An Account of Thomas Brown's Philosophy of the Human Mind

by

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ABSRACT:
This manuscript, which has been prepared as the first part of my ongoing Ph.D. research into the historical development of the principles and practices of hypnotism, and the nature, form, and content of hypnotic suggestion, presents a detailed, systematic account (supported by an innovative taxonomical representation) of the notions of "suggestion" and "dominant ideas" presented by the influential Edinburgh University philosopher, Thomas Brown, M.D. (1788-1820), within his (posthumously published) *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind*.

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Thomas Brown (1778-1820 CE)

> In the slow progress of some insidious disease, which is scarcely regarded by its cheerful and unconscious victim, it is mournful to mark the smile of gaiety as it plays over that very bloom, which is not the freshness of health, but the flushing of approaching mortality,— amid studies, perhaps, just opening into intellectual excellence, and hopes and plans of generous ambition that are never to be fulfilled. (Brown, *Lectures*, XLIII, p.277)

Thomas Brown was born on 9 January 1778. He was the youngest of the Rev. Samuel Brown and Margaret Smith's thirteen children. His father died in 1779. His mother was responsible for his education until he was placed under the care of his maternal uncle, Captain Smith, who ensured that he had a solid classical education in the years from seven to fourteen.

As a child, Brown displayed a prodigious memory. Brown "displayed [an] inordinate literary precocity"[1] during his early education; and one of his teachers was so taken with one of Brown's poems that he submitted it for publication "and a short time afterwards showed him a magazine with his production in it" (Welsh, 1825, p.9).

Captain Smith died in 1792, and Brown returned to Edinburgh to live with his mother and sisters.

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[1] Quoting from Rollin's introduction to Brown (1835/1977), p.v.

Whilst absent from Scotland he had amassed a large collection of books comprised of "valuable works" which he had purchased over time with his pocket money, "his prizes, and the presents he had received from his companions". Unfortunately, he shipped his collection home independently, and the entire collection was lost at sea when the ship carrying his books "was lost, in fine weather, on a sand-bank in Yarmouth Roads". Welsh remarks that "Dr. Brown always remembered the circumstance [of his loss] with great regret, and considered it one of the greatest misfortunes of his early life" (Welsh, 1825, pp.19-20).

In the winter of 1792/1793, then just fourteen, he enrolled in the University of Edinburgh and, amongst others, including James Finlayson's classes in logic, he attended Dugald Stewart's lectures in moral philosophy.

He made quite an impression on Stewart; particularly because he raised a number of considered challenges to one of Stewart's theories: "Mr Stewart listened patiently, and then read to the youth a letter which he had received from a M. Prevost of Geneva, containing the very same objections" (McCosh, 1875/1990, p.318).

Brown commenced a study of Law in 1796, but soon found that the study of Law made far too many demands on his extensive literary, linguistic, and philosophical interests. Because of this he transferred to Medicine in 1798; and, whilst studying medicine, he still pursued his extra-curricular intellectual interests.

He was a founding member of the Edinburgh's *Academy of Physics* (Cantor, 1975); and several of the *Academy*, including Brown, established the *Edinburgh Review* in 1802 — Brown wrote a number of articles for early issues of the review, including a review of Belsham's "philosophy of the mind", a fierce attack on phrenology,[2] and the first English analysis of Kant's critical philosophy.

In 1798, he published his extremely well-received *Observations on the Zoonomia of Erasmus Darwin, M.D.*, having been encouraged to expand on his earlier critique of Erasmus Darwin's *Zoonomia*, written in 1796.

In 1804 a two-volume edition of the first collection of his poems was published; "the greater number of pieces in them were written while he was at college" — and, overall, whilst "they all exhibit the marks of an original and powerful genius and of a singularly refined taste", "they are of a very miscellaneous description, and are certainly inferior to many of his subsequent compositions" (Welsh, 1825, p.86).

In 1805, Brown became involved in a controversy raging between academics and clergy over the eventual rejection of one John Leslie's appointment to the chair of mathematics at Edinburgh. Leslie was by far the best-qualified candidate, with his claims to the vacant chair being "so incontestably superior to those of any clerical competitor" (Welsh, 1825, p.94).

[2] This was published anonymously; but the fact that Brown made one of the earliest challenges to the principles of phrenology makes later claims by certain phrenologists that Brown's philosophy of mind was symmetrical with their principles quite absurd.

According to the clergy, Leslie's earlier published treatise on heat contained atheistic causal principles which had been derived from Hume (which they felt, collectively, led to a rejection of morality and religion).

In 1805, Brown published a small volume in defence of Leslie's position, *Observations on the Nature and Tendency of the Doctrine of Mr. Hume concerning the Relation of Cause and Effect,* and, rather than simply supporting Leslie, he took the far more complex step of arguing that whilst Hume's stance was sceptical, it was not atheistic; and, in particular, he argued, as he would continuously argue throughout his career, that causation simply meant uniform antecedence.

This was a highly influential book.

A second, enlarged edition of this work was published in 1806, and a third, further enlarged and further modified edition was published in 1817, and a fourth edition was published posthumously in 1835 (i.e., Brown, 1835/1977).

He was awarded his medical degree 1803. His dissertation was on the intricate structures of both willed and unwilled (or 'mechanical') movement (*De somno*, 1803).

He was well thought of as a highly talented medical practitioner in Edinburgh, and started working as the associate of the famous Dr James Gregory, "professor of the practice of physic" in 1806.

He continued to practice medicine until 1808;[3] and, even when he held the Chair of Moral philosophy at Edinburgh University, his colleagues still consulted with him, from time to time, over difficult cases.

With strong academic support, Brown was nominated to fill the chair of Rhetoric at the University of Edinburgh in 1799, and the Chair of Logic[4] in 1808.

He had both nominations rejected by the political strength of the local clerical influence.

In the winter of 1808/1809 he was asked to lecture to the Moral Philosophy class at Edinburgh University for the ailing Dugald Stewart. A letter dated 30 December 1809 Stewart asked of Brown:

> As the state of my health at present makes it impossible for me to resume my lectures on Wednesday next, I must again have recourse to your friendly assistance, in supplying my place for a short time. *Two* lectures, or at the utmost *three* in the week will, I think, be sufficient during my absence; and I should wish (if equally agreeable to you) that you should confine yourself chiefly to the *intellectual powers of man*; a part of the course which I was led to pass over this season, in hopes of being able, by contracting my plan, to do more justice to the appropriate doctrines of Ethics. On this last subject I had accordingly entered a few days before the vacation; and it is my intention to prosecute it as soon as I shall find myself in a condition to return… (Welsh, 1825, p.171)

[3] Rollin's introduction to Brown (1835/1977), p.vi.

[4] In Edinburgh, "the chair of Logic… was devoted to the topics of Intellectual Philosophy — embracing generally Logic, Psychology, and Metaphysics, and in the cases of St. Andrews and Glasgow, Rhetoric as well" (Veitch, 1877b, p.207)

The reason for this request in this form was that, in these sorts of temporary absence, it was normal practice to request a friend to "supply one's place":

> In general [in the case of a temporary absence], it is very easy for a Professor to find a substitute. Nothing more is necessary than that the manuscript lecture should be committed to a friend, by whom it is read to the class.[5] In Mr. Stewart's case, however, it was otherwise. His habits of composition, the numerous transpositions that were to be found in his pages, and the many illustrations of which he sketched merely the outline, trusting the filling up to his extemporaneous powers of discourse, rendered his papers in a great measure useless in any hands but his own. In this difficulty he applied to Dr. Brown, who undertook the arduous task of supplying his place with lectures of his own composition. (Welsh, 1825, p.171)

He substituted again for Stewart the following winter (1809-1810).

Thanks to Stewart's recommendation, and strong support from the intellectual community of Edinburgh, he was appointed Conjoint Professor of Moral Philosophy[6] in Edinburgh University in mid-1810, and despite being officially the joint holder of the chair, he "henceforth discharged all the duties of the office" (McCosh, 1875/1990, p.285).[7]

Following his professorial appointment, each afternoon and evening, he would write out in full the text for the mid-day lecture that he intended to deliver on the following day.[8]

In a letter (written April 1811) Brown remarks that, during 1810, he had, "with [his] abominable procrastination, …suffered the remaining summer months to pass away *idly*". As a consequence, "the [1810/1811] winter which followed was what you might well suppose [an extremely fatiguing task] from morning till night". Yet, despite the fact that "for the six or seven weeks of the latter part of the course, [he] had to compose every day the lecture of the ensuing day" Brown strongly believed that "these lectures were amongst the best [he ever] gave". (Welsh, 1825, p.194)

His teaching notes were written on alternate pages of his notebook; and, as the years went by, certain embellishments, corrections, and more precise explanations were written on the intervening pages as they came to mind.

Yet, according to the hagiographic exaltations of a number of his biographers, Brown did not alter any of his original drafts:

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[5] In much the same way that a colleague may "read" a paper to a conference on behalf of the author who is unable to attend at the last moment due to illness.

[6] According to Veitch (1877b, p.207), "the chair of Moral Philosophy… was regarded as embracing Ethics proper, Natural Jurisprudence, Natural Theology, and generally Political Economy".
Veitch also notes that "Intellectual Philosophy was… to some extent [also] taught by the Professors of Moral Philosophy".

[7] Thus he was, at various times, Stewart's student, Stewart's colleague and, eventually, Stewart's successor.

[8] As was the custom of the times, these notes would be delivered word for word, precisely as Brown had written them; consequently, these collected notes are a precise text of what Brown actually said — rather than being some sort of *aide-mémoire* from which Brown spoke "off the cuff", however the fancy took him.
Also, from the various comments made in the text itself, it appears that his lectures were delivered every day, rather than just once or twice a week.
This view is supported by Veitch (1877b): "Since [1730] the spoken discourse of an hour each day has been the staple of instruction in Philosophy in the Scottish Universities" (p.208).

> His biographer tells us that, on his appointment to the chair, he had retired to the country in order that fresh air and exercise might strengthen him for his labours, and that, when the session opened, he had only the few lectures of the previous winters [that he had prepared to teach on Stewart's behalf]; but such was *t*he fervor of his genius and the readiness of his pen, that he generally commenced the composition of a lecture after tea and had it ready for delivery next day by noon, and that nearly the whole of the lectures contained in the first three of the four-volumed edition were written in the first year of his professorship, and the whole of the remaining next session. *Nor does he appear to have rewritten any portion of them, or to have been disposed to review his judgements, or make up what was defective in his philosophic reading.* (McCosh, 1875/1990, p.323, emphasis added)

It seems that this is the passage to which McCosh is referring:

> Immediately after his appointment, Dr. Brown retired to the country, where he remained till within six weeks of the meeting of the College. He judged that air and exercise might strengthen him for the labours of the [1810/1811] winter; and from the experience of the former year, he had sufficient confidence in his own powers to be assured that he could prepare his Lectures upon the spur of the occasion. Accordingly, when the College opened, except the Lectures that were written during Mr. Stewart's absence [in the previous year], he had no other preparation in writing. But in his extensive reading, his thorough acquaintance with the science, a copious imagination, great powers of language, with good health and spirits, and the stimulus of an enlightened audience, he had the best of all preparations. From a mind of such a conformation, and in a state of such culture, what is called forth in the excitement of the hour, has certainly far more spirit, and generally as much correctness as the careful and plodding products of timid mediocrity.
>
> He seldom began to prepare any of his lectures till the evening of the day before it was delivered. His labours generally commenced immediately after tea, and he continued at his desk till two, and often till three in the morning. After the repose of a few hours, he resumed his pen, and continued writing often till he heard the hour of twelve, when he hurried off to deliver what he had written. When his lecture was over, if the day was favourable, he generally took a walk, or employed his time in light reading, till his favourite beverage restored him again to a capacity for exertion.
>
> His exertions during the whole of the winter [of 1810/1811] were uncommonly great; and with his delicate frame, it is surprising that he did not sink altogether under them. For several nights he was prevented from ever being in bed; and, upon one occasion, he did not begin his lecture till one o'clock on the morning of the day on which it was to be delivered. He had been engaged in entertaining a numerous company of literary friends, and it was upon their departure that he commenced his studies. The lecture contains a theory of avarice [viz., lecture LXIX]; and though I cannot agree with his general doctrine [as expressed in this particular lecture] …I think it must be allowed to contain much valuable truth, and to bear no marks whatever of the rapidity with which it was composed.[9] The subject of many of his lectures he had never reflected upon till he took up his pen, and many of his theories occurred to him during the period of composition. He never, indeed, at any time, wrote upon any subject

[9] As will be seen in the notes on Brown's set of *Lectures*, this belief that the section on avarice "bears no marks whatever of the rapidity with which it was composed" is not universally shared; and, in fact, it does seem that Brown has mistakenly conflated two separate categories into one (q.v., Gilman, 1825, pp.23-24). This anecdote from Welsh would explain this defect in Brown's otherwise flawless presentation.

> without new thoughts, and these often the best, starting up in his mind.[10] (Welsh, 1825, pp.191-193)

However, from his own direct, recent physical viewing of Brown's actual lecture notes (from which the *Lectures* were compiled and published), held in the Library of the University of Edinburgh, Stewart-Robertson (2004) finds no basis for the widely held view that his teaching notes were a once-only production:

> Brown's biographer, the Revd David Welsh, popularized the tale that Brown composed his entire lecture series *ex nihilo* in virtually a single session. Yet his extant lecture notes, penned first in 1810–12, reveal extensive and continuous revision, the product of a tireless mind.

In relation to his teaching notes, Welsh often refers to the fact that Brown had invented a peculiar form of short hand (Wells, 1825, p.336):

> [Brown] made use of a method of short hand, which he invented; the benefit of which he found to consist not merely in enabling him to put down his ideas rapidly, but also in the power thus given to him by the extreme minuteness of the character of taking in the whole subject both with his eye and his mind at a single glance. (Welsh, 1825, p.336)

And, from an oblique reference (in a letter written in January 1797) to a set of "universal" symbolic writing, termed *pasigraphy*, "invented by one of the Parisian men of letters"[11] (Wells, 1825, p.35), it is clear that Brown was interested in more graphical and more systematic sorts of representations of concepts, relationships and ideas.

In 1814, his most famous set of poems, *The Paradise of Coquettes*, was published anonymously. It ran to a second, corrected and polished edition, published in 1816. Welsh tells us that "he had begun this poem, and written a great part of it more than six years before, but was obliged to lay it aside on account of his health", and goes on the remark that "in general, indeed, writing had the effect of raising his pulse very much, and rendered it so irritable as to make a difference of thirty in sitting or standing" (1825, p.357). Also, according to Welsh (p.393):

> The frequency with which the poetical works of Dr. Brown succeeded each other began to excite remark. And while the devotion of his mind to poetry, to the neglect, as was supposed, of philosophy, was objected to him by his enemies almost as a moral defect in his character, even those who were inclined to judge more favourably, regretted it as a weakness that materially injured his reputation.[12] (p.393)

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[10] Welsh appends this additional comment:

> To those who take an interest in the variety of intellectual character, these circumstances will be of a deeper interest than that which arises merely from the proof they convey of the rapidity of his powers of execution. They serve to illustrate a peculiarity of intellect, where the comprehensive energy is so great, that the utmost diversity and novelty of subordinate and particular disquisitions are all kept in complete unison with the general design. (1825, p.193)

[11] Although no further information is given, it seems certain that Brown refers to Anne Pierre Jacques de Vismes (1745-1819), who proposed a universal alphabet (based on music, rather than ideograms). His *Pasilogie*, was published in Paris in 1806. [*The Oxford English Dictionary* has this to say of *pasigraphy*: "A name given to a system of writing proposed for universal use, with characters representing ideas instead of words, so as to be (like the ordinary numerals 1, 2, 3, etc.) intelligible to persons of all languages. Applied originally to a system proposed in 1796."]

[12] In the total absence of any philosophical publications — i.e., except for the publication of the incomplete *Sketch of a System of the Philosophy of the Human Mind* just before his death — and, in addition to his first two-volume set of poems, published in 1804, and *The Renovation of India, A Poem,* published in 1808, and the

> That Dr. Brown did not consult for his immediate fame in the choice he made, may be readily allowed. But before he brought himself forward in the character of a poet, he was aware of the risk to which he subjected himself. And, having once resolved, he had too much firmness of character to be moved by the censure or neglect of his contemporaries. (p.395)

Towards the end of 1819 Brown fell ill.

He attempted to continue teaching following the Christmas holidays, but fell ill and died from consumption in the April of 1820.

Not a man of robust constitution, it was generally thought that he had exhausted himself from overwork.

At the time of his death, he was engaged in a project of reducing his complex teaching notes into text-book form; and an incomplete, interim draft of a synopsis of the first fifty-one of his lectures (*Sketch of a System of the Philosophy of the Human Mind*) had appeared just prior to his death. According to Welsh, at the time of his death, Brown had planned a whole series of works:

> Among ["the variety of works which he had in contemplation"], the first which he proposed, after bringing his Outlines [viz., his projected two-volume *Sketch of a System of the Philosophy of the Human Mind*] to conclusion, was to be entitled Ethical Essays. He then intended, in two separate works, to give a theory of Virtue and Beauty. After this he contemplated a work on the Philosophy of Physical Inquiry. This last work, it is particularly to be regretted that he did not live to accomplish — as in it he would have brought forward some views in regard to the material universe, that would have placed his character as a philosopher in a new aspect. He had a theory of Heat that he intended to bring forward. Upon this theory he set great value; and when urged to publish it without loss of time, lest others might fall upon it, he said that it was of such a nature that there was no fear of such anticipation. A fragment of the Essay had been committed to paper when he was a member of the Academy of Physic [sic]; but it contains merely his views upon the theories of others, and there is nothing in it that can enable us, with any show of probability, to conjecture what were his own sentiments.
>
> He intended also to give a very full course of Political Economy. His first intention was to deliver his Lectures upon that subject in summer; but he was soon convinced that this would confine him too much to the town; and he resolved for one year to endeavour to give a lecture at three o'clock. Political Economy was a subject which had occupied much of his thoughts before he was elected professor. There is cause to regret that all his notes, from different works, as well as his own views, are lost to the public, having originally been written in [his idiosyncratic] short-hand, and never extended.
>
> He intended, after having delivered his Lectures upon Political Economy for six or seven years, to resign his situation, and retire to the country, where he proposed to prepare his lectures for publication, and devote himself, without any interruption whatever, to letters and philosophy. (Welsh, 1825, pp.464-465)

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first edition of *The Paradise of Coquettes*, published in 1814, Welsh lists his poetic publications as follows:

> The *War-fiend* was published in 1816; *the Bower of Spring* in 1817; a second edition of the *Paradise of Coquettes* in 1817; *Agnes* in 1818; *Emily* in 1819. The second edition of *The Renovation of India*, though printed in 1819, was not published till after Dr. Brown's death. (1825, p.393)

Brown's lecture notes were published in their entirety almost immediately after his death. The collection of teaching notes for the one hundred lectures was edited only to the extent that the embellishments, corrections, more precise explanations and other "interlineations" Brown had accumulated over his years of teaching were inserted.

It is also highly significant these notes were not a posthumous compilation of his students' notes (e.g., Ferdinand de Saussure's famous *Course of Lectures on General Linguistics*, was compiled, as a collective effort, from the aggregated notes that had been taken by a number of his students during his lectures) but were, rather, a compilation of his own personal notes from which the lectures were delivered, verbatim, by Brown:

> As the lectures were not prepared for the press, they do not appear without some of the disadvantages of posthumous publications. There is an awkwardness in some of the forms of expression that immediately presents itself to the eye; though even this has a certain value, as affording evidence of perfect genuineness. The recapitulatory statements also, being intended for the convenience of [the ears of] the auditors for whom the lectures were prepared, are not always to be found where the nature of the subject might suggest. It may be added, that the style occasionally bears the marks of the circumstances in which the author was placed; and the want of the benefit of notes may sometimes be experienced. Some other imperfections might perhaps be mentioned, but they are all of minor importance, and do not in any degree affect the essential excellencies. Indeed, considering the circumstances under which the work appears, it is a matter of admiration that the defects should be so trivial; and that these lectures, possessing so great and varied merits, should have been printed in the form in which they were prepared for the purpose of academic instruction, without requiring any alteration, is altogether without a parallel.[13] (Welsh, 1825, pp.323-324)

Given the unusual nature of Brown's teaching style, wherein which he continually visits and revisits each point on many of occasions, from many of different perspectives, over many (non-sequential) lectures, and given his expansive knowledge of Latin and English poetry, his extensive quotations therefrom, and his florid, expansive style of writing, any attempt at a coherent 2005 reading of his *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind* is an extremely daunting task to a reader without Latin.

> Among the inconveniences, to which the form of posthumous Lectures subjects this work, are the innumerable recapitulations and repetitions, which everywhere occur. Probably all the leading ideas and arguments are stated, to a greater or less extent, three times over; and many of them, even more. So that, were the Lectures reduced to a regular treatise, and these repetitions omitted, we should have a book exceeding in size little more than two thirds of the present. It should be remembered, however, that what is sometimes an annoyance in perusal, must have been attended with some advantages to those who originally had the privilege of hearing [Brown's actual lectures]. And, even now, the reader will find much assistance in comprehending and appreciating the author's arguments, by studying the recapitulations, in which former statements are frequently placed in better points of view, and considerations altogether new are sometimes presented. (Gilman, 1825, pp.48-49)

[13] Here, again, Welsh is incorrectly asserting that the notes for each lecture was written in a single draft that was never altered.

There is a quite simple, rational explanation for the (otherwise inexplicable) complexity of his teaching notes.

As was the custom of the day, Brown would enter the lecture hall, produce his lecture notes, and recite his lecture from them, precisely as written, for the entire hour.

His enrolled students were predominantly "youths between sixteen and twenty"; and, so, his style could not be either "too elaborate" or "too artificial and sentimental" (McCosh, 1875/1990, p.322).

It was essential that the content of each lecture of Brown's was highly redundant in itself and, as well, strongly interwoven with what had gone before and what would follow, with lots of reminders of past matters discussed, and lots of projection of current topics into their future applications, specifically because Brown *refused to allow his students to take any notes of any sort during his lectures*:

> Dr Brown did not permit his students to take notes during the time of his lecturing, owing to a fact with which you are doubtless familiar, viz., that a few years preceding, some of the lectures of Mr [Dugald] Stewart were presented to the public in a garbled form, before the author himself had issued them. (Gilman, 1825, p.39)

Notwithstanding this prohibition or, perhaps, because of it, Brown's lectures were highly popular:

> A course so eminently popular among students had not, I rather think, been delivered in any previous age in the University of Edinburgh, and has not, in a later age, been surpassed…
>
> In the last age you would have met, in Edinburgh and all over Scotland, with ministers and lawyers who fell into raptures when they spoke of his lectures… (McCosh, 1875/1990, p.322)

Welsh, a contemporary of Dugald Stewart, and a long-time friend of Brown, had often attended Brown's lectures, speaks of "the enthusiastic admiration that day after day was exhibited [by his audience], and which was beyond any thing of the kind that I can recollect" (1825, p.173):

> The Moral Philosophy class at this period presented a very striking aspect. It was not a crowd of youthful students led away in the ignorant enthusiasm of the moment; distinguished members of the bench, of the bar, and of the pulpit, were daily present to witness the powers of this living philosopher. Some of the most eminent of the professors were to be seen mixing with the [enrolled] students, and Mr. Playfair,[14] in particular, was present at almost every lecture. The originality, and depth, and eloquence of the lectures, was the subject of general conversation, and had a very marked effect upon the young men attending the university, in leading them to metaphysical speculations. (pp.173-174)

According to Gilman, "[Brown] certainly had the happiness of combining the genius of the severest inductive philosophy with an adventurous metaphysical spirit" (1856, p.362).

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[14] That is, Mr. John Playfair, M.A. (1748-1819 CE).

He was Professor of Mathematics at the University of Edinburgh from 1785 to 1805), and Professor of Natural Philosophy (i.e., today's *Physics*), also at the University of Edinburgh, from 1805 until his death in 1819.

In a reference written in support of Brown's 1810 candidature, he commented on his experience as an auditor of the lectures Brown gave when standing in for Dugald Stewart:

> The great impression made by his lectures when he assisted Mr, Stewart during his ill health last winter, and the general admiration they excited, are well known to you… and I must beg leave, having been present at most of Dr. Brown's lectures, to add my testimony, both as to the great pleasure I received from them, and as to the effect which they produced on the whole of his audience; an effect that I found was not confined to the moment, but was augmented by reflection. (Welsh, 1825, pp.185-186)

> Dr. Brown was in height rather above the middle size, about five feet nine inches [viz., 1.75 metres]; his chest broad and round; his hair brown; his features regular; his forehead large and prominent; his eyes dark grey, well formed with very long eyelashes, which gave him a very pleasing and soft expression:
>
> his eye was keen,
> With sweetness mix'd.
>
> His nose might be said to be a mixture of Grecian and Roman, and his mouth and chin bore a very striking resemblance to those of the Buonaparte family. (Welsh, 1825, p.454)

> He was intimately acquainted with the principles of almost all the fine arts; and in many of them showed, that practice only was wanting to insure perfection in his powers of execution.
>
> His acquaintance with languages was great, and he might be said to have a talent for languages. French, Italian, and German, he read with the same ease as English. He read also Spanish and Portuguese, though not so fluently. He was as familiar with French literature as with that of our own country…
>
> In any language with which he was acquainted he read with a rapidity that appeared inconceivable. The period from his receiving a volume till his laying it aside was so brief, that his own relatives could scarcely be convinced he had perused it, till he satisfied them by showing his acquaintance with its contents. (Welsh, 1825, pp.462-463)

Not only was Brown possessed of great intelligence and a prodigious memory, he also had an exceptional talent for discerning patterns amongst events and objects; one Dr. Currie, in a fragment of a letter that appears in Welsh's biography, speaks of how "in the early part of his life [Brown] occasionally indulged in cards, and was very successful as a whist player", Brown had explained to Currie that the secret of his success "consisted in a quick discovery of the play of his partner" and his consequent "immediate conformity to it" (Welsh, 1825, p.507).

