining people upon the orders and authority of Sir Paul Scoon, the Governor General. Perhaps without grasping the cruel irony of his words, Sir Paul exclaimed at one point to reporters, “The Americans have done a bloody good job.” Yet no one really believes that Sir Paul has any power but what the Americans decide he has. It was, as noted, the U.S. which brought Grenadian exiles to Barbados for eventual positions in an “interim government.”

Greatly uplifted by it all was the Grenada Democratic Movement, a small group which had opposed the NJM, picketing with its motley band every appearance in the U.S.
by a Grenadian official. The president, Francis Alexis, had been in Barbados for some time; other officials, such as Keith Mitchell, were on their way to Barbados the day after the invasion began. Reactions of some well-known Grenadians were less than heroic. It was one thing to "tank Gawd" for the "rescue;" but some, like former Attorney General Lloyd Noel, have taken to wearing U.S. Army shirts and calling for a permanent U.S. military base on Grenada.

The real overt power in Grenada seems to be Charles Anthony Gillespie, the U.S. "Ambassador" (even though there is no government to which he can present his credentials and be accredited). The Ross Point Inn Hotel and Restaurant, which had always been a favorite for U.S. diplomats visiting Grenada, has been taken over as the Embassy and now houses the only de facto government on the island.

Another elusive and powerful figure is Ashley Wills, who was a political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Barbados and whom Bishop accused in July of being a CIA officer. Wills has been intimately involved in Eastern Caribbean affairs for some time (see CAIB Number 10). During the invasion, Wills was seen by London Guardian reporter Greg Chamberlain on board the U.S.S. Guam, who described him as "the political adviser to the U.S. operation." Wills told Chamberlain he had been "called away from his 'university studies' in the U.S. 36 hours before the invasion."

The Airport and the Cubans

One of the more far-reaching ironies of the invasion has been the near-completed international airport. U.S. officials have "quietly" dropped their references to the Bishop government's prospective use of it for military purposes. Only after the invasion did the U.S. media report the repeated assurances from British and American contractors that the airport was designed for civilian use, and only now are U.S. officials conceding, despite three years' assertions to the contrary by President Reagan, that the airport is essential to the Grenadian economy.

But the greater irony is that the invasion has shown that the airport can indeed be used for military purposes—the taking off and landing of military aircraft. It could even be used by the U.S. against Central America.

It is already known that the Pentagon is allowing U.S. charter companies to join LIAT, formerly the only airline serving Grenada. One, Arrow Air, is a charter company licensed by the U.S. to fly between Miami and Havana. Within three weeks of the invasion it had added Grenada and Suriname to its territories.

The stories about the Cubans in Grenada apparently will never let up. Even after the initial fighting was over, "senior Pentagon officials" were saying that the very existence of Cuba made it unlikely that the security of Grenada could be left to a Caribbean constabulary, even though that was the theory announced at the time of the invasion. And, if all the Cubans on Grenada were gone, how could "the Cubans" pose a problem? Indeed the rush to rid the island of Cubans led to the shipment of 42 bodies to Cuba, at least 12 of which were obviously not Cuban, dressed as they were in PRA uniforms.

One of the most ludicrous rumors was taken quite seriously by the U.S. press—a State Department assertion that intelligence reports emanating from Cuba contained "death threats" against Americans "in retaliation for the invasion of Grenada." (New York Times, November 2, 1983.) No evidence of any threats was ever produced, and the reports ceased to appear, though they indicate the depths to which anti-Cuban propaganda will stoop.

The Implications

Clearly, one of the most significant implications of the invasion of Grenada has been a dangerous flexing of U.S. military muscle in the region. New Caribbean naval maneuvers were ordered within days of the invasion and reports of the military's heightened role in U.S. foreign policy were rife.

Directly threatened by such saber-rattling are Nicaragua, Cuba, and El Salvador. Any talk of the "impossibility" of a U.S. invasion of Nicaragua has been mooted by the fate of Grenada. Nicaragua is feverishly preparing for just such an invasion—and even before the attack on Grenada, contra activity had escalated dramatically (as described elsewhere in this issue). The U.S.-sponsored war against Nicaragua has increased both qualitatively and quantitatively in recent months. Nicaragua is arming all of its people and creating a nation-wide militia to prevent a repeat of Grenada. But it is clear the situation there is not parallel to that in Grenada. There are no splits within the revolutionary leadership, which functions far more collectively than any other socialist government. There is a universal recognition that the best defense is an armed population. And there is both widespread support for the government and widespread disgust for the U.S. policy of arming and supporting the Somocistas.

In Cuba, the fear of attack is also real; on Grenada, for the first time, U.S. troops engaged in combat with Cubans. Ever since Reagan came to power Cuba has been bolstering and reinforcing its militia, a policy which has been accelerated. One can only hope that the U.S. will study the mathematics of the situation before acting. If it took 8,000 or more trained troops to vanquish several hundred Cubans and Grenadians, it would take many more combat soldiers than the U.S. has in the world to defeat the Cubans or the Nicaraguans.

E. Ashley Wills, reported to be power behind U.S. presence in Grenada.
Cuban Statements on Grenada

STATEMENT OF THE PARTY AND THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF CUBA CONCERNING THE EVENTS IN GRENADA

It has now become clearly evident that a deep conflict had been evolving within the leadership and the Grenada ruling Party for some weeks, perhaps even months.

When Maurice Bishop, main leader of the Party and Prime Minister of Grenada, made a brief stop-over of some 36 hours in Cuba, from Thursday evening, October 6, to Saturday morning, October 8—afer an official visit to Hungary and Czechoslovakia—in his talks with comrade Fidel and other Cuban leaders, he did not make the slightest reference to the serious discussions and differences taking place within the New Jewel Movement, the name under which the ruling party of his country is known, thereby evidencing great dignity and respect for his Party and Cuba. All the topics of the talks dealt with Cuban cooperation with Grenada and cooperation efforts of the Grenadian delegation in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, whose results had fully pleased him, as well as other international issues.

On Friday, October 7, Fidel accompanied Bishop on a tour of important facilities under construction in Cienfuegos, and showed him the progress in our development projects and the excellent attitude of our workers, with whom they both talked at length.

A few days later—on Wednesday, October 12—our Embassy in Grenada reported the shocking and distressing news that deep divisions had taken place within the Central Committee of the Party in Grenada. That same morning, Bishop himself informed the Embassy of the long-standing differences that were being discussed and of the attempts at settling them, but that he had never imagined how serious they would become during his absence. He simply stated the differences, but did not ask for any opinion or assistance from us in trying to resolve them, once again evidencing his great respect for Cuba's international policy and the internal affairs of his own Party.

In the afternoon, it was learned that Bishop's opponents had gained a majority within the Central Committee of the Party, as well as in the political apparatus of the Army and the Security forces, and that Bishop had been removed from his position in the Party and placed under house arrest.

As this was purely an internal problem, the Party and the Government of Cuba, notwithstanding our friendship with Bishop and our confidence in his integrity and ability as a leader, and strictly abiding by the principle and norms of Cuba's international policy, instructed our representatives in Grenada to refrain totally from interfering in the internal affairs of the Party and of Grenada.

In the days that followed, news of the positions and arguments of the two parties involved in the conflict kept pouring in through our Embassy. In our view, it was actually a matter of conflicting personalities and conceptions on leadership methods—not exempt from other subjective factors—rather than substantial conflicts.

On Saturday, October 15, comrade Fidel sent a message to the Central Committee of the New Jewel Movement, clearly stating the position of Cuba, guided by the principle of fully refraining from interfering in the internal affairs of the Party and of the nation. At the same time, he expressed his deep concern over the division that had emerged, which might considerably damage the image of the Grenadian revolutionary process both domestically and abroad; that in Cuba itself, where Bishop enjoyed high esteem, it would not be easy to explain the events, and that he hoped that the difficulties could be overcome with utmost wisdom, serenity, loyalty to principles and generosity.

Cuba's concern was essentially focused on preventing events from reaching a state of violent and bloody confrontation.

In that message, it was also stated that Cuba's cooperation would be continued as a commitment with the people of Grenada, regardless of any changes that might take place in the leadership of the Party and in the country, since this was a purely internal matter.

For a few more days, the situation remained at a standstill. At times, it seemed that an honorable, intelligent and peaceful solution would be reached. It was evident that the people backed Bishop and demanded his presence.

The Western press fabricated all sorts of speculations around the events. We did not utter a word, in order to avoid our public pronouncements from being misrepresented as interference in the internal affairs of Grenada, due to the very close, wide-ranging, and fraternal relations with that sister nation. In so doing, we had rigorously abided by our principles of respect for the internal affairs of fraternal parties and countries.

Yesterday morning, October 19, the news reported that the workers had gone on strike and that the people had taken to the streets in support of Bishop. In a mass demonstration, they reached his residence, where they released him from house arrest. It is claimed—reports are still inaccurate—that the people took over a military installation. The Army sent troops to that area. It is said that the Army fired on the demonstrators and inflicted casualties on them; that it recaptured the installation and arrested many people. There was no news about the fate of Bishop and the other leaders that were with him.

The tragic outcome was learned in the afternoon. An official communiqué reported the death of Maurice Bishop, Prime Minister: Union Whiteman, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Jacqueline Crest, Minister of Education; Vincent Noel, First Deputy Chairman of the Grenada Trade Union Congress; Norris Bain, Minister of Housing; and Fitzroy Bain, Secretary General of the Agricultural Workers Union. It has not yet been accurately determined how Bishop and the other leaders died.

Bishop was one of the political leaders who enjoyed greatest esteem and respect on the part of our people due to his talent, modesty, sincerity, revolutionary honesty and proven friendship for our country. He also commanded great international prestige. The news of his death shocked our Party leadership and we pay heart-felt tribute to his memory.

Unfortunately, the divisions between the Grenadian revolutionaries have ended up in this bloody tragedy.

No doctrine, principle or position proclaimed as revolutionary nor any internal division can justify such brutal procedures as the physical elimination of Bishop and of the prominent group of honest and worthy leaders who died yesterday.

The death of Bishop and his comrades must be clarified; and had they been executed in cold blood, those responsible for it deserve exemplary punishment.

Imperialism will now try to profit from this tragedy and from the serious mistakes made by the Grenadian revolutionaries, in order to stamp out the revolutionary process in Grenada, and once again subject that nation to imperialist and neo-colonial domination.

The situation is extremely difficult and complex. Only a miracle of common sense, equanimity and wisdom on the part of Grenadian revolutionaries, and of serenity in the reactions and actions of the international progressive movement may yet save the process.

No step should be taken that may help further the designs of imperialism.

In Grenada, there are many Cuban doctors, teachers, technicians in various fields, and hundreds of construction workers giving their assistance to the people in the provision of basic services and in the development of vital works for Grenadian economy.

Though deeply embittered by these events, we shall not hasten to take any steps regarding technical and economic cooperation, which may jeopardize the basic services and vital economic interests of the people of Grenada, whom we sincerely and deeply admire and love.

After yesterday's tragic outcome, we shall closely follow the course of events; we shall strictly abide by the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of Grenada and shall, above all, take into account the
interest of the Grenadian people concerning economic and technical cooperation, were it possible in the new situation, but our political relations with the new Grenadian leadership must be subjected to a serious and profound analysis.

However, if the Grenadian revolutionary process is preserved, we shall do our best to assist it.

Let us hope that these painful events will lead all the revolutions of Grenada and of the world to profound reflection, and that the concept that no crime can be committed in the name of revolution and liberty will prevail.

October 20, 1983

STATEMENT BY THE CUBAN PARTY AND GOVERNMENT ON THE IMPELIMIALIST INTERVENTION IN GRENADA

The painful internal developments in Grenada that brought about the death of comrade Bishop and other Grenadian leaders, are well known by all the people.

In its statement of October 20, the Cuban Government explained in detail the unfolding of events and stated our country's unequivocal and honorable position regarding these developments while cautioning that imperialism would try to derive utmost benefit from this tragedy.

But, above all, it stressed the rigorous policy of Cuba of totally refraining from any form of intervention in the internal affairs of the Grenadian Party and people.

The merits of such a policy of principles can be noted now more than ever, since it has become evident that the Cuban personnel in Grenada had the combat capability with which they could have attempted to influence the course of internal events. The weapons in the hands of the Cuban construction personnel and cooperation workers in Grenada had been given to them by Bishop and the Grenadian Party and Government leadership so that they could defend themselves in the event of a foreign aggression against Grenada, as has unfortunately been the case. These were mainly light infantry weapons. Our own personnel kept custody over those weapons in their living quarters. They were not meant to be used in any domestic conflict and they were never, and will never be used for those ends. Neither had any type of fortification work been undertaken since it was illogical to do so in times of peace, at the site of a purely civilian airport. And another thing: When the invasion of Grenada took place, the weapons in Cuban hands had less than one ammunition module per rifle.

After Bishop's death and Cuba's statements, relations between our Party and the new Grenadian leadership were very cold and somewhat strained. But under no circumstances were we willing to play into the hands of imperialism, foresaking the Grenadian people by stopping our cooperation and halting the work of our construction crews, doctors, teachers and other specialists. We did not even immediately recall our military and security advisors.

Future relations with the new leadership would be determined by its conduct, its domestic and foreign policy, and by the hope that the revolutionary process could be saved, even though this appeared to be possible only through a miracle of wisdom and serenity on the part of the Grenadians themselves and of the international progressive movement.

Relations with the new Government were yet to be defined. But notwithstanding the aforementioned reasons regarding our cooperation with the people of Grenada, from the moment the news of a powerful U.S. naval force advancing on Grenada was made public it became morally impossible to consider the evacuation of Cuban personnel in that country.

On the other hand, the new Grenadian leadership, faced with the imminent danger of an invasion and invoking their homeland's security, requested our cooperation, an appeal to which it was not easy to accede in view of the events that had taken place in that country.