Not only was Brown an eloquent and fascinating speaker, he was also, according to Welsh, a very delicate and excitable man; for example, when writing poetry, his pulse rate would rise significantly. He would also be so greatly affected by the matters discussed in his lectures, that he would routinely display "quickness of the pulse, and a feeling of weakness":

> Indeed, many of his lectures affected him so much, that he found it difficult to conceal from his pupils what he felt. When he read any thing that contained sublime moral sentiments, or any thing very tender, he never failed to be much moved. (Welsh, 1825, p.441)

Of the last lecture that Brown ever delivered (Brown, *Lectures*, XXXV, pp.221-227, dealing with *resemblance* as one of the *primary laws of suggestion*), Welsh observes that "[this] lecture unfortunately happened to be one which always excited him a great deal of emotion" (Welsh, 1825, p.441), and goes on to remark "and those who recollect the manner in which he always recited the very affecting lines from Beattie's *Hermit*, will not wonder that some who attended his last course should conceive the emotion he displayed arose from a foreboding of his own approaching dissolution" (Welsh, 1825, pp.441-442).[15]

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[15] Despite his appointment to the chair of Moral Philosophy at Aberdeen University, James Beattie (1735–1803) was far more a respected as a poet than a philosopher. According to Boswell, in his *Life of Johnson*, Samuel Johnson was always greatly moved by Beattie's poem, *The Hermit*:

In the lecture in question, Brown has been discussing the extent to which "the simile… is a figure of much more deliberate reflection than the metaphor" (Brown, *Lectures*, XXV, p.226). Having already argued that the metaphor is "the figure of passion", which involves "the suggestion of objects by their analogous objects", contrasted with the simile, "the figure of calm description", which "presents, not the analogy merely, but the two analogous objects and traces their resemblance to each other with the formality of regular comparison" (XXV, p.224), Brown goes on to assert that "notwithstanding the intellectual labour which [the simile's deliberate reflection] seems to imply, it is evident that, in the pleasure which we receive from it, we still have in view the general principle of spontaneous suggestion" (XXV, p.226).

The final point made by Brown, in his argument — having cited a number of poetic examples to support his view that "we are more pleased, in general, with comparisons derived from the works of nature, than with those which are borrowed from the works of art" (XXV, p.226) — is the section of the lecture that was specifically referred to by Welsh:

> When the analogies are suggested by surrounding objects, or by objects that harmonize with the surrounding scenery, they appear more natural, and therefore more pleasing. It is this which forms the principal charm of the separate stanzas of another very popular poem of a similar class, the Hermit of Dr. Beattie,[16] in which the moral allusions are all caught from objects that are represented as present to the eye or ear of the moralist. I confess, however, that, when read as a whole, the uniformity of the allusions, drawn from such a variety of objects to the single circumstance of man's mortality. Gives an appearance of laborious search, almost in the same manner as if the analogy had been traced from very remote objects. I select, therefore, only a single stanza [viz., stanza 4] from the whole:—
>
> " 'Tis night and the landscape is lovely no more.
> I mourn, but ye woodlands I mourn not for you:
> For morn is approaching your charms to restore,
> Perfum'd with fresh fragrance, and glittering with dew.
> Nor yet for the ravage of winter I mourn,
> Kind Nature the embryo blossom will save.
> But when shall Spring visit the mouldering urn?
> O! when shall it dawn on the night of the grave? (XXV, p.226)

According to Todd (1943, pp.64-65) Brown's *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind* was a prescribed text for courses in "intellectual philosophy" at Harvard from 1825 to 1833. [According to Fuchs (2000, p.3), in the period "from the colonial and early federal period to the Civil War" in the United States, all of these sorts of proto-psychology courses were labelled either "intellectual philosophy" or "mental philosophy".] It was also used, at Harvard, as a text for a course called "Moral Philosophy and Natural Theology" in 1830.

> Such was his [Johnson's] sensibility, and so much was he affected by pathetick poetry, that, when he was reading Dr. Beattie's *Hermit* in my presence, it brought tears into his eyes. (1783: aetat.[viz. "at the age of"] 74: Sunday, 30 March, 1783: 1799/1970, p.1210).

[16] Whilst Beattie's highest degree was an M.A. from Aberdeen University, he had also been awarded an Honorary Doctor of Laws by Oxford University in April 1773; thus "Dr. Beattie**".**

In 1827, Levi Hedge, Harvard Professor of Logic, responded to the problem of the complexity of the set of lectures and produced a far smaller work, *A Treatise on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, Being the Lectures of the Late Thomas Brown, M.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, Abridged, and Distributed according to the Natural Divisions of the Subject by Levi Hedge, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in Harvard University, in Two Volumes*, from which he had removed all of Brown's repetition.

Using modern terminology, he "cut and pasted" the body of Brown's text, precisely as it had been published, into a far more coherent sequence, with only the minimal number of additions to make any otherwise disjointed reading (due to the excisions he had made) smooth and coherent.

It is clearly obvious that Brown would have rather been a poet than a philosopher.[17]

Yet, there is a delightful, excited earnestness in all of his work that seems to transmit a feeling that his ideas are so simple (i.e., non-complex), and so centrally basic, that anyone who takes the time to follow his patient disentanglement of the complex notions (by contrast with what we might characterize as the vicious knot-cutting of others) will finally reach a point where not only are Brown's views clearly understood, but are, also, strongly held on the grounds of a fundamental agreement, within the reader, based on them having acquired a *knowledge by acquaintance*.

John Stuart Mill — who, by his own account, first read Brown's *Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect* in 1822 and, then, read Brown's *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind* "two or three years later"[18] — expresses his own, often-stated positive opinion of Brown's value and worth; an opinion that is in strongly contrast with his view of Sir William Hamilton (who was born in 1778, the same year as Brown, and died in 1856):

> It is much to be regretted that Sir W. Hamilton did not write the history of philosophy, instead of choosing, as the direct object of his physical exertions, philosophy itself. He possessed a knowledge of the materials such as no one, probably, for many generations, will take the trouble of acquiring again; and the erudition of philosophy is emphatically one of the things which it is good that a few should acquire for the benefit of the rest. Independently of the great interest and value attaching to a knowledge of the historical development of speculation, there is much in the old writers on philosophy, even those of the middle ages, really worth preserving for its scientific value. But this should be extracted, and rendered into the phraseology of modern thought, by persons as familiar with that as with the ancient, and possessing a command of its language; a combination never yet so perfectly realized as in Sir W. Hamilton. It is a waste of time for a mere student of philosophy, to have to learn the familiar use of fifty philosophic phraseologies, all greatly inferior to that of his own time; and if this were required from all thinkers, there would be very little time left for thought. A man who had done it so thoroughly as Sir W. Hamilton, should have made his cotemporaries and successors, once for all, partakers of the benefit; and rendered it unnecessary for anyone to do it again, except for verifying and correcting his representations. This, which no one but himself could have done, he has left undone; and has given us, instead, a contribution to mental

[17] "That Dr. Brown preferred poetry to philosophy is certain" (Welsh, 1825, p.394).

[18] Mill (1873), p.69.

philosophy which has been more than equalled by many not superior to him in powers, and wholly destitute of erudition. Of all persons, in modern times, entitled to the name of philosophers, the two, probably, whose reading on their own subjects was the scantiest, in proportion to their intellectual capacity, were Dr. Thomas Brown and Archbishop [Richard] Whately [1787-1863]: accordingly they are the only two of whom Sir W. Hamilton, though acknowledging their abilities, habitually speaks with a certain tinge of superciliousness. It cannot be denied that both Dr. Brown and Archbishop Whately would have thought and written better than they did, if they had been better read in the writings of previous thinkers: but I am not afraid that posterity will contradict me when I say, that either of them have done far greater service to the world, in the origination and diffusion of important thought, than Sir W. Hamilton, with all his learning: because, though indolent readers, they were, both of them, active and fertile thinkers. (1865, pp.552-553)

Brown's Philosophy of the Human Mind

> Thomas Brown was the last prominent figure in the Scottish philosophical tradition deriving from David Hume and Thomas Reid. Like Reid, he took the mind's knowledge about itself to be a datum it is pointless to challenge or try to justify, since no other grounds can be more certain for us. But he defended Hume's account of causation as nothing more than invariable succession. The mind, therefore, is a simple substance, whose successive states are affected by and affect the states of physical objects: the laws according to which these changes take place are no harder to grasp than the effects of gravitation. Brown's lectures, published as delivered daily to Edinburgh students, seek to classify the laws of the mind so that we can conveniently understand ourselves, and direct our lives accordingly; the last quarter of his course draws conclusions for ethics and natural religion. (Bryant, 1998)

It is quite clear that the concept of "the association of ideas presupposes a mind possessed of ideas and possessed of the power of associating them" (Flint, 1876, p.323); and, yet, according to Anderson and Bower (1974) the greatest and, apparently, insurmountable problem for associationists:

> …is that items that we know to be related in different ways are assumed to be connected in the mind by one and the same sort of association. For instance, in our mind a dining room is associated with eating, a glutton with eating, a fork with eating, and a steak with eating. How is it that we know that the relation expressed by the first association is one of location to act, the second is that of actor to act, the third of act to instrument, and the fourth of act to object? All are connected by the same sort of associative link. No doubt James Mill would argue that these differences could be captured by considering each of the above examples as part of a larger network of associations, so that the relation in each case could somehow be "computed" from the position of the association in the network. However, no one has ever described exactly how this computation proceeds. (1974, p.24)

Plato (427-347 BCE)

It can be argued that Plato indirectly addresses the issue of the association of ideas with his theory of "the Forms".

In his *Phaedo* (73-76: Gallop, 1975, pp.19-25), Plato produces a dialogue in which Socrates defends his view that "learning is actually nothing but recollection" (Gallop, p.19). The dialogue expounds the view that "if anyone is to be reminded of a thing, he must have known that thing at some time previously" (p.20). Socrates discusses the various trains of thought that might arise from a particular, given stimulus (e.g., seeing something that belongs to one's lover). He then remarks that one can be reminded by (a) a "recollection from similar things" or (b) a recollection of "dissimilar things" (p.21): "it makes no difference [whether it is based on similarity or dissimilarity]; so long as on seeing one thing one does, from this sight, think of another, whether it be similar or dissimilar, this must be recollection" (p.22).

Aristotle (384-322 BCE)

In his *De Memoria et Reminiscentia* (*Memory and Recollection*), Aristotle discussed memory and mnemonic systems. Taking the simple position that the best mnemonic system would reflect the habitual manner in which people actively, intentionally and systematically attempted to exhume information from their stored collection of memories, he distinguished between:

(i) our unintentional, passive retention of items within the mind (*mneme* or "memory"), and

(ii) our intentional, sustained and active search within that mental store for a particular item (*anamnesis* or "recall").[19]

Using this distinction, he comments on the different manifestations of memory and recollection:

> In discussing memory and remembering, it is necessary to say what they are, and how their occurrence is to be explained, and to which part of the soul this affection, and recollecting belong. *For it is not the same people who are good at remembering and at recollecting. Rather, for the most part, slow people are better at remembering, while those who are quick and learn well are better at recollecting.* (449^{b}4-8: Sorabji, 1972, p.47, emphasis added)

It is also significant that Aristotle viewed the act of recollection as a natural series of connected mental movements (or "changes"); with each of these mental movements being predetermined on account of their being the inevitable consequent of a specific antecedent:

> Acts of recollection happen because one change [in mental imagery] is of a nature to occur after another. If the changes follow each other of necessity, clearly a person who undergoes the earlier change will *always* undergo the later one. But if [these changes] follow each other not of necessity but by habit, then *for the most part* a person will undergo the later one. [However, it can also] happen that by undergoing certain changes *once* a person is more habituated than he is by undergoing other changes *many times*. And this is why after seeing some things once, we remember better than we do after seeing other things many times. (451^{b}10-15: Sorabji, 1972, p.54, emphasis added)

From a study of the way people actively *hunted* for a missing idea (he specifically chose θηρευομεν, thirevomen, "hunt"), he identified three significant relationships: *similarity*, *contrast*, and *contiguity in place or time*:

> When we recollect, we run through a series of former movements till we reach the movement before the final one. So we hunt for the next step, starting from the present or some other movement, and from something like or contrary to or neighbouring on what we want. Recollection follows, because the movements we go through are identical or simultaneous with or parts of what we want, so that the further movement to be remembered is but small. (451^{b}16-22: Aristotle, 1955, p.240)

> Whenever we recollect, then, we undergo one of the earlier changes, until we undergo the one after which the change in question habitually occurs.
>
> And this is exactly why we hunt for the successor, starting in our thoughts from the present

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[19] Aristotle clearly refers to the intentional sort of *active* and *voluntary reminiscence* that we conduct when trying to exhume a particular knowledge item ("Where *did* I leave my car keys?"). In real life, we often find ourselves returning to, say, the spot we vacated in the lounge room, in order to answer the question "*Why* did I bring this book into the kitchen?".

This is quite different from the sort of *passive* and *involuntary reminiscence* that Brown discusses later on.

> or from something else, and from something similar, or opposite, or neighbouring. By this means recollection occurs. For the changes connected with these things in some cases are the same, in others are together, and in others include a part, so that the remainder which one underwent after that is small. ($451^{b}16$-22: Sorabji, 1972, pp.54-55)

Obviously, the place from which the hunt actually begins is crucial:

> Whenever someone wishes to recollect, he will do the following. He will seek to get a starting-point for a change after which will be the change in question. And this is why recollections occur quickest and best from a starting-point. For *as things are related to each other in succession*, so are the changes. And whatever has some order, as in mathematics do, is easily remembered. Other things are remembered with difficulty. ($451^{b}29$-$452^{a}3$: Sorabji, 1972, p.55, emphasis added)

Francis Bacon (1561-1626 CE)

Bacon, who equated "suggestion" to "remembrance" (1605/1915, 2.XIII.6: p.127), and was with Plato, clearly spoke of a deliberate, intentional and voluntary activity:

> The other part of invention, which I term suggestion, doth assign and direct us to certain *marks* or *places*,[20] which may excite our mind to return and produce such knowledge, as it hath formerly collected, to the end we may make use thereof. Neither is this use, truly taken, only to furnish argument to dispute probably with others, but likewise to minister unto our judgment to conclude aright within ourselves. Neither may these Places serve only to apprompt our invention, but also to direct our inquiry. For a faculty of wise interrogating is half a knowledge. For as Plato saith, *Whosoever seeketh, knoweth that which he seeketh for in a general notion: else how shall he know it when he hath found it?* and therefore the larger your anticipation is, the more direct and compendious is your search. But the same Places which will help us what to produce of that which we know already, will also help us, if a man of experience were before us, what questions to ask: or, if we have books and authors to instruct us, what points to search and revolve: so as I cannot report, that this part of invention, which is that which the schools call *Topics*, is deficient. (2.XIII.9: pp.128-129).

In relation to Bacon's views on suggestion, and from the perspective of hypnotic suggestion, his remark on the imagination is particularly significant:

> …if the imagination fortified have power, then it is material to know how to fortify and exalt it. (Bacon, 1605/1915, 2.XI.3: pp.119-120)

René Descartes (1596-1650 CE)

In his *Principles of Philosophy* (IV.197: 1644/1983, p.281), Descartes speaks of the different sequences of thoughts provoked by, amongst other things, words on paper:[21]

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[20] From the context of this passage in the whole text, it clearly seems that "marks" refer to (consequent) signs that indicate the presence of some (antecedent) event or entity, and that "place" specifically refers to the mnemonic strategy known as the system of *loci* ("places").

[21] In the section that follows, the translators have adopted the following convention: (a) anything enclosed in square brackets "[]" does not appear in the Latin original, and has been added by the translators for clarity; and (b) anything appearing in braces "{}" appears in the expanded and corrected text of the 1647 French translation of Abbé Claude Picot — which was published with Descartes' "enthusiastic approval" (p.xi).

> Next, it is proved that the nature of our mind is such that, simply from the fact that certain movements occur in a body, it can be driven to all sorts of thoughts, which convey no image of these movements; and especially to those confused thoughts which are called feelings or sensations. For we see that either spoken or even written words can excite any thoughts and stirrings whatever in our mind. On the same sheet of paper, with the same quill and ink, if the end of the quill is merely guided over the paper in a certain way; it will produce letters which will excite the thoughts of combats, tempests, and furies, and states of indignation and sadness in the minds of readers. If, however, the quill is moved in another almost identical manner, it will cause very different thoughts, of calm weather, peace, and pleasantness, and exactly opposite states of love and happiness. It will perhaps be replied that writing or speech does not excite states and images of things different from itself directly in the mind, but only diverse understandings; on the occasion of which the soul itself, {which understands the meaning of these words}, forms in itself images of various things. But what will be said of the feelings of pain and titillation? A sword, applied to our body, cuts it: from this alone pain is produced, {without thereby indicating to us what the movement or figure of the sword is. The idea of} this pain is obviously as different from the local motion of the sword or of the body which is cut, as is {the idea of} color, sound, odour, or flavor. And since we clearly see that the feeling of pain is excited in us solely by the fact that some parts of our body are locally moved by contact with some other body, we can on that account conclude that our mind is of such a nature that, from some other local motions, it can have the experiences of all the other feelings [and sensations].

In a letter written in 1647 Descartes describes how his passion for cross-eyed women had developed *per medium* of associative thinking (Diamond, 1974, p.278[22]):

> …when I was a child, I loved a girl of my own age, who was somewhat crosseyed; as a result of which, the impression which sight made on my brain when I looked at her divergent eyes was so joined to that which also stirred in me the passion of love, that long afterwards, whenever I looked at crosseyed persons, I felt more inclined to love them than love others, simply because they had this defect.[23]

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679 CE)

In his *Leviathan* (1651/1968, Chapter III, pp.94-99), Hobbes comments on how one thought tends to follow another.[24]

He speaks of *trains of thought*, "the succession of one Thought to another" (p.94), and of the links

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[22] The letter was written on 6 June 1647 to his friend Hector-Pierre Chanut (Diamond mistakenly has "Canut").

[23] This forms an interesting parallel to Locke (II.33.11: 1700/1975, p.398), who speaks of how "hatreds are often begotten" from the chance connexion of two ideas.

[24] It is significant that Hobbes speaks of trains of *thoughts*, rather than the association of *ideas*.
Later, in the same work (Chapter III, p.402), he does speak of *ideas*, and it is very plain that, in that case, he is speaking of a *conception*, in terms of *something conceived by the mind* ("Nor to say that we conceive, and imagine, or have an *Idea* of him…").

between the preceding and consequent thoughts:

> When a man thinketh on anything whatsoever, His next Thought after, is not altogether so casuall as it seems to be. Not every Thought to every Thought succeeds indifferently… But because in sense, to one and the same thing perceived, sometimes one thing, sometimes another succeedeth, it comes to pass in time that in the Imagining of any thing, there is no certainty what we shall Imagine next; Onely this is certain, it shall be something that succeeded the same before, at one time or another. (p.94)

Hobbes (p.95) divided these sequences into those which are:

(1) *Regulated*: sustained, intentional, deliberate, and voluntarily generated chains of ideas; i.e., the guided, "more constant" trains of thought, which are "regulated by some desire and designe";[25] and

(2) *Unregulated*:[26] spontaneous, automatic and involuntarily generated chains of ideas; trains of thought which are "unguided, without design, and inconstant" ("in which case the thoughts are said to wander, and seem impertinent one to another, as in a Dream").

Hobbes relates the story of an occasion when a deep, intense conversation on the (then raging) English Civil War was interrupted by a bizarre question on the value of a *denarius*; and how this apparently irrelevant digression was, upon Hobbe's own reflection, entirely justified — according to the peculiar train of thought the discussion had prompted in that particular individual's mind:

> This Trayne of Thoughts, or Mentall Discourse, is of two sorts. The first is *Unguided, without Designe*, and inconstant; Wherein there is no Passionate Thought, to govern and direct those that follow, to it self, as the end and scope of some desire, or other passion: In which case the thoughts are said to wander, and seem impertinent one to another, as in a Dream. Such are Commonly the thoughts of men, that are not onely without company, but also without care of any thing; though even then their Thoughts are as busie as at other times, but without harmony; as the sound which a Lute out of tune would yeeld to any man; or in tune, to one that could not play. And yet in this wild ranging of the mind, a man may oft-times perceive the way of it, and the dependance of one thought upon another. For in a Discourse of our present civill warre, what could seem more impertinent, than to ask (as one did) what was the value of a Roman Penny? Yet the Cohaerence to me was manifest enough. For the Thought of the warre, introduced the Thought of the delivering up the King to his Enemies; The Thought of that, brought in the Thought of the delivering up of Christ; and that again the Thought of the 30 pence, which was the price of that treason: and thence easily followed that malicious question; and all this in a moment of time; for Thought is quick. (p.95)

Hobbes further subdivided the second, unregulated group according to their typical application: (a) those which, given a particular effect, speculate on its possible cause, and, (b) those which, given a particular thing, speculate on "all the possible effects that can by it be produced" (p.96).

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[25] Hobbes emphasizes that these regulated trains of thought are "strong, and permanent". If they ever disappear, he says, they only disappear for a moment, and rapidly return — and, as well, they are often so strong that "[they] hinder and break our sleep".

[26] He used the term "Unguided".

He then goes on to echo Aristotle's views on *hunting*:

> In summe, the Discourse of the Mind,[27] when it is governed by designe, is nothing but *Seeking*, or the faculty of Invention, which the Latins call *Sagacitas*, and *Solertia*; a hunting out of the causes of some effect, present or past; or of the effects of some present or past cause. Sometimes a man seeks what he hath lost; and from that place, and time, wherein hee misses it, his mind runs back, from place to place, and time to time, to find where and when he had it; that is to say, to find some certain and limited time and place in which to begin a method of seeking. Again, from thence, his thoughts run over the same places and times, to find what action, or other occasion might make him lose it. This we call Remembrance, or calling to mind: the Latins call it *Reminiscentia*, as it were a *Re-conning* of our former actions.
>
> Sometimes a man knows a place determinate, within the compasse whereof he is to seek; and then his thoughts run over all the parts thereof, in the same manner, as one would sweep a room to find a jewel; or as a Spaniel ranges the field, till he find a scent; or as a man should run over the Alphabet to start a rime.
>
> Sometimes a man desires to know the event of an action; and then he thinketh of some like action past, and the events thereof one after another, supposing like events will follow like actions. (pp.96-97)

John Locke (1632-1704 CE)

In his introduction to his *Essay*, Locke makes it quite clear that in his usage of the term *idea* he refers to whatever might be the immediate object of one's thoughts or one's mental perceptions:

> I must …beg pardon of my Reader for the frequent use of the Word *Idea*, which he will find in the following Treatise. It being that term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding when a Man thinks, I have used it to express whatever is meant by *Phantasm*, *Notion*, *Species*, or whatever it is, which the Mind can be employ'd about in thinking; and I could not avoid frequently using it. (I.1.8, p.47)

Locke examined the *chance* connexion of ideas (i.e., the way in which one idea seemed to follow from another) as a factor in faulty reasoning (especially when extraordinary or otherwise irrational associations had been made).

He "[emphasized] both the necessity of avoiding the acquisition of associations and developing ways of ridding oneself of those which do occur (Brooks, 1982, p.1252):

> This wrong Connexion in our Minds of *Ideas* in themselves, loose and independent of one another, has such an influence, and is of so great force to set us awry in our Actions, as well Moral as Natural, Passions, Reasonings, and Notions themselves, that, perhaps, there is not any one thing that deserves more to be looked after. (II.33.9, p.397)

Whilst allowing that, through reason, "some of our *Ideas* have a natural Correspondence and Connexion one with another" — because that particular "union and correspondence… is founded in their peculiar beings" (p.395) — he also argues that others have no such logical connexion at all:

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[27] In an earlier part of the same section (p.94) Hobbes clearly states that the terms "train of thoughts" (which he also calls "consequence") and "mental discourse" are synonymous: "By *Consequence*, or TRAYNE of Thoughts, I understand that succession of one Thought to another, which is called (to distinguish it from Discourse in words), *Mentall Discourse*." (emphasis in original)

> Besides this there is another Connexion of *Ideas* wholly owing to Chance or Custom; *Ideas* that in themselves are not all of kin, come to be so united in some Mens Minds, that 'tis very hard to separate them, they always keep in company, and the one no sooner at any time comes into the Understanding, but its Associate appears with it; and if they are more than two which are thus united, the whole gang always inseparable shew themselves together. (II.33.5: p.395)

Locke offers the following example of the chance connexion of ideas: those which "either the strength of the first impression" or that of "future Indulgence" are responsible for their union; a union of such a strength that the two ideas "always afterwards kept company together in that Man's Mind, as if they were but one *Idea*" (II.33.7, p.396):

> A grown person surfeiting with Honey, no sooner hears the name of it, but his Phancy immediately carries Sickness and Qualms to his Stomach, and he cannot bear the very *Idea* of it; other *Ideas* of Dislike and Sickness, and Vomiting soon accompany it, and he is disturb'd, but he knows from whence to date this Weakness, and can tell how he got this Indisposition: Had this happen'd to him, by an over dose of Honey, when a Child, all the same Effects would have followed, but the Cause would have been mistaken, and the Antipathy [to Honey] counted Natural. (II.33.7, p.397)

He further argues (II.33.5: p.396) that in cases such as this (i.e., of the sorts of ideas that are not, *out of their own nature*, allied in any way), regardless of whether the association has been made by accident or design, this strong linkage is very much an individual matter; and is different in different individuals "according to their different Inclinations, Educations, Interests, *etc*.".

Despite individual differences in the links constituting the chains in question, for each of us, the general nature of our thinking processes is that, once our ideas have been placed into their routine pathway, by producing one idea, all of the remaining members of the "habitual train" appear automatically in their customary sequence.

As a consequence, much of our faulty and irrational thinking can not be cured by reasoning.

It is important to note that, whilst this appears in the section of Locke's *Essay* entitled "Of the Association of *Ideas*" that was added, as an entirely new chapter, to the fourth (1700) edition (II.33.1-19, pp.394-401), Locke never uses the word *association* in the text.

He consistently uses the word *connexion*.

In Diamond's view (1974, p.281), Locke's "connexion of ideas" was, most likely, his rendering of Malebranche's "*liaison des idées*". The "association" in the title was, Diamond's supposes, driven by Molyneux's choice of the Latin word *consociatione* in the Latin edition that "was being prepared simultaneously and for which the chapter was indeed written".

The chapter title has extensively misled "later associationists [who] came to look on [Locke] as their founder" and have *rivetted* the phrase *association of ideas* to Locke's name. Diamond feels that Locke would have been sorely dismayed to find that he, himself, had become a classic example of how a chance connexion of ideas could generate a train of *un-rectify-able* faulty reasoning:

> When two things, in themselves disjoin'd, appear to the sight constantly united; if the Eye sees these things riveted which are loose, where will you begin to rectify the mistakes that

follow in two *Ideas*, that they have been accustom'd so to join in their Minds, as to substitute one for the other, and, as I am apt to think, often without perceiving it themselves? (II.33.18, p.401)

George Berkeley (1685-1753 CE)

In his *Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision*,[28] first published in 1709, Berkeley recognized the associative principle without specifically naming it as such:

17. Not that there is any natural or necessary connexion between the sensation we perceive by the turn of the eyes and greater or lesser distance, but because the mind has by constant experience found the different sensations corresponding to the different dispositions of the eyes to be attended each with a different degree of distance in the object, there has grown an habitual or customary connexion between those two sorts of ideas, so that the mind no sooner perceives the sensation arising from the different turn it gives the eyes, In order to bring the pupils nearer or farther asunder, but it withal perceives the different idea of distance which was wont to be connected with that sensation; just as upon hearing a certain sound, the idea is immediately suggested to the understanding which custom had united with it. (Berkeley, 1929, p.17)

In a later (1733) essay, *The Theory of Vision, or Visual Language shewing the immediate Presence and Providence of a Deity, Vindicated and Explained* (Berkeley, 1993, pp.277-304), Berkeley elaborates on his application of the word *suggestion*:

9. By a sensible object I understand that which is properly perceived by sense. Things properly perceived by sense are immediately perceived. Besides things properly and immediately perceived by any sense, there may be also other things suggested to the mind by means of those proper and immediate objects. Which things so suggested are not objects of that sense, being in truth only objects of the imagination, and originally belonging to some other sense or faculty. Thus, sounds are the proper object of hearing, being properly and immediately perceived by that, and by no other sense. But, by the mediation of sounds or words all other things may be suggested to the mind, and yet things so suggested are not thought the object of hearing.

10. The peculiar objects of each sense, although they are truly or strictly perceived by that sense alone, may yet be suggested to the imagination by some other sense. The objects therefore of all the senses may become objects of imagination, which faculty represents all sensible things. A colour, therefore, which is truly perceived by sight alone, may, nevertheless, upon hearing the words *blue* or *red*, be apprehended by the imagination. It is in a primary and peculiar manner the object of sight: in a secondary manner it is the object of imagination: but cannot properly be supposed the object of hearing. (Berkeley, 1993, pp.283-284)

In the same essay, Berkeley also speaks of ideas:

13. Ideas which are observed to be connected together are vulgarly considered under the relation of cause and effect, whereas, in strict and philosophic truth, they are only related as the sign to the thing signified. For we know our ideas; and therefore know that one idea can not be the cause of another. We know that our ideas of sense are not the cause of themselves.

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[28] Berkeley, 1929, pp.1-98.

> We also know that we do not cause them. Hence we know they must have some other efficient cause distinct from them and us. (p.284)

Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746 CE)

In his 1738 work on philosophical aesthetics, the fourth edition of *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue* (1973, pp.23-93), Hutcheson built upon the distinctions that had been proposed by Locke between natural and chance associations (such as the chance association between honey and malaise), arguing that these chance associations were mostly, but not invariably, counterproductive:

> III. We shall see [in XI] that associations of ideas make objects pleasant and delightful which are not naturally apt to give any such pleasures; and the same way, the casual conjunction of ideas may give disgust where there is nothing disagreeable in the form itself. And this is the occasion of many fantastic aversions to figures of some animals, and to some other forms. Thus swine, serpents of all kinds, and some insects really beautiful enough, are beheld with aversion by many people who have got some accidental ideas associated to them. And for distastes of this kind no other account can be given. (I.VI.III, pp.75-76)

> XI. The association of ideas above hinted at [in III] is one great cause of the apparent diversity of fancies in the sense of beauty, as well as in the external senses, and often makes men have an aversion to objects of beauty, and a liking for others void of it, but under different conceptions than those of beauty and deformity. And here it may not be improper to give some instances of some of these associations. The beauty of trees, their cool shades, and their aptness to conceal from observation have made groves and woods the usual retreat to those who love solitude, especially to the religious, the pensive, the melancholy, and the amorous. And do we not find that we have so joined the ideas of these dispositions of mind with those external objects that they always recur to us along with them?…
>
> In like manner it is known that often all the circumstances of actions, or places, or dresses of persons, or voice, or song, which have occurred at any time together, when we were strongly affected by any passion, will be so connected that any one of these will make all the rest recur. And this is often the occasion both of great pleasure and pain, delight and aversion to many objects which of themselves might have been perfectly indifferent to us; but these approbations, or distastes, are remote from the ideas of beauty, being plainly different ideas. (I.VI.XI, pp.80-81)

In one of his *Reflections Upon Laughter* (1973, pp.108-112), published in the *Dublin Journal* of Saturday 12 June 1725, he comments on the view "that we receive sensations of pleasure from those objects which are great, new, or beautiful", and that "disagreeable ideas" are given to us by "objects that are more narrow and confined, or deformed, or irregular". He also remarks that "we apply these ideas not only to material objects, but to characters, abilities, [and] actions" (p.108):

> It may be farther observed, that by some strange associations of ideas made in our infancy, we have frequently some of these ideas recurring along with a great many objects, with which they have no other connection than what custom and education, or frequent allusions, give them, or at most, some very distant resemblance. The very affections of our minds are ascribed to inanimate objects; and some animals, perfect enough in their own kind, are made

> constant emblems of some vices or meanness; whereas other kinds are made emblems of the contrary qualities. For instances of these associations, partly from nature, partly from custom, we may take the following ones: sanctity in our churches, magnificence in public buildings, affection between the oak and ivy, the elm and vine; hospitality in a shade, a pleasant sensation of grandeur in the sky, the sea, and mountains, distinct from a bare apprehension or image of their extension; solemnity and horror in shady woods. An ass is the common emblem of stupidity and sloth, a swine of selfish luxury; an eagle of great genius; a lion of intrepidity; an ant or bee of low industry, and prudent economy. Some inanimate objects have in like manner some accessary [sic] ideas of meanness, either for some natural reason, or oftener by mere chance or custom. (p.109)

David Hartley (1705-1757 CE)

In his *Observations on Man* (Vol.I, Chap.I, Props.12-14: 1749/1966, pp.73-84), Hartley speaks of how "simple ideas" associate themselves into clusters and combinations of "complex ideas": "as simple ideas run into complex ones by Association, so complex Ideas run into decomplex ideas by the same"[29] (Prop.12, Corollary 4, p.77).

In the December 1748 preface to this work Hartley states the following:

> About Eighteen Years ago I was informed, that the Rev. Mr. *Gay*, then living, asserted the Possibility of deducing all our intellectual Pleasures and Pains from Association. This put me upon considering the Power of Association. Mr *Gay* published his Sentiments on this Matter, about the same time, in a Dissertation on the fundamental Principles of Virtue, prefixed to Mr. Archhdeacon *Law's* Translation of Archbishop *King's* Origin of Evil.
>
> From inquiring into the Power of Association I was led to examine both its Consequences, in Respect of Morality and Religion, and its physical Cause, By degrees many Disquisitions foreign to the Doctrine of Association, or at least not immediately connected with it, intermixed themselves…[30] (p.v)

Yet, with the work itself, Hartley attributes the term *association* (i.e., where the "infinitesimal Parts" of ideas "cohere together through joint Impression" (Prop.11, pp.70-71) to John Locke:

> The Influence of Association over our Ideas, Opinions, and Affections, is so great and obvious, as scarce to have escaped the Notice of any Writer who has treated of these, though the Word *Association*, in the particular Sense here affixed to it, was first brought into Use by Mr. *Locke*. (Prop.10, p.65)

In particular, Hartley's work was driven by the view that "since the Human Body is composed of the same Matter as the external World, it is reasonable to expect, that its component Particles should be subjected to the same subtle laws" (Prop.9, p.62); yet, despite his descriptions seeming to favour a mechanical, arithmetic linkage, he clearly does seem to understand that in different circumstances, a specific idea will produce different associations:

> In whatever Way we consider them, the Trains of them [viz., Ideas] which are presented to

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[29] Decomplex = compounded of parts which are themselves complex.

[30] According to McReynolds (1969, pp.xv-xix) the attribution of the authorship of this work to John Gay is controversial. McReynolds believes the author was a James Long (i.e., Long, 1747/1969).

the Mind seem to depend upon the then present State of the Body, the external Impressions, and the remaining Influence of prior Impressions and Associations, taken together. (Proposition 12, Corollary 2, p.76)

In relation to Brown's work, it is also significant that he spoke of *affections* and *passions*:

It is of the utmost Consequence to Morality and Religion, that the Affections and Passions be analysed into their simple compounding Parts, by reversing the Steps of the Associations which concur to form them. For thus we may learn how to cherish and improve good ones, check and root out such as are mischievous and immoral, and how to suit our Manner of Life, in some tolerable Measure, to our intellectual and religious Wants. And as this holds, in respect of Persons of all Ages, so it is particularly true, and worthy of Consideration, in respect of Children and Youth. The World is, indeed, sufficiently flocked with general precepts for this Purpose, grounded on Experience; and whosoever will follow these faithfully, may expect good general Success. However, the Doctrine of Association, when traced up to the first Rudiments of Understanding and Affection, unfolds such a Scene as cannot fail both to instruct and alarm all such as have any Degree of interested Concern for themselves, or of a benevolent one for others. It ought to be added here, that the Doctrine of Association explains also the Rise and Progress of those voluntary and semivoluntary Powers, which we exert over our Ideas, Affections and bodily Motions; and, by doing this, teaches us how to regulate and improve these Powers. (Proposition 14, Corollary 5, pp.81-82)

Hartley also spoke of "states of mind":

The *Will* is that State of Mind, which is immediately previous to, and causes, those express Acts of Memory, Fancy, and bodily Motion, which are termed *voluntary*. (Vol.I, Introd., p.iii)

Thomas Reid (1710-1796)

According to Reid (1785/2000), who was both the Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow University and an ordained minister (he was a Doctor of Divinity), perception involved a mental movement from the sensation to the object.

When he spoke of a sensation suggesting an object, he also clearly distinguished between the "natural suggestions" (which were the "original principles of belief") and those which were nothing more than "the result of experience and habit":

I beg leave to make use of the word *suggestion*, because I know not one more proper, to express the power of the mind, which seems entirely to have escaped the notice of the philosophers, and to which we owe many of our simple notions which are neither impressions nor ideas, as well as many original principles of belief. I shall endeavour to illustrate, by an example, what I understand by this word. We all know that a certain kind of sound suggests immediately to the mind, a coach is passing in the street; and not only produces the imagination, but the belief, that a coach is passing. Yet there is no comparing of ideas, no perception of agreements or disagreements, to produce this belief; nor is there the least similitude between the sound we hear, and the coach we imagine and believe to be passing.[31]

[31] Although Reid does not acknowledge Berkeley, it is obvious that this example is based on a passage from Berkeley's *Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision (*1709):

> It is true that this suggestion is not natural and original; it is the result of experience and habit. But I think it appears, from what hath been said, that there are natural suggestions; particularly, that sensation suggests the notion of present existence, and the belief that what we perceive or feel, does now exist; that memory suggests the notion of past experience, and the belief that what we remember did exist in time past; and that our sensations and thoughts do also suggest the notion of a mind, and the belief of its existence, and of its relation to our thoughts. By a like natural principle it is, that a beginning of existence, or any change in nature, suggests to us the notion of a cause, and compels our belief of its existence. And, in like manner, as shall be shewn when we come to the sense of touch, certain sensations of touch, by the constitution of our nature, suggest to us extension, solidity, and motion, which are nowise like to sensations, although they have been hitherto confounded with them. (1785/2000: II:VII, p.38)

David Hume (1711-1776 CE)

In the abstract to his *Treatise of Human Nature*,[32] Hume asserts that the human mind has both the ability *and* the propensity to link ideas together.

For Hume, "ideas" existed in the mind; whilst "impressions" were the original perceptions from which those ideas were derived:

> Here therefore we may divide all the perceptions of the mind into two classes or species, which are distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible and lively are commonly denominated THOUGHTS or IDEAS. The other species want a name in our language, and in most others; I suppose, because it was not requisite for any, but philosophical purposes, to rank them under a general term or appellation. Let us, therefore, use a little freedom, and call them IMPRESSIONS; employing that word in a sense somewhat different from the usual. By the term *impression*, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are the less lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements above-mentioned. (Hume, 1748/1999:2.3, pp.96-97).

And, to Hume, this connective and associative capacity was so critical to human thinking that it can be thought of as "the cement of the universe":

> Thro' this whole book, there are great pretensions to new discoveries in philosophy; but if anything can entitle the author to so glorious a name as that of an *inventor,* 'tis the use he

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46. From what we have shewn, it is a manifest consequence that the ideas of space, outness, and things placed at a distance are not, strictly speaking, the object of sight; they are not otherwise perceived by the eye rather than the ear. Sitting in my study I hear a coach drive along the street; I look through the casement and I see it; I walk out and enter into it. Thus, common speech would incline one to think I heard, saw, and touched the same thing, to wit, the coach. It is nevertheless certain the ideas intromitted by each sense are widely different, and distinct from each other; but, having been observed constantly to go together, they are spoken of as one and the same thing. By the variation of the noise, I perceive the different distances of the coach, and I know that it approaches before I look out. Thus, by the ear I perceive distance just after the same manner as I do by the eye. (Berkeley, 1929, p.36)

[32] The *Treatise* was anonymously published in 3 volumes in 1739-1740. The abstract, *An Abstract of a Book Lately Published; Entituled, a Treatise of Human Nature, & c. Wherein the Chief Argument of that Book is farther Illustrated and Explained*, was published anonymously in 1740. The first volume of the *Treatise* was thoroughly revised and expanded, and published as *Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding* in 1748. In 1756 it was re-titled *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* and has remained so ever since.

> makes of the principle of the association of ideas, which enters into most of his philosophy. Our imagination has a great authority over our ideas; and there are no ideas that are different from each other, which it cannot separate, and join, and compose into all the varieties of fiction. But notwithstanding the empire of the imagination, there is a secret tie or union among particular ideas, which causes the mind to conjoin them more frequently together, and makes the one, upon its appearance, introduce the other. Hence arises what we call the *apropos* of discourse. Hence the connexion of writing: and hence that thread, or chain of thought, which a man naturally supports even in the loosest *reverie*. These principles of association are reduced to three, *viz. Resemblance*; a picture naturally makes us think of the man it was drawn for. *Contiguity*; when *St. Denis* is mentioned, the idea of *Paris* naturally occurs. *Causation*; when we think of the son, we are apt to carry our attention to the father. 'Twill be easy to conceive of what vast consequence these principles must be in the science of human nature, if we consider, that so far as regards the mind, these are the only links that bind the parts of the universe together, or connect us with any person or object exterior to ourselves. For as it is by means of thought only that anything operates upon our passions, and as these are the only ties of our thoughts, they are really *to us* the cement of the universe, and all the operations of the mind must, in a great measure, depend on them. (Anon/Hume, 1740/2000, pp.416-417)

Hume reiterates this view in his *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, in the section titled *"Of the Association of Ideas"*:

> To me, there appear to be only three principles of connexion among ideas, namely, *Resemblance*, *Contiguity* in time or place, and *Cause* or *Effect*.
>
> That these principles serve to connect ideas will not, I believe, be much doubted. A picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original:[33] The mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an enquiry or discourse concerning the others:[34] And if we think of a wound, we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it.[35] (Hume, 1748/1999, pp.101-102).

The regularity with which aggregates of ideas could be associated, the ease with which their complex chains of connexion could be reduced to their simple, isolated constituents, and the ease with which those (now un-connected) constituent ideas could be re-assembled into entirely different aggregates, strongly indicated to Hume that some sort of *universal principle* had to be operating:

> As all simple ideas may be separated by the imagination, and may be united again in what form it pleases, nothing wou'd be more unaccountable than the operations of that faculty, were it not guided by some universal principles, which render it, in some measure, uniform with itself in all times and places. Were ideas entirely loose and unconnected, chance alone wou'd join them; and 'tis impossible the same simple ideas shou'd fall regularly into complex ones (as they commonly do) without some bond of union among them, some associating quality, by which one idea naturally introduces another. This uniting principle among ideas is not to be consider'd as an inseparable connexion; for that has been already excluded from the imagination: Nor yet are we to conclude, that without it the mind cannot join two ideas; for

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[33] [Hume's own note] Resemblance.

[34] [Hume's own note] Contiguity.

[35] [Hume's own note] Cause and Effect.

> nothing is more free than that faculty: but we are only to regard it as a gentle force, which commonly prevails, and is the cause why, among other things, languages so nearly correspond to each other; nature in a manner pointing out to every one those simple ideas, which are most proper to be united in a complex one. The qualities, from which this association arises, and by which the mind is after this manner conveyed from one idea to another, are three, *viz*. RESEMBLANCE, CONTIGUITY in time or place, and CAUSE and EFFECT. (Hume, 1739-1740/2000; 1.1.4.1, pp.12-13)

Then, he continues:

> These are therefore the principles of union or cohesion among our simple ideas, and in the imagination supply the place of that inseparable connexion, by which they are united in our memory. Here is a kind of ATTRACTION, which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to shew itself in as many and as various forms. Its effects are every where conspicuous; but as to its causes, they are mostly unknown, and must be resolv'd into *original* qualities of human nature, which I pretend not to explain. (Hume, 1739-1740/2000; 1.1.4.6, p.14)

In this context, the meaning of the term attraction is very specifically that of either gravity or magnetism. Hume uses the term analogically, and stresses that his "kind of attraction" (which is found "in the mental world") is "a gentle force, which commonly prevails"; by contrast with the sort of attraction due to gravity or magnetism that is found in the natural world which, in respect to its control over movements, *always*, rather than *commonly*, prevails.

For Hume, the "associating quality, by which one idea naturally introduces another" (Kallich, 1970, p.11), could be of:

(i) a *natural* kind where the terms involved have some sort of objective affinity (they could be alike in some way, as the relative *ferocity* of a cassowary and a wild pig, they could be unlike in some way, as the relative *ferocity* of a cassowary and a lamb, or they could display some sort of cause and effect relationship, as a shotgun and a head wound); or

(ii) an *unnatural* kind, where they are simply contiguous due to some sort of accidental happening (as an elephant and a circus).

> In either case, natural or unnatural, rational or irrational, the underlying subjective characteristic of an association of ideas remains constant: when one idea or quality is perceived or experienced, it immediately calls to mind or suggests others to which it is in some manner related. (Kallich, 1970, p.11)

In his *Treatise of Human Nature*, (Hume, 1739-1740/2000; 1.1.5, pp.14-16) Hume distinguished between two quite different sorts of relation; those of *natural* relations and *philosophical* relations:

> The word *relation* is commonly us'd in two senses considerably different from each other. Either for that quality, by which two ideas are connected together in the imagination, and the one naturally introduces the other… or for that particular circumstance, in which, even upon the arbitrary union of two ideas in the fancy, we may think proper to compare them. In common language the former is always the sense, in which we use the word, *relation*; and 'tis only in philosophy, that we extend it to mean any particular subject of comparison, without a connecting principle. (Hume, 1739-1740/2000; 1.1.5.1, p.14)

Edmund Burke (1729-1797 CE)

In his work on aesthetic theory, *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful* (1757/1990), Burke spoke specifically of association:

> It is no small bar in the way of our inquiry into the cause of our passions, that the occasions of many of them are given, and that their governing motions are communicated at a time when we have not capacity to reflect on them; at a time of which all sort of memory is worn out of our minds. For besides such things as affect us in various manners according to their natural powers, there are associations made at that early season, which we find it very hard afterwards to distinguish from natural effects. Not to mention the unaccountable antipathies which we find in many persons, we all find it impossible to remember when a steep became more terrible than a plain; or fire or water more dreadful than a clod of earth; though all these are very probably either conclusions from experience, or arising from the premonitions of others; and some of them impressed, in all likelihood, pretty late. But as it must be allowed that many things affect us after a certain manner, not by any natural powers they have for that purpose, but by association; so it would be absurd, on the other hand, to say that all things affect us by association only; since some things must have been originally and naturally agreeable or disagreeable, from which the others derive their associated powers; and it would be, I fancy, to little purpose to look for the cause of our passions in association, until we fail of it in the natural properties of things. (1757/1990, IV.II, pp.118-119)

Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797 CE)

In her *Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1792/1971), Mary Wollstonecraft devotes an entire chapter (Chapter VI: "The Effect which an Early Association of Ideas has upon the Character") to the association of ideas, which she describes as follows:

> The association of our ideas is either habitual or instantaneous; and latter mode seems rather to depend on the original temperature of the mind than on the will. When the ideas, and matters of fact, are once taken in, they lie by for use, till some fortuitous circumstance makes the information dart into the mind with illustrative force, that has been received at very different periods of our lives. Like the lightning's flash are many recollections; one idea assimilating and explaining another, with astonishing rapidity. I do not now allude to that quick perception of truth, which is so intuitive that it baffles research, and makes us at a loss to determine whether it is reminiscence or ratiocination, lost sight of in its celerity, that opens the dark cloud. Over those instantaneous associations we have little power; for when the mind is once enlarged by excursive flights, or profound reflection, the raw materials will, in some degree, arrange themselves. The understanding, it is true, may keep us from going out of drawing when we group our thoughts, or transcribe from the imagination the warm sketches of fancy; but the animal spirits, the individual character, give the colouring. Over this subtile [sic] electric fluid, how little power do we possess, and over it how little power can reason obtain. These fine intractable spirits appear to be the essence of genius, and beaming in its eagle eye, produce in the most eminent degree the happy energy of associating thoughts that surprise, delight, and instruct. These are the glowing minds that concentrate pictures for their fellow-creatures; forcing them to view with interest the objects reflected from the impassioned imagination, which they passed over in nature…
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> Education thus only supplies the man of genius with knowledge to give variety and contrast

> to his associations; but there is an habitual association of ideas, that grows "with our growth", which has a great effect on the moral character of mankind, and by which a turn is given to the mind that commonly remains throughout life. So ductile is the understanding, and yet so stubborn, that the associations which depend on adventitious circumstances, during the period that the body takes to arrive at maturity, can seldom be disentangled by reason. One idea calls up another, its old associate, and memory, faithful to the first impressions, particularly when the intellectual powers are not employed to cool our sensations, retraces them with mechanical exactness. (1792/1971, pp.142-143)

William Wordsworth (1770-1850 CE)

In his preface for the 1800 *Lyrical Ballads* (Wordsworth & Coleridge, 1798/1800/1802/1963, pp.266), Wordsworth speaks of how a poet/author, operating in accord with "certain known habits of association" (p.237), can strongly influence his readers for the better:

> …the Poems in these volumes will be found distinguished at least by one mark of difference, that each of them has a worthy *purpose.* Not that I always began to write with a distinct purpose formerly conceived; but I believe that my habits of meditation have so formed my feelings, that my descriptions of such objects as strongly excite those feelings, will be found to carry along with them a *purpose.* If in this opinion I am mistaken I can have little right to the name of a Poet. For all good poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings; but though this be true, Poems to which any value can be attached, were never produced on any variety of subjects but by a man who being possessed of more than usual organic sensibility, had also thought long and deeply. For our continued influxes of feeling are modified and directed by our thoughts, which are indeed the representatives of all our past feelings; and as by contemplating the relation of these general representatives to each other, we discover what is really important to men, so by the repetition and continuance of this act feelings connected with important subjects will be nourished, till at length, if we be originally possessed of much organic sensibility, such habits of mind will be produced that by obeying blindly and mechanically the impulses of those habits we shall describe objects and utter sentiments of such a nature and in such connection with each other, that the understanding of the being to whom we address ourselves, if he be in a healthful state of association, must necessarily be in some degree enlightened, his taste exalted, and his affections ameliorated. (pp.240-241)

Thomas Brown (1778-1820 CE)

> Philosophy is not the mere passive possession of knowledge; it is, in a much more important respect, the active exercise of acquiring it. (Brown, *Lectures*, XV, p.95[36])

To Brown, psychology was a physical study of the mind, and he constantly spoke of the study as

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[36] Despite the fact that their texts are identical, there is an extremely wide range of publications of Brown's *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind*: at least 20 editions over a 40 year period. They appeared in various formats and presentations, ranging from a single volume edition to two, three and four volumes, and with some heavily italicized for emphasis, others barely italicized at all.

To facilitate the (otherwise) almost impossible task of cross-referencing citations from the page numbers of 19th edition (1858) — the one I have quoted from exclusively — to each of the other editions, I have adopted the practical convention of also supplying the lecture number in Roman numerals for each and every citation.

"mental physiology". The mind was a substance.[37] It was a substance that was prone to various feelings; with each of those various feelings being nothing more, in and of themselves, than the particular phenomena of that specific mind, existing in different states.[38] And, deeply and firmly embedded within this view, is the even more significant principle that the mind simply can not exist in two states at once.

In his first lecture (I, pp.1-5), Brown announces that his subject, "*the Philosophy of the Human Mind*", was naturally comprised of four divisions:

(1) *Mental Physiology*: "the physiology of the mind, considered as a substance capable of the various modifications, or states, which constitute, as they succeed each other, the phenomena of thought and feeling" (II, p.5).

(2) *Ethics*: "the doctrines of general ethics, as to the obligation, under which man lies, to increase and extend, as widely as possible, the happiness of all that live" (II, p.5).

(3) *Politics*: "the political doctrines as to the means which enable him, in society with his fellow-men, to further most successfully, and with the least risk of future evil, that happiness of all, which it is the duty of each individually to wish and promote" (II, p.5).