Numerous messages regarding these matters were exchanged between Cuba and our representatives in Grenada, who conveyed the Grenadian requests.

Due to the imminence of the aggression, during the afternoon of Saturday, October 22, comrade Fidel sent the following message to the Cuban representatives in Grenada:

"I believe that organizing our personnel's immediate evacuation at a time when U.S. warships are approaching might be highly demoralizing and dishonorable for our country in the eyes of the world public opinion.

"A large-scale Yankee aggression against us can take place at any moment. In Grenada against our cooperation workers; in Nicaragua against our doctors, teachers, technicians, construction workers, etc.; in Angola against our troops, civilian personnel and others, or even in Cuba itself. We must always be ready and keep our morale high in the face of these possibilities.

"I understand how bitter it is for you, as well as for us here, to risk complications in Grenada after the gross mistakes the Grenadian Party has made and the tragic developments to which they gave rise. But our position has been unequivocally and honestly clarified, so much so that it has been received with great respect everywhere. It is not the new Grenadian Government we must think of now, but of Cuba, its honor, its people, its fighting morale.

"I believe that in the face of this new situation, we must strengthen our defenses, keeping in mind the possibility of a surprise attack by the Yankees. The existing danger fully justifies our doing so. If the United States intervenes, we must vigorously defend ourselves as we were in Cuba, in our camp sites, in our work places close by, but only if we are directly attacked. I repeat: only if we are directly attacked. We would Thus be defending ourselves, not the Government or its deeds. If the Yankees land on the runway section near the University, or on its surroundings to evacuate their citizens, fully refrain from interfering.

"Advisors from the Army and the Ministry of the Interior are to stay in their posts awaiting new orders, so as to receive information and try to exert as much positive influence as possible on the behavior of the Army and the Security forces towards the people.

"The Viet Nam Heroico vessel is to be kept there by all means, and efforts should be made to put children and people who are not essential to indispensable services and work there on the first plane that lands on the island.

"Convey to Austin and Layne the following oral reply to their proposals:

"That our force, essentially made up of civilian cooperation workers, is too small to be considered as a significant military factor vis-a-vis a large-scale U.S. invasion.

"That sending reinforcements is impossible and unthinkable.

"That the political situation created inside the country due to the people's estrangement on account of the death of Bishop and other leaders, isolation from the outside world, etc. considerably weakened the country's defense capabilities, a logical consequence derived from the serious errors made by Grenadian revolutionaries. That due to the above situation, the present military and political conditions are the worst for organizing a firm and efficient resistance against the invaders, an action which is practically impossible without the people's participation. That therefore we find a way to achieve reconciliation with the people, perhaps one way would be to clarify the death of Bishop and the other leaders and seek out those responsible.

"That the Grenadian Government may try to prevent affording a pretext for intervention by publicly offering and reiterating total guarantees and facilities for the security and evacuation of U.S., English and other nationals.

"That if, however, the invasion were to take place anyway, it is their duty to die fighting, no matter how difficult and disadvantageous the circumstances may be.

"That the Cuban personnel have been instructed to remain in their camps and to continue the works of the airport. That they are to adopt defensive measures and fortify their positions as much as possible in order to be prepared to face a surprise foreign aggression. That you are to be in constant communication with our Party's leadership, and should an imperialist attack take place, you will receive instructions regarding what you should do.

"That, in these circumstances, they should keep utmost equanimity and restraint, if they wish to preserve the Grenadian revolutionary process' opportunity to survive.

"That Cuba will do its best to promote, together with all progressive countries, a strong campaign to counter the U.S. threats against Grenada."

At 9:00 p.m. on Saturday, October 22, we sent the following message to the Government of the United States through its Interests Section:

"That the U.S. side is aware of the developments in Grenada; that it is also aware of our position on these developments and of our determination of not interfering in the internal affairs of that country. That we are aware of their concern about the numerous U.S. residents there. That we are also concerned about the hundreds of Cuban cooperation personnel working there in different fields and about the news that U.S. naval forces are approaching Grenada.

"That according to the reports we have, no U.S. or foreign nationals, nor our personnel has had any problems. It is convenient to keep in touch on this matter, so as to contribute to solve favorably any difficulty that may arise or action that may be taken relating to the security of these individuals, without violence or intervention in the country."

Once the agreements adopted by a group of Yankee satellites in the Caribbean area to dispatch troops to Grenada became known, the new
leadership in that country renewed its requests for the sending of reinforcements by Cuba. On Sunday, October 23, comrade Fidel sent the following message to the Cuban representatives in Grenada:

"Jamaica, Saint Lucia and Barbados have no forces to invade Grenada. If this were to occur, it is a mere pretext by the Yankees for their ground invasion afterwards. In this case you should strictly abide by the instructions received yesterday.

"Convey the following answer orally to the Grenadian leadership:

"That Jamaica, Saint Lucia and Barbados have no forces to invade Grenada, and in that case they should defeat them with their own forces without greater difficulties.

"That behind this intervention, were it actually to take place, there might be a pretext for the Yankees to act directly; in that case, the Grenadian revolutionaries should try to win over the people for the defense of the country, be ready to fight until the very last man and create conditions for a protracted resistance to the invasion and foreign occupation.

"That Cuba cannot send reinforcements not only because it is materially impossible in the face of the overwhelming U.S. air and naval superiority in the area, but also because politically, if this were to be merely a struggle among Caribbeans, it should not do so in order not to justify U.S. intervention.

"That, on the other hand, the unfortunate developments in Grenada render the useless sacrifice entailed by the dispatching of such reinforcements in a struggle against the United States morally impossible before our people and the world.

"That, as a matter of our country's honor, morality and dignity we will keep the Cuban personnel there at a time when powerful Yankee naval forces are approaching Grenada.

"That, if Grenada is invaded by the United States, the Cuban personnel will defend their positions in their camps and working areas with all their energy and courage.

"That, due to the limited number of those forces, it is impossible to assign them any other mission.

"That Grenadian revolutionaries themselves are the only ones responsible for the creation of this disadvantageous and difficult situation for the revolutionary process politically and militarily.

"That within the difficult conditions created, the Cuban personnel in Grenada, shall honorably meet the duties our revolution has assigned to them under these circumstances.

"That, as regards military advising, they will receive all possible cooperation in the face of the situation.

"That it is necessary to continue making adequate political and diplomatic efforts on their part to prevent the intervention without compromising on any principles or backing down. That, on our part, we will do our best in this connection."

The Grenadian side continued to insist on plans that in our judgment, were, in some respects, unrealistic and politically unsound. They even hoped to sign a formal agreement on what each side should do in the military and political field and in coordination with the Cuban construction and cooperation workers to the Grenadian army. On Monday, October 24, the following principal points were conveyed to the Grenadian leadership:

"That the Cuban personnel will defend their positions, that is, the runway up to the Hardy Bay filling and the area between Point Salines and Morne Rouge, in case of a large-scale U.S. invasion.

"That, in the present conditions, our personnel have neither the means nor forces to undertake any other mission, nor the moral and international justification to do so in areas outside their work site.

"It is clear to us that were it just a question of evacuating foreign personnel, there would be no invasion, and presumably under those circumstances they would find a solution with the parties concerned. That, due to this, the American University and its premises should be under the custody of Grenadians if they deem it necessary and convenient (the U.S. University is located at one end of the runway under construction by the Cubans). Perhaps it would be better if that area were free of military personnel so that it would not be regarded as a battle ground which could justify armed actions by imperialism under the pretext of evicting its citizens.

"That there is need for any formal agreement between us.

"That the instructions regarding what the Cuban personnel is to do in case of war can only be issued by the Government of Cuba."

This message, which should have been delivered at 8 o'clock in the morning, Tuesday the 25th, did not even reach the hands of its addressees. The intervention of the United States in Grenada occurred at the break of day.

The Cuban representatives and personnel strictly followed the instructions of the Party and Government of Cuba: to fight if they were attacked in their camps and work areas.

During the early hours of the day, while U.S. troops were landing with helicopters in the University area, there was no combat at all with the Cubans, who had taken strictly defensive positions in the above mentioned sites. Around 8:00 a.m. local time (7 a.m. Cuban time), U.S. troops advanced from different directions on the Cuban facilities, and the fighting began.

At 8:30 (Cuban time) on the 25th—almost three days later—the Government of the United States replied with the following note to the Cuban message sent on Saturday the 22nd:

"The United States of America Interests Section of the Embassy of Switzerland presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Relations of the Republic of Cuba and has the honor to inform the Ministry that the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, acting out of the grave concern of its members for the anarchy, bloodshed, and callous disregard for human life of the Island of Grenada, has asked the United States Government to facilitate armed forces of its member states in the restoration of security in Grenada. In response to the request, and taking into due account the need to safeguard the lives of several hundred United States citizens now in Grenada, the United States Government has agreed to this request.

"Consequently, armed forces from the member states of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, supported by those of the United States, Barbados and Jamaica have entered Grenada for the purpose of restoring order and public safety.

"The United States Government is aware that military and civilian personnel of the Republic of Cuba are present in Grenada. It has taken into full account the message on this subject which we delivered on the night of October 22 from the Ministry of Foreign Relations to the Acting Chief of the United States Interests Section in Havana. It wishes to assure the Government of the Republic of Cuba that all efforts are being and will continue to be made to ensure the safety of these persons while order is being re-established. These personnel will be granted safe passage from Grenada as soon as conditions permit. The Government of the United States agrees to the Cuban proposal of October 22 to maintain contact concerning the safety of the personnel of each side. The appropriate civilian representatives with the United States Armed Forces presently in Grenada have been instructed to be in contact with the Cuban Ambassador to Grenada to ensure that every consideration is given to the safety of Cuban personnel on the Island and to facilitate the necessary steps by Grenadian authorities for their prompt evacuation. The United States Armed Forces will be prepared to assure this evacuation at the earliest possible moment on ships of third countries. Alternatively, should there be no vessel of the Cuban merchant marine—not a war ship—in Grenadian waters at present that vessel may be authorized to conduct the evacuation of Cuban personnel.

"In addition, any Cuban views communicated to the Department of State through the Cuban Interests Section in Washington or through the United States Interests Section in Havana will be given immediate attention.

"The Government of the United States calls upon the Government of the Republic of Cuba, in the interest of the personal safety of all concerned, to advise its citizens and forces in Grenada to remain calm and to cooperate fully with the forces of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States and with those of the United States, Jamaica and Barbados. It asks that they be instructed to avoid any steps which might exacerbate the delicate situation in Grenada. Above all, the Government of the United States cautions the Government of the Republic of Cuba to refrain from sending any new military unit or personnel to Grenada.

"The United States of America Interests Section of the Embassy of Switzerland avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Relations of the Republic of Cuba the assurances of its highest and most distinguished consideration."

When this note from the Government of the United States arrived, one and a half hours had elapsed since troops from that country started their attack on Cuban personnel and three hours since they had begun the landings.

Throughout the whole day today, Tuesday 25, the Cuban people have been informed in as much detail as possible, on the development of the fighting and the resolute and heroic resistance of Cuban construction and cooperation workers, who practically had not even had time to dig trenches or to fortify their positions in the rocky terrain, in the face of the sea, air and ground attacks by U.S. elite troops.

The people are familiar with the contents of the message exchanged between the Commander in Chief and Colonel Tortolo, who is in command of the Cuban personnel. This chief, who had not yet been in that country for 24 hours and who was on a work visit, with his actions and words has written a chapter in our contemporary history worthy of Antonio Maceo.

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CovertAction 23
At 5 p.m. in the evening, while intense fighting was taking place, the Government of the United States, through Mr. Fereh, head of the Interests Section, sent the following message to Cuba:

"The Cuban personnel stationed in Grenada is not a target for the actions by U.S. troops.

"The United States is ready to cooperate with Cuban authorities in the evacuation of Cuban personnel to Cuba.

"The United States is aware that armed Cuban personnel do not have either the weapons or the ammunition stocks needed for a protracted action, thus maintaining a belligerent position would entail a useless loss of human life.

"The United States does not wish to present the departure of Cuban armed personnel as a surrender.

"Last it regrets the armed clashes between men from both countries, and considers that they have occurred due to confusion and accidents brought about by our men's proximity to the area of operations of the multinational troops."

At 8:30 p.m., the following reply was handed over to Mr. Fereh to be conveyed to the Government of the United States:

"1. That we did our best to prevent the intervention, and that in our note dated Saturday we explained that, according to our reports, no U.S. or foreign citizen was in danger, while at the same time we expressed our readiness to cooperate so that the problems could be resolved without violence or intervention.

"2. That the intervention is totally unjustifiable. That we had absolutely refrained from meddling in the country's internal affairs, despite our friendship with and sympathies for Bishop.

"3. That the answer to our constructive note delivered on Saturday 22, at 9 a.m., arrived on Tuesday 25, at 8:30 a.m., when our personnel and installations at the airport had been under attack by U.S. troops for one and a half hours.

"4. That we have no soldiers, but actually construction workers and civilian advisors in Grenada, with the exception of a few tens of military advisors who were working with the army and the security forces before Bishop's death. Our personnel had been instructed to fight back only if attacked, and they were not the first to shoot. Furthermore, they had been given instructions not to obstruct any action for the evacuation of U.S. citizens in the area of the runway near the U.S. University. It was evident that if any attempt was made to occupy Cuban installations, they would clash with them.

"5. That our personnel has suffered an indeterminate number of casualties in today's combats.

"6. That the attack by U.S. troops came as a surprise, without any previous warning.

"7. That although the Cuban personnel that is still in a position to resist stands at an absolute numerical, technical and military disadvantage, their morale remains high and they are firmly ready to continue defending themselves, were the attacks to continue.