(4) *Natural Theology*: "the doctrines of natural theology, as to the existence and attributes of that greatest of Beings, under whose moral government we live, and the foundations of our confidence that death is only a change of scene, which, with respect to our mortality indeed, may be said to be its close; but which, with respect to the soul itself, is only one of the events of a life that is everlasting" (II, pp.5-6).[39]

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[37] Near the end of his set of on hundred lectures, in the section dealing with natural theology, Brown defends his stance:

> In the whole course of our inquiries into the phenomena of the mind, I [have] abstained from allusion to the great controversy of the materialists and immaterialists, or at least made only very slight allusion to it, because the analysis and arrangement of the mental phenomena, considered simply as phenomena that succeed each other in a certain order and are felt to bear to each other certain relations, are independent of any views which we may be led to form of the nature of the substance itself, which exhibits these various but regular phenomena of thought; and I was desirous of accustoming you to fix your attention chiefly on those simpler and more productive investigations. (XCVI, p.643)

[38] Here, Brown is using the word *state* in its "the mental or emotional condition in which a person finds himself at a particular time" meaning.

[39] The mental physiology section of the *Lectures* comprises more than two-thirds of the entire work, and his discussions of suggestion comprise the major part of that section.

Simply put, the entire work can be classed as follows:

(a) General Introduction (I-VI, pp.1-23);

(b) Mental Physiology (V-LXXIII, pp.23-486);

(c) Ethics (LXXIII-XCI, pp.486-616); and

(d) Natural Theology (XCII-C, pp.616-675).

Politics is not dealt with at all. In the last lecture (C, p.675), Brown comments that, because it seemed quite separate from the other topics (which "were [comparatively] more intimately related to each other"), and because the topic itself was so broad, deep and extensive, he has not dealt with politics in these lectures; and that the particular topic of politics "has been reserved by me as the subject of a separate course [of lectures]".

The significant distinction between the physical investigations of mind and that of matter is that "in intellectual science the materials on which we operate, the instruments with which we operate, and the operating agent, are the same" (II, p.6).

In other words, even though it was an entirely mind-based, intellectual exercise of introspection, it was still, at least metaphorically, as much a scientific process as chemistry or physiology (hence Brown's preferred term, *mental physiology*), in that it "analyzed the whole into parts, classified those parts, and described the dynamics of their interaction" (Dixon, 2001, p.299):

> The process, and the instruments by which the [two] analyses are carried on, are, indeed as different as matter is from mind,— cumbrous as matter, in the one case,— in the other, simple and spiritual as mind itself. The aggregates of matter we analyse by the use of other matter, and varying manipulation after manipulation;— the complex mental phenomena we analyze virtually by mere reflection; the same individual mind being the subject of analysis, the instrument of analysis, and the analysing inquirer. (X, p.60)

Consequently:

> In every situation in which man can be placed, as long as his intellectual faculties are unimpaired, it is impossible that he should be deprived of opportunities of carrying on his intellectual study; because in every situation in which he can be placed, he must still have with him that universe of thought, which is the true home and empire of the mind. (II, p.6)

The advantage of this is immediately evident:

> No costly apparatus is requisite,— no tedious waiting for seasons of observation. He has but to look within himself to find the elements which he has to put together, or the compounds which he has to analyze, and the instruments that are to perform the analysis or composition. (II, p.6)

There are only two realistic approaches to any physical enquiry into the philosophy of mind, with each approach being determined by whether the specific objects of our inquiry, the various natural substances, *exist in space*, or whether they *exist in time*:

(1) Studying their *composition*.

Whenever a substance exists in space — which also entails "the co-existence of a multitude of bodies, similar in nature, or dissimilar in apparent continuity" — "we inquire into its composition, or, in other words, [we] endeavour to discover what are the elementary bodies that co-exist in the space which it occupies, and that are all which we truly consider, when we think that we are considering the compound as one distinct body" (V, p.26); or

(2) Studying their *changes*.

Whenever a substance exists in time — i.e., a thing "which is affected by the prior changes of other bodies, or which itself produces a change of some sort in other bodies" — "we inquire into its susceptibilities or its powers, or, in other words, [we] endeavour to trace all the series of prior and subsequent changes, of which its presence forms an intermediate link" (V, p.26).

> Whenever, therefore, the question is put, as to any object, *What is it?* there are two answers, and only two answers that can be given with meaning. We may regard it as it exists in space, and state the elements that co-exist in it, or rather constitute it; or we may regard it as it exists in time, and state, in all the series of changes, of which it forms an invariable part, the objects to which it is related as antecedent or consequent. (VI, p.36)

According to Dixon,

> Brown's [posthumous] influence on later mental science and psychology was considerable. His introspective 'mental science' methodology and his new classification of mental states were both widely adopted. Brown had divided mental-scientific methodology into two tasks: first, analysing mental states into their components ('mental chemistry' — an idea picked up by both the Mills), and, secondly, discovering the laws of succession of mental states ('mental physics'). These were what Brown called his 'laws of suggestion'. (Dixon, 2003a, p.126)

The practical value of any classification of mental physiology that is simultaneously symmetrical with some set of natural principles, and somehow descriptive of the natural, real-world manifestations of these principles, is that, all things being equal:

> There are some advantages more peculiarly felt [from gaining an understanding of the Philosophy of the Mind] in certain departments of science and art. It is not merely with the mind that we operate; the subject of our operations is also often the mind itself. In education, in criticism, in poetry, in eloquence, the mind has to act upon mind, to produce in it either emotions that are temporary, or affections or opinions that are permanent. We have to instruct it, to convince it, to persuade it, to delight it, to soften it with pity, to agitate it with terror or indignation; and all these effects, when other circumstances of genius are the same, we shall surely be able to produce more readily, if we know the natural laws of thought and emotion; the feelings which are followed by other feelings; and the thoughts, which, expanding into other thoughts, almost of themselves produce the very passion, or conviction, which we wish to excite. (III, p.15)

The philosophy of mind and the philosophy of matter have precisely the same goals: "the analysis of what is complex, and the observation and arrangement of the sequences of phenomena, as respectively antecedent and consequent" (IX, p.53).

In attempting to classify "the Phenomena of the Mind in general",[40] Brown takes the initial position that "what the chymist does, in matter, the intellectual analyst does in mind" (XI, p.64).

That is, the intellectual analyst's task is "distinguishing, by a pure mental process of reflection, the elements of his complex feelings" in the same way that the chymist "operates on his material compounds, by processes that are themselves material"[41] (XI, p.64):

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[40] It is significant that, at this moment, he chooses to use upper case letters in the expression "the Phenomena of the Mind".

[41] Later in the set of lectures he refers to *chemist*, *chemists* or *chemistry*, rather than *chymist*, *chymists* or *chymistry*. Because neither Brown nor the editor of his teaching notes remark or comment to the contrary, the terms must simply be considered to be variants of one another. This view is also supported by the fact that whilst the terms chymist, chymists and chymistry all appear in the earlier lectures, they are entirely absent from the later lectures, where the terms chemist, chemists and chemistry appear in identical contexts in the

> From the very instant of its first existence, the mind is constantly exhibiting phenomena more and more complex,— sensations, thoughts emotions, all mingling together, and almost every feeling modifying, in some greater or less degree, the feelings that succeed it;— and as, in chymistry, it often happens that the qualities of the separate ingredients of a compound body are not recognizable by us, in the apparently different qualities of the compound itself,— so, in this spontaneous chymistry of the mind,[42] the compound sentiment, that results from the association of former feelings, has, in many cases, on first consideration, so little resemblance to these constituents of it, as formerly existing in their elementary state, that it requires the most attentive reflection to separate, and evolve distinctly to others, the assemblages which even a few years may have produced. (X, p.62)

However, he also warns us not to be misled by the possible ramifications of this chemical analogy:

> [In terms of the Philosophy of the Mind] when we speak of complex notions, and of thoughts and feelings, that are united by association with other thoughts and feelings, we [are not speaking] of a plurality of separable things. The complex mental phenomena… are complex only in relation to our mode of conceiving them. They are, strictly and truly, as simple and indivisible states of a substance, which is necessarily in all its states simple and indivisible — the results, rather than the compounds of former feelings, — to which, however, they seem to us, and from the very nature of the feelings themselves, cannot but seem to us, to bear the same species of relation, which a whole bears to the parts that compose it.[43] (XI, p.64)

Whilst it is true that particular chemical substance (and, analogically, the current state in which the mind is existing) may be easily and readily analysed into its constituent parts — and, therefore, be considered as being the consequent of a specific set of antecedents — it may also be the case that the consequent chemical is "indivisible"; unlike, say, H_2O, which can be transformed into its constituents hydrogen and oxygen, which, also, in turn, can be recombined to form water.

In terms of mental phenomena, commonsense tells us that a particular mental aggregate of inputs can never be subsequently reduced it to its original parts.

For example, it was revealed to Princess Michael of Kent in 1985 that her father had belonged to the Nazi Party.

Commonsense tells us that, upon the "input" of this data, there would have been a very complex series of irreversible changes within a wide range of the different aspects of the Princess's mental physiology; and, that, subsequent to this "input", her mind could never be the same again — and, even more significant, her earlier state of mind could never be reconstituted.

Despite all of this talk of "mental chemistry", there are many aspects of the analogical source

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later lectures.

[42] Contrasted, that is, with the mechanical tasks of "intellectual physics"; viz., the task of reducing complex feelings "to simpler elements" (X, p.60).

[43] This notion of the compound:

(a) having unexpected properties that can't be predicted from its constituent ingredients, and

(b) the complex substance constructed from these ingredients, having been constructed, being indivisible, will, in 1875, be termed "emergent properties" by Lewes (1875, p.413).

"chemistry" that can't be mapped on to its target "philosophy of mind". For example, Haven (1862, p.20) speaking of the general low "public regard" for, and the "comparative neglect" of, "the science of the mind", quotes Sydney Smith, on the limitations of "mental science": "Four or five new metals have been discovered within as many years, of the existence of which no human being could have had any suspicion; but no man that I know of pretends to discover four or five new passions" (p.21).

Consciousness, and Personal Identity

At this stage of his discussion of the philosophy of the human mind, Brown turns his attention to the critical questions of consciousness and the identity of the mind:

> The examination of [consciousness and of personal identity are] essential to all the enquiries and speculations in which we are afterwards to be engaged; since, whatever powers or susceptibilities we may consider as attributes of the mind, this consideration must always suppose the existence of certain phenomena, of which we are conscious, and the identity of the sentient or thinking principle, in which that consciousness resides, and to which all the varieties of those ever-changing feelings, which form the subjects of inquiry, are collectively to be referred. (XI, p.67)

(1) *Consciousness*: Consciousness is not a separate power of the mind.

And, on the basis that it is completely impossible to have a sensation or an idea and, at precisely the same moment, to have an entirely separate feeling of consciousness about it — "to suppose the mind to exist in two different states, in the same moment, is manifest stupidity" — Brown argues that any such belief "is founded, partly on a confusion of thought, and still more on a confusion of language" (XI, p.67):

> To the whole series of states of mind, then, whatever the individual momentary successive states be, I give the name consciousness,— using that tern, not to express any new state additional to the whole series, (for to that, which is already the whole, nothing can be added, and the mind, as I have already said, cannot be conceived to exist in two different states) but merely as a short mode of expressing the wide variety of our feelings; in the same manner as I use any other generic word for expressing briefly the individual varieties comprehended under it. There are not sensations, thoughts, passions, and also consciousness, any more than there is quadruped or animal, as a separate being, to be added to the wolves, tigers, elephants, and other living creatures, which I include under those terms.[44] (XI, pp.67-68)

> The fallacy of conceiving consciousness to be something different from the feeling, which is said to be its object, has arisen, in great measure, from the use of the personal pronoun *I*, which the conviction of our identity, during the various feelings, or temporary consciousnesses of different moments, has led us to employ, as significant of our permanent self,— of that being, which is conscious, and variously conscious, and which continues, after those feelings have ceased, to be the subject of other consciousnesses, as transient as the former. *I* am *conscious* of a certain feeling, really means, however, no

[44] This is an example of the sort of terminological misinterpretation that Gilbert Ryle called a "category mistake" (now, sometimes, referred to as a "category error").

more than this,— I feel in a certain manner, or in other words, my mind exists in a state which constitutes a certain feeling;— the mere existence of that feeling, and not any additional and distinguishable feeling that is to be termed consciousness, being all which is essential to the state of my mind, at the particular moment of sensation; for a pleasure, or pain, that, in reference to us at least, has no existence. But when we say, I am conscious of a particular feeling, in the usual paraphrastic phraseology of our language, which has no mode of expressing, in a single word, the mere existence of a feeling, we are apt, from a prejudice of grammar, to separate the sentient *I* and the feeling, as different,— no different, as they really are, merely in this respect, that the feeling is one momentary and changeable state of the permanent substance I, that is capable of existing, also, at other moments, in other states,— but so radically different, as to justify our classing the feeling in the relation of an object, to that sentient principle we call I,— and an object to it, not in retrospect only, as when the feeling is remembered, or when it is viewed in relation to other remembered feelings,— but in the very moment of the primary sensation itself; as if there could truly be two distinct states of the same mind, at that same moment, one of which states is to be termed sensation, and the other different state of the same mind to be termed consciousness. (XI, p.68)

…when it is understood as regarding the present only, [consciousness] is no distinct power of the mind, or name of a distinct class of feelings, but is only a general term for all our feelings, of whatever species these may be,— sensations, thoughts, desires;— in short, all those states or affections of the mind, in which the phenomena of mind consist; and when it expresses more than this, it is only the remembrance of some former state of mind, and a feeling of the relation of the past and the present as states of one sentient substance. The term is very conveniently used for the purpose of abbreviation, when we speak of the whole variety of our feelings, in the same manner as any other general term is used, to express briefly the multitude of individuals that agree in possessing some common property of which we speak; when the enumeration of these, by description and name, would be as wearisome to the patience, as it would be oppressive to the memory. But still, when we speak of the evidence of consciousness, we mean nothing more, than the evidence implied in the mere existence of our sensations, thoughts, desires,— which it is utterly impossible for us to believe to be and not to be; or, in other words, impossible for us to feel and not feel at the same moment. (XI, pp.70-71)

Consciousness, …whenever it is conceived to express more than the present feeling, or present momentary state of the mind, whatever that may be, which is said to be the object of consciousness,— as if it were at once something different at every moment from the present state or feeling of the mind, and yet the very state in which the mind is at every moment supposed to exist,— is a retrospect of some past feeling, with that belief of a common relation of the past and present feeling to one subject mind, which is involved in the very notion, or rather constitutes the very notion of personal identity,— and all which distinguishes this rapid retrospect from any of the other retrospects, which we class as remembrances, and ascribe to the memory as their source, is the mere briefness of the interval between the feeling that is remembered, and the reflective glance which seems to be immediately retrospective. A feeling of some kind has arisen, and we look instantly back upon that feeling; but a remembrance is surely still the same

in nature, and arises from the same principle of the mental constitution, whether the interval which precedes it be that of a moment, or of many hours, or years. (XII, pp.71-72)

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(2) *Personal Identity and Mental Identity*: According to Brown the issue of personal identity is complicated by the fact that *personal* also applies to *person*.

In his view, he is really speaking of *mental* identity,[45] and his remarks on "the Identity of the Mind" (which is "truly one and permanent, amid all the variety of its fugitive affections") are intentionally "[confined] to the phenomena which are purely mental" (as distinct from "the daily waste and daily aliment of our corporeal part") (XII, p.72).

> The identity, which we are to consider, is …the identity only of the principle which feels and thinks, without regard to the changeable state of the particles of the brain, or of the body in general. (XII, p.73)

He argues that "no process of reasoning can ever demonstrate [personal identity], because the very essence of every argument consists in the circumstance, that the mind, which adopts the conclusion, irresistibly believes itself to be the same mind which held the premises" and, consequently, "this belief rises above all argument, or rather, is the foundation of every reasoning process"; and, from this, "it follows directly, that since no argument can proceed a step without it, the belief itself is *intuitive*" (Gilman, 1824, p.14):

> The belief of our mental identity, then, we may safely conclude, is founded on an essential principle of our constitution, in consequence of which, it is impossible for us to consider our successive feelings, without regarding them as truly our successive feelings, states, or affections of one thinking substance, But though the belief of the identity of the substance which thinks, is thus established on the firmest of all grounds, the very ground, as we have see,, on which demonstration itself is founded… (XIII, p.82)

Brown makes a number of additional points in his *Sketch*, including:

> We cannot prove our identity, then, and yet we believe it irresistibly,— as irresistibly at least, as we believe the result of any demonstration. The belief flows from a principle of our constitution, which is truly a part of it as the principle of reason itself. It flows, in short, from a principle of intuition; and in this, as in every other case of intuitive belief, it is vain to look for evidence beyond it. (Brown, *Sketch*, 1820, pp.30-31)

> We have an *irresistible*, *immediate*, and *universal* belief of our identity, as often as we think of the present and the past. We cannot think of any former feeling as truly a former feeling, without it. (Brown, *Sketch*, 1820, pp.32-33)

> Now we know, that what is called the Mind, far from being at every moment the same in every respect, scarcely presents for two successive moments the same phenomena. (Brown, *Sketch*, 1820, p.34)

> A single illustration, however, from one of the most familiar of the phenomena of matter, may be sufficient to shew what is meant by that compatibility of sameness and

[45] In fact, the relevant chapter in his *Sketch* (1820, pp,29-39) is titled "Of Mental Identity".

diversity in things without, to which the internal phenomena of the mind, in their similar union of diversity and sameness, present an analogy so striking, as to justify the assertion of the compatibility as a general law of nature.

A body at rest, we believe, would remain for ever at rest, but for the application of some foreign force: when impelled by some other body, it moves, and, as we believe, would for ever in free space continue to move onward, in the line of impulse. Let us take, then, any series of moments, *a*, *b*, *c*, in the continued quiescence, and any series of moments, *x*, *y*, *z*, in the continued uniform motion. At the moment *a*, every atom of the body is in such a state, that, in consequence of this state, it does not exhibit any tendency to motion in the moment *b*; at the moment *x* every atom of it is in such a state, that in the subsequent moment *y*, though an impelling body be no longer present, it has a tendency to pass from one point of space to another; and thus progressively through the series a, b, c, and the series x, y, z, the difference of tendency at each moment is indicative of a difference of state at each moment. Every atom of the body, at the moment *y* is, however, exactly the same atom which it was at the moment *b*. Nothing is added to the mass; nothing is taken away from the mass; yet how different are the phenomena exhibited, and consequently how different the tendencies, or physical character, of the identical atoms, at these two moments! Nay more, as the varieties of velocity are infinite, increasing or diminishing with the force of the primary impulse or other cause of motion, and as, in the continual progressive motion, the cause of the particular velocity of that motion at the moment *y* is the peculiar state of the atoms at the moment *x*, with any difference of which the velocity also would be different, there is the varieties even of such rectilinear motion, without taking into account any other varieties arising from foreign causes, an infinite number of states of every atom of every mass, with the same continued identity of the whole: and it is truly not more wonderful, therefore, that the substance which we give the name of Mind should, without the slightest loss of identity, be affected in succession with joy, sorrow, love, hate, or any other feelings or tendencies the most opposite, than that a substance to which we give the name of Matter, without the slightest loss of identity, should have tendencies so opposite as those by which at one time it remains, moment after moment, in the same relative point of space, and afterwards flies through space with a velocity of which the varieties are infinite. However paradoxical, then, the statement may appear, it may yet be safely admitted, as a law both of mind and of matter, that there may be a complete change of tendencies or physical character, without any essential change; and that absolute identity, in the strictest sense of that term, is consistent with infinite diversities. (Brown, *Sketch*, 1820, pp.37-39)

When facing the question of how to classify the "almost infinite" phenomena of the mind, "it might seem, on first reflection, a very hopeless task to attempt to reduce, under a few heads, the innumerable feelings which diversify almost every moment of our life".

Whilst the "objects of classification" of "other sciences" have a 'fixed and definite nature", with *this* science, "the objects are indefinite and complex, incapable of being fixed for a moment in the same state, and destroyed by the very effort to grasp them" (XVI, p.97).

Fortunately, however:

> [Although] Nature has given us difficulties with which to cope, she has not left us to be wholly overcome… [and,] if she has placed us in a labyrinth, she has at the same time furnished us with a clue, which may guide us, not indeed through all its dark and intricate windings, but through the broad paths which conduct us into day (XVI, p.97).

The secret is in the power that we have "[to] discover resemblance or relation in general":

> It is this feeling of the relation of certain states of mind to certain other states of mind which solves the whole mystery of mental analysis… the virtual decomposition, in our thought, of what is, by its very nature, indivisible…
>
> It may still, indeed, be said with truth, that the different feelings,— the states or affections of mind which we term complex,— are absolutely simple and indivisible, as much as the feelings or affections of mind which we term simple. Of this there can be no doubt. But the complexity with which alone we are concerned is not absolute but relative,— a seeming complexity, which is involved in the very feeling of relation of every sort. That we are thus impressed with certain feelings of relation of conceptions to conceptions, no one can doubt who knows, that all science has its origin in these very feelings; and equivalence, or equality, in one of those relations, which, from its very constitution, it would be as impossible for the mind, in certain circumstances, not to feel, as it would be impossible for it, in certain other circumstances, not to have those simple feelings which it compares…
>
> Analysis, then, in the science of mind… is founded wholly on the feeling of relation which one state of mind seems to us to bear to other states of mind, as comprehensive of them; but, while this seeming complexity is felt, it is the same thing to our analysis, as if the complexity, instead of being virtual and relative only, were absolute and real. (X, p.61)

And, "in the perplexity and confusion of our first attempts at arrangement", this unique power provides "a sufficient aid to us":

> If there had been no such science as chymistry, who would have ventured to suppose that the innumerable bodies, animate and inanimate, on the surface of our globe, and all, which we have been able to explore in the very depths of the earth itself, are reducible, and even in the imperfect state of science, have been already reduced, to a few simple elements? The science of mind, as it is a science of analysis, I have more than once compared to chymistry, and pointed out to you, and illustrated its various circumstances of resemblance. In this, too, we may hope the analogy will hold,— that, as the innumerable aggregates, in the one science, have been reduced and simplified, the innumerable complex feelings in the other will admit of a corresponding reduction and simplification. (XVI, p.97)

It is axiomatic that, whenever we attempt any sort of classification, we project our individual-specific, patterned thinking on to whatever confronts us — i.e., "every classification has reference only to our mode of considering objects" (XVI, p.100) — and, obviously, because "they are [being] considered by different individuals in different points of view", there is often a considerable variation in views on "the relations according to which objects can be arranged".

Whilst "some of these relations present themselves immediately", "others are discoverable only after attentive reflection"; and it often seems that "the classification, which approaches nearest to perfection, is far from being always that which is founded on relations that seem, at first sight, the most obvious" (XVI, p.97). Particularly because of:

(a) "the almost infinite variety of phenomena which the mind exhibits",

(b) the "indefinite and fugitive" nature of our mental phenomena, and

(c) (regardless of whether we classify "material or mental phenomena"), our classification always depends on "the nature of that generalizing principle of analogy or resemblance",

there *are* specific and peculiar difficulties entailed within any attempt to make arrangements of classifications of our mental phenomena.

Brown examines and, then, rejects a number of traditional and conventional classifications of the primary divisions of mental phenomena — particularly "the understanding and the will" of the Christian theologians,[46] and "the intellectual and active powers of the mind"[47] of Thomas Reid (XVII, p.103) — and completely setting aside notions such as "mental powers" or "faculties of the soul", chose to make a classification of mental states which he termed either "feelings" of "affections of the mind" (Dixon, 2003a, p122).

Affections of the Mind

When discussing "the phenomena of the mind", Brown constantly argues that "all the feelings and thoughts of the mind… are only the mind itself existing in certain states" (XVI, p.101);[48] and, in all of his speculations on the hidden organization of the mind, he denotes these states of mind with the label "affections of the mind", with the specific intention of delivering the sense of:

(a) the (current) state of mind being the transient effect of the immediately preceding circumstances that had, in their turn, induced that (current) state of mind, and

(b) these "affections of the mind" being "the various feelings of which the mind is susceptible" (XXXI, p.197)

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[46] Brown (XVI, pp.100-101):

> No sooner, for example, were certain affections of the mind classed together, as belonging to the will, and certain others, as belonging to the understanding,— that is to say, no sooner was the mind, existing in certain states, denominated the understanding, and in certain other states denominated the will,— than the understanding and the will ceased to be considered as the same individual substance, and became immediately, as it were,, two opposite and contending powers, in the empire of the mind, as distinct as any two sovereigns, with their separate nations under their control; and it became an object of as fierce contention to determine, whether certain affections of the mind belonged to the understanding, or to the will, as in the management of political affairs, to determine, whether a disputed province belonged to one potentate or another. Every new division of the faculties of the mind, indeed, converted each faculty into a little independent mind,— as if the original mind were like that wonderful animal which naturalists tell us, that may be cut into an almost infinite number of parts, each of which becomes a polypus, as perfect as that from which it was separated. The only difference is, that those who make us acquainted with this wonderful property of polypus, acknowledge the divisibility of the parent animal; while those who assert the spiritual multiplicity, are at the same time assertors of the absolute indivisibility of that which they divide.

[47] In particular, Brown argues, this division into intellectual and active powers involves "a very obvious abuse of nomenclature" because there is, embedded within this terminology, a misleading and very strong assertion that the mind is far more *active* in its "active powers", than it is "in its intellectual functions" (LXXIII, p.485).

[48] In his deliberations, Brown the physician is clearly aware of the effects of both somatopsychic *and* psychosomatic influences on the human organism:

> Certain states of our bodily organs are directly followed by certain states or affections of our mind;— certain states or affections of our mind are directly followed by certain states of our bodily organs. (XVII, p.106)

It is clear that he is using the term "affection" in the sense of "being acted upon" or "being influenced" (in much of the sense of one having a spell cast upon oneself); and, consequently, an "affection of the mind" can be thought of as a mental state that has been induced by some influence.

Clarifying his position (XVII, p.103), he says he chose *affection* because it is "the simplest term for expressing a mere change of state, induced in relation to the affecting cause, or the circumstances, whatever they may have been, by which the change was immediately preceded".

He elaborates, citing the example of the initial perception of an oak tree (XVI, pp.101-102) which, whilst it "belongs to the mind alone", would not have existed in the mind at all without the light entering our eyes; this, therefore, involving the *sensation* of vision:

> [which is] an affection which belongs to the mind alone, indeed, but of which we have every reason to suppose, that the mind, of itself, without the presence of [the light that has been reflected from the oak tree], would not have been the subject. The peculiar sensation, therefore, is the result of the presence pf light reflected from the oak; and we perceive it, because the mind is capable of being affected by external things.

He contrasts this *initial*, very specific "affection of the mind" with the other, *consequent* "[mental] changes [that] succeed it, without any other external impression":[49]

> Of all the variety of states of the mind, which these processes of thought involve, the only one which can be ascribed to an external object as its direct cause, is the primary perception of the oak: the rest have been the result, not immediately of any thing external, but of preceding states of the mind;— that particular mental state, which constituted the perception of the oak, being followed immediately by that different state which constituted the remembrance of some tree observed before, and this by that different state which constituted the comparison of the two; and so successively, through all the different processes of thought enumerated. The mind, indeed, could not, without the presence of the oak,— that is to say, without the presence of the light which the oak reflects,— have existed in the state which constituted the perception of the oak. But as little could any external object, without this primary mental affection, have produced, immediately, any of those other states of mind which followed the perception. There is, thus, one obvious distinction of the mental phenomena; as, in relation to their causes external or internal; and, whatever other terms of subdivision it may be necessary to employ, we have, at least, one boundary, and know what it is we mean, when we speak of the external an internal affections of the mind. (XVI, p.102)

Internal and External Affections of the mind

Brown proposed a simple, practical, and universal primary division of mental phenomena, based on the simple distinction of whether the *immediate antecedent* of the phenomenon in question was:

(1) *material* (i.e., "foreign to the mind") or

(2) *mental* (i.e., "belonging to the mind itself") (XVI, p.102-XVII, p.103).

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[49] Brown, XVI, p.102:

> Of all the variety of states of mind, which theses processes of thought involve, the only one which can be ascribed to an external object as its direct cause, is the primary perception of the oak.

These "affections of the mind", distinguished "according to the circumstances which precede them" (XXXIII, p.213), were of two classes, *internal* and *external*, on the basis of whether "the causes, or immediate antecedents, of our feelings are themselves mental or material" (XVI, p.102):

(1) *External affections*: where the conception of an object was generated by the perception of a real, external object acting on an organ of sense (thus, a "sensation").

> That the mind should begin immediately to exist in a certain state, in consequence of the presence of external objects, so that it would not, at that moment, have existed in that state but for the presence of the external object, is a proof of [the existence of this external class of affections], which connect mind directly and immediately with matter. (XXXIII, p.213)

Brown also speaks of "external or sensitive affections of the mind", remarking that "the characteristic distinction [of this class] is, that the phenomena included in it have their causes or immediate antecedents external to the mind itself" (XVIII, p.109).
They are *external* in the sense that they are "foreign to the mind" (XVII, p.103); i.e., they are "[caused by] objects without the mind" (XXXI, p.197).

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(2) *Internal affections*: where the conception of an object is generated within the mind itself.

These are *internal* in the sense that they are either "belonging to the mind itself" (XVII, p.103), or are "previous feelings, or affections of the mind itself" (XXXI, p.197); i.e., contrasted with the external affections, which are only there "because some external object is present" (XVI, p.101).
Because they occur "in consequence of certain preceding affections of the mind itself", all of these *internal* affections "result from the susceptibilities of the mind itself"; thus, unlike the external affections, they "are not the result of causes foreign to the mind itself, but [are the] immediate consequents of its own preceding feelings" (XXXII, p.204).

> That [the mind] should afterwards begin to exist in a similar state [to that which occurs in consequence of the presence of external objects] without the recurrence of any external cause whatever, in consequence of its own susceptibilities only is a proof of [the class of internal affections] peculiar to the mind itself. (XXXIII, p.213)[50]

Gilman (1856, p.366) stresses that "the class of internal affections [are] by far the more copious and various of the two".

Once again stressing that "all the feelings and thoughts of the mind… are only the mind itself

[50] Brown identifies an advantage of these internal affections not requiring external objects:

> How wide a field the internal affections of the mind present, without dependence on the system of material things,— with which we are connected, indeed, by many delightful ties, but by ties that have relation only to this mortal scene,— is proved in a very striking manner, by the increased energy of thought which we often seem to acquire in those hours of the quiet of the night, when every external influence is nearly excluded,— the hours of inward meditation, in which the mind has been poetically said to retire into the sanctuary of its own immense abode, and to feel there and enjoy its spiritual infinity, as if admitted to the ethereal dwellings and the feasts of the Gods. (XVI, p.102)

existing in certain states" (XVI, p.101), Brown further clarifies his distinction between the external and internal affections of the mind:

> When we consider, then, the various states or affections of the mind, which form this series, one circumstance of difference must strike us, that some of them rise immediately, in consequence of the presence of external objects,— and some, as immediately, in consequence of certain preceding affections of the mind itself. The one set, therefore, are obviously the result of the laws both of matter and of mind, implying, in external objects, a power of affecting the mind, as well as, in the mind, a susceptibility of being affected by them. The other set result from the susceptibilities of the mind itself, which has been formed by its divine Author to exist in certain states, and to exist in these in a certain relative order of succession. The affections of the one class arise, because some external object is present;— the affections of the other class arise because some previous change in the states of mind has taken place. (XVI, p.101).

Summary of this Section



The External Affections of the Mind: Further Subdivision

The external affections of the mind can be further subdivided into two orders:

(a) the less definite affections of the mind, and

(b) the more definite affections of the mind.

(1) *The Less Definite External Affections of the Mind*: this class is essentially a consequence of "various species of [bodily] uneasiness", and is comprised of "the mental states, which constitute the uneasiness that is felt", and they are "a state or affection of the mind, arising, immediately and solely, from a state or affection of the body".

It only requires "a very simple analysis" to be able to recognize that one can "separate, from the desire of relief, the feeling of pain which we wish to be relieved"; especially "since it is very evident that the pain must have existed primarily before any such desire could be felt".

Brown remarks that the "immediate office ["of the physiologist of the mind"] is finished when he can trace any particular feeling of the mind to some affliction of our organic frame, as its invariable

antecedent" (XVII, p.107).

Brown details three sorts of feeling:

(a) organic and muscular feelings: firstly, this involves the sense of touch:

> According as the [object with which we are attempting to grasp] is hard or soft, rough or smooth,— that is to say, according as it resists, in various degrees, the progress of our effort of contraction,— the muscular feeling which arises from the variously impeded effort will vary in proportion; and we call hard, soft, rough, [and] smooth, that which produces one or other of the varieties of these muscular feelings of resistance,— as we term sweet or bitter, blue or yellow, that which produces either of these sensations of taste or vision. With the feeling of resistance, there is, indeed, in every case, combined, a certain tactual feeling, because we must touch whatever we attempt to grasp; but it is not of this mere tactual feeling we think when we term bodies hard or soft,— it is of the greater or less resistance which they afford to our muscular contraction. (XXII, p.141)

Secondly, it involves those states of mind that arise from both the distresses of organic disease, protracted illness, excessive physical exertion or inactivity, and the pleasures of robust health, engaging in healthy exercise and general physical fitness overall.
From the following, it is also obvious that, in a more modern analysis, Brown would have included the sense of proprioception in this class of feelings:

> [In my earlier discussion], I referred to various organic feelings which constitute the animal pleasure of good health, when every corporeal function is exercised in just degree; and in a particular manner, our muscular feelings, whether of more general lassitude or alacrity; or those fainter differences of feelings which arose in our various motions and attitudes, from the different muscles that are exercised, or from the greater or less contraction of the same muscles. These muscular feelings, though they may be unnoticed by us, during the influence of stronger sensations, are yet sufficiently powerful, when we attend to them, to render us, independently of sight and touch, in a great measure sensible of the position of our body in general, and of its various parts; and, comparatively indistinct as they are, they become… elements of some of the [most precise] and most accurate judgements which we form. (XVIII, p.109)

(b) appetites: using examples of hunger and thirst, Brown explains how these are a complex of two successive feelings, and separates the initial feeling of organic uneasiness ("internal pain arising from a state of the bodily organs") from the subsequent desire to eat and drink respectively ("the subsequent desires which they occasion"); the initial feeling is an "external affection of the mind", the later desire is an "emotion", and is classed along with all our other emotions in his later lectures (XVII, p.107).

(c) other feelings of uneasiness: such as "the oppressive anxiety which arises from impeded respiration" (XVII, p.107).

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(2) *The More Definite External Affections of the Mind*: these are "the feelings more commonly termed sensations, and universally ascribed to particular organs of sense" (XVIII, p.109).

They are "all those states of mind, however various they may be, which immediately succeed the

changes of state, produced, in any of our organs of sense, by the presence of certain external bodies".

This definition embodies two assumptions: "first, of the existence of external things, that affect our organs of sense; and, secondly, of organs of sense that are affected by external things" (XVIII, p.110).

In the strictest sense, the term *sensation* only refers to the feelings themselves, whilst the term *perception* refers to both the feeling and "the reference to a direct external cause" (XVIII, p.110).

Brown describes the process as follows:

> In sensation, there is… a certain series,— the presence of the external body, whatever this may be in itself, independently of our perception,— the organic affection, whatever it may be, which attends the presence of this body,— and the affection of the mind that is immediately subsequent to the organic affection. I speak only of one organic affection; because, with respect to the mind, it is of no consequence whether there be one only, or a series of these, prior to the new mental state induced. It is enough, that, whenever the immediate sensorial organ has begun to exist in a certain state, whether the change which produces this state be single, or second, third, fourth, or fifth, of a succession of changes, the mind is instantly affected in a certain manner. This new mental state induced is sensation. (XXV, p.157)

Consequently, it is best to classify the more definite affections of the mind according to the sensory organs that are originally excited: smell (XX, pp.121-122); taste (XX, pp.122-124); hearing (XX, pp.124-133); touch (XX, p.133-XXVIII, p.177); and vision (XXVIII, p.177-XXIX, p.188).

Brown then distinguishes between a "conception" and a "sensation" on the basis that one can be confirmed per medium of the sensory organs and the other can not:

> A still more important acquisition, is our knowledge of our own organic frame, by which we are enabled, in a great measure, to verify our sensations,— to produce them, as it were at pleasure, when their external objects are before us, and in this way to correct the feelings which have risen, spontaneously, by those which we ourselves produce. Thus, when, in reverie, our conceptions become peculiarly vivid, and the objects of our thought seem almost to exist in our presence; if only we stretch out our hand, or fix our eyes on the forms that are permanently before us, the illusion vanishes. Our organ of touch or of sight is not affected in the same manner as if the object that charms us in our musing dream were really present; and we class the feeling, therefore, as a conception,— not as a sensation,— which, but for the opportunity of this correction, we should unquestionably, in many instances, have done. (XVIII, p.111)

Summary of this Section



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

The Internal Affections of the Mind: Further Subdivision

The internal affections of the mind, those belonging to the mind itself, can be further subdivided into two orders (XXXIII, pp.213-214):

(1) *Intellectual States of Mind*: which are "composed of feelings, which arise immediately, in consequence of former feelings of the mind" (XXXIII, p.214), and

(2) *Emotions*: "vivid feelings, arising immediately from the consideration of objects, perceived, or remembered, or imagined, or from other prior emotions" (XVI, p.102).

Brown felt that whilst "it is difficult to state ["the exact meaning of the term *emotion*"] in any form of words", it was also true that "every person understands what is meant by an emotion, at least as well as he understands what is meant by any intellectual power; or, if he do not, it can be explained to him only, by stating the number of feelings to which we give the name, or the circumstances which induce them" (XVI, p.102).

> [In] Thomas Brown's *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind* (1820) [the term] 'emotions' was … adopted for all those feelings that were neither sensations nor intellectual states. Brown developed a new terminology and classification of mental states, motivated by a desire to break away from traditional faculty psychology, and to create a de-Christainised and scientific alternative. 'Emotions' included a wide variety of states that had previously been differentiated, and many of which had been considered active powers of the soul. The term 'emotions' was baptised in a way that suggested these mental states were passive and non-cognitive. The category was over-inclusive and was embedded in a tradition committed to the application of scientific methodology to the study of the mind… (Dixon, 2003a, p.23)

> Thomas Brown's treatment of the emotions in his Edinburgh *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind* (1820) was a watershed; he was the first mental philosopher to give the term a coherent, systematic and central role instead of 'passions and affections', or 'active powers'. "Emotions" was a term baptised by Brown… (Dixon, 2003a, p.101)

> Brown's *Lectures* was the single most important work in introducing the term 'emotions' as a major psychological category to the academic and literary worlds during the first half of the nineteenth century. (Dixon, 2003a, p.109)

> Brown made the terminological transition from the 'active powers' — "appetites', 'passions', 'desires' and 'affections' — to the 'emotions'. (Dixon, 2003a, p.113)

> Brown's *Lectures* was one of the most successful philosophy books of the period, going through twenty editions. The *Lectures* were widely acknowledged to be the most successful and popular work of their kind ever to have appeared. (Dixon, 2003a, p.141)

Dixon, having extensively studied Brown's work, believes that Brown's Lectures contain the following "tacit definition of emotions": "*non-cognitive feelings arising in a law-like way from precedent thoughts and sensations*" (2003a, p.126, emphasis added).

Summary of this Section



The Place of this Section within the System



The Intellectual States of Mind Generated by Suggestion of Two types: Simple and Relative

Brown took a different position from the associationists; who, due to "their preoccupation with associated *ideas*, … had failed to note the influence of emotion and mood on the instigation of thought" (Klein, 1970, p.686). When the "intellectual states of mind" are examined as an entire group, argued Brown, and are considered "exclusively of the emotions which may coexist or mingle with them, and of sensations that may be accidentally excited by external objects", it is clear that they can be further subdivided on the basis of "[the] feelings that have induced them" (LIX, p.214).

Rather than using the passive term *association*,[51] Brown chose the active term *suggestion* to label these particular inductive influences (XXXIII, p.214), specifically because, in our trains of thought, "the state or affection of mind which we call a conception or idea of an object, in whatever manner

[51] The fact that there was a long history of religious interference in Scottish academic appointments (and, as well, the 1697 hanging of Edinburgh student Thomas Aikenhead for blasphemy), may have also contributed to his choice to avoid the term "association" with all of its Hume-oriented connotations of atheistic scepticism.

Also, the rejection of Brown's applications for the Chairs of Rhetoric and of Logic at Edinburgh in 1799 and 1808 (respectively) parallel David Hume's two unsuccessful efforts to gain the Chairs of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh in 1745 and of Logic at Glasgow in 1752.

In an early lecture (IV, p.18), he does speak of "the associating principle in the mind" (which he describes as "that principle, by which ideas, and other feelings, that have often co-existed, acquire, for ever after, an almost indissoluble union"), noting that this is a topic upon which, "in an after part of the course" he will "have an opportunity of illustrating at length".

excited, may give immediate rise to other ideas, of which no external cause at the moment exists before us" (XL, p.256).

He also noted that the general, overall class of "suggestions"[52] — all of those "circumstances that seem to regulate the spontaneous successions of our ideas"[53] (XL, p.257) — can be further subdivided, on the basis of the nature of the type of suggestion itself, into two different orders:

(a) *simple suggestions*: trains of thoughts, where each individual, separate thought is suggested by its predecessor, and

(b) *relative suggestions*: where "feelings of relation" are suggested (XLV, p.288).

Summary of this Section



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

Simple Suggestion

Simple suggestion involves those circumstances where "mere conceptions or images of the past,

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[52] It is clear from his constant references to "trains of suggestion" (e.g., XLIII, p.277), that he is referring to extended sequences of suggestions, rather than the solitary case of concept A suggesting concept B; however, it is also true that whatever applies to an extended train of suggestions also applies to the isolated case of A suggesting B alone.

[53] In Lecture XLI (p.261) Brown speaks of "the power of suggestion" and defines it as being "a certain mental power or susceptibility by which… the perception of one object may excite the notion of some absent object".

that rise, image after image, in regular sequence, but simply in succession, without any feeling of relation necessarily involved" (XXXIII, p.214).[54]

> "[Simple suggestion is the mechanism which] gives to us conceptions of external objects formerly perceived, and all of the variety of our past internal feelings, as mere conceptions, or fainter images of the past" (LI, p.337)

Simple Suggestion is not an Association of Ideas

Whilst the phenomena known as simple suggestion "are usually classed under the general term of the Association of Ideas" (XXXIV, p.216), any restriction of our considerations to ideas *alone* would not represent the real state of affairs in any useful fashion:

> The intellectual phenomena which we are, in the first place, to consider, then, are those of Simple Suggestion, which are usually classed under the general term of the Association of Ideas; a term employed to denote that tendency of the mind by which feelings that were formerly excited by an external cause arise afterwards, in regular successions to each other, as it were spontaneously, or at least without the immediate presence of any known external cause. The limitation of the term, however to those states of mind, which are exclusively denominated ideas, has, I conceive, tended greatly to obscure the subject, or at least to deprive us of the aid which we might have received from it in the analysis of many of the most complex phenomena. The influence of the associating principle itself extends, not to ideas only, but to every species of affection of which the mind is susceptible. Our internal joys, sorrows, and all the variety of our emotions, are capable of being revived in a certain degree by the mere influence of this principle, and of blending with the ideas or other feelings which awakened them, in the same manner as our conceptions of external things. These last, however, it must be admitted, present the most striking and obvious examples of the influence of the principle, and are, therefore, the fittest for illustrating it. The faint and shadowy elements of past emotions, as mingling in any present feeling, it may not be easy to distinguish; but our remembrances of things without are clear and definite, and are easily recognized by us as images of the past. (XXXIV, p.216)

In the next lecture he clarifies the reason for this distinction: in his view, the problem lies with the "[serious] error into which the common phrase, *Association of Ideas*, has led us, by restricting, in our conception, the influence of the suggesting principle to those particular states of mind which are exclusively denominated ideas [alone]" and, from this, also excluding "the influence of emotions and other feelings, that are very different [states of mind] from ideas" (XXV, p.222).

In an earlier lecture, having expressed his dissatisfaction with the "general ambiguity" of the word *idea* as used by philosophers (XXV, p.156), Brown went on to make the following comment:

> An idea, however, in all these applications of the term, whether it be a perception, a remembrance, or one of those complex or abstract varieties of conception, is still nothing more than the mind affected in a certain manner, or, which is the same thing, the mind existing in a certain state. The idea is not distinct from the mind, or separable from it in any sense, but is

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[54] That is, it is a conception which, simply, in its turn, gives place to some other conception (which is, in its turn, just as transient as the first): that is, it is the process "by which feelings, formerly existing, are revived, in consequence of the mere existence of other feelings" (XXXIII, p.214)

truly the mind itself, which, in its very belief of external things, is still recognizing one of the many forms of its own existence. (XXV, p.157)

In the majority of the instances that Brown deals with, Hume's "supposition of prior co-existence" is wrong (XL, p.257); and, in fact, Brown argues, the *suggested idea* and the *suggesting idea* have never been previously associated, either in terms of (a) their immediate succession, or (b) their momentary or continued coexistence — and, precisely because of this, it *is* a case of a *suggestion*, and it *can not be* a case of an *association of ideas*.

At the end of his discussion on the advantage of his own concept of suggestion, Brown remarks:

I cannot quit the subject of our suggestions without remarking the advantage which we derive from the accurate reference to these laws of mind, that operate at the time of the suggestion only, and not to any previous union of the parts of the train,— in refuting the mechanical theories of association, and of thought and passion in general, which… have so unfortunately seduced philosophers from the proper province of intellectual analysis, to employ themselves in fanciful comparisons of the affections of matter and mind, and at length to conceive that they had reduced all the phenomena of mind to corpuscular motions. The very use of the term *association* has, unquestionably, in this respect, been of material disadvantage; and the opinion, which it seems to involve, of the necessity of some connecting process prior to suggestion, some coexistence of perceptions, linked, as it were, together, by a common tie, has presented so many material analogies, that the mind which adopted it would very naturally become more ready to adopt that general materialism, which converts perception and passion, and the remembrances of these, into states of sensorial particles, more easily produced, as more frequently produced before, in the same manner as a tree bends most readily in the direction in which it has most frequently yielded to the storm. (XLIII, p.279)

Brown believes the view that "opposites, by the very circumstances of their opposition, suggest opposites" (e.g., "the sight of a gigantic stranger brings before us the image of our diminutive friend") often offered to support the concept of the association of ideas is misleading (XL, p.256).

[With] suggestions of objects formerly contiguous, it might [be supposed] …that, as the perceptions originally co-existed, or were immediately successive, some mysterious connexion of those states of mind might be formed at the time of this co-existence, or immediate proximity, that might deserve to be expressed by the particular name of association, in consequence of which connexion, the one state afterwards was to induce the other. But when there has been no such co-existence or succession, as in the case of the first suggestions of contrast [of, say, the giant and the dwarf], what association can there have been on which the suggestions may be supposed to have depended? The association, in such a case, is manifestly nothing more than the momentary influence of the tendency of the suggestion itself; and to say that the suggestion depends on association, is the same thing as it would be to say, that suggestion depends upon suggestion. It depends, indeed, on the relation of the suggesting object to the object suggested,— as similar, opposite, contiguous in time and place, or in some other way related,— the tendency to suggest relative feelings after relative feelings being one of the original susceptibilities of the mind, essential to its very nature,— but it depends on nothing more; and an object, therefore, the very moment of our first perception of it, may suggest some object that is related to it, in one or other of these ways, as readily as after we

> have perceived it a thousand times; though it surely would be a very strange use of a very common term to speak of any previous association in this case, and to say, that objects were associated before they had existence, as they may have been, if this first suggestion had depended on any prior union or process of any kind. (XL, pp.257-258)

Brown also argues that:

> If suggestion, in every case, depend on association,— that is to say, if, before objects or feelings can suggest each other, they must have been, at some former period, associated together in the mind, it is evident, that, at some former period, at whatever distance of time it may have been before suggestion, both ideas or feelings must have existed together; for it would surely be absurd to speak of associations actually formed between feelings which either had not begun, or had already ceased, before the supposed association. But this supposition of prior co-existence, though it might explain the mutual suggestion of objects that have been contiguous, as Hume expresses it, in place or time, cannot explain the case at present under consideration, if contrast be considered as different from contiguity; for it is the very first perception of the giant which is supposed by us to induce the conception of the dwarf. It, therefore, cannot admit of being associated with the idea of the dwarf till it have actually suggested it; for, till the moment of the actual suggestion, the two ideas never have existed together; and if it have already suggested it, without any former association, it is surely absurd to have recourse to a subsequent association, to account for the prior suggestion, and to say that which is the first in a series of changes, owes its existence to that which is second, and is produced by that which itself produces. (XL, p.257)

And, precisely because there has never been either coexistence *or* succession, the subsequent suggestion of the suggested idea (i.e., consequent upon the presentation of the suggesting idea) *can not be* a case of *association*:

> That an object seen for the first time does suggest many relative conceptions, no one surely will deny; and this single consideration, I cannot but think,— if the distinction universally made, of various principles of suggestion, be admitted,— should, of itself, have led to juster notions of our trains of thought. It appears to me, indeed, as I have said on that view of our suggestions, to be absolutely decisive of the question; since, whatever might be supposed in other cases, in this case, at least, there cannot have been any previous connexion of that which suggests with that which is suggested. It proves that the tendency of the mind, in suggestion, is not to exist successively in states which have been previously associated, but simply to exist in successive states, which have to each other certain relations, permanent or accidental,— those relations which, in former lectures, were considered by us as reducible to certain primary laws of suggestion. (XL, p.258)

Because, if it were to be a case of association, the "objects [concerned would have been] associated before they had any existence, as they must have been, if this first suggestion had depended on any prior union, or process of any kind" (XL, p.258).[55]

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[55] This is supported by James' (1899/1932, p.86) view that "we can never work the laws of association forward"; viz., that given a specific individual's current state of mind, "we can never cipher out in advance just what the person will be thinking of five minutes later". Yet, James continues:

> [it is also true that] although we cannot work the laws of association forward, we can always work them backwards. We cannot say now what we shall find ourselves thinking of five minutes hence; but, whatever it may be, we shall then be able to trace it through intermediary links of contiguity or similarity to what we are thinking now.

> [In relation to the troublesome phrase "association of ideas", as it is generally used], it must always be remembered, that the [label] association of ideas denotes as much the succession of ideas of objects which never have existed together before, as the successions of objects which have been perceived together,— that there are not two separate mental processes, therefore, following perception, and necessary to the succession,— one by which ideas are primarily associated, and another by which they are subsequently suggested, but that the association is, in truth, only another word for the fact of the suggestion itself. (XL, p.259)

From all of this, asserts Brown:

> You will now, then, I hope, perceive,— or, I flatter myself, may have already perceived, without the necessity of so much repetition of the argument, — the reasons which led me to prefer the term *suggestion* to *association*, as a more accurate general term for all the spontaneous suggestions of our thought; since, by making the suggestion itself to depend upon an association or combination of ideas prior to it, we should not merely have assumed the reality of the process, of which we have no consciousness whatsoever, but should have excluded, by the impossibility of such previous combination, many of the most important classes of suggestions,— every suggestion that arises from the relations of objects which we perceive for the first time, and, indeed, every suggestion that does not belong, in the strictest sense, to Mr. Hume's single class of *contiguity in time*.[56] (XL, p.259)

Yet, as Landes (1926, p.452) remarks, "it is surprising that so keen an observer as Brown should have failed to note that all cases of association belong to the 'single class of contiguity in time'".

The Suggesting Principle

Overall, there is a conceptual difficulty with the term suggestion; it is not a *descriptive* term, it is an *explanatory* term. Rather like Rudyard Kipling's *Just So Stories*, where things are simply just that way, or the doctoral candidate (in Molière's *Le Malade imaginaire*) who, when asked by his examiners to explain why opium made people go to sleep, spoke of how opium possessed a "dormitive virtue" (viz., a sleep-inducing factor), suggestive things are only known to be suggestive retrospectively, i.e., consequent upon their having suggested something.