"8. That if there is a real intention to forestall further bloodshed, attacks against the Cuban and Grenadian personnel who are still fighting might stop and an honorable way should be sought to put an end to a battle that far from honors the United States; a battle against small forces that, though unable to resist the overwhelming military superiority of the U.S. forces, even when losing the battle and sacrificing themselves, could still inflict a costly moral defeat on the United States—the most powerful country in the world, engaged in a war against one of the tiniest countries on Earth.

"9. That the head of the Cuban personnel in Grenada has been instructed to receive any parleyer that might approach him, listen to his views and convey them to Cuba.

"10. It cannot be ignored that some Grenadian units are also fighting, and that the treatment given to the Cubans should not differ from the one they are to receive."

During this evening the Cuban construction and cooperation personnel were still holding some of their positions in an uneven and difficult struggle but with high morale and steadfastness. Later into the night there was little news forthcoming from Grenada and communications were becoming difficult.

The courageous and heroic Cuban construction and cooperation personnel have written an unforgettable chapter in the annals of international solidarity; but in a larger sense, in Grenada they have been waging a battle for the small countries of the world and for all the peoples of the Third World in the face of a brutal imperialist aggression. They have also fought for the American continent and for their own homeland as if there, in Grenada, they were in the first line of defense of the sovereignty and integrity of Cuba.

Grenada may become for Yankee imperialists in Latin America and the Caribbean what the Moncada garrison meant to the Batista tyranny in Cuba.

Eternal glory to the Cubans who have fallen and to those who have fought and are still fighting to defend their honor, their principles, their internationalist work, their homeland, and their own personal lives threatened by the unjustified, treacherous and criminal imperialist attack.

Patricia Muñoz.
Venceremos.
Cuba. October 25, 1983

Paranoia?

From the early days of the Grenadian Revolution, Maurice Bishop warned that the Americans would invade—with mercenaries or with troops. This was dismissed in the western media as typical socialist paranoia. In fact, after Bishop's June meeting with then National Security Adviser William P. Clark, he told reporters that he hoped the timing of an invasion had been "pushed back." But, he insisted, "We do not think the threat has been entirely removed."

If Clark was at all reassuring, his influence was clearly minimal. It may have been uncomfortable for him later to sit in on the meetings of the "Special Situation Group" of the National Security Council, chaired by Vice President and former CIA Director George Bush, and to listen to the warmongering of Shultz, Bush, and Casey. Clark finally—a few days before the invasion of Grenada—accepted another Cabinet post, letting friends know that he was tired of fighting with Shultz.

Rather remarkably, even after the invasion, U.S. officials were suggesting that Grenadian fears had been paranoid. One such Pentagon official, having reviewed some of the captured documents, told reporters:

If you're predisposed to see a Soviet and Cuban threat, then you can find evidence of a significant military buildup in Grenada and carry it one step further to see the makings of a Soviet-Cuban puppet state. On the other hand, if you bring a different bias to the agreements [between Grenada, Cuba, and the Soviet Union], it's possible to argue that a paranoid, Marxist leadership was rushing to improve its armed forces for fear that Grenada might be invaded someday."

That this official could label such a fear paranoid two weeks after the invasion is incredible. His boundless disingenuousness was evident in his further comment:

It might not be convincing, but the Russians could take the United States military assistance program in El Salvador or Honduras and by just presenting the raw number of guns and ammunition make the propaganda argument that the United States is turning those countries into a military bastion.

Really!
Nicaragua Braces for War

By Ellen Ray and Bill Schaap

The Sandinista government of Nicaragua recently instituted sweeping changes in foreign and domestic policy and offered significant proposals to ease tensions in the region. All this occurred in the face of serious U.S. threats of an invasion, an event which most observers agree is not a question of whether, but of when.

In the past six months, the U.S. has set the stage for such a military move by its activities in Central America and by the invasion of Grenada. And having tasted blood in Grenada, the Pentagon may be thirsting for another battle. There is terrible irony in a recent remark by the former chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, Wayne Smith, that "Central America now exercises the same influence on American foreign policy as the full moon does on werewolves."

The Nicaraguans have made substantial moves to better relations with the Roman Catholic hierarchy; they have offered amnesty to thousands of exiled Miskito Indians, and to all but top Somocista leaders and those who have led the counterrevolutionary bands, and have released hundreds of others from jail. They have proposed far-reaching regional peace treaties; they have relaxed wartime censorship of newspapers, and announced preliminary election time schedules. Yet such moves, in virtually every area where the U.S. has voiced criticisms, have not slowed the evident U.S. buildup toward an invasion.

One of the first stages in that buildup was the sending of 5,000 American troops to Honduras in the Big Pine 2 military exercises—open-ended maneuvers all along the border with Nicaragua. These troops have both provided logistical support for the Honduran armed forces and the CIA-supported contras and participated directly in actions against Nicaragua, while helping their hosts attempt to exterminate their own revolutionary opponents. A second stage involved the revival of Condeca, the Central American Defense Council, described in detail below.

With U.S. and regional troops primed throughout Central America, a number of alternative scenarios are possible. As we go to press, any one of them might take place. On the one hand, the contras might lead an invasion, with direct Honduran and U.S. military support. On the other hand, the Hondurans, within the Condeca framework, might lead an attack against Nicaragua, with U.S. and other allied support. And, finally, there is the possibility that events might lead to direct U.S. leadership of the invasion. In each circumstance, though, it is clear that massive U.S. involvement will become necessary at some point, for neither the contras nor the Condeca forces could defeat the Nicaraguans.

There are two other variables to be considered. With any plan there is the possibility that events might require a prior military move in El Salvador, a concerted move by the Condeca forces to try to defeat the FMLN, who are consolidating their victories in province after province. The Salvadoran regime's position becomes more precarious every day. Further, each possibility is subject to the strictures of the U.S. presidential election campaign. They will probably occur either before the campaign is in full swing, or after the election, but not very likely during the height of the campaign itself. However, if—as some sources say—Reagan is reluctant to run again, he might well be less hesitant to start a war which would surely continue well beyond the campaign and the election.

The Scenarios

A contra invasion probably would entail a beachhead on the Atlantic Coast and the creation of a "provisional government"—which would rapidly receive U.S. recognition and support. There are enough contra bases in Zelaya Norte, albeit temporary and constantly on the move, that it could be made to appear that a portion of the population welcomed the invasion. As in Grenada, many opponents of such a move would be silent through fear.

Then Condeca forces could be rushed in to defend such a provisional government, a move already approved in the second "new" Condeca meeting held in Tegucigalpa on October 23 and 24. U.S. troops, under cover of Big Pine 2, would provide support and direction, and intervene if necessary. All of the contra groups have been invited to be a part of such a provisional government, and their greater unity has been urged by U.S. officials, including special envoy Richard Stone, who met with contra leaders in Panama in December. Even coy Eden Pastora seems primed for this move. After some intricate maneuvering, during which he claimed that his partner, Alfonso Robelo, was trying to kill him, they traveled together to the U.S. to raise funds and gather support. Pastora disingenuously denounced the U.S. invasion of Grenada, counseled unconvincingly against invasion of Nicaragua, but was nevertheless hooted and jeered at most campus appearances.

The possibility remains very real that Condeca forces might lead an invasion of Nicaragua in their own right, and not under cover of supporting the contras. Honduras especially has been extraordinarily provocative in its rhetoric, and there are rumblings within Condeca. An indication of the depth and seriousness of the planning is clear in the sacking of Panamanian Vice President Jorge Ilueca. The National Guard forced his ouster for his harsh
criticism of Condeca, when he denounced the alliance as a creation of Anastasio Somoza and said that Panama was "not in Condeca playing the game against Nicaragua." His abrupt dismissal suggests that he may not be entirely correct, and maneuvers leading to a joint action against Nicaragua, perhaps over some trumped-up incident or provocation, may be already in progress.

It is least likely that the U.S. would simply invade Nicaragua, a la Grenada. This is partly for reasons of garnering international support and partly because the U.S. might recognize it could not do it alone. Even with allied support, though, it is clear that the war, which is inevitable, will be long, bloody, and very costly. It is unlikely that the U.S. wants to bear the brunt of such a conflict alone. With this pessimistic but starkly realistic preface, we review the incidents of the past several months.

The Deepening U.S. Involvement
Starting in the beginning of September, the Reagan administration's war against Nicaragua moved to a new stage. There was an upsurge in all forms of activity, from the level of propaganda to the level of direct U.S. involvement in the attacks. Larger, bolder, and more sophisticated operations were launched, by air, land, and sea, and, according to CBS, U.S. military personnel took part in some of the raids, driving the speedboats used to attack the petroleum depot at Puerto Corinto in mid-October.

The controlling hand of the CIA has been openly revealed, as one by one the administration's phoney rationales are exposed. Reagan's people never really believed there was a massive flow of arms from Nicaragua to the FMLN in El Salvador; they were just desperate to overthrow the Sandinistas. Unfortunately, public opinion in the United States is divided, partly because of the propaganda and partly because people have become inured to covert intervention as a result of clever media manipulation by the likes of Time and Newsweek. Long-standing concepts of international law and of morality have been stood on their heads. It is one thing for a Neanderthal-like Ernest W. Lefever to argue that "deceptive, deadly covert actions are moral;" it is another thing for the Washington Post to give him half a page to make the argument.

Over a year ago stories abounded describing the $19 million allocated to secret paramilitary operations against Nicaragua. Most critics, including CAIB, asserted that this figure represented only the tip of the iceberg and recently revealed figures bear this out. According to Philip Taubman of the New York Times, more than $50 million was spent in each of the past two fiscal years, and $80 million has been requested for the current fiscal year. In fact, because the Nicaraguan operations have "stretched—some would say overextended—the agency's capabilities," more than 400 recently retired covert action specialists have been rehired by the CIA. The Nicaragua operation, according to Taubman's
sources, "is expected to become the largest paramilitary effort mounted by the CIA since the Vietnam War."

The numbers of people involved are hard to estimate. There may be 10,000 contras in the north and 2,000 in the south, all supported by the U.S. And there are so many U.S. troops in Honduras that a Carnegie Endowment expert was quoted by Newsweek saying, "It looks pretty grim. We're turning Honduras into a military base."

The technology is also impressive. Sophisticated artillery equipment is getting to the contras, and the support logistics, provided directly by the U.S., include massive transport jets, radar installations, underwater demolition equipment, and the like.

The Shift in Strategy

In early September the emphasis of contra actions noticeably shifted, from hit and run attacks on border villages to coordinated attacks on strategic economic objectives linked to the infrastructure of the country. Airports, oil depots, pipelines, factories, warehouses—these became the major targets, accounting for losses to Nicaragua of more than $380 million. The shift, according to the New York Times, "was the result of a decision, reached by the CIA over the summer, that attacks directly against industrial and transportation targets inside Nicaragua would be a quicker and more effective way of hurting the Sandinistas than previous efforts." (October 16, 1983.) Captured contras have confirmed that CIA officers are directing the attacks from bases in Honduras; and many reports have confirmed that, despite Costa Rican "neutrality," attacks from the south also involve CIA support and direction.

For some time the contras in the south. Eden Pastora's Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE), denied any connection with the Somocista-led Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) in the north. But in late September, within hours of an attack on an oil terminal at Puerto Sandino, for which ARDE took credit, FDN spokesmen in Honduras were briefing journalists on the raid, stating that they were informed in advance of Pastora's actions.

Pastora and the CIA

More to the point, Pastora's pious denials of any connection with the CIA have been totally discredited. Even United States officials describe to journalists the assistance funneled to Pastora. Time magazine recently reported that some of the aid has been channeled to Pastora through Israel, some through El Salvador. Further evidence of CIA assistance to Pastora can be seen by the discovery, in Costa Rica, that Miami-based Cuban exiles—the CIA's long-time hit men—have been recruited to join Pastora's group. When 17 gusanos were ordered to leave Costa Rica, the U.S. Ambassador complained, telling reporters that the Costa Rican government was being "overzealous."

While on the one hand some ARDE officials deny CIA assistance, others complain to the media that they are not getting enough money from the CIA. One official complained to the London Times reporter in San Jose (September 14, 1983) that ARDE was competing with FDN for the CIA's money and not getting it "to the extent we'd be happy with."

But the most compelling research on the CIA-Pastora connection was done by Jeff Gerth of the New York Times (October 6, 1983). On September 8, a Cessna plane crashed after attacking Managua's international airport in a raid for which Pastora took credit. Four weeks later Gerth reported on the results of his attempt to track down the ownership and history of that plane. He learned that until shortly before the raid the plane was registered to the Investair Leasing Corporation of McLean, Virginia. That company is managed by Edgar L. Mitchell, who until 1975 had worked for Intermountain Aviation, Inc., which was identified in the Church Committee reports as a CIA proprietary. The marketing director of Investair is Mark L. Peterson, and, as Gerth carefully phrased it, "a Mark L. Peterson was secretary and treasurer of Air America, Inc., a CIA proprietary involved in air cargo operations." Papers found on the pilot of the plane after it was downed even included instructions for making clandestine contact with U.S. Embassy personnel in San Jose. Gerth later learned that the plane was maintained by Summit Aviation, Inc., a company which was established in 1960 and known to have done contract work for the CIA. (New York Times, November 8, 1983.)

The Specifics of a Coordinated Plan

The convenient cover for the plan, coordinated among the CIA, the contras, and the Honduran armed forces, was the joint U.S.-Honduras military exercise, Big Pine 2 (or Ahuas Tara 2, in Miskito). The exercises began in early August and are still continuing; as a U.S. official told the New York Times recently, "There's no end in sight, ... ." The scope of the exercises is vast; radar installations have been built, new airfields have been constructed and old ones enlarged, port facilities have been extended. The joint task force commander called the exercises "a marvelous opportunity for U.S. forces." During Big Pine 2, in late August and throughout September, another exercise, Readex 2, brought NATO and Atlantic Fleet ships into the Caribbean, under the command of Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, who went on to lead the invasion of Grenada.