And, moreover, all things being equal, apart from, and prior to a specific individual subject's idiosyncratic response, there is no intrinsic, objective difference "between the suggestive idea and any other idea" (Titchener, 1910, p.450).

Brown argued that each suggested idea in a train or sequence is spontaneously generated within the mind by its corresponding suggesting idea, *per medium* of the actions of the idiosyncratic "suggesting principle" of that specific moment; and these suggestive principles can be distinguished on the basis of "[the] feelings that have induced them" (XXXIII, p.214):

> It is the suggesting principle, the reviver of thoughts and feelings which have passed away, that gives value to all our other powers and susceptibilities, intellectual and moral — not, indeed, by producing them, for, though unevolved, they would still, as latent capacities, be a part of the original constitution of our spiritual nature,— but by rousing them into action, and

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[56] And, as Landes (1926, p.452) remarks, "it is surprising that so keen an observer as Brown should have failed to note that all cases of association belong to the 'single class of contiguity in time'".

> furnishing them with those accumulating and inexhaustible materials, which are to be the elements of future thought, and the objects of future emotion. Every talent by which we excel, and every vivid feeling which animates us, derive their energy from the suggestions of this ever-active principle. We love and hate,— we desire and fear,— we use means for obtaining good, and avoiding evil,— because we remember the objects and occurrences which we have formerly observed, and because the future, in the similarity of the successions which it presents, appears to us only a prolongation of the past. (XXXIV, p.217)

Yet, by contrast with "the lowest forms of mere animal life", it is only through our "looking before and looking behind", and entertaining "those spontaneous suggestions of thought which constitute remembrance and foresight, that we rise to the dignity of intellectual being" (XXXIV, p.217).

On the basis that "the future memory of perception seems to us almost implied in the perception itself" (XXXIV, p.217), he argues that this is an exceptional mental capacity:

> To [be able to] foresee that which has not yet begun to exist is, in itself, scarcely more unaccountable than to see, as it were before us, what has wholly ceased to exist. The present moment is all of which we are conscious, and which can strictly be said to have a real existence in relation to ourselves. That mode of time, which we call the past, and that other mode of time, which we call the future, are both equally unexisting. (XXXIV, p.218)

Not just Recollection, but Recollection in a Specific Order

It is highly significant that, in the case of simple suggestion, not only does the "principle of suggestion" actively revive thoughts and feelings of which we had been previously conscious, but, it also revives those thoughts and feelings *in a specific order* (XXXIV, p.218):

> If past objects and events had been suggested to us again, not in that series, in which they had formerly occurred, nor according to any of those relations, which human discernment has been able to discover among them, but in endless confusion and irregularity, the knowledge thus acquired, however gratifying as a source of mere variety of feeling, would avail us little, or rather would be wholly profitless, not merely in our speculative inquiries as philosophers, but in the simplest actions of common life. It is quite evident, that, in this case, we should be altogether unable to turn our experience to account, as a mode of avoiding future evil or obtaining future good… (XXXIV, p.218)

From the very fact that the presence of each suggested idea in a sequence can be retrospectively justified by the nature of its specific link with the immediately preceding suggesting idea, it seems self-evident that each of these links are never random; and, from this, it is also self-evident that they follow one or more specific (yet to be determined) systematic regularities, peculiar to that unique linked pair of ideas, in that general context, at that particular moment, viewed from the perspective of the particular individual concerned.

Whilst it is clearly true that, given any one *suggesting idea*, there is no means by which its succeeding *suggested* counterpart can be systematically predicted, Brown argues that there *are* and that there *must be* systematic regularities — in the form of qualitative patterns — that can promote a far clearer understanding of the means through which these suggesting ideas generate their suggested counterparts.

Although Suggesting and Suggested ideas are Successive, they are not Mutually Exclusive

Although the earlier *suggesting idea* and the later *suggested idea* always appear successively, the appearance of the later *suggested idea* in their sequence is not necessarily exclusive of the earlier *suggesting idea*.

Therefore, the *suggested ideas* and the *suggesting ideas* may also continue, coexist, or, even, blend and coalesce (McCosh, 1875, p.328) with one another.

Yet, whilst they always follow and always succeed one another ("a certain series of states of the mind in regular progression"), it is not always the case that the earlier idea fades away as the later idea rises to its full strength (XXXIX, p.250) — and this the factor that is "the [critical] distinction of the trains of our thought from the other trains of which we are accustomed to speak" such as, for example, the extended single file line of beasts in a mule or camel train (as distinct from the wide lateral spread of the camels in a caravan):

> …in our mental sequences, the one feeling which precedes and induces another feeling does not, necessarily, on that account, give place to it; but may continue in that virtual sense of combination, as applied to the phenomena of the mind, of which I have often spoken, to coexist with the new feeling which it excites, outlasting it perhaps, and many other feelings to which, during its permanence, it may have given rise. I pointed out to you how important this circumstance in our mental constitution is to us, in various ways; to our intellectual acquirements; since, without it, there could be no continued meditation, but only a hurrying confusion of image after image, in wilder irregularity than in the wildest of our dreams; and to our virtue and happiness, since, by allowing the coexistence and condensation of various feelings in one complex emotion, it furnishes the chief source of delight of those moral affections which it is at once our happiness to feel, and our virtue to obey. (XL, p.253)

Once again, concepts embedded in our day-to-day language mislead us.

Our continuous reference to concepts such as "trains of thought" lead us to overlook the significant "continuance" and "virtual co-existence" of our feelings; i.e., the "continued co-existence of some of our associate feelings, with the feelings which they suggest" (XXXIX, p.251):

> We are so much accustomed to talk of the successions of our ideas, of the trains of our ideas, of the current of our thought; and to use so many other phrases of mere succession, to the exclusion of all notions of co-existence, in speaking of modifications of the principle of suggestion, that, by the habitual use of these terms, we are led to think of our ideas as consecutive only, and to suppose that, because there is truly a certain series of states of the mind in regular progression, the state of mind at one moment must be so different from the state of mind of the moment proceeding, that one idea must always fade as a new one arises. That the sequence may sometimes be thus exclusive in the very moment of all that preceded the particular suggestion I do not deny, though there are many circumstances which lead me to believe that, if this ever occur, it is at least far from being the general case. (XXXIX, p.250)

And, in his synopsis of his own lectures (*Sketch of a System*, 1820), Brown expands on his view that our characteristic modes of speech, especially our constant reference to "trains of thought", are the principal causes of this error:

> The various feelings which rise in the mind by the principle of Suggestion, are said to form a *train* of thought, and are expressed by so many other phrases of simple *sequence*, that a

person who has not been accustomed to consider the differences of meaning which the same words are often used to convey, may be led inadvertently to consider the internal train as in its order of sequence exactly similar to the onward figures of a procession, of which one vanishes from view, at the moment when another becomes visible. Such a notion, however, would be very inaccurate, as to the phenomena of Suggestion; and since it is an error which might almost seem to be involved in the general opinions, or at least in the ordinary language of philosophers on the subject, it is the more necessary, on that account, to point it out distinctly.

If we look back with the slightest attention on the successive states of mind in any of our musings, we shall find, that a conception, after giving rise to some new conception, did not always cease to be itself part of our continued consciousness. In the metaphysical sense of combination as applied to our feelings, the prior conception, in such a case, often remains, so as to co-exist with the conception which itself has induced, and may afterwards suggest other conceptions, or other feelings, with which it may coexist in like manner, in a still more complex group. It is impossible, indeed, without such a widening co-existence of feelings, to account for some of the most ordinary phenomena of our thought. We compare, we chuse [sic], in our internal plans; because different objects are together present to our conception. How many forms of beauty, for example, hover before the poet's eye, when he selects the most enchanting of them for the loveliness which he wishes to picture:— yet how little aid would he derive from all the splendid variety, if, instead of mingling and pausing before him even for a few moments, each were to flit away singly, in rapid succession, without affording any opportunity of wide comparison and choice! (pp.222-224)

The Primary Laws of Simple Suggestion

Brown discusses the familiar phenomenon of:

(a) the "tendency of ideas to suggest each other, without any renewed perception of the external objects which originally excited them",

(b) the observation that "that the suggestion [so made] is not altogether loose and indefinite", and

(c) "that certain ideas have a peculiar tendency to suggest certain other relative ideas in associate trains of thought" (XXXIV, p.219).

Referring to Aristotle's analysis of voluntary, intentional remembering — which he describes as "the process by which… we endeavour to discover the idea in which we are in search" — and stressing that Aristotle's choice of *thirevomen* (hunt) emphasizes the fact that "we hunt for it… among other ideas, either of objects existing at present, or at some former time; and from their resemblance, contrariety, and contiguity…" (XXXIV, p.219), Brown draws our attention to Aristotle's anticipation of Hume's three principles of association: i.e., resemblance, contiguity in time and place, and cause and effect.

Brown makes a strong challenge to Hume (XXXV, p.222), arguing that there are only two principles: "resemblance" and "contiguity in place and time" (a union of Hume's *contiguity* and *cause*

and effect):[57]

> Causation, far from being opposed to contiguity, so as to form a separate class is, in truth, the most exquisite species of proximity in time, and in most cases of contiguity in place also, which could not be adduced; because it is not a proximity depending on casual circumstances, and consequently liable to be broken, as these circumstances may exist apart, but one which depends only on the mere existence of the two objects that are related to each other as cause and effect, and therefore fixed and never failing. Other objects may sometimes be proximate; but a cause and effect are always proximate, and must be proximate, and are, indeed, classed in that relation, merely from this constant proximity. (XXXV, p.222)

The two principles of resemblance and contiguity in place and time often interact.

A portrait resembling its subject is a case of resemblance alone; and, yet, the less complete the resemblance, the more that contiguity comes into play. Brown uses the example of the costume of a particular period bringing to mind "some distinguished person of that time":

> A ruff, like that worn by Queen Elizabeth, brings before us the sovereign herself, though the person who wears the ruff may have no other circumstance of resemblance;— because, the ruff, and the general appearance of Queen Elizabeth, having formed one complex whole in our mind, it is necessary only that one part of the complexity should be recalled,— as the ruff, in case supposed,— to bring back all the other parts, by the mere principle of contiguity. (XXXV, p.223)

From a long discussion on the way that various literary forms and rhetorical figures express various levels, degrees and types of "resemblance" (metaphor, simile, analogy, puns, alliteration, antithesis, etc.), Brown concludes that there are two equipollent forms of resemblance: *similarity* and *contrast* (XXXV, p.223-234).

From this, the primary laws of simple suggestion can be understood as the consequence of actions of the two connecting principles of *resemblance* (i.e., similarity or contrast) and *contiguity* (i.e., nearness in either place time).

In Brown's biography, Welsh quotes the following piece, which was a direct transcription of an undated item in one of Brown's manuscript volumes, given to Welsh as resource material, which speaks of a special manifestation of the contiguity principle:

> Many striking circumstances have been related of persons who, when engaged in an important affair, as in a lawsuit, have, in a dream, thought of some particular of great consequence, as of the place in which an old paper was deposited, and have thus been led to believe in supernatural interference. The true explanation in this case seems to be, that they have before known something with respect to the circumstance discovered, though in their waking hours it had escaped their memory. Even in our waking hours we remember at one time what at others was forgotten; and in sleep the circumstances which favour recollection are still more striking. For when awake our attention is distracted by a thousand objects, while in sleep the regular train of associations is unimpeded by external impression. The light connections, therefore of contiguity, may be renewed in a dream, though the power of the connection, to use a mechanical metaphor, may not have been sufficient to resist the force of

[57] From page 235 onwards, Brown tends to use the more specific expression "nearness in place or time" in preference to the more general term "contiguity".

light and sound, and the more vivid and permanent emotions excited by the business of the active day. (Welsh, 1825, pp.344-345)

Summary of this Section



The Place of this Section within the System



"Laws" of the Mind

When criticizing Hamilton's equivocal use of the term "Law" (sometimes in the sense of a scientific law, and others in the simpler sense of just a precept), Mill offers the following definition of what "Laws of Thought" might actually be: "*the modes in which, and the conditions subject to which, by the constitution of our nature, we cannot but think*" (1865, p.386, emphasis added).

He also distinguishes between true laws and precepts in the following way: laws state "[how] our faculties are governed", whilst precepts state "[how] they ought to be governed" (p.388).

Clearly anticipating Mill — and, most likely this is due to the fact that he influenced Mill — it seems quite clear that, in the same sense that Newton's laws of gravity were physical laws, Brown was trying to establish Laws of the Mind (i.e., rather than Laws of Thought).

> Even those philosophers, who have had the wisdom to perceive, that man can never discover any thing in the phenomena of nature, but a succession of events, that follow each other in regular series, and who, accordingly, recommend the observation and arrangement of these regular antecedents and consequents as the only attainable objects of philosophy, yet found this very advice, on the distinction of what they have termed efficient causes, as different from the physical causes, or simple antecedents, to which they advise us to devote our whole attention. There are certain secret causes, they say, continually operating in the production of every change which we observe, and causes which alone deserve the name of efficient; but they are, at the same time, careful to tell us, that, although these causes are constantly operating before us, and are all which are truly acting before us, we must not hope that we shall ever be able to detect one of them; and, indeed, the prohibition of every attempt to discover the efficient causes of phenomena,— repeated in endless varieties of precept or reproof,— is the foundation of all their rules of philosophizing; as if the very information, that what we are to consider exclusively, in the phenomena of nature, is far less important, than what we are studiously to omit, were not, of itself, more powerful, in stimulating our curiosity to attempt the forbidden search, than any prohibition could be in repressing it. "Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas".[58] This will for ever [sic] be the feeling of the inquirer, while he thinks that there are any causes more than those which he has already investigated. Even Newton himself, that sagest of observers and reasoners, who could say, with the simplicity of pure philosophy, "*Hypotheses non fingo*",[59] yet showed, as we have seen, by one of the most hypothetical of his Queries, that he was not exempt from the error which he wished to discourage — that inordinate love of the unknown, which must always lead those, who believe that there is something intermediate and undiscovered truly existing between events, to feel the anxious dissatisfaction of incomplete inquiry, in considering the mere antecedents and consequents which nature exhibits, and to turn, therefore, as if for comfort, to any third circumstance, which can be introduced, without obvious absurdity, as a sort of connecting link, between the pairs of events. To suppose, that the mind should not have this disposition, would, indeed, be to suppose it void of that principle of curiosity, without which there can be no inquiry of any kind. He who could believe, that, between all the visible phenomena, there are certain invisible agencies continually operating, which have as real an existence as all that he perceives, and could yet content himself with numbering the visible phenomena, and giving them names, without any endeavour to discover the intervening powers, by which he is constantly surrounded, or at least to form some slight guess, as to that universal machinery, by which he conceived all the wonders of nature to be wrought, must be a being as different from the common intellectual beings of this earth, as the perfect sage of the Stoics from the frail creatures, of mingled vice and virtue, that live and err around us. That, in considering the phenomena of nature, we should confine our attention to the mere antecedents and consequents, which succeed each other in regular series, is unquestionably the soundest advice

[58] Lit. "Happy is he who knows the causes of things"; a direct quote from Virgil, *Georgics*, II, 490.

[59] Lit. "I feign no hypothesis [as to mechanism]". For an extended discussion of this expression and how and why it can not mean "I frame no hypothesis", see Cohen (1962), and Cohen (1999), pp.274-277.

that can be given. (IX, p.52). [60]

Here, it is essential to recognize that, whilst Newton systematically *described* what was happening, he offered no causal *explanation* of any kind in relation to whatsoever the mechanisms might have been that underlay any of the regularities he had so painstakingly described.

In full, the relevant passage from the concluding *General Scholium*[61] of Newton's *Principia* follows:

> Thus far I have explained the phenomena of the heavens and of our sea by the force of gravity, but I have not yet assigned a cause to gravity. Indeed, this force arises from some cause that penetrates as far as the centers of the sun and planets without any diminution of its power to act, and that acts not in proportion to the quantity of the *surfaces* of the particles on which it acts (as mechanical causes are wont to do) but in proportion to the quantity of *solid* matter, and whose action is extended everywhere to immense distances, always decreasing as the squares of the distances. Gravity toward the sun is compounded of the gravities toward the individual particles of the sun, and at increasing distances from the sun decreases exactly as the squares of the distances as far out as the orbit of Saturn, as is manifest from the fact that the aphelia of the planets are at rest, and even as far as the farthest aphelia of the comets, provided that those aphelia are at rest. I have not as yet been able to deduce from phenomena the reason for these properties of gravity, and I do not feign hypotheses ["*Hypotheses non fingo*"]. For whatever is not deduced from the phenomena must be called a hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, or based on occult qualities, or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy. In this experimental philosophy, propositions are deduced from the phenomena and are made general by induction. The impenetrability, mobility, and impetus of bodies, and the laws of motion and the law of gravity have been found by this method. And it is enough that gravity really exists and acts according to the laws that we have set forth and is sufficient to explain all the motions of the heavenly bodies and of our sea. (Newton, 1999, p.943)

Significance of the observed Considerable Variation in Suggested Ideas

He then raises a very significant issue in relation to suggestion in general: the issue of the extensive and "various relations, by which, without the renewal of perception, the mere conception of one object is sufficient to awaken the conception of many others that are said to be associated with it" (XXXVII, p.236):

> If there be various relations, according to which these parts of our trains of thought may succeed each other,— if the sight of a picture, for example can [recall] to me the person whom it resembles, the artist who painted it, the friend who presented it to me, the room in which it formerly was hung, the series of portraits of which it then formed a part, and perhaps many

[60] Brown elaborates on his view that this is "the soundest advice" as follows:

> But it is sound advice, for this reason more than any other, that the regular series is, in truth, all that constitutes the phenomena; and that to search for any thing more, is not to have an unattainable object in view, but to have no conceivable object whatever. Then only can the inquirer be expected to content himself with observing and classing the sequences, which nature presents to us spontaneously, or in obedience to our art, when he is convinced, that all the substances which exist in the universe — God and the things which he has created — are every thing which truly exists in the universe, to which nothing can be added, which is not itself a new substance; that there can be nothing in the events of nature, therefore, but the antecedents and consequents which are present in them; and that these, accordingly, or nothing, are the very causes and effects which he is desirous of investigating. (IX, p.52)

[61] A *scholium* is a note that has been appended to a text, by the text's author, to illustrate or further develop some point that he/she has already treated in the text.

> circumstances and events that have been accidentally connected with it,— *why does it suggest one of these conceptions rather then the others?* (XXXVII, p.236; emphasis added).

The Secondary Laws of Simple Suggestion

If there were only the primary laws of simple suggestion, those which control "the relations of the successive feelings" (XXXVII, p.236), the laws of contiguity and resemblance would dictate that a wide range of suggestions had an equal likelihood of production by any given perceived object.

However, this would also mean that, once a suggestion had been induced, by the perceived object, the associated suggestion induced by that perceived object would always be uniform.

This is clearly not the case at all.

Therefore, in addition to his primary laws, Brown proposed another set of *modifying* laws which controlled "the relations of the successive feelings"; laws that governed the "other circumstances which modify their peculiar influence at different times, and in different persons".

He called them the "*secondary laws of suggestion*":

> In addition, then, to the primary laws of suggestion, which are founded on the mere relations of the objects or feelings to each other, it appears that there is another set of laws, the operation of which is indispensable to account for the variety in the effects of the former. To these I have given the name of secondary laws of suggestion… (XXXVII, p.240).

> The secondary laws of suggestion [relate to]… those circumstances which diversify the general power of suggestion, in different individuals, and which thus give occasion to all the varieties of conception or remembrance, in individuals, to whom the mere primary laws of suggestion may be supposed to have been nearly equal. (XLI, p.266)

Haven (1862) usefully summarized Brown's views as follows:

> *These Laws distinguished as Objective and Subjective*.— It will be observed that the primary laws of suggestion, so called, are such as arise from the relation which our thoughts sustain to each other, while the secondary are such as arise from the relations which they sustain to ourselves, the thinking subjects. Hence the former have been called *objective*, the latter, *subjective* laws. (p.107)

These secondary laws, which acted to modify and direct the operation of the primary laws:

(a) could act alone, or

(b) could act in concert with one or more of the other laws, to either:

(i) compound, amplify or otherwise strengthen the actions of one another,[62] or

(ii) conflict with, diminish, obstruct or, even, nullify the actions of one another.

The secondary laws determine the extent to which a specific idea (rather than some other, alternative and otherwise theoretically equiprobable idea) is suggested, to a particular individual, by another idea, that has been presented within a particular context, at a particular moment.

Brown's question was "why, if the same object, as either perceived or imagined by us, is capable,

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[62] This "otherwise strengthening" process could, for example, occur not by any positively active sort of supplementation, but by some other negatively inactive sort of action that, in fact, diminishes some sort of obstruction.

by its almost innumerable relations, of suggesting the conception of various other objects, it suggests, at any particular time, one of these rather than another?" (XXXVIII, p.240).

Brown identified a number of these secondary laws, that tended to be linked with either the natural disposition of the individual concerned, or the current state of their bodily functions, which acted to "[modify] the influence of the primary laws, in inducing one associate conception rather than another" (XXXVII, p.236).

They can be examined in five general groups:

(a) factors that modify resemblance,

(b) factors that modify contiguity, and

(c) "constitutional" factors. This third group is further subdivided into intellectual factors, emotional factors, and physical factors.
Brown remarks that, regardless of whether they are intellectual, emotional or physical, these "constitutional differences" act to modify the primary laws of suggestion in two ways:

(a) "by *augmenting and extending* the influence of all of [the primary laws]"; and

(b) "by *giving greater proportional vigour* to one set of tendencies of suggestion than another" (XXXVII, p.237, emphasis added).

A. Factors that may Modify the Resemblance Principle

(A.1) *Relative duration of individual presentations*: "the length of time during which the original feelings from which they flowed, continued, when they coexisted, or succeeded each other" (XXXVII, p.236).[63]

(A.2) *Relative vividness or intensity of individual presentations*: "the parts of the train appear to be more closely and firmly associated, as the original feelings have been more lively". "Brilliant objects" are better remembered than "those which are faint and obscure". "Occasions of great joy or sorrow" are better remembered than those occasions of "slight pleasures or pains", etc. (XXXVII, p.236).[64]

(A.3) *Relative frequency of individual presentations*: "the parts of the train are more readily suggested, in proportion as they have been more frequently renewed" (XXXVII, p.236).[65]

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[63] "The longer we dwell on objects, the more fully do we rely on our future remembrance of them". (XXXVII, p.236)

[64] "That strong feeling of interest and curiosity, which we call attention, not only leads us to dwell longer on the consideration of certain objects, but also gives more vivacity to the objects, on which we dwell,— and in both these ways tend, as we have seen, to fix them, more strongly in the mind." (XXXVII, p.236)

[65] "It is thus, we remember, after reading them three or four times over, the verses, which we could not repeat, when we had read them only once". (XXXVII, p.236)
This is a different issue from that of "redundancy" — as understood within information theory — which speaks to the extent to which the components of a message are present to a degree far in excess of that technically

(A.4) *Relative recency of last presentations*: "the feelings are connected more strongly, in proportion as they are more or less recent" (XXXVII, p.236).[66]

B. Factors that may Modify the Contiguity Principle

(B.1) *The extent to which the suggesting idea has been more or less exclusively linked with one suggested idea*: "our successive feelings are associated more closely, as each has coexisted less with other feelings" (XXXVII, p.236).[67]

(B.2) *Prior habits*: Prior habits (especially "professional peculiarities") increase the likelihood of certain suggested ideas being generated,[68] and, also, make the generation of those suggested ideas much easier (XXXVII, p.239): "the nature of habit may be considered in two lights; as it thus produces a greater tendency to certain actions, and as it occasions greater facility and excellence in those particular actions" (XLIII, p.276).
Brown makes it clear that, in this case, he is not simply speaking of the constant juxtaposition of ideas (referred to in A.3 above):

> [When speaking of the principle of habit] I do not speak of its influence in suggesting

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necessary in order to ensure that the entire message will be correctly understood in the event of some disturbance to the message (e.g., static during broadcast).
Here, it seems, Brown is referring to repeated exposure over a period of time, rather than a single redundant message.

[66] "Immediately after reading any single line in poetry, we are able to repeat it, though we may have paid no particular attention to it;— in a very few minutes, unless when we have paid particular attention to it, we are no longer able to repeat it accurately — and in a very short time we forget it altogether." (XXXVII, p.236)

[67] "The song, which we have never heard but from one person, can scarcely be heard again by us, without recalling that person to our memory; but there is obviously less chance of this particular suggestion, if we have heard the same air and words frequently sung by others." (XXXVII, p.236)

[68] Brown also states that one of the pernicious influences of "professional habits" in relation to their "[modification of] "trains of thought" is that they lead us to "[attach] undue importance to particular sets of opinions" (XLIV, p.282). Speaking of "accidental circumstances" of "the advantages of scientific and elegant education", Brown comments:

> If the associations and consequent complex feelings which we derive from the accidental impression of external things, or which we form to ourselves by our exclusive studies and occupations, have a powerful influence on our intellectual character, those which are transmitted to us from other minds are not less powerful. We continue to think and feel as our ancestors have thought and felt; so true, in innumerable cases, is the observation, that "men make up their principles by inheritance, and defend them as they would their estates, because they are born heirs to them". It has been justly said that it is difficult to regard that as an evil which has been long done, and that there are many great and excellent things, which we never think of doing, merely because no one has done them before us. This subjection of the soul to former usage, till roused by circumstances of more than common energy, is like the *inertia* that retains bodies in the state in which they happen to be, till some foreign force operate to suspend their motion or their rest. (XLIV, p.283)

In his own synopsis of his lecture notes (*Sketch of a System*, 1820) Brown continues:

> Another modifying influence in suggestion is that of general habit. I do not speak of cases in which the suggesting and suggested conceptions have frequently existed before… but of cases in which the conception suggesting and the conception suggested may never before have existed together, yet arise in rapid succession, in consequence of a general cast of thought, superinduced variously by circumstances peculiar to the individual. Such is the effect of long-continued and exclusive professional studies or practice. The technical pedantry which these produce, while, on the simplest occurrences of common life, it is continually giving rise to allusions that are intelligible only within the circle of those who are conversant with the same studies and practice, and appear ridiculous beyond it, is but an exemplification of this natural influence of customary thought. (p.214)

> images which have been already frequently suggested in a certain order,— for it would then be simpler to reduce the habit itself to the mere power of association. I speak of cases in which the images suggested may have been of recent acquisition, but are suggested more readily in consequence of general tendencies produced by prior habits. When men of different professions observe the same circumstances, listen to the same story, or peruse the same work, their subsequent suggestions are far from being the same; and, could the future differences of the associate feelings that are to rise be foreseen by us at the time, we would probably be able to trace may of them to former professional peculiarities, which are thus always unfortunately apt to be more and more aggravated by the very suggestions to which they have themselves given rise. (XXXVII, p.239).

According to Klein (1970):

> [Brown's claim that "general tendencies produced by prior habits" influence "trains of thought"]… is an allusion to habitual attitudes and habitual modes of speech associated with given professions, vocations, and dominant fields of interest. A given scene viewed by an engineer, an artist, an economist, and a geologist is not likely to affect each of these men in precisely the same way. Their reports of what they saw will be colored by their professional habits. Thus, if the scene chanced to be a new bridge, the engineer may stress its structural characteristics, the artist its symmetry, the economist its effect on business, and the geologist the solidity of its foundations. *Their respective interests will have determined the trend of their thinking*. (p.693, emphasis added)

Brown also states that one of the pernicious influences of "professional habits" in relation to their "[modification of] "trains of thought" is that they lead us to "[attach] undue importance to particular sets of opinions" (XLIV, p.282).
Speaking of "accidental circumstances" of "the advantages of scientific and elegant education", Brown comments:

> If the associations and consequent complex feelings which we derive from the accidental impression of external things, or which we form to ourselves by our exclusive studies and occupations, have a powerful influence on our intellectual character, those which are transmitted to us from other minds are not less powerful. We continue to think and feel as our ancestors have thought and felt; so true, in innumerable cases, is the observation, that "men make up their principles by inheritance, and defend them as they would their estates, because they are born heirs to them". It has been justly said that it is difficult to regard that as an evil which has been long done, and that there are many great and excellent things, which we never think of doing, merely because no one has done them before us. This subjection of the soul to former usage, till roused by circumstances of more than common energy, is like the inertia that retains bodies in the state in which they happen to be, till some foreign force operate to suspend their motion or their rest. (XLIV, p.283)

In his own synopsis of his lecture notes (*Sketch of a System*, 1820) Brown continues:

> Another modifying influence in suggestion is that of general habit. I do not speak of cases in which the suggesting and suggested conceptions have frequently existed before… but of cases in which the conception suggesting and the conception suggested

> may never before have existed together, yet arise in rapid succession, in consequence of a general cast of thought, superinduced variously by circumstances peculiar to the individual. Such is the effect of long-continued and exclusive professional studies or practice. The technical pedantry which these produce, while, on the simplest occurrences of common life, it is continually giving rise to allusions that are intelligible only within the circle of those who are conversant with the same studies and practice, and appear ridiculous beyond it, is but an exemplification of this natural influence of customary thought. (p.214)

C. Intellectual Differences that may Influence the Suggestive Linkage

Brown is of the opinion that this class can be considered to be a more detailed subdivision of the quality that Locke designated *sagacity*[69] (XLIX, pp.317-319):

(C.1) *Constitutional differences in stored memory*: a consequence of the individual's actual capacity for remembering items, *per se*,[70] these are the differences due to "the varieties of the general power of remembering, so observable in different individuals" (XXXVII, p.237). He also notes (XXXVII, p.238) that "copious reading" allied with "a retentive memory", in "an individual, of very humble talent", will eventually produce a great profusion of "splendid images" — by proxy, from the various authors studied — that will, eventually, in total, be far greater than that possessed by any of those single authors alone; yet, despite this magnificent store of "splendid images", this "individual, of very humble talent" can never be treated as though he or she is genuinely *creative*.

(C.2) *Constitutional differences in relational thinking*: the idiosyncratic expression in different individuals of "the general constitutional tendency of the mind, to exist, successively, in states that have certain relations to each other" (XL, p.259).

(C.3) *Constitutional differences in imaginativeness*: this refers to the native ability to generate the imaginary perception of an absent object.

(C.4) *Constitutional differences in inventiveness*: this refers to the native capacity within the individual for "giving greater proportional vigour to one set of tendencies of suggestion than another". Brown strongly argues that, from his perspective, this is the determining criterion of *genius*. In essence, it is not "from any superior tenacity of general memory" or from the possession of "any more copious store of images" that the genius rises above the

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[69] Locke (*Essay Concerning Human Understanding*), Book IV, Chapter 2 ("Of the Degrees of our Knowledge"):

> Those intervening *Ideas*, which serve to shew the Agreement of any two others, are called *Proofs*; and where the Agreement or Disagreement is by this means plainly and clearly perceived, it is called *Demonstration*, it being *shewn* to the Understanding, and the Mind made to see that it is so. A quickness in the mind to find out these intermediate *Ideas*, (that shall discover the Agreement or Disagreement of any other,) and to apply them right, is, I suppose, that which is called *Sagacity*. (IV.2.3, p.532)

[70] It is clear from Brown's discussion of (C.4) that, here (in C.1) he is referring to one's "tenacity of general memory" and, in particular, the extent to which one individual has, comparatively, a "more copious store of images" than another (XXXVII, p.237).

rest. It refers, especially, to the individual's capacity for innovative and creative analogical thinking, especially the production of compounds different from those which nature exhibits. Using the example of the poetry, he explains that the work of original imaginative genius differs from the hack in that, even when given precisely the same store of images, the hack operates on the basis of "grosser contiguity":

> In the mind of one poet, for example, the conception of his subject awakens only such images, as he had previously seen combined with it in the works of others; and he is thus fated, by his narrow and unvarying range of suggestions, only to add another name to the eternal list of imitators. (XXXVII, p.237)

By contrast, the poetic genius will produce a set of innovative, new analogies from that very same set of images.

> In a poetic mind of a higher order, the conception of this very subject can not exist for a moment, without awakening, by the different tendency of the suggesting principle, groups of images which never before had existed in similar combinations; and instead of being an imitator, he becomes a great model, for the imitation of others. (XXXVII, p.237)

He stresses that it is the innovative creativity of the establishment of these new links that is the measure of genius; i.e., rather than the suggestion of the images alone:

> The inventions of poetic genius, then, are the suggestions of analogy,— the prevailing suggestions of common minds, are those of mere contiguity; and it is this difference of the occasions of suggestion, not of the images suggested, which forms the distinctive superiority of original genius. (XXXVII, p.238)

He also emphasizes the extent to which scientific progress is driven by the powerful influence of innovative analogical thinking which, in its creation of novel connexions, is entirely dependent upon the operations of the suggestive principle:

> [One very important class of analogies is comprised of] those which form the powerful associations that direct the genius of scientific invention. These are the analogies of objects, considered as means, in reference to a particular end. When a mechanician [sic] sees a machine, the parts of which all concur in one great ultimate effect, if he be blessed with inventive genius he will not merely see and comprehend the uses of the parts as they co-operate in the particular machine before him, but there will perhaps arise in his mind the idea of some power yet unapplied to the same purpose, some simpler process by which the ultimate effect may be augmented or improved, or at least obtained at less cost of time, or labour, or capital. When the crucible of the chemist presents to him some new result, and his first astonishment is over, there arise in his mind the ideas of products, or operations, in some respects analogous, by the comparison of which he discovers some new element or combination of elements, and perhaps changes altogether the aspect of his science. A Newton sees an apple fall to the ground, and he discovers the system of the universe. In these cases, the principle of analogy, whether its operation be direct or indirect, is too forcible and too extensive in its sway to admit of much dispute. It is sufficient to know that, by the suggestions that it has afforded to those …series of minds, which spread from age to age the progress of improvement over all the regions and generations of mankind, we have risen to an

> empire over nature, which, compared with our original imbecility, is a greater advance in the scale of being than that fabulous apotheosis which the ancient world conferred upon its barbarous heroes. (XXXV, p.227)

D. Emotional Differences that may Influence the Suggestive Linkage

(D.1) *Natural disposition or temper*: whether one's outlook is naturally cheerful or gloomy, optimistic or pessimistic, etc. (XXXVII, p.238) It may also be a consequence of one's stage of life: e.g., "the happy thoughtlessness of youth", contrasted with the "cautious calculating sadness of old age" (XXXVII, p.239).

(D.2) *Transient variations in emotional state*: "according to the varying emotion of the hour" (XXXVII, p.238):

> In two individuals who walk along the same meadow, the one after suffering some very recent and severe affliction, and the other with a light heart, and an almost vacant mind, how very different, in number and intensity, are the mere sensations that arise at every step! Yet we surely do not deny, to him who scarcely knows that there are flowers around him, an original susceptibility of being affected by the fragrance of that very violet, the faint odour of which is now wafted to him in vain. Brown (LV, p.366)

(D.3) *Level of attention*: a consequence of the level of interest and curiosity. It is, quite simply, the consequence of the extent to which an increase in the strength of one sensation produces a corresponding decrease in the strength of other coexisting sensations.

According to Brown this is all driven by *curiosity*, or in his terminology, *the desire of knowing*:[71] "what we call attention is nothing more" than the situation that obtains when "the desire of knowing accurately a particular object in a group, is instantly,— or, at least, instantly after some organic change which may be necessary,— followed by a more vivid and distinct perception of the particular object, and a comparative faintness of the other objects that coexist with it" (XXI, p.200).

It determines (XXXI, pp.200-202):

(a) the degree of concentration and the length of time that is spent dwelling on a particular idea, and

(b) the degree of vivacity and intensity given to the ideas so dwelt upon.

E. Physical differences that may influence the suggestive linkage

(E.1) *One's temporary condition*: whether one is starving, not hungry, engorged, intoxicated, coming down with an illness, convalescing after an illness has passed, delirious, etc. (XXXVII, p.239)

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[71] The desire of knowing is dealt with later in the group of prospective emotions.

(E.2) *One's general condition*: whether one is generally healthy or diseased — "how different are the trains of thought in health and in sickness" (XXXVII, p.239).

Summary of this Section



Supposedly distinct mental powers that are reducible to simple suggestion alone

Having clearly discredited the implicit assumption embedded within the association of ideas concept, that our "trains of thought… [do not] depend on any previous intellectual process, constituting… a union or association of ideas", and having demonstrated that (XLI, pp.260-261):

(a) within our spontaneous trains of thought "in the phenomena themselves, there is no evidence of any such association, or earlier connecting process of any kind, all of which we are conscious being merely the original perception and the subsequent suggestion",

(b) in our trains of thought "conception follows conception… without any recurrence of the external objects, which, as perceived, originally gave occasion to them",

(c) "these conceptions, as internal states of the mind, independent of any immediate influence of external things, do not follow each other loosely, but according to a certain general relation, or number of relations, which constitute what I have termed the primary laws of suggestion, and which exercise their influence variously, in different persons, and at different times, according to circumstances, which, as modifying the former, I have denominated secondary laws of suggestion",

(d) rather than simply following one another, and "the suggesting idea giving immediate place to the suggested", the "various conceptions, which arise at different moments, may coexist, and form one compound feeling, in the same manner as various perceptions, that arise together, or at different moments, may coexist, and form one compound feeling of another species", and

(e) "no previous association, or former connecting process, of any kind, is necessary for suggestion",[72]

Brown concludes his treatment of simple suggestion with an argument that many of the so-called mental faculties that are supposed to be distinct, peculiar intellectual powers can be accounted for by simple suggestion; he specifically discusses conception, memory, imagination, and habit.

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(1) *The Power of Conception*.

The Power of Conception is "the power that enables us to form a notion of an absent object of perception, or of some previous feeling of the mind" (XLI, p.261).

> That we have a certain mental power or susceptibility by which… the perception of one object may excite the notion of some absent object, is unquestionably true. (XLI, p.261)

> The power of suggestion and the power of conception are the same, both being only that peculiar susceptibility of the mind from which, in certain circumstances, conceptions arise,— or,

[72] Brown argues as follows:

> That our suggestions do not follow each other loosely and confusedly, is no proof of prior associations of mind, but merely of the general constitutional tendency of the mind, to exist, successively, in states that have certain relations to each other. There is noting in the nature of our original perceptions, which would enable us to infer this regularity and limitation of our subsequent trains of thought. (XLI, pp.258-259).

> at least, if the power of conception differs from the more general power of suggestion, it differs from it only as a part from a whole,— as the power of taking a single step differs from the power of traversing a whole field,— the power of drawing a single breath from the general power of respiration… (XLI, p.262)

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(2) *The Power of Memory.*

"Our remembrances are nothing more than conceptions united with the notion of a certain relation in time" (XLI, p.262).

Brown argues that our notion of time is based on a relationship that can be expressed by the terms "priority" and "succession or subsequence" (XLI, p.263):

> …for time, as far as we are capable of understanding it, or rather of feeling it, is nothing more than the varieties of this felt relation, which, in reference to one of the subjects of the relation, we distinguish by the word before,— in reference to the other, by the word after. It is a relation, I may remark, which we feel nearly in the same manner as we feel the relation which bodies bear to each other, as coexisting in space. We say of a house that it is two miles from a particular village, half a mile from the river, a mile from the bridge…
>
> There is some point to which, in estimating distance of space, we refer the objects which we measure, as there is a point of time in the present moment, or in some event which we have before learned to consider thus relatively, to which, directly or indirectly, we refer the events of which we speak as past or future, or more or less recent. (XLI, p.263)

In fact, a *memory* is better understood as "nothing more than a particular suggestion, combined with the feeling of the relation of priority, and all the conceptions, therefore, which it involves, arise according to the laws which regulate suggestion in general" (XLI, p.264).

> To be capable of remembering, in short, we must have a capacity of feelings which we term *relations*, and a capacity of feelings which we term *conceptions*, that may be the subjects of the relations; but with these two powers no other is requisite,— no power of memory distinct from the conception and relation which that complex term denotes. (XLI, p.263)[73]

Brown distinguished between two sorts of remembering:

(a) *Simple Memory*: the spontaneous remembering, where "conception follows conception by the ordinary laws of suggestion… [and] with which there is not combined, any notion of time"[74] (XLI, p.265); and

(b) *Recollection*: the intentional "species of memory, which is said to be under our control", is driven by our "desire of remembering something forgotten", in which "we will the existence of certain ideas… and they arise in consequence of our volition"[75] (XLI, p.265).

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[73] Brown explains that his account will become clearer later, as it relies on his to-be-discussed-later-on concept of *relative suggestion*:

> The conception, which forms one element of the remembrance, is referable to the capacity of simple suggestion, which we have been considering; the feeling of the relation of priority, which forms the other element of the remembrance, is referable, like all our other feelings of relation, to the capacity of relative suggestion, which we are afterwards to consider. (XLI, p.264)

[74] That is, the unintentional, passive and involuntary reminiscence of *mneme* ("memory").

[75] That is, the intentional, sustained, active and voluntary reminiscence of *anamnesis* ("recall").

(3) *The Power of Imagination (or Fancy).*

Imagination is "generally regarded as implying a voluntary selection and combination of images, for the production of compounds different from those which nature exhibits" (XLII, p.270).

> We not merely perceive objects, and conceive or remember them simply as they were, but we have the power of combining them in various new assemblages,— or forming at our will, with a sort of delegated omnipotence, not a single universe merely, but a new and varied universe, with every succession of thought. The materials of which we form them are, indeed, materials that exist in every mind; but they exist in every mind only as the stones exist shapeless in the quarry, that require little more than mechanic labour to convert them into common dwellings, but that rise into palaces and temples only at the command of architectural genius" (XLII, p.269)

The key distinction here is the active presence of *desire*:

> We have seen, in considering some other mental processes, that these are rendered very different in appearance by the union of desire; that mere perception, in this way becomes attention,— mere memory, recollection. A similar difference is produced by the union of the same feeling in the phenomena we are at present considering.
>
> Imagination, then, may be considered in two lights; as it takes place without desire, or, as it takes place with desire or intention…
>
> That there is imagination, or new combination of images[76] and feelings unaccompanied with any desire, and consequently, altogether void of selection, is as true as that there is memory without intentional reminiscence (XLII, p.270).

> Such is imagination, considered, as it most frequently occurs, without any accompanying desire,— a mode of the general capacity of simple suggestion and nothing more. But there are, unquestionably, cases in which the desire, or intention of some sort, accompanies it during the whole, or the chief part of the process; and it is of these cases chiefly that we are accustomed to think, in speaking of this supposed power. Such is the frame of the mind, in composition of every species, in prose or verse. In this state, conceptions follow each other, and new assemblages are formed. It is a continued exercise of imagination… (XLII, p.271)

> [Composition] is not the exercise of a single power, but the development of various susceptibilities,— of desire,— of simple suggestion, by which conceptions rise after conceptions,— of judgement or relative suggestion, by which a feeling of relative fitness or unfitness arises, on the contemplations of the conceptions that have thus spontaneously presented themselves. We think of some subject; the thought of this subject induces various conceptions related to it. We approve of some, as having a relation of fitness for our end, and disapprove of others, as unfit. We may term this complex state, or series of states, imagination, or fancy, and the term may be convenient for its brevity. But in using it, we must not forget that the term, however brief and simple, is still the name of a state that is complex, or of a succession of certain states; that the phenomena comprehended under it, being the same in nature, are not rendered, by this use of a mere word, different from those to which we

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[76] That is, mental impressions or conceptions.

have already given peculiar names, expressive of them as they exist separately; and that it is to the classes of these elementary phenomena, therefore, that we must refer the whole process of imagination in our philosophic analysis,— unless we exclude analysis altogether, and fill our mental vocabulary with as many names of powers as there are complex affections of the mind.(XLII, p.272)

In the inventive process, indeed, when it is long continued, there is this peculiarity to distinguish it from the suggestions to which we do not give that name, that the process is accompanied with intention, or the desire of producing some new combination, together with the expectation that such a combination will arise, and with judgement, as it is termed in science, that discerns the greater or less aptness of the means that occur to us, for that end which we have in view; or with taste, which is the name for the particular judgement in the fine arts, that discerns, in like manner, the aptness of the new combinations which arise for producing that end of pleasure which it is our wish to excite. But still the new suggestions or successions of thought, in which all that is truly inventive in the process consists, in nothing more than the operation of that principle of the mind to which memory itself is reducible,— the general tendency of our conceptions to suggest, in certain circumstances, certain other conceptions related to them. (XLII, p.273)

In relation to the question of hypnotic suggestion in general and, in particular, to Baudouin's (1920) "Law of Reverse Effort" ["When an idea imposes itself on the mind to such an extent as to give rise to a suggestion, all the conscious efforts which the subject makes in order to counteract this suggestion are not merely without the desired effect, but they actually run counter to the subject's conscious wishes and tend to intensify the suggestion" (p.116)], and "Law of Concentrated Attention" [whenever a person's attention is concentrated on a particular idea over and over again, the idea tends to spontaneously realize itself[77]], Brown's remarks, during his discussion of imagination, on the impossibility of banishing unwanted thoughts are particularly significant:

We cannot, by any direct effort of will, banish from our mind any thought which we may conceive to be incongruous to our subject, so as to retain only such as are congruous. To desire to banish is, in truth, effectively to retain,— the very desire making the particular thought more vivid than it otherwise would have been.

"We vainly labour to forget
What by the labour we remember more."[78]

We cannot select any two images, therefore, out of many, with the express design of forming that third which results from them, since the design itself would imply their previous combination. We cannot banish a third, fourth, or fifth image, coexisting with these two, from our feeling of their incongruity with the plan already conceived by us, since the wish of

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[77] Baudouin (1920, p.114, emphasis in original):

The Law of Concentrated Attention.— The essential and invariable condition of spontaneous suggestion relates to the first phase of the process. *The idea which tends to realise itself in this way is always an idea on which spontaneous ATTENTION is concentrated*, or an idea which has been forced on the attention after the manner of an obsession.

[78] Quite unusually, Brown cites no source for this quotation; and, to date, I have not been able to locate its origin. Perhaps there is a simple explanation: Brown would have no need to cite a verse that he himself had written and had previously published.

banishing them will only give them a firmer place. We do not truly separate the two images from the group by any direct effort of our will,— for our will would have no power of producing this separation; but Nature, by certain principles with which our mind is endowed, forms the separation for us, and consequently, the new assemblage which remains after the separation of the rejected parts. This it does for us, according to the simple theory which I have been led to form of the process, in consequence of our feeling of approbation — the feeling of the congruity of certain images with the plan already conceived by us; for this feeling of approbation, and therefore of increased interest, cannot arise and continue, without rendering more lively the conceptions to which it is attached, producing, in short, a prominence and vividness of these particular conceptions, in consequence of which, they outlast the fainter conceptions that coexisted with them. (XLII, p.274)

Thomas Brown, the poet, goes on to reduce creative imagination to simple suggestion:

Of the various images that exist in the mind of the poet, in those efforts of fancy that we call creative, because they exhibit to us results different from any that have been before exhibited to us, he does not, then, banish by his will, because he is not capable of thus directly banishing a single image of the confused group; but he has already some leading conception in his mind; he perceives the relation which certain images of the group bear to this leading conception; and these images instantly becoming more lively, and therefore more permanent, the others gradually disappear, and leave those beautiful groups which he seems to have brought together by an effort of volition, merely because the simple laws of suggestion that have operated without any control on his part, have brought into his mind a multitude of conceptions, of which he is capable of feeling the relation of fitness or unfitness to his general plan. What is suitable remains — not because he wills it to remain, but because it is rendered more vivid by his approval and intent admiration. What is unsuitable disappears — not because he wills it to disappear — for his will would, in this case, serve only to retain it longer; but simply because it has not attracted his admiration and attention, and therefore fades like every other faint conception. (XLII, pp.274-275)

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(4) *The Power of Habit.*

Habit "produces a greater tendency to certain actions, and… occasions greater facility and excellence in those particular actions" (XLIII, p.276). Brown clearly distinguishes this form of habit from that which he identified amongst the secondary laws of suggestion:

In treating of the secondary laws of suggestion, I before considered the effect of general habit, if it might so be termed, in modifying the suggestions of mere analogy. The habit which we are now to examine, however, is that in which *the effects are not analogous merely, but strictly similar*, in a tendency to the repetition of the same actions. (XLIII, p.276, emphasis added)

In the first case, the greater tendency to certain actions, Brown uses the example of the drunkard:

[in whom] the mere conception of the poisonous beverage, to which he has devoted and sacrificed his health, and virtue, and happiness, will induce, almost as if mechanically, the series of mental affections, on which the worse animal appetite, and the muscular motions

necessary for gratifying it depend. Perhaps, at the early period of the growth of the passion, there was little love of the wine itself, the desire for which was rather a consequence of the pleasures of gay conversation that accompanied the too frequent draught. But whatever different pleasures may originally have accompanied it, the perception of the wine and the draught itself were frequent parts of the complex process; and, therefore, those particular mental states, which constituted the repeated volitions necessary for the particular muscular movements; and it is not wonderful, therefore, that all parts of the process should be revived by the mere revival of a single part. (XLIII, p.277)

In the second case, the greater facility and excellence in those particular actions, Brown uses the example of a tight-rope walker:

> There is very little reason to think that [any] individual, whatever general vigour he might possess, would be successful [in his first attempt to walk along the wire]; and if he were so singularly fortunate as to perform the feat at all, there can be no doubt that he would perform it with great labour and comparative awkwardness…
>
> In our first attempt, accordingly, though we may produce a rude imitation of the motion which we wish to imitate, the imitation must still be a very rude imitation of the motion which we wish to imitate, the imitation must still be a very rude one; because, in our ignorance of the particular muscles and particular quantities of contraction, we contract muscles which ought to have remained at rest, and contracted those which ought to be contracted only in a certain degree, in a degree either greater or less than this middle point. By frequent repetition, however, we gradually learn and remedy our mistakes; but we acquire this knowledge very slowly, because we are not acquainted with the particular parts of our muscular frame, and with the particular state of the mind, necessary for producing the motion of a single muscle separately from the others with which it is combined. The most skilful anatomist, therefore, if he were to venture to make his appearance upon a tight-rope, would be in as great danger of falling as any of the mob (who might gather around him, perhaps, in sufficient time at least to see him fall) would be in his situation; because, though he knows the various muscles of his frame, and even might be capable of foretelling what motions of certain muscles would secure him in his perilous elevation, he is yet unacquainted with the separate states of mind that might instantly produce the desired limited motions of the desired muscles; since these precise states of mind never have been part of his former consciousness. (XLIII, p.278)

In his summary, which represents habitual action as a process of ever-increasing efficiency (and ever-decreasing inefficiency), he provides a delightful analogical representation of habit that is symmetrical with his views on how and why it is impossible to banish unwanted conceptions:

> But, though our command over our separate muscles is not a command which we can exercise with instant skill, and though it is, and must at all times be exercised by us blindly, without any accurate perception of the nice parts of the process that are going on within us at our bidding, we do certainly acquire this gradual skill. In the long series of trials, we find what volitions have produced an effect that resembles most the model which we have in view. At almost every repetition, either some muscle is left at rest, which was uselessly exerted before, or the degree of contraction of the same muscles is brought nearer and nearer to the desired point; till, at length, having found the particular volitions which produce the desired effect, we repeat these frequently together, so that, on the general principles of suggestion, they arise together afterwards with little risk of the interference of any awkward incongruous volition

> which might disturb them, and destroy the beauty of the graceful movements, that seem now scarcely to require any effort in the performer, but to be to him what the muscular motions necessary for simple walking or running are to us,— motions that, easy as they now seem to us all, were once learned by us as slowly, and with as many painful failures, as the more difficult species of motions, which constitute their wonderful art, were learned in maturer life by the rope-dancer and the juggler.