The difficulty for observers, of course, is the inability to
distinguish between exercises and the real thing. Most of the activities against Nicaragua appear subsumed within the joint exercise activities. For example, a major part of Big Pine 2 involves amphibious actions, landings, frogmen training, and the like. The commencement of all this marine training was followed by a spate of amphibious attacks against Nicaragua, including the mining of port facilities and hit and run naval attacks. A Newsweek reporter saw "fifteen frogmen loaded down with diving tanks, tubes and flippers" in downtown Tegucigalpa (September 5, 1983). And sophisticated frogmen gear was captured by the Nicaraguans in several clashes with contras, including extremely unusual gear which allowed for the recycling of air so that no bubbles would be released to float up to the surface and which enabled divers to remain underwater for more than eight hours without giving any signs of their presence.

At the same time that Big Pine 2 was turning Honduras into a gigantic U.S. military base—much of which was for the sole purpose of working with the contras in attacking economic targets in Nicaragua—reports emerged that El Salvador was also playing a role in the "secret" war. The story first broke in the London Times (September 14, 1983), confirming that the air attacks of early September had been launched from El Salvador, where the planes, based in Costa Rica, were modified for bombing runs. After the raids, the surviving aircraft returned to Costa Rica, allowing the Costa Rican government to state carefully that the planes did not take off from Costa Rica for the bombing raids. Eden Pastora, who took credit for the raids, said that the bombs had been supplied not by the United States, but by El Salvador. But the London Times learned that the CIA and Israel were funneling arms and munitions for Pastora through El Salvador. (Pastora also claimed that the plane had been given to him by El Salvador, although the New York Times learned, as noted above, that it was a CIA plane.)

Condeca
The most significant development relating to the roles of El Salvador and Honduras in the war against Nicaragua has been the revival of Condeca, the Central American Defense Council. Condeca was founded in 1963, a military alliance between Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and the United States. Panama and Costa Rica had observer status. (A high Panamanian official has recently said that Panama joined in 1974.) The alliance was fostered by the U.S. to deal with the then young guerrilla movements in Nicaragua and Guatemala. But Condeca fell apart in 1969 when El Salvador and Honduras fought the so-called "football war."

However, by June 1983 the U.S. was encouraging the revival of Condeca, without Nicaragua. And in August 1983, when General Rios Montt was ousted in Guatemala, the time was considered ripe for a formal reconstitution of the alliance, which took place at a secret meeting in Guatemala on October 1. In light of the role played by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (O ECS) in the master plan to topple the government of Grenada, the new role of Condeca bears careful scrutiny. One stumbling block is being dealt with now; the charter speaks of aggression against a Central American country from outside Central America. So, as an insider told one of Jack Anderson's reporters, the members will have to "rework the language." Honduran military officers are already saying that Condeca has been revived because of perceived threats from Nicaragua.

The danger to Nicaragua was real even before events in Grenada demonstrated how willing the U.S. was to intervene militarily. Honduran officials constantly speak of the need for the overthrow of the Sandinista government, and U.S. military and political figures have voiced similar opinions. The U.S. representative to Condeca, General Paul F. Gorman, recently promoted to four stars, wonders whether diplomatic efforts have been exhausted, and says that "all the signs point to a military road." (Los Angeles Times, October 5, 1983.) And Under Secretary of Defense Fred C. Ikle has also spoken to Congress of the need for "victory."

The contra leaders stress the analogy between OECS and Grenada on the one hand, and Condeca and Nicaragua on the other. FDN officials told journalists they hoped that the Sandinista leadership would also split into factions, allowing a Grenada-type intervention.

Disinformation
All of the disinformation campaigns directed against Nicaragua during the last few years have moved into high gear. These include an attempt to perpetuate the myth that the contras have widespread support within Nicaragua, something which any on-the-scene observer knows is not true. The Voice of America reports are singularly insubstantial. Feelings against the government are commonplace, it is reported, because the correspondent has been so informed by "a taxi driver." Similar reports pass for news in the major media.

The campaign to suggest that the Sandinistas are guilty of genocide against the Miskito Indians continues unabated; false report after false report of massacres are spread, with total casualty figures greater than the entire number of Miskitos in the world.

There is also a major campaign being waged to suggest that Costa Rica is scrupulously neutral, and is extremely angry about the use of its territory by contras. Yet, as is well known, Pastora and Robelo and the ARDE maintain public offices in San Jose and reporters from around the world interview ARDE people not only in San Jose but near the border as well. President Monge has been forced by his own domestic opponents to be a bit more neutral, and reluctantly turned down an offer by the U.S. Army to provide 1,000 "engineers for road and bridge repairs" because of public opposition. This offer was seen as an attempt by the U.S. to launch a counterinsurgency operation from Costa Rica.

The Attacks
More than disinformation, of course, the direct attacks are serious problems for the Nicaraguans. The list of only the major assaults is long:
• On September 8 a light plane bombed Managua's airport, causing one death, several woundings, and extensive damage. The pilot and navigator were also killed when the plane was shot down. Another small plane simultaneously raided a residential section of Managua, dropping bombs near the home of Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto. ARDE claimed credit for both raids.
• The same day, offshore oil loading facilities at Puerto Sandino were bombed. The facilities were 60 feet under water, 300 feet off shore, indicating the likely placement of explosives by a frogman team, which might have occurred some time prior to the detonation. The FDN claimed credit.
- The next day, September 9, an unsuccessful air attack was made against the oil storage depot at Puerto Corinto, on the Pacific coast about 60 miles further north than Puerto Sandino, which is about 30 miles northwest of Managua. The planes retreated from anti-aircraft fire and headed for Costa Rica, suggesting another ARDE action.

- The same day an attacking plane was shot down near the Sandinista army base at Cibalsa, on the west shore of Lake Nicaragua, just a few miles north of the border with Costa Rica.

- On September 25 there was a major assault on the provincial capital of Ocotal near the Honduran border. FDN radio broadcasts announced that they had taken the town, although in fact they never entered the town proper. After nearly two days of fighting they were repulsed. During the fighting the Rio Coco bridge which serves as a main link for Ocotal with the rest of the country was bombed, as it had been six months earlier.

- On September 27 FDN raiders attacked a Sandinista customs post at El Espino on the Honduran border, killing six government soldiers. Twenty contras were killed in the attack, which was apparently intended, if successful, to launch another attack on nearby Ocotal.

- The following day, September 28, ARDE raiders attacked a southern border post at Peñas Blancas, creating a serious diplomatic dispute between Costa Rica and Nicaragua about who fired across whose territory. Even the Costa Rican papers, while whipping up war fever admitted that the rebels had come from Costa Rica.

- On October 3, ARDE contras in speedboats attacked the fuel depot at the Atlantic coast port of Benjamin Zeladon, more than 100 miles up the coast from Costa Rica.

- The same day an FDN DC3 airplane was shot down by the Sandinistas near Matagalpa, and the pilot and copilot captured. These two later provided details to the government, and to international journalists, of their CIA training in Honduras. They confirmed that all of the FDN plans and attacks were coordinated and directed by American CIA officers, a number of whom they identified. This and all the other downed aircraft have been linked to the U.S., through various CIA proprietaries.

- Before midnight, October 10, CIA men and contras in speedboats launched a successful rocket attack against the oil tanks at Puerto Corinto. It took two days to extinguish the fires, during which time more than 25,000 people had to be evacuated from the city because of the extreme danger of an explosion. Their callousness can be seen in the attack which, had more volatile petroleum products been hit, could have caused thousands of innocent deaths. (While the fires were raging, Henry Kissinger and the President's National Bipartisan Commission on Central America was meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica with Alfonso Robelo of the ARDE. Kissinger had previously said the Commission would not be meeting with contras; after the Robelo meeting he said he was not going to meet with combatants, but that Robelo was a political leader, not a fighter.)

- On October 14, the underwater facilities at Puerto Sandino were again bombed, the fifth attack on oil installations in five weeks. The Exxon Corporation announced almost immediately that it would no longer allow its ships to be used to transport the Mexican crude oil to Nicaragua, which accounts for more than 75% of Nicaragua's petroleum needs. (As this attack took place, Assistant Secretary of State Langhorne Motley was winding up a two-day visit to Managua, discussing possibilities of reducing tensions between the U.S. and Nicaragua—something the constant sabotage was hardly likely to encourage.)

- October 18 saw a massacre more vicious than any of the previous contra raids, all of which were bloody and heartless. The small village of Pantasma was attacked by a band of over 250, slaughtering 47 people, including six teachers and most of the workers on two area agricultural cooperatives. The townpeople fought heroically for ten hours until soldiers reached the remote mountain village and drove off the contras. As one shocked villager said, "What they did here has no name."
Four Nicaraguan youngsters run for their lives from Honduran mortar attack near border.

- Various fishing boats, agricultural and border communities, and ordinary Nicaraguans are daily attacked by the contras.

**Congress and the Contras’ Contempt**

While the orders of the CIA to step up the scope and viciousness of the attacks were carried out, the U.S. Congress debated a proposal to provide another $80 million “covert” aid to the contras. The House of Representatives voted against it and the Senate voted for it, creating a funding controversy resolved by a conference committee which authorized $24 million, but no more, without further congressional approval, ostensibly taking away the CIA’s power to commit unallocated funds to the operation.

But what is clear is that neither the President nor the CIA nor the contras care very much what the Congress does or does not do. The rebel leaders brag that their funds will not be cut off even if Congress refuses more, and they surely know what they are talking about. “Arrangements” have been made, one contra leader said, for the laundering of aid through Israel. Furthermore, President Reagan has defended the use of covert operations such as those against Nicaragua even if the Congress and the American people are left uninformed, if he believes the country’s “best interests are served.”

**Conclusion**

The reality facing the United States was discussed by Commander Tomas Borge, Nicaraguan Minister of the Interior, in a recent interview:

It is difficult to occupy a country where the people are armed. . . . We are technically prepared to take on the Honduran Army, and even all Central American armies together. . . . In other words, the prospects for a military victory over Nicaragua are nil. . . . So, should an intervention come, national territorial sectors be occupied, and a puppet government installed, international politics will force the United States to leave that puppet government alone, providing it only with arms and funds. What then? Could that puppet government survive daily confrontations with people who have tasted power and have arms in hand?

Borge made it clear, however, that his government wanted peace, not war. He intended to come to the United States to speak out on these issues, but President Reagan personally refused him a visa. As the Nicaraguan Embassy noted, “he was coming to speak of peace at a moment in which any war in the world could lead to a nuclear confrontation.” This, sadly, frighteningly, does not deter Ronald Reagan.
Fort Huachuca Buildup:

War Technology in the Desert

The following is part of a report circulated by a veteran who served in intelligence in Vietnam. The implications of this information for Central America are substantial. Such double-checking as CAIB has been able to do indicates that the material here is accurate, and well worth publication.

Located in a sparsely populated area of Southeast Arizona, adjacent to the City of Sierra Vista, is Fort Huachuca, which dates back to the days of the Indian Wars. Today, no cavalry soldiers ride out to fight Cochise, for Huachuca has become the home of the Army Communications Command Test Facilities and the Army Intelligence School and Center, and until recently, the most active organization on post, the Electronic Proving Ground. If the United States military were preparing to go into El Salvador or anywhere else in Central America, this would be the first place things would start to happen, because this is where the military would work on correcting the mistakes made in Vietnam.

Things have been happening at Fort Huachuca for the last decade, but at an eyebrow-raising rate for the last year. Late last summer Major General Grumbacher was replaced by Major General McKnight as Post Commander. Until then, the numerous commands operated separately, with the Post Commander responsible for housekeeping only. McKnight has assumed overall command of the various functions carried on at Huachuca. Brigadier General Riley of the 7th Signal Corps of Fort Richie, Maryland, which controls communications for the United States, Puerto Rico, and Panama, has switched places with Brigadier General Myers of Fort Huachuca Army Communications Command headquarters. Colonel William R. Harnagle, who served two tours in Vietnam and was former director of Combat Developments Fort Gordon has assumed command of the U.S. Army Electronic Proving Ground. All operations placed under one commander; an officer experienced in Vietnam taking over the proving ground; and an officer knowledgeable in U.S. Army communications in Central America; are significant developments.

The civilian hiring freeze imposed by President Reagan was lifted last September for Fort Huachuca. This was to allow the hiring of more office workers, maintenance personnel, etc. Even though the people being hired appear to be redundant for present needs, civil service employees in areas which have been essential to the basic mission of Huachuca are now being laid off. The primary missions of Fort Huachuca have been training military personnel in intelligence activities, test and report on intelligence procedures, and test electronics and communications equipment. The end result of all this effort was the production of training and repair manuals and the graduation of students. This has changed.

The intelligence school is graduating fewer students than in the past, and taking much longer to do it. One local resident who has dealt with students for years stated, "There is something different about this batch. They are not the same as the others in the past years."

The intelligence school is hiring no new people. Now all vacancies are being filled with personnel who are already employed by the school. If a position in the school becomes vacant, an employee is given on-the-job training to teach that subject. Someone from the outside who may have years of experience is not hired. The intelligence school wants no new people inside.

The civil service technical writers who have been the backbone of the Huachuca mission for years are being laid off. The individual in charge of the personnel department who handles the technical writing staff says this is because the military is contracting more of the work to civilian companies. There are a number of private firms which do technical writing on a contract basis. Among them are Kentron, C.A. Parshell, BDM, and Man Tech. Except for Man Tech all of these firms are about to close shop and leave town. They say, "TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia) has frozen all funds."

The Army is saying they are contracting out their work. The contractors say they have no work, except for one contract to write a manual on ground sensors, those devices first utilized in Vietnam to detect guerrilla movement. Man Tech has three unspecified contracts. It is rather curious that all the teaching, testing, and research done at this large facility can be summarized by such a small number of technical writers, compared to the past.

When the Army was hiring civil service tech writers, a Department of Defense Directive from the Intelligence Research Industrial Directorate forbade the hiring of personnel who had served as Military Intelligence Specialists or Military Intelligence Analysts. In other words, people who had been trained and experienced in the analysis and interpretation of intelligence were not wanted. This seems strange until you know that the title of another training manual written was Guerrilla Infiltration Techniques. Manuals on guerrilla infiltration techniques and ground sensors would tell anyone experienced in analyzing intelligence that the military was not getting ready to stop the Russians at the Berlin Wall.

All the contractors except for Man Tech are experiencing hard times. Man Tech in the last year has gone from three offices in town and on base to five, and claims to have only thirty-four employees for these five offices. Man Tech has no interest in tech writers, but is looking for personnel who have tactical experience in interrogation, image interpretation, intelligence analysis, counterintelligence, and intelligence collection. They want people who do it, not write it. The contracts call for some personnel to go overseas. They particularly want people experienced in high tech electronics communications.

Is Man Tech recruiting for the Army? One thing learned in Vietnam was that intelligence organizations had to be in
place and functioning when the troops landed. At present the Army is restricted to fifty-five military advisers in El Salvador. Through the manipulation of their own funds, they could be planning, or have already sent an advance intelligence team of civilians rather than military personnel. It would be almost impossible for Congress to detect such a movement, as there would be no financial or military records to indicate it. Where do these people go, and for what?

In Vietnam attempts were made to train Vietnamese in intelligence procedures. The results were not highly successful often because the local military selected the candidates. The solution would be to choose and select those people you wanted to train, rather than allowing the various militaries of Central America to do the choosing for you.

U.S. Border Patrolmen don’t know why higher-ups single out refugees from Central American countries, in particular El Salvador, who during interrogation reveal that they are intelligent and educated. Before they are sent to Tucson, a notation of this fact is made on the documentation that accompanies them. Is the Army or CIA recruiting people to return to Central America as intelligence agents? If a man was told his family could stay and would be taken care of, he certainly might agree to cooperate.

The only thing known for sure is that the Army has formed a Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This new branch includes the Special Forces, which has increased from twenty-five hundred to fifty-five hundred persons in the last few years. Special Forces (commonly called Green Berets) personnel are trained to fight insurgents, not to make secret rescue missions into Iran.

In a guerrilla war, you often have a particular group of people, or a village, who feel no allegiance to their government or the rebels. Special Forces teams of up to fifteen go to these people and give them everything from medical aid to military training. The training of this team is quite varied. The medics can do simple operations such as appendectomies, and the weapons experts can teach the villagers how to make explosives out of chicken droppings. Once the quality of life has been improved, and the men trained and armed, part of the team will stay behind to lead them. The area surrounding these people becomes hostile to guerrilla forces operating in the region. Needless to say, government forces show these people much more respect. Generally they just leave them alone.

Also, individual soldiers of the Special Forces who demonstrate outstanding combat leadership are loaned to the CIA to command small bands of mercenaries.

For some years, small numbers of Special Forces personnel, never more than sixty, have come to Huachuca supposedly for training in the desert and mountain terrain. Why Huachuca is picked for desert training is unclear, since the Army has many more suitable areas. It is suspected they come here for training with sophisticated equipment rather than because of the terrain. This year there are a substantially larger number than usual, and unlike the past, no one is allowed near them.

For an installation its size, at present not much appears to be happening at Fort Huachuca. Few vehicles pass up and down its many roads. Many buildings are under-used, if at all; yet, construction is going on at a feverish rate. The Enlisted Men’s Club and the Officers’ Club, also under-utilized, have been expanded and improved far beyond any present need. The Field House or gymnasium has been modernized, improved, and expanded. Large and small buildings are being built, and numerous old ones being remodeled. The one area that needs expansion and improvement, married personnel housing, is being totally ignored. This doesn’t make sense unless one recalls that only a volunteer army is a married army. In times of war, when you fill the ranks with drafted personnel, the military doesn’t have to worry about reenlistment rates, can freeze pay scales (which Reagan has done), and can tell the draftee his family, if he has one, is his problem. Arizona Senator DeConcini has stated that less additional personnel are now at Huachuca than in the past. Then what are the buildings for?

One building the Army is happy to tell everyone about is the Electro-Magnetic Facility. This forty-one thousand square foot building is to be used by the military and private contractors to test the efforts of magnetic fields on communication and electronics equipment. The bids for this building were put out with great publicity. Bids for another building, supposedly concerned with satellites, were put out very quietly and the contractors were forced to give hurried bids on this seven thousand [square] foot building. The contract was put out through TRW Corporation, located in McLean, Virginia, and calls for a building framework covered by a non-metallic skin. Undoubtedly the bids came through TRW rather than the Army directly because the local contractors are not to know what is going into that building. This building is to be completed by June. Also to be completed by June is a base for a Western Union Satellite Receiving Station pointed 167 degrees, true, south. Taking into consideration that the actual antenna can be varied a few degrees, it still means it is pointing at the western coast of Central America.

The Electronic Proving Ground at Huachuca is testing a mobile computer and communications system called the Maneuver Control System. Combat commanders ridicule this system as something a businessman might use to keep track of stock on hand, but next to useless in a war. “Two thousand yards on a computer screen is one thing, but to have it actually travel that distance is another. Unsuspected enemy fire, or terrain, might force the foot soldier to have to circle around, causing him to travel ten thousand yards.”

Combat intelligence officers are not ridiculing the system, because with it they will be able to send and receive accurate information, up-to-the-minute information, over great distances, via satellite. This system receives, relays, transfers, stores, processes, retrieves, and prints out data. It has a processor, a flexible disc drive and magnetic bubble. The Army says the bubble is a new magnetic medium used in mass data storage because in the event of a power failure, the memory is not lost. They also say it provides memory processing faster than current chip memory. Commonly known technology says that the magnetic bubble (which is not new) does not lose its memory in the event of a power loss, but that it definitely provides memory processing at a much slower rate than current chip memory.

When this contradiction was presented to an individual who studied both computer science and physics at a prestigious university, he said, “It is possible. It would have to be some sort of hybrid computer, with an ultra-sensitive magnetic bubble. Chips would have to be used to boost its speed, but regular chips might create too much radiation for this new bubble. Most probably they would use complimentary metal oxide semi-conductors, but they are extremely sensitive to static electricity.”
If a large home base, or sort of master computer, were located where these mobile computers could feed and retrieve data via satellite transmission, it would be tactical in nature and of the same basic design so memory wouldn't be lost in the event of power failure. It would have to be housed in a non-metallic building if located in Southeast Arizona, where electrical storms are common. Is it mere coincidence that such a building shell, and a communications satellite receiver base pointed toward El Salvador are both to be completed by June?

This system solves part of the problem for our intelligence failure in Vietnam. Now information can be transmitted instantly to a center where it can be not only analyzed by men, but by computer at the speed of light. Also, remember the mobile computers are referred to as tactical systems. Interrogation reports, agent reports, patrol reports, and copies of enemy documents can be sent to Huachuca for analysis. Also Huachuca is perfectly located. It is far enough beyond the horizon that Cuban technicians could not intercept or interfere with any transmissions.

We still have the problem of interpreting aerial photographs and the fact that guerrillas move at night. For years Fort Huachuca has been conducting exercises with its Mohawk surveillance aircraft using infra-red film. The sensitivity of these cameras is such that they can take a picture of a building from the air and tell you if more heat is escaping from a window than a door. This can be explained as routine development and testing of equipment. What can't be explained is why Huachuca needed a silver recovery process to collect the valuable metal left over from the development of extremely large amounts of film. To test their equipment, they had to bring film from all over the state. That kind of system, which is presently used by only a few civilian firms which process massive amounts of film, would only be needed if they planned to develop and analyze all the film used in the actual fighting of a war, not for routine testing and teaching.

As for interpreting what is on that film, it can now be done by computer. A German, Rudolph Hell, has invented a machine called the Hell Chromacom. The Chromacom does for images what word processors do for words. Using a laser it can turn a square inch of photograph into 360,000 bytes of computer storage space. Control Data Corporation at Greeley Hall, Fort Huachuca has computers that can process 100 million machine instructions per second. In other words, a computer could analyze and interpret in one second what would take men days. Parts of El Salvador could be photographed often and if the slightest change had occurred, military intelligence would know about it. Of course, massive amounts of film would be used.

The last stages of the Vietnam War saw the introduction of sensing devices that could detect enemy movement. These devices were imperfect, but have been worked on through the years. Ground-sensors are now used by the U. S. Border Patrol to detect the crossing of illegal aliens. They use them in series so they can tell the direction the object is traveling, but even rabbits can cause a poorly placed detector to sound a false alarm. In recent years a new security system has been developed. It sends out a high frequency sound wave, like sonar, that bounces back. When coupled to a small computer it can memorize everything that is in front of it, and ignore it. Only when an unmemorized object is placed in its field of detection will it take notice. This system, which is now used in office buildings, is being expanded not only to detect, but also to identify an object, when coupled with a complex computer program. Recently a company known as Ultra Systems moved into Sierra Vista as a contractor working for Fort Huachuca. The electrical requirements for their building included outlets for a number of computers, and other equipment. Among other things, Ultra Systems work with high frequency sound equipment.

The single largest contract is for a new runway to be built at Libby Airfield, located at Fort Huachuca. For a long time there has been talk of improving the facilities. In November 1981, Libby was selected as the site for auxiliary training for Arizona Air Guard and Air Force A-10s, A-7s and F-4s. When the improvements were approved recently, the specifications had been expanded to a 12,000-foot runway with a 1,000-foot overrun. Confirmed reports state this runway is to be constructed of eight foot thick, steel reinforced concrete. Even though a runway of this length is not needed for the proposed aircraft that are to use it, the extra length could be considered a safety factor. A runway of this extraordinary thickness is for a plane with a tremendous "foot print pressure," such as a 747 or C5A cargo plane.

None of the reasons given for building this runway makes sense, even for the United States military. Since German NATO pilots are no longer being trained at Davis Montham Air Force Base in Tucson, and since four runways are closed down at Luke Air Force Base west of Phoenix, it doesn't seem reasonable to build a new one. This new runway is also to be used for civilian commercial traffic, but the present runways are quite adequate for those aircraft which fly people in and out of the area. Residents of the area apparently do not find it hard to believe that airlines would use an aircraft with three times the capacity of those used to serve Tucson, to serve Sierra Vista and the surrounding area, with one-tenth the population. The gullibility of Cochise County residents may be one reason why Huachuca was picked.

The airport is also supposed to be an emergency landing field. From the Phoenix area to the southern border there are eight runway complexes which have strips of eight thousand feet or longer. North of the Phoenix area, there are only two. Why put another one in the southern half of the state, and especially one that is almost two thousand feet higher in altitude than all the others, making it more dangerous to use in an emergency?

The most interesting thing about this $20 million runway from an intelligence point of view is that it is less than twenty air miles from the border. In all of northwest Mexico, there is no radar. You could fly the Empire State Building across northwest Mexico and not a soul would know it. The airspace from Libby to the border is highly restricted and civilian aircraft are not allowed in many areas and above four thousand feet in the rest. People in the Pentagon who should know about the "expanded version," don't! All they know is that money is tight, and the rest of the military is hanging onto their purse strings with a death grip.

A lot of new people are being seen around the city of Sierra Vista. Even though projected growth rates of the community are supposed to decline, the City's Planning Commission received urgent requests from Tucson Builders for permission to build six hundred and eighty-four new apartments. The permits were rushed through as the builders stated that half had to be finished by July. The Sierra Vista City Officials said in response to this, "These builders must know something we don't know!"
Washington's Proxy:

Israeli Arms in Central America

By Clarence Lusane*

The war drums are beating in Central America and Israel is an important player. The State of Israel has emerged as a major, and in some cases, principal, supplier of arms, advisers and training to the repressive forces in the region. Long denounced for its military ties to South Africa, Chile, and the Philippines, the Zionist regime has extended its role as surrogate for the U.S. to the front line of Central America. Although much of what is happening is held in strict secrecy, the vast extent of Israeli aid has begun to fray the cover under which Reagan administration policy objectives circumvent Congressional obstacles.

As this article will show, stopping U.S. military aid to Central America also requires stopping U.S. military aid to Israel. The information presented only scratches the surface of what is probably the key link in U.S. foreign policy under the Reagan administration. By the end of the 1960s Israel had emerged as an arms exporter, but only since the Reagan administration has it been able to reach its potential as a full junior partner to U.S. imperialism.

The Israeli Arms Industry

Fourteen percent of Israel's industrial labor force is employed in its arms industry. If the armed forces are included, the number rises to 25%.

According to the latest CIA estimates, Israel is the fifth largest exporter of arms in the world. This is up from its seventh place ranking in 1980. Israel remains the largest supplier of arms to sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America.

In 1977, Israel's arms exports were valued at $285 million. Despite the loss of two reliable customers, Iran and Nicaragua, by 1981, military exports had risen to $1.3 billion.

The battle-tested efficiency of Israeli weapons is well known. The Israeli-built Uzi submachine gun, for instance, is revered among arms merchants. Carried by U.S. Secret Service personnel and bodyguards of oil millionaires, it is the shining star of Israeli weaponry. It is the choice of NATO and is used in at least 43 countries, including virtually all the nations of Latin America.

Equally reliable Israeli military hardware includes Arava STOL (short takeoff and landing) transport aircraft, Shafir and Gabriel missiles, Galil assault rifles, Kfir fighter jets, Merkava tanks, and various electronic and computer equipment. Israel is also a major source of training in intelligence and counterinsurgency techniques.