And, then, he stresses the importance of the *presence of the productive* and the consequent *absence of the counterproductive* in the generation of the ever-increasingly efficient state of affairs:

> The painfulness and labour of our first efforts in such attempts, it must be remembered, do not arise merely from our bringing too many muscles into play, with the view of producing a certain definite effect; but, also, in a great measure, from the absolute necessity of bringing more into play than we intended, for the purposes of counteracting and remedying the evil occasioned by former excess of motion. We lose our balance; and, merely in consequence of this loss of exact equilibrium, we are obliged to perform certain other actions, not directly to execute the particular movement originally intended by us, but simply to restore that equilibrium, without which it would be vain for us to attempt to execute it. All this unnecessary labour,— which is a mere waste of strength, and a painful waste of it,— is of course saved to us, when we have made sufficient progress to be able to at least keep our balance; and the desired motion thus becomes easier in two ways, both positively, by our nearer approximation to the exact point of contraction which constitutes the perfect attitude, and, negatively, by the exclusion of those motions which our own awkwardness had rendered unavoidable. (XLIII, p.278)

Relative Suggestion

Relative suggestion is "the tendency of the mind… by which, on perceiving or conceiving objects together, we are instantly impressed with certain feelings of their mutual relation"[79] (LI, p.334), wherein "the perceptions of relation in the various objects of our thought, form another set of feelings, [which are] of course as various as the relations perceived"[80] (XXXIII, p.214) — and, moreover, "these suggested feelings are feelings of a peculiar kind, and require, therefore, to be classed separately from the perceptions or conceptions which suggest them, but do not involve them" (LI, p.334) .

Moreover, the particular relations amongst the thoughts or objects that have come to mind, which have been suggested *per medium* of relative suggestion, are idiosyncratically derived from "the laws of the [individual] mind which considers them" and are most certainly *not* derived "from the laws or direct qualities of the objects considered" (XLV, p.292).

> [Relative suggestion is the mechanism through] which the objects of our perception or conception, that are themselves separate, no longer appear to us separate, but are instantly invested by us with various relations that seem to bind them to each other, as if our mind could

[79] And, Brown notes, "it is easy for us, in every case, to separate this feeling of relation from the perceptions or conceptions themselves" (LI, p.334).

[80] That is, it is the "capacity of feeling resemblance, difference, proportion, or relation in general, when two or more external objects, or two or more feelings of the mind itself, are considered by us" (XXXIII, p.214).

> give its own unity to the innumerable objects which it comprehends, and… convert into a universe what was only chaos before." (LI, p.337)

It also seems that the presence of the content of previous internal states of mind is also a significant defining feature of relative suggestion:

> Of the feelings which arise without any direct external cause, and which I have, therefore, denominated internal states or affections of the mind,— there are many, then… which arise simply in succession, in the floating imagery of our thought, without involving any notion of the relation of the preceding objects, or feelings, to each other. These …are what I have termed the phenomena of simple suggestion. But there is an extensive order of our feelings which involve this notion of relation, and which consist indeed in the mere perception of a relation of some sort. To these feelings of mere relation, as arising directly from the previous states of mind which suggest them, I have given the name of *relative suggestions*…
>
> Whether the relation be of two, or of many external objects, or of two or many affections of the mind, the feeling of this relation, arising in consequence of certain preceding states of mind, is what I term a relative suggestion; that phrase being the simplest which it is possible to employ, for expressing, without any theory, the mere fact of the rise of certain feelings of relation, after certain other feelings which precede them; and therefore, as involving no particular theory, and simply expressive of an undoubted fact, being, I conceive, the fittest phrase…(XLV, p.288)

Relative Suggestion is not Comparison

Despite the strong superficial similarity between his term "relative suggestion" and the notion of *comparison*, Brown tells us that he intentionally rejected the term "comparison" because, whilst comparison clearly "involves the feeling of relation", it also clearly implies "a voluntary seeking for some relation" (XXXIII, p.215).

And much of what Brown addresses in his lectures entails the circumstances where one is not (at least intentionally) setting out to compare two or more external objects, or two or more affections of the mind; or, even, attempting to find any sort of relation between them (XLV, p.288).

The term "relative suggestion" also has the additional advantage over "comparison" of very smoothly applying equally to those circumstances where one *has*, in fact, intentionally compared two things: "[it] is applicable alike to both cases, when a relation is sought, and when it occurs, without any search or desire of finding it" (XXXIII, p.214).[81]

Two Orders of Relative Suggestion

Stressing that they are states in which the mind exists, Brown identifies the two different orders of relationship that are possible, *succession* and *coexistence* (XLV, p.289).

> Our relative suggestions… are those feelings of relation which arise from the perception or

[81] Brown also makes the point (XXXIII, p.215) that, although these "relative suggestions" are an essential part of "our intentional comparisons or judgements", the characterization of these as *relative suggestion*, rather than either "our intentional comparisons or judgements", allows us to treat these intentional comparisons the same as the (otherwise identical) situation "when the feelings of relation seem to us to rise spontaneously".

> conception of two or more objects, or two or more affections of our mind,— feelings which are of considerable variety, and which I classed under two heads, as the relations of coexistence and the relations of succession. (LI, p.334)

He makes the elegant observation that these states can be far more simply understood from their connexion with time; specifically that:

(a) the relation of *succession* involves a relation that is extended over time, and

(b) the relation of coe*xistence* needs to make no reference to time at all:

> [The] relations either of external objects, or of feelings of our mind, [that are] considered without reference to time [are labelled] coexisting; [and those that are] considered with reference to time [are labelled] successive. To take an example of each kind, I feel that the one half of four is to twelve, as twelve is to seventy-two; and I feel this, merely by considering the numbers together, without any regard to time. No notion of change or succession is involved in it. The relation was and is, and will for ever be the same, as often as the numbers may be distinctly conceived and compared. I think of summer — I consider the warmth of its sky, and the profusion of flowers that seem crowding to the surface of the earth, as if hastening to meet and enjoy the temporary sunshine. I think of the cold of winter, and of our flowerless fields and frozen rivulets; and the warmth and the cold of the different seasons, I regard as the causes of the different appearances. In this case, as in the former, I feel a relation; but it is a relation of antecedence and consequence, to which the notion of time, or change, or succession is so essential, that without it the relation could not be felt. (XLV, p.289)

Summary of this Section



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

Things that are Successive in Time

With relations of succession, where things are "successive in time", there is only antecedence and consequence, priority and subsequence, and "certain aptitudes to precede or follow" of two sorts:

(a) *casual succession*: the "merely casual antecedence and consequence" of, say, two events in chronological order, and

(b) *invariable succession*: the "relation of invariable antecedence and consequence", where "we speak of other events as the effects of events or circumstances that preceded them": the "relation of causes and effects" (L, p.329).

Things that Coexist in Space

In the case of relations of coexistence, where things are "coexisting in space", the relations in

"which the subjects are regarded, without reference to time", there are "certain proportions, or proximities, or resemblances" of five sorts (XLV, pp.289-290):

(1) The relation of *position*:

> I look at a number of men, as they stand together. If I merely perceived each individually, or the whole as one complex group, I should not have the feeling of relation; but I remark one, and I observe who is next to him, who is second, who third; who stands on the summit of a little eminence above all the rest; who on the declivity; who on the plain beneath; that is to say, *my mind exists in the states which constitute the various feelings of the relation of position*. (XLV, p.290, emphasis added)

(2) The relation of *resemblance* (either *similarity or contrast*):

> The fire which the child sees today is not the fire which burnt him yesterday; and if he were insensible of the resemblance, to the exclusion, perhaps, of many circumstances that differ, the remembrance of the fire of yesterday would be of no advantage in guarding him against similar exposure. (XLV, p.293)

(3) The relation of *proportion*:

> I think of the vertical angles formed by two straight lines, which cut one another; of the pairs of numbers, four and sixteen, five and twenty,— of the dimensions of columns, and their bases and entablatures, in the different orders; and my mind exists immediately in that state, which constitutes the feeling of proportion. (XLV, p.290)

(4) The relation of *degree*:

> I hear one voice, and then a voice which is louder. I take up some flowers, and smell first one, and then another, more or less fragrant. I remember many days of happiness, spent with friends who are far distant,— and I look forward to the day of still greater happiness, when we are to meet again. In these instances of spontaneous comparison, my mind exists in that state, which constitutes the feeling of degree. (XLV, p.290)

(5) The relation of comprehensiveness:

> I consider a house, and its different apartments,— a tree, and its branches, and stems, and foliage,— a horse, and its limbs, and trunk, and head. My mind, which had existed in the states that constitute the simple perception of these objects, begins immediately to exist in that different state, which constitutes the feeling of the relation of the parts to one comprehensive whole. (XLV, p.293)

Summary of this Section



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

In his review of Brown's *Sketch*, Gilman (1824) gave an interesting account of the consequences of this individual difference:

> Perhaps an interesting sketch of the various orders of intellects might be taken in connexion with Dr Brown's views, and classifications of the simple and relative suggestions. A mind, for instance, which has a particular tendency to feel the relation of *comprehension* between any whole subject and all its possible parts or properties, is happily adapted, according to the theory just given, to logic, reasoning, and demonstration in general. If the tendency of a mind be to feel the relation of *proportion*, though with some subtlety this relation may be reduced to the former, its inclination is to mathematical demonstration. If it be chiefly inclined to perceive the relation of *resemblance* or *difference*, it deals in the generalizations of philosophy or in the distinctions of wit. If its habit be to look for the relation of *degree*, or comparison, it will be likely to excel in exquisite taste and judgement. If its leading tendency be to feel only the relation of *position*, it is of an humbler order. There are a few minds, which seem to be blessed with equal and decided capacities for all these five relative suggestions; and if the same minds are also gifted with tendencies towards the higher order of *simple suggestions*, that is to say, the suggestions of analogy, before dwelt upon, which will almost infinitely multiply the resources of new conceptions among which relations are *felt*; and if also their simple suggestions of proximity in place and time be unusually abundant, meaning thereby, apart from the author's nomenclature, only a strong and ready memory,— on such minds nature has conferred a high, singular, and enviable pre-eminence. Of course the infinite diversities among different minds will follow the corresponding distributions, which nature or circumstances may make of the foregoing tendencies, modified also, be it observed, by the secondary laws of suggestion already enumerated. (Gilman, 1824, p.39)

Supposedly distinct mental faculties that are reducible to relative suggestion alone

Brown concludes his treatment of relative suggestion with an assertion a number of (by others) supposedly distinct mental faculties can be accounted for by relative suggestion. He specifically discusses judgement, reason, and abstraction.

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(1) *Judgement*

Our judgements are nothing more than our "feelings of relation"; therefore, we do not need a separate faculty to explain their existence.

Brown's view is that "the faculty of judgement" is essentially synonymous with the "susceptibility of relative suggestion" (LI, p.334):

> Our relative suggestions …are those feelings of relation which arise from the perception or conception of two or more objects, or two or more affections of the mind,— feelings which are of considerable variety, and which I classed under two heads, as the relations of coexistence and the relations of succession. It is easy for us, in every case to separate this feeling of relation from the perceptions or conceptions themselves. We perceive or conceive objects; we feel them to be variously related; and the feeling of the relation itself is not more mysterious that the perception or the simple suggestion which may have given rise to it. The law of mind, by which, on considering four and eight, I feel a certain relation of proportion,— the same

> precise relation which I feel, on considering together five and ten, fifty and a hundred,— is as clear and intelligible a law of our mental constitution, as that by which I am able to form the separate notion, either of four or eight, five or ten, fifty or a hundred. (LI, p.334)

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(2) *Reason*

Those who claim that there is a separate "faculty of reason" mistakenly represent the whole as if it were "something different from all the parts which compose it".

Brown argues that a simple analysis shows that "reasoning itself is …nothing more than a series of judgements" (LI, p.334):

> Whether we reason syllogistically with the schoolmen, or according to those simpler processes of thought, which nature teaches, our reasoning is divisible into a number of consecutive judgements, or feelings of relation; and if we take away these consecutive judgements, we leave nothing behind that can be called a ratiocination. In a simple proposition, we take one step, or feel one relation; in an enthymeme, we take two steps, or feel two relations; in a syllogism, we take three steps, or feel three relations; but we never think, when we speak of the motion of our limbs, that the power of taking three steps differs essentially from the power of taking one; and that we must, therefore, invent new names of bodily faculties for every slight variety, or even every simple repetition of movement. If this amplification of faculties would be absurd in treating of the mere motion of our limbs, it is surely not more philosophic in the case of the intellectual exercise. Whatever is affirmed, in any stage of our reasoning, is a relation of some sort,— of which, as felt by us, the proposition that affirms the relation is only a verbal statement,— is a series of such judgements, or feelings of relation, and nothing distinct from them, though the mutual relations of the series, which together form reasoning, have led us falsely to suppose, as I have said, that the whole is something more than all the parts which constitute the whole. (LI, p.334)

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(3) *Abstraction*

This is "the faculty by which we are supposed to be capable of separating in our thought certain parts of our complex notions, and of considering them thus abstracted from the rest"; yet, according to Brown, not only is this mental faculty "unreal", but it is also true that "such a faculty is impossible, since every exertion of it would imply a contradiction" (LI, p.335):

> In abstraction, the mind is supposed to single out a particular part of some one of its complex notions for particular consideration. But what is the state of the mind immediately preceding this intentional separation — its state at the moment in which the supposed faculty is conceived to be called into exercise? Does it not involve necessarily the very abstraction which it is supposed to produce? And must we not, therefore, in admitting such a power of voluntary separation, admit an infinite series of preceding abstractions, to account for a single act of abstraction? If we know what we single out, we have already performed all the separation that is necessary; if we do not know what we are singling out, and do not even know that we are singling out any thing, the separate part of the complex whole may, indeed, rise to our conception; but it cannot arise by the operation of any voluntary faculty…
>
> We perceive two objects,— a rock, for example, and a tree: We press against them; they both produce in us that sensation, which constitutes our feeling of resistance. We give the

> name of hardness to this common property of the external objects; and our mere feeling of resemblance, when referred to resembling objects is thus converted into an abstraction. If we are capable of feeling the resemblance, the abstraction is already formed, and it needs, therefore, no other power to produce it. (LI, pp.335-336)

The Emotions

Having distinguished the internal from the external affections of the mind — the internal affections "are not the immediate consequence of the presence of external objects"[82] — the *emotions* are easily distinguished "from the intellectual states of mind, which constitute our simple or relative suggestions of memory or judgement", "by that peculiar vividness of feeling which everyone understands" (LII, p.338):

> Our emotions, then, however dependent they may have been originally [on the "external affections of our senses"], are now no longer dependent on these external things. They may arise, from memory or imagination, as readily from perception; but when they arise from memory or imagination, they are as truly distinguishable from what we remember and imagine as they are distinguishable from our perceptions of mere forms and colours, and other sensible qualities, when they arise from what we perceive (XVII, pp.105-106)

> Our emotions, then, even in cases in which they seem most directly to co-exist with perception, are still easily distinguishable from it; and, in like manner, when they arise from the intellectual states of memory, imagination, comparison, they are equally distinguishable from what we remember, or imagine, or compare. They form truly a separate order of the internal affections of the mind,— as distinct from the intellectual phenomena, as the class, to which they both belong, is distinguishable from the class of external affections that arise immediately from the presence of objects without. (XVI, p.103)

> Our emotions, then, may co-exist with various sensations, remembrances, reasonings,— in the same manner as these feelings, sensitive, or intellectual, may variously co-exist with each other. But we do not think it less necessary to class our sensations of vision as different from our sensations of smell, and our comparison, as itself different from the separate sensations compared, because we may, at the same moment, both see and smell a rose, and may endeavour to appreciate the relative amount of pleasure which the beautiful flower thus doubly affords. In like manner, our intellectual states of mind, and our emotions, are not the less to be considered as distinct classes, because any vivid passion may continue to exist together with those intellectual processes of thought which it originally prompted, and which, after prompting, it prolongs (XVII, p.104)

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[82] Although it might be the case that these internal affections of the mind "are not the immediate consequence of the presence of external objects", it is also true that it may be that they are only *indirectly* "excited by objects without" — and that this *indirect excitement* occurs "through the medium of those common feelings, which are commonly termed sensations or perceptions" (LII, p.338).

Brown further subdivides the emotions into:

(1) *simple* emotions (joy, grief, desire, astonishment, contempt, respect (XVI, p.102)), and

(2) *complex* emotions of three types (i.e., immediate emotions, retrospective emotions, and prospective emotions (LII, p.340)).

Three Divisions

Given his view that the "order of our feelings, which I have comprehended under the name of Emotions" is best dealt with "in those complex forms in which they usually exist, and have received certain definite characteristic names that are familiar to you" (i.e., the way that they are distinguished in language) — rather than unpacking them and treating them as simple aggregates of "elementary feelings" — Brown decided to use "their relation to time", symmetrical with his earlier discussions of other aspects of mental physiology, as the basis for his description; and, thus, found three divisions within the overall class of emotions (LII, p.340):

(1) *Immediate Emotions*: "that arise from the consideration of objects as present, or not involving, at least, any necessary reference to time" (LXIII, p.418);

(2) *Retrospective Emotions*: "those which relate to objects as past" — these are "complex feelings" for which "the conception of some object of former pleasure or pain [is] essential" (LXIII, p.418); and

(3) *Prospective Emotions*: "[those which have] their relation to objects as future" (LXVI, p.439).

Summary of this Section



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

The Immediate Emotions

These are the emotions "that arise from the consideration of objects as present, or not involving, at least, any necessary reference to time" (LXIII, p.418):

> There are certain emotions which arise or continue in our mind, without reference to any particular object or time, such as cheerfulness or melancholy; or which regard their objects simply as existing, without involving, necessarily, any notion of time whatever, such as wonder, or our feelings of beauty or sublimity: these I denominate immediate [emotions]. There are certain others which regard their objects as past, and which cannot exist without this notion of the past, such as remorse, or revenge, or gratitude: these I denominate retrospective emotions. There are certain others which regard their objects as future, such as the whole tribe of our desires: these I denominate prospective emotions.[83] (LIII, p.345)

[83] Brown (LII, p.340):

> Admiration, remorse, [and] hope, may serve as particular instances, to illustrate my meaning in this distinction, which I would make. We admire what is before us, we feel remorse for some past crime, we hope for some future good.

And, on the basis that:

> …man, in the most important light that we can consider him, is a social being, united by his emotions with whatever he can love or pity, or respect or adore, these, and other moral emotions, seemed to form a very proper subdivision of [the order of immediate emotions], as distinct from the emotions of the same order in which no moral feeling is involved (LIII, p.345),

the immediate emotions can be further subdivided according to whether or not "some moral affection" (i.e., "any feeling that can be termed moral") is either absent or present (LII, p.340).

A. The Immediate Emotions involving no Moral Affection

(A.1) *Cheerfulness*: "is a sort of perpetual gladness" and is "that state which, in everyone, even of the most gloomy disposition, remains for some time after any event of unexpected happiness, though the event may not be present to their conception at the time; and which, in many of gayer temperament, seems to be almost a constant frame of mind". Brown also distinguished the "unreflecting merriment" of *cheerfulness* from the feeling of *joy*, on the basis that joy entails a happiness from a known cause (and, also, the intensity of our joy is a consequence of the "importance" of its cause) (LII, p.341).

(A.2) *Melancholy*: "is a state of mind, which even the gayest must feel for some time after any calamity, and which many feel for the greater part of life, without any particular calamity, to which they can ascribe it" (i.e., "without knowing why they should be sorrowful, they still are sorrowful"), and, yet, it is "not constitutional and permanent, but temporary" (LII, pp.341-342).

Brown takes great care to distinguish this transient melancholy from:

> …that extreme depression, which constitutes the most miserable form of insanity, the most miserable disease; that fixed and deadly gloom of soul, to which there is no sunshine in the summer sky, no verdure or blossom in the summer field, no kindness in affection, no purity in the remembrance of innocence itself, no heaven, but hell,— no God, but a demon of wrath" and further describes melancholy, by contrast, as "that internal sadness, which we diffuse unconsciously from our own mind over the brightest and gayest objects without, almost in the same manner, and with the same unfailing certainty, as we invest them with the colours, which are only in our mental vision. (LII, p.341)

Brown identified two types of "melancholy of common life" (LII, p.341):

(1) *Sullen Gloom*: which "disposes to unkindness and every bad passion", and is "a fretfulness" which manifests "in all the daily and hourly intercourse of familiar life", and is "so poisonous to the happiness, not of the individual only, but all of those who are within the circle of its influence, and who feel their misery the more, because it may perhaps rise from one who they strive, and vainly strive, to love" (LII, p.341).

(2) *Philosophic Melancholy*: "there is a melancholy of a gentler species, a melancholy of which, as it arises, in a great measure, from a view of the sufferings of man, disposes to a warmer love of man the sufferer, and which is almost as essential the finer emotions of virtue, as it is to the finer sensibilities of poetic genius" (LII, pp.341-342).

Despite the initial strength of these sorts of feeling, they gradually diminish over time simply "because the source of the sorrow itself is removed as it were at a distance" (LII, p.343).

Thus, Brown argues, "Time is truly *the comforter*, at once lessening the tendency to images of sorrow, and softening that sorrow when the images arise" (LII, p.344):

> The state of melancholy, …when it is not constitutional and permanent, but temporary, is a state which intervenes between the absolute affliction of any great calamity, and that peace to which, by the benevolent arrangement of Heaven, even melancholy itself ultimately leads. As it is nearer to the time of the calamity, and the consequent profound affliction, the melancholy itself is more profound, and gradually softens into tranquillity, after a period, that is in some degree proportioned to the violence of the affliction. (LII, p.342)

> The melancholy emotion which remains after any great affliction,— after the death, for example, of a husband or a child, — is, of course, when recent, combined with few feelings that do not harmonize with the grief itself and augment it, perhaps, rather than diminish it. In a short time, however, from the mere unavoidable events of life, other feelings, suggested by these events, combine with that melancholy with which they coexist, so as to form with it one complex state of mind. When the melancholy remembrance recurs, it recurs, therefore, not as it was before, but as modified by the combination of these new feelings. In the process of time, other feelings, that may casually but frequently coexist with it, combine with it in like manner; the complex state of mind partaking thus gradually less and less of the nature of that pure affliction which constituted the original sorrow, till at length it becomes so softened and diversified by repeated combinations, as scarcely to retain the same character, and to be rather sadness, or a sort of gentle tenderness, than affliction. (LII, p.343)

Brown argues that this also explains the dilution/reduction, over time, of the frequency, strength, intensity and duration of two other specific forms of melancholy, each a "very abundant source of misery", especially in the times of the most "recent affliction" (LII, p.344), that are not directly generated by the specific object of the remembrance (LII, p.343):

(1) Thoughts and emotions aroused by the *perception* of entities once closely associated with the "lost object of regard" ("there is scarcely an object which can meet a father's eye, soon after the death of his child, that does not bring that child before him") (LII, p.344).

(2) Thoughts and emotions aroused by the *realization* that, along with the "lost object of regard", we have also lost our past (i.e., we have lost "all of the plans which have engaged us"), and our future (i.e., we have lost "all of the hopes which we have been forming"), and these particular matters, "as the recent objects of thought, and its liveliest objects, must, of course, by the operation of the common laws of suggestion, frequently arise to the mind"[84] (LII, p.344).

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[84] The process that Brown describes could be considered to be analogous to the reduction of the effects of a poisonous contaminant through a combination of:

(a) the natural decomposition of the contaminant *per medium* of elapsed time,

(A.3) *Surprise, Astonishment, or Wonder at what is New, Strange and Unexpected*: From our experience of the "physical events in that part of the physical universe, with which we are immediately connected", and the fact that "the phenomena of nature are conceived by us, not as separate events, but as uniformly consequent in a certain series" our mind is accustomed to experience a "[certain] order of physical changes".

However, whenever "any seeming irregularity [occurs]", "the situation of the mind is very different"[85] (LIII, p.345):

> We, therefore, [when confronted with natural phenomena,] do not only see the present, but seeing the present, we expect the future. When the circumstances, which we observe in any case, are very similar to the circumstances formerly observed by us, we anticipate the future with confidence; when the circumstances are considered different, but have many strong similarities to the past, we make the same anticipation, but not with confidence; and if the event should prove to be different from the event anticipate by us, we treasure it up, for regulating our future anticipations in similar circumstances; but we do this without any sense of astonishment at the new event itself. It is when we have anticipated with confidence, and our anticipation has been disappointed by some unexpected result, that the astonishment arises, and arises always, with greater or lesser vividness of feeling, according to the strength of that belief which the expectation involved. (LIII, p.345)

Treating astonishment and surprise as essentially synonymous, Brown distinguishes between surprise and wonder as follows: surprise is a response to "the presence of [a] familiar object, in [an] unexpected situation"; whilst, with wonder, the novelty comes from a new and entirely unexpected new object, which may or may not be in an expected situation ("the very novelty of the object… leads us to dwell on it with particular interest").[86]

The appearance of this novel object "leads us to dwell on it with particular interest" and, simultaneously, "this very novelty, or uncommonness, which stimulates our curiosity to observe and inquire, renders our inquiry less easy to be satisfied; and one inquiry, even when satisfactorily answered, far from giving us the knowledge which we desire, leaves of course, when the object is one with which we are unacquainted, many new properties to be investigated" (LIII, p.346).

Thus, in the case of wonder, "it is not the emotion… which is different itself, but the mixture of

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(b) the gradual disintegration of the "pure" contaminant through its chemical interactions with other (counteractive) chemicals with which it has come in contact, and

(c) the dilution of the contaminant's relative strength through increasing the volume within which it is contained (i.e., dilution), and

(d) other changes to the site of the contamination that makes it more robust in relation to the insult provided by the contaminant.

[85] And, Brown argues, any feeling of wonder, not only implies "the mere feeling of novelty" but, also, "the knowledge of some other circumstances which were expected to occur" — and, therefore, the feeling of wonder is "inconsistent with absolute ignorance" (LIII, p.345).

[86] Brown also comments that:

> …though the terms [wonder and surprise] in this sense be not strictly synonymous, but expressive of states more or less complex, the wonder differs from the surprise, only by the new elements that are added to this primary emotion, and not by any original diversity of the emotion itself. (LIII, p.346)

enquiry and emotion, which, coexisting, form a state of mind different from the simple emotion [of surprise] itself". Moreover, in any case where our wonder becomes mixed with additional feelings of "the beauty or grandeur