Since 1970, Israel's military budget has consumed more than 30% of its national budget. Limited domestic use has made the export of arms essential to its economic survival. Latin American money has become indispensable to the Israeli arms industry. As we shall see, war torn Central America has become a goldmine for Israeli arms sales.

It must be pointed out that Israel's goals are political as well as economic. Stability of the current and international political order is a chief objective of Israeli foreign and military policy. In country after country, we can observe how Israeli arms sales meet these twin aims.

Honduras

The bodies were still warm after the Israeli-sanctioned massacres at Sabra and Shatila when then Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon and the Air Force Chief arrived in Honduras. In his 38-hour visit, Sharon and the Hondurans agreed that Israel would send Honduras 12 Kfir planes, radar equipment, light weapons and spare parts and 50 advisers. Military training was also proposed. Incidentally, upon leaving Honduras, Sharon flew to the U.S. AFP, the French News Agency, observed the deal "could intensify the danger of unleashing an arms race in the region."

Less than six months later, the New York Times reported on its front page that Israel was sending weapons to Honduras. These included artillery pieces, mortar rounds, mines, hand grenades, and ammunition. Much, if not all, of these arms were to go to U.S.-backed counterrevolutionaries seeking to overthrow the Nicaraguan government from bases in Honduras.

It was also reported that the Honduran Armed Forces Commander, Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, visited a CIA training facility in Virginia earlier this year to examine captured PLO weapons. Israel has stated that it would provide captured weapons to any Central American military government for only the cost of transporting them.

According to knowledgeable sources in Tegucigalpa and Washington, General Alvarez is the major Honduran official giving orders to the contras. Despite denials by Honduras that it is involved with the counterrevolutionary forces, spokesmen for the Nicaraguan Democratic Force continue to complain of the bad advice they receive from the Hondurans.

In the period of 1970-1980, Honduras received the following weapons from Israel: 12 Dassault Super Mystere fighters; 4 Arava (STOL) transports; 1 Westwind reconnaissance plane; 14 RBY Mk armored cars; 5 fast patrol boats (unconfirmed); 106-mm mortars; and 106-mm rifles.

The estimated $25 million in weapons promised to Honduras by Sharon is a continuation of past practice. How-

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ever, Honduras is now playing a new role in Central America, similar to the one Israel plays in the Middle East. It has become strategically important to U.S. interests and goals in the region. As a rear base for the contras attacking Nicaragua, and as a training ground for Guatemalan and Salvadoran fascists, Honduras must be armed. Determined not to be inhibited by congressional or public opinion, the Reagan administration has given the Israelis the go-ahead in Honduras. In addition to aid from the U.S. and Israel, Honduras has received military aid from Argentina and Chile, allowing it to increase its armed forces six-fold since 1970 (from 5,000 to over 30,000). The Honduran Air Force is the most powerful in Central America. U.S. officials have admitted that Israeli assistance is important in achieving Reagan administration military and political goals. Worried about potential congressional locks on aid to the Nicaraguan contras, the administration wants to be sure supply lines are not disturbed. U.S. military aid to Honduras will go toward buying weapons from Israel which have themselves been produced with U.S. military aid.

By its own account, the U.S. has at least 300 military advisers, technicians, and engineers in Honduras. The U.S. is spending $20 million to construct a modern airport at Comayagua to accommodate U.S. troop transports. Another four airstrips are being expanded to handle military jets. Future plans include the installation of new radar and electronic surveillance posts, the positioning of large stocks of military equipment, and the initial phases of construction of a planned $150 million air and naval base on the Atlantic coast.

It is the goal of the U.S., with the critical assistance of Israel, to make Honduras the chief gendarme of Central America. The second poorest nation in the region (behind Haiti) will continue to buy arms from Israel at the expense of its own people. Like its neighbors in El Salvador and Guatemala, Honduras increasingly violates the human rights of its citizens with the helping hand of Israel. There is one central objective in the U.S.-Honduras-Israel connection. If the conditions ripen to where U.S. policy makers launch an all-out invasion of Nicaragua, it will duplicate the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, except that it will be launched from Honduran soil.

El Salvador

From his first days in office, Ronald Reagan pledged to draw the line against communism in El Salvador. The murderous and corrupt Salvadoran junta, a politically split U.S. Congress, and the superior fighting capacities of the FMLN guerrillas have turned out to be difficult obstacles. He sleeps well, however, knowing that any hesitation by the U.S. Congress to send military aid finds a willing substitute in Israeli aid.

An example of this backdoor approach occurred in 1981 when the Administration was scrambling to find more aid to send El Salvador. Israel agreed to “lend” the U.S. $21 million to give to El Salvador, money which came from previous U.S. aid to Israel. In other words, the U.S. cynically took out a loan on its original funds, thereby violating the expressed will of Congress.

The U.S. has only recently become a major supplier of military aid to El Salvador. Through all of the 1970s, Israel was the biggest seller of weapons and aircraft to the country. The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) reports the following sales of military hardware to El Salvador: 17 Arava (STOL) transports; 6 Fouga Magister trainers; 18 Dassault Ouragan fighters; 200 80-mm rocket launchers; 200 9-mm Uzi submachine guns; ammunition; and spare parts.

This arsenal made up more than 80% of El Salvador’s military imports during the period. It has been supplemented by an estimated 100 Israeli advisers (almost twice the official number the U.S. claims to have). These advisers, like their U.S. counterparts, are training the Salvadoran military in counterinsurgency strategy and tactics at a secret base near Tegucigalpa.

In addition, Israeli pilots are believed to be flying Israeli-made aircraft against the guerrillas. El Salvador has the infamous distinction of being the first Latin country to receive these advanced combat fighters. The Gouga Magisters and Dassault Ouragans are actually outdated French planes which have been overhauled by Israel Aircraft Industries Ltd. (IAI). They were fitted with motors manufactured by the U.S. company, Pratt & Whitney.

Israel has also set up advanced computer systems to gather and analyze intelligence about the citizenry. Similar to the Israeli-installed computers in Guatemala, the network in El Salvador also monitors changes in water and electricity consumption.

The popular struggle to cut off aid to El Salvador has won some limited victories. The Reagan administration must now certify every six months that the Salvadororan government is improving its human rights record and aid has been partially cut. While certification has routinely been granted each time, the imposition is not welcomed by the Reagan administration.

Even these slight gains, however, are made negligible by the capacity and willingness of the Israelis to help fill the shoes of the U.S. All Israeli aid to El Salvador comes from American military and economic aid to Israel. It has been noted that some of the most vocal congressional critics of Reagan policy objectives in El Salvador are also unquestioning supporters of aid to Israel.

Thus far denied by elected officials and ignored by many progressive activists, the fact is that to cut off U.S. aid to El Salvador also requires cutting or limiting aid to Israel.

Somoza’s Nicaragua

Until the very end, Israeli arms poured into Somoza’s Nicaragua. After the cold-blooded killing of journalists by Somoza’s National Guard in 1978, President Carter cut off all U.S. aid to Nicaragua. Israel, bolstered by U.S. aid to it, picked up the slack and until July 2, 1979, just two weeks before the Sandinistas won the final battle, provided 98% of Somoza’s arms. According to NACLA, Israeli weapons to Somoza in the decade preceding his fall included: 2 Arava (STOL) transports; Galil assault rifles; ammunition; patrol boats; and radios.

When questioned about selling arms to Somoza, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin responded, “We have a debt of gratitude with Somoza.” In 1948, the U.N. General
Assembly recommended the partition of Palestine and the creation of a Jewish state. The new State of Israel needed weapons and had almost nowhere to turn. Israel struck a deal with Somoza. Somoza appointed Yehuda Arazi as a Nicaraguan Ambassador to Europe where he could purchase weapons in the name of Nicaragua. Eventually, all the weapons ended up in Israel. All of this was accomplished for a mere $200,000. Arazi, it turned out, was a member of the Jewish underground's clandestine army organization, Haganah.

Guatemala

The U.S. is not the primary supplier of arms to Guatemala. Since 1976, Israel has been the main provider of weapons, aircraft, and training to Guatemala. In fact, between 1977 and 1981, after the U.S. cut off aid due to gross human rights violations, Israel was the only nation giving military aid to the regime.

Weaponry to Guatemala has included: 10 RBY Mk armored cars; 15,000 5.56-mm Galil assault rifles; and 4 field kitchens. Since 1976, Guatemala has bought at least 11 Arava aircraft, designed for short takeoff and landing. It has been reported that Israelis have been acting as pilots and maintenance technicians for these planes.

Training of Guatemalan military strongmen by Israel has included education in the use of terror and interrogation techniques, modern intelligence methods and psychological warfare. Israeli advisers are the key link in Guatemalan counterinsurgency operations. From national planning to civilian rural cooperative programs to military maneuvers, Israel is centrally involved.

Israel's connection with the right-wing and repressive forces of Guatemala are hardly secret. Israeli advisers have trained many of the officers of Guatemala's police intelligence (G-2). In reference to the guerrillas fighting the ever-changing military juntas which have come to power, the right wing openly calls for the "Palestinianization" of the rebelling Mayan Indians.

As with Somoza, Guatemala's relationship to the Zionist state goes back to 1948 when Israel was created. One of the three U.N. Commissioners overseeing the establishment of Israel was from Guatemala. Despite the numerous changes in power in Guatemala over the years, it has remained a consistent and staunch supporter of Israel.

Today, Guatemala-Israel relations are better than ever. Extensive trade and economic agreements have been signed recently. Bilateral tourism contracts were signed in March 1982 with the expressed purpose of rebuilding Guatemala's lagging tourist industry. INGUAT, the Guatemalan tourist board, is advertising in the Jewish communities of New York City, Miami, and Los Angeles.

First and foremost, however, Israel's relations with Guatemala are military. Some of Israel's most advanced electronic and computer technologies have been installed in Guatemala. Hit lists used by the death squads have been computerized. Technologically sophisticated murder is coordinated by a Regional Telecommunications Center (RTC) built and managed by Israeli Army experts. The RTC is also linked to the U.S. Army's Southern Command at Fort Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone. The RTC is run by the generals from the fourth floor of the National Palace Annex.

The U.S. Agency for International Development has said that the RTC is Guatemala's principal presidential level security agency and works with a high level security network. Further, AID claims that it links the key officials of the National Police, Treasury Police, Detective Corps, Ministry of Government, the Presidential Palace, and the Military Communications Center.

The Tel Aviv newspaper Haolam Hazeh and the London Guardian revealed in December 1982 that Israeli advisers work closely with Guatemala's G-2 police units in the use of interrogation and torture. In this activity, they work closely with Argentina and Chile, both of which have long track records in the art.

Computerized death lists are a mainstay of government terror and inspired a "spy-on-thy-neighbor" campaign. By 1980, computers already listed 80% of the Guatemalan population.

In November 1981, the Israeli-sponsored Army Electronics and Transmission School was opened in Guatemala. At its opening, the Israeli Ambassador to Guatemala, Moshe Dayan [no relation to the former Defense Minister of the same name] said that the school was the first of its kind in Latin America. Its purpose is to teach computer and electronic monitoring of the Guatemalan people. Equipment at the school is capable of doing everything from checks on potential apartment renters to detecting changes in electricity consumption that supposedly might indicate that an illegal printing press is in operation. Should you be detected as a potentially subversive tenant or an excessive user of electricity, modern Guatemalan technology could identify you for a death list.

Israel has also been helpful in developing Guatemala's major military-civilian programs. The Guatemalan military has attempted to create Vietnam-style strategic hamlets. The means of implementing these counterinsurgency plans were couched in terms of establishing peasant cooperatives similar to the kibbutzim in Israel. Guatemalan and Israeli agricultural and military officials were exchanged and it soon became apparent that the goals of the program were to crush peasant support and participation in the armed struggle.

The U.S., becoming involved through AID, sent "experts" and provided credits and grants. These civic programs were to take place in the Ixcan area. This is the major base of support for the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EKG),
one of the major rebel forces fighting to overthrow a succession of repressive governments.

Under the recently overthrown Rios Montt regime, the Israeli model was put into full operation. In August 1982, a "Plan of Assistance to Conflict Areas" (PAAC) program was begun. The PAAC program reproduced many of the tactics applied by the Israelis on the West Bank, such as finding mayors willing to accommodate to the status quo.

Rios Montt's strategic relations with Israel began before his March 23, 1982 coup. Tel Aviv newspapers reported that 300 Israeli advisers had helped to execute the takeover. Rios Montt confessed to an American reporter that many of his soldiers were trained by Israel.

On August 8, 1983, Rios Montt was overthrown in another military coup led by General Oscar Humberto Mejia Victores. Mejia, who was Defense Minister under Rios Montt, is also a fierce anti-communist. It is doubtful that U.S. and Israeli support will dwindle under Mejia's rule. Gaining almost immediate recognition from the U.S., Mejia's pledges to return to civilian rule, abolish secret tribunals and end Rios Montt's "state of alarm" were received enthusiastically by the Reagan administration. While the precise U.S. role in this latest coup is unclear, it has been reported that some of the Israeli-trained officers that brought Rios Montt to power also participated in his overthrow.

Costa Rica

Costa Rica's northern border has become an operational base for attacks by contras on Nicaragua. Former Sandinista turned traitor, Eden Pastora, leads a small army estimated at 5,000 from this border area.

At one point, Pastora claimed that he had to shut down his activities because he had run out of funds. He stated that because of his "anti-U.S." stance, he would not accept funds from the CIA. Within days he was fighting again, reportedly with an infusion of funds from Israel, as well as other countries. In fact, much of this was a propaganda charade, as Pastora has been receiving CIA aid all the time.

Although Costa Rica has no army, Israeli military trainers and arms are beginning to pour into the country. In 1982, President Luis Alberto Monge met with Menachem Begin in Washington. They discussed the possibility of Israeli military aid in building up Costa Rican security forces. The funds would come from Washington.

The U.S. has been pressuring Costa Rica to consolidate its security forces. This would include a 5,000-member Civil Guard, a 3,000-member Rural Guard, 1,700 prison guards, the 100-member National Security Agency, and the Chilean-trained, 500-member Organization of Judicial Investigation. In 1983, the U.S. will have spent $150,000 to train 103 members of Costa Rica's security forces, three times the amount spent in 1982.

Israel has been chosen by AID to build a $10 million settlement project along the Nicaragua-Costa Rica border. The military squeeze that the contras are currently operat-

The U.S. Role

Has exposure of illegal arms transfers by Israel forced the U.S. to cut back on aid? Or has the fact that Israel has sent arms to countries which the U.S. Congress and others have designated as flagrant violators of basic human rights made the Reagan administration voice any criticism of Israel? The answer to both questions is no.

Relative to its size and needs, the immense scale of continued U.S. military and economic aid to Israel is obscene. Even after last summer's internationally condemned invasion of Lebanon, Israel remains the largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid. It receives about one-third of all U.S. foreign aid, which in the last 10 years has amounted to about $25 billion, or roughly $7 million a day.

Even more shocking, since 1976 Israel has not spent a penny of its own for military imports. The average U.S. subsidy to Israel for military imports has been 129% of the actual cost of those imports.

In Latin America Israel has found clients. Here can be found some of the most brutal and repressive regimes of modern times most in need of Israel's "technical" and military assistance. In exchange for this assistance and cooperation, Israel has found some of its most vocal support in international affairs. Israel has even been granted observer status in the Organization of American States. The only other country to enjoy this special status is Spain.

In the current fiscal year, Israel will receive $785 million in economic assistance and $1.7 billion in military aid. It will receive the same amounts in the fiscal year which began October 1, 1983.

Israel's Defense Minister, Moshe Arens, was in Washington in late July to discuss more military aid and the right to use U.S. aid to develop weapon systems that are currently only available in the U.S. The State Department and White House refused to comment on the results of the meeting, but an Israeli official said "this trip was one of the most successful trips ever made by an Israeli minister to Washington."

The above figures shed light on the important and central role that Israel plays in U.S. foreign policy goals. No amount of struggle against U.S. aid to repressive dictatorships and juntas will be complete, or even marginally successful, unless Israel is also taken to task.

NOTE:

After our last issue exposed the fact that the late Robert G. Deindorfer had worked as a spy under journalistic cover, the truth was admitted. His name appeared on the "In Memoriam" list published in Periscope, the quarterly bulletin of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers.
Pak In The Saddle Again

By Fred Clarkson*

The minions of Korean cult leader Sun Myung Moon are hard at work in Latin America. In some countries, the Moonies have become a major force in politics, business, and the media. In Uruguay, for example, Moon’s organizations own a 500-room luxury hotel, two newspapers, a radio station, the largest book publishing house, and a meat packing plant. (Washington Post, August 28, 1983.) There is open speculation in the press about whether Uruguay will become the first “Unificationist republic.” (Miami Herald, October 21, 1982.)

These and other such extraordinary developments are largely the work of Bo Hi Pak, who is from all available evidence, the real brains and power in Moon’s multinational operations, including Moon’s Latin American political arm: CAUSA (Confederation of the Associations for the Unification of the Societies of the Americas). CAUSA was founded in 1980 and claims, in its conference invitations, to be active in 18 countries.

Pak, best known as a central character in the Koreagate influence peddling scandal of the 1970’s, has had a key role in the development of Moon’s Unification Church from the early days. As a young army officer he helped stage the coup that brought former Korean dictator Park Chung Hee to power and with guidance and support from the CIA was among the founders of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), where he attained the rank of colonel. Before “retiring” to become a full-time Moonie he was the military attaché at the Korean Embassy in Washington. During this period he was reportedly the liaison with the American intelligence community, and made regular visits to the National Security Agency. (See Gifts of Deceit, by Robert Boettcher.) Through his many roles in Moon organizations, Pak plays Chief Executive Officer to Moon’s Chairman of the Board.

CAUSA began in the Southern Cone nations of Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay, with seminars entitled: “Unificationism: A Solution to Communism,” purporting to present a cogent unifying platform against Marxism for the right-wing elites who attend by special invitation. The seminars pleased the local dictators well, despite the heavy infusion of Moon theology. Pak told the Chilean seminar in 1981 that although “Chile is still seen as a villain in the liberal press, I think the day will come when the world will recognize this nation as a fountain of hope.” Likewise, Chilean General Claudio Lopez said: “We know that . . . Rev. Moon and yourself are pillars in the struggle against international communism.”

Pak is also directing a campaign at the U.S. Hispanic community through the Times-Tribune Corp., publisher of the Washington Times, New York Tribune, and since 1980, Noticias del Mundo, a Spanish language daily distributed in New York, Washington, and other American cities. It is often cited as an authoritative source by South American papers. Significantly, Pak’s Executive Vice President is Sang In Kim, of whom the 1978 U.S. congressional report on Koreagate stated that he was an early Moonie who participated in the Park coup; was Park’s translator during his first state visit to the U.S., and was a former KCIA station chief in Mexico City who “made frequent trips to Washington; and there is reason to believe [he] was Tong-sun Park’s ‘control officer’ in the KCIA.” Park was the linchpin of the Koreagate conspiracies. (See Investigation of Korea—American Relations, Report of the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations, October 31, 1978, p. 363.)

Such long-time involvements are not unusual among the true believers, and the black-and-white world view of the Moon organizations is characteristic as well. According to Moon theology, these are the last days, in which Moon, the Messiah, will lead the forces of God over the forces of Satanic communism to create the kingdom of God on earth.

During the past year, Honduras has become a major battleground in CAUSA’s anti-communist crusade. Pak has a close relationship with the military and business elite, notably General Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, the military chief and de facto dictator. Alvarez is said to want to use CAUSA to build support for a national security state, instead of the year-old civilian democracy. Alvarez’s heaven on earth has been temporarily thwarted by the Catholic Bishops of Honduras. Following a warning about “cults” by the Pope and a Vatican briefing about the history and goals of the Moonies, the Bishops issued a pastoral letter denouncing CAUSA and the Moonies as “anti-Christian” and warned of “serious dangers to the psychological, religious, and civic integrity of anyone who yields to its influence.” The public controversy that followed forced prominent Hondurans to back off a bit; Honduras is over 90% Catholic. Nevertheless, CAUSA remains a powerful force in the country.

About the time Pak first arrived in Honduras (November 1982 according to the April 17, 1983 Boston Globe), a Presidential “Office of International Information” was set up to deal with the problems created by the war being waged against Nicaragua from Honduran soil. The office is headed by Presidential Press Secretary Amilcar Santamaria, a leading public defender of CAUSA who attended the Moon sponsored “World Media Conference” (WMC) in Seoul, South Korea, October 1982. Also attending were Oswaldo Soto Rector of the National University; Herman Padgett, the Honduran Consul General in New York; and several right-wing Honduran journalists. The WMC brings several hundred such people from around the world semi-annually (all expenses paid) to rally for anti-communist

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perspectives in journalism. Closer ties between Honduras and South Korea are suggested by reciprocal military visits and all-expense-paid trips to South Korea for Honduran businessmen, courtesy of Bo Hi Pak.

Meanwhile, another WMC was held in Guatemala in June. This event featured former South Vietnamese Premier Nguyen Cao Ky, who believes the media played a major role in the defeat of South Vietnam. After the WMC, CAUSA flew delegates to El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras on a Boeing 707 for day trips. When in Honduras, they attended a reception at the Office of International Information hosted by Bo Hi Pak. In each country, delegates met with business and military leaders. (See El Grafico (Guatemala), June 14, 1983; El Heraldo (Honduras), June 10, 1983; and Washington Post, August 28, 1983.)

(Continued from page 44.)

hidden, notebooks that could be chewed as gum if discovered, and secret writing materials. Eventually they gave her a bottle of poisoned wine for D’Escoto. Moncada exposed the plan, and a film of her receiving the poisoned bottle of wine was given to the press when the expulsions were announced.

Although the U.S. denied the plot, even the Christian Science Monitor editorial said “it cannot be ruled out that the embassy personnel were up to something,” while The Nation said “it may be more common-sensical than pathological to fear the worst from Washington.”

This plot was neither the first nor the last in Nicaragua. In February of 1982 a bomb exploded on an airplane in Managua, killing four baggage handlers. The flight had originated in New Orleans, and the bomb was generally presumed to have been planted by CIA-trained Cuban rightists. And last August two captured Nicaraguan contras confessed to having planned to kill D’Escoto. Ernesto Cardenal, and Vice Chancellor Nora Astorga. One of the men, Jorge Ignacio Ramirez Zelaya, said a CIA agent named Mike Tock was behind the plot.

When assassination becomes a way of life, it can get out of hand. That may have been what happened in the case of the murder of El Salvador’s Archbishop Oscar Romero, attributed by Robert White to Roberto D’Aubuisson. It is also the most reasonable explanation for the assassination of Benigno Aquino in the Philippines last August. While it is certainly true that the U.S. did not order Aquino killed, indeed by the time of his death he was probably the leader favored by the U.S.; nevertheless it was the CIA in the fifties under Edward Lansdale that made murder a way of life there. By 1954, as we saw in Part 2 of this series, CIA station chief Ralph B. Lovett was plotting the assassination of Philippine nationalist leader Claro M. Recto. It should come as no surprise to the CIA’s killers that the Marcos dictatorship has learned its lessons well, even when they are applied in a way that the U.S. finds embarrassing.

The other major assassination of recent months was that of Grenada’s Prime Minister, Maurice Bishop. Is it not possible that the CIA had a hand in this also? On the surface it doesn’t seem likely. Credible reports say that Bishop was killed as a consequence of factional strife within the New Jewel Movement, in which Bishop was opposed by people more hardline than he.

The convergence of such a variety of interests through Pak, suggests much more influence than the Moonies usually get credit for.

FLASH: According to a reliable journalistic source just returned from Central America, one of the Nicaraguan contra leaders, Fernando “El Negro” Chamorro of the UDN-FARN, was approached more than two years ago by Moonies to attend meetings (all expenses paid) in San Francisco, New York, and perhaps elsewhere, aimed at unifying the various anti-Sandinista groups. Chamorro said he went to the meetings, but declined to follow Moon’s lead, for fear of Moon domination. Asked if he had taken any Moon money, he said he hadn’t but might if there were no strings attached.

Nevertheless, we would do well to recall the CIA’s plot to poison Chou En-lai during a visit to Burma in 1958, which was to be accompanied by a “black” propaganda campaign that would have blamed the Soviet KGB for his death. (See Part 1.) Bearing that in mind, it could be meaningful that Gen. Hudson Austin, one of the leaders of the coup that ousted Bishop and then killed him, was described in a secret CIA report two years ago as pro-American.

Grenada: Nobody’s Backyard

Historical perspective of U.S. destabilization against Grenada during first year of revolution—events which later led to coup and invasion.

A 16 mm, 60-minute color documentary film. Includes interviews with late Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, former Guyanese P.M. Cheddi Jagan, Chilean patriot Isabel Letelier, Workers Party of Jamaica leader Trevor Munroe, and former CIA officer Philip Agee.

Produced by CovertAction Information Bulletin; directed by Ellen Ray. For rental information, telephone (202) 265-3904 or (212) 254-1061, or write to P.O. Box 50272, Washington, DC 20004.
Korean Air Lines flight number 007 was not the first spy plane downed by the Soviet Union, but its cover has held up better than previous ones, with a strong assist from many of the major U.S. media, giving the Reagan administration a significant victory in its march toward ever-widening war.

According to Duncan Campbell writing in the London New Statesman, “since 1950 the United States has lost at least 27 aircraft forced or shot down and seen 60 others attacked in the course of electronic or photographic reconnaissance activity. At least 139 U.S. servicemen have died in this reconnaissance programme.” He adds, “More than 900 attempts have been made, by the Soviet Air Force and others, to shoot down the super-secret SR-71 ‘Blackbird.’ None has succeeded, for it flies too high and too fast.”

Very few of these aircraft have received much attention in the news media, even the ones that have been shot down, but they are known in the aviation and espionage trades and, despite the fact that they are entirely illegal, they are considered matter-of-fact. The April 1979 issue of Air Classics magazine ran a photograph of four U-2 airplanes shot down by the People’s Republic of China in the 1960s.

On occasion, when coupled with important political events, they erupt into public view, as happened in the case of the best known U-2 flight of all, the one piloted by Francis Gary Powers over the U.S.S.R. in May of 1960 which torpedoed the scheduled Eisenhower-Khrushchev summit meeting. But details of another spy flight shot down over the Caucasus two years before Powers’ weren’t made public until this year.

Spy flights that violate the airspace of another country are not labeled as such. When Powers began his U-2 career with the CIA, his identity card showed him to be an employee of Lockheed on loan to the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA). In other words, he and his colleagues were under civilian deep cover.

The CIA unit to which Powers belonged was officially called the second Weather Observational Squadron (Provisional). The first NACA news release about the U-2, issued in April 1956, said the plane would be used to study turbulence and meteorological conditions in Nevada. The second announced the program was being extended to Europe. Powers and his fellow spies were instructed to tell parents and friends that their flying missions were tied in with the then forthcoming International Geophysical Year in various parts of the globe.

After Powers was shot down, the U.S. government announced that a NACA weather plane had strayed off course over Turkey into Soviet skies when the pilot developed oxygen trouble. After Khrushchev disclosed that the pilot had been captured, the State Department abandoned the cover story, but said that Washington had not authorized the spy flight. Two days later, Eisenhower admitted to the press that he had authorized the flight, and said the overflights would continue.

A similar sequence of lies followed by corrections has emanated from Washington concerning KAL 007 but, despite that, since no one from the crew of that flight survived to testify as to the true mission, the proof that it was on an espionage mission is largely circumstantial. Nevertheless, it is persuasive to experts, but what has obscured the truth is the continued insistence by U.S. officials that a civilian airliner would never be used for such a purpose.

This is demonstrably false. The earliest spy aircraft of the Cold War era were mostly converted military planes—B-29 Superfortresses, SA-16 Albatrosses, later RB-47s—followed by the U-2 and then the SR-71 designs which were specifically engineered for spying over “denied” territory. But civilian cargo and transport planes have been widely used too, reaching their peak when the CIA operated a vast network of proprietary airlines on a “commercial” basis, including Air America, Air Asia, Civil Air Transport, Intermountain Aviation, and others. Aircraft currently in use by proprietary airlines in Central America include Beechcraft King Airs, Cessna 404s, and DC-3s. Modern reconnaissance craft, including the well known AWACS and RC-135, are modified airliners.

The mission determines what type of aircraft is most appropriate, and at times it includes regularly scheduled commercial airliners, despite a statement by the United States Information Agency, repeated twice in its report “The Shootdown of KAL 007,” that “The United States does not involve commercial airliners in intelligence activities.” (Let us leave aside the likelihood that this may have been carefully worded legalese to avoid saying whether South Korea uses commercial airliners in intelligence activities, on its own, or on behalf of the U.S., or both. Virtually every important sentence in the report would fail that sort of scrutiny.)

Even Leslie Gelb in the New York Times reported that the U.S. used commercial airliners for cover “in the 1950s when the CIA outfitted commercial flights with equipment to spy on activities in East Germany as the planes flew to and from Berlin.” A number of French press accounts have quoted former agents of SDECE, the French secret service, saying that French passenger planes have made “hundreds” of spy flights at the behest of the CIA while en route to Moscow. Rudolf Braunberg, a former pilot for the West German airline Lufthansa, has written in Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, a West German weekly paper, that “since 1947 32 civil planes have been shot down for violating foreign airspace,” one of them by NATO. These, however, have not caused the outcry that KAL 007 has.

Many experts smelled something fishy from the earliest reports about the downing of the airliner. Ironically it was Gen. George Keegan, the retired head of Air Force
intelligence and of the Defense Intelligence Agency, a well known war hawk and anticommunist extremist, who was quoted as having said immediately afterward, "I have never failed to be surprised at how careless the Koreans are, despite the risks of flying near Soviet air space. Despite all the Soviets have there, the Koreans continue to fly too close. The Koreans continue to bruise the Soviets on this. What happened today they invited."

As pertinent facts dribbled out bit by bit—that an \textit{RC-135} reconnaissance plane was flying nearby KAL 007 in the early part of its flight; that a second RC-135 was somewhere about; that two Orion maritime reconnaissance aircraft were in the area of its later travel; that the Korean flight's movements over the most militarily sensitive areas of the Soviet Union coincided with the orbital overflights of the U.S. Ferret-D satellite; and that the U.S. frigate \textit{Badger} was stationed at what would have been where KAL 007 emerged from Soviet airspace had it not been downed—the official U.S. story began to unravel.

First the U.S. charged that the Soviet Union had deliberately shot down a plane known to be an unarmed civilian jetliner. Later the State Department admitted the consensus of U.S. intelligence was that the U.S.S.R. believed it was monitoring and bringing down an RC-135. Initially the U.S. claimed that no warning was given to the airliner, and a tape of radio transmissions was played that purported to prove it, but later an "amended" version on the tape was released that supported the Soviet claim that warning shots had been fired. According to Alexander Cockburn in the \textit{Village Voice}, the State Department mistranslated part of the tape in which the Soviet pilot reported the target "does not respond to inquiries" as "does not respond to IFF" [Identify Friend or Foe, a frequency the Boeing 747 would not have received]. Much was made of the difference in the sizes and profiles of the two types of planes, but everyone now seems to agree that the Soviet interceptor's approach was behind and beneath the Boeing 747, from sufficient distance that comparative size would have been difficult to discern regardless of whose weather report is more reliable, and where its "distinctive hump" would not have been visible. Moreover, the RC-135, though smaller, has a hump similar to that of a 747. \textit{Le Monde} confirmed that KAL 007 was flying without lights until some time after the interceptor was "locked on" target, after which time came the reports of flashing lights quoted by the U.S.

Then began the quibbling. There was no need for KAL 007 to spy, because satellite photos would be as good as those from a lower altitude. But even if night photography had been the plane's mission, photo-interpreters would dispute this, especially concerning oblique views and stereo pairs. (Interestingly, when Krushchev argued that U-2 flights were needless provocations because of the quality of satellite surveillance, CIA director Allen Dulles said they were needed. In the current dispute, Cockburn pointed out in the \textit{Voice} that, since satellite orbits are known and can be anticipated, spy flights are utilized to see things concealed from the satellite's scheduled flyby.)

In the \textit{New York Times} Gelb argued that this was nighttime, and infrared cameras "are ineffective above a few thousand feet." Why then, Cockburn asked, do satellites carry infrared cameras? Gelb wrote, "The only imaging system that works at higher altitudes at night is something called synthetic aperture radar," which "is fairly large and is said to take up a lot of space." How, then, do they fit it inside the nose of F-15s, which regularly carry it, Cockburn wanted to know.

Huge doubts were raised when two former RC-135 intelligence specialists who had piloted the craft went public in the \textit{Denver Post} with information from their experience. T. Edward Eskelson and Tom Bernard wrote that the official explanation of the RC-135's mission off the Soviet coast did not agree with their knowledge.

"The RC-135 can stay aloft for 18 to 20 hours, demanding only a single mid-air refueling. The aircraft are assigned 'orbit' areas near target nations by the National Security Agency, which has operational authority over all the personnel aboard.

"It has been our experience that, on occasion, NSA adjusts the flight paths of RC-135s so that they will intentionally penetrate the airspace of a target nation, bringing a target country's air defense systems into a state of alert. This allows NSA to analyze these activated systems for potential flaws and weaknesses.

"The RC-135 acts for the NSA as a prime receptor of signals from a surveillance target. The aircraft is deemed so important to U.S. intelligence collection efforts in sensitive areas that it always is relieved on its orbit by another RC-135 just before the conclusion of its mission. We find the implication made by President Reagan that the Sakhalin-Kamchatka target area was abandoned by the RC-135 to be unbelievable and contrary to NSA policy.

"The capabilities of the RC-135, some of them offensive, may have been of particular value to the KAL 747 as it moved toward, and eventually through, Soviet airspace.

"The RC-135 has a superadvanced, ultrasecure communications system linked to the most sophisticated communications network in the world. This system permits the instant reporting of tactical intelligence to the highest levels of government, including the president, from any location in the world. A message for the president is required to be in his hands no more than 10 minutes after the actual time of transmission."

They next pointed out that the RC-135 had the capability to communicate directly with the 747, and could have notified its crew that the plane was off course and was being tracked by the Soviets.

"Another feature of the RC-135 is the equipment manned by Strategic Air Command officers which can 'jam' radar and radio transmissions in addition to certain electronic systems in other aircraft.

"The RC-135 also contains an internal warning system that monitors all radar and tactical air activity of the target nation for the earliest indication of any hostile activity that could be directed against the RC-135."

In a later interview with a Denver weekly newspaper, \textit{Westword}, Bernard said, "That leads us back to one thing. We had coverage, we had analysis, we had the ability to intervene—and we didn't." He could suggest only two possible reasons why: either the U.S. had complicity, or feared compromising an intelligence source more than it was concerned about the lives of those aboard KAL 007. He concluded, "Personally, I think the Korean airliner overflew Soviet airspace for the purpose of gathering intelligence."
Former CIA case officer Ralph McGehee reached a similar conclusion: "The KAL plane was sent loaded with espionage equipment into Soviet airspace in accordance with a secret agreement between the governments of the United States and South Korea, but with the incorrect assumption that it would not be shot down since it was a commercial flight."

Stories on National Public Radio and in the Boston Globe documented that Korean Air Lines has had "a long and intimate relationship" with the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, and that KCIA, in turn, has a similarly cozy tie to U.S. intelligence agencies. Even former CIA director Stansfield Turner told a student audience that he couldn't swear on a Bible that KAL007 wasn't engaged in spying.

Leslie Gelb in the New York Times, while generally supporting the official U.S. position, listed what the government was withholding: "Worldwide American radar and anti-aircraft abilities; any communications between the RC-135 and the Korean Air Lines Flight 007 and between Flight 007 and the somewhat earlier Korean Air Lines flight from Anchorage to Seoul, and communications between Soviet ground controllers and fighter planes."

The Sunday Times of London summed up its investigation by saying that "there is growing conviction in military, political, and aviation circles that Captain Byong-in was not in Soviet airspace by accident."

Far Eastern Economic Review was more forceful. "How did 007 get to its rendezvous with disaster? An error in the INS (Inertial Navigational System) which would have taken it exactly where it was going—a million to one chance—has to be added to another million to one chance: that the two pilots on the flight deck never once noticed Kamchatka's coastline appearing on their weather radar—which has a range of about 200 miles—or even looked out of the cockpit window to see that they were flying over land where there should have been sea. And this in an area where maps are studded with warnings to pilots to stay on course."

The actual notice reads, "WARNING Aircraft infringing upon Non-Free Flying Territory may be fired on without warning."

The Review concurred with the logical consensus. "These coincidences strain credulity and force an examination of a simpler explanation: that the aircraft was for some reason deliberately flown on the course that it took."

What might its spy mission have been? In a Newsday article, David Kahn wrote, "Although the official U.S. statement declared that the RC-135 was checking on Soviet compliance with disarmament treaties, more often these reconnaissance planes, nicknamed 'ferrets,' seek information on Soviet radar systems. Specifics about radar locations and their power, pulse rate and frequency can enable U.S. bombers to blind the Soviet radars by jamming them, or to trick—spoil—their operation, for example, by showing the true radar echoes of the bombers, but false ones that show incorrect distances and speeds. This can provide the bombers with an electronic shield in case they must attack the Soviet Union."

Especially in the age of Stealth technology with its nearly invisible radar signature, such tests are probably common in the face of likely attempts to improve radar defenses. A New York Times report by David Schirbman says that Soviet ground controllers encountered difficulty in directing the Soviet planes on courses that would intercept KAL 007, a serious problem for aircraft with limited range. If this report is true, the only reasonable explanation is that the RC-135 was jamming Soviet radar as the 747 violated Soviet airspace, expecting to win a red badge if successful, and perhaps assuming that, in the event the test failed, the Soviet pilots would refrain from shooting down a commercial flight. That might also explain, if "friendly" (U.S. and Japanese) radar was also being jammed, why nobody warned the Korean crew that their plane was off course, and why the U.S. won't release information that could conclusively show what was happening during the fateful flight.

If that's the truth, or close to it, the Korean-U.S. spy team failed to take an important consideration into account. David Kahn summed it up: "Soviet leaders perhaps remember something that exerts as powerful an influence on them as the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor does to Americans. It may explain their fear and rage about air intrusions. From October 1940 to June 1941, German airplanes—toward the end averaging more than three a day—penetrated Russian airspace and photographed thousands of square miles of the Soviet Union. June 22, Hitler invaded."

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Number 20 (Winter 1984)
Sources and Methods:

CIA Assassinations—Part IV

By Ken Lawrence

When the topic is assassination, U.S. officials exhibit a curious ambivalence. On the one hand, we’d never, never even consider such a thing. On the other hand, a casual, yawning, “So, what else is new?”

No one is surprised when right-wing Cuban exiles, armed and trained by the CIA, kill or attempt to kill Cuban or Soviet diplomats stationed in New York.

Last August 8, after reporting on a “hair-raising new development”—that Arab terrorists have invented an “invisible bomb”—Jack Anderson coolly disclosed that “none of the western intelligence agencies privy to the secret raised objections when one agency set out to find the bomb maker and eliminate him and his lethal products ‘with extreme prejudice.’” If Anderson’s account is accurate, the CIA officials he says are involved in this are explicitly violating stated policy.

On October 26, Frank Greve of Knight-Ridder News Service quoted Brooks McClure, a retired veteran Foreign Service officer and terrorism specialist, as having said that when the group that bombed the Marines in Beirut is found out, they will be quietly “disposed of. It’s more effective against your real enemies if you take them out and never talk about it.”

“Don’t talk about it” is also the solution proposed by William F. Buckley, Jr., himself a former CIA officer, to what he considers the occasional need for assassination despite an official ban on it. Last June he wrote, “But isn’t assassination wrong?”

“Yes assassination is wrong. But can’t one say that assassination is wrong, but that there are worse things than assassinations? Like death for a quarter million people, and perhaps a war?”

“Yes, one can say that.” In that case, do it but don’t talk about it.

Once begun, this sort of thing becomes a way of life. That has happened in Central America. The former U.S. ambassador to El Salvador, Robert White, appeared on the Today show last April 14 to describe what he had learned on a recent trip to Central America. Among other things, White mentioned that he had talked with a mercenary trained by the CIA and paid to assassinate leaders of Nicaragua.

White’s revelation came almost two months before the Nicaraguan government expelled three U.S. diplomats for plotting the murder of Nicaragua’s foreign minister, Miguel D’Escoto Brockman. The three—Ermila Loretta Rodriguez, David Greig, and Linda Pfeifel—were identified as principal figures in a CIA network who had attempted to recruit Marlene Moncada to kill D’Escoto, who is also a priest.

They gave her a shortwave radio to receive coded messages, two wooden idols in which cypher keys were

*Part 1 appeared in CAIB Number 8 (March-April 1980); Part 2 appeared in Number 11 (December 1980); Part 3 in Number 17 (Summer 1982). (Continued on page 39.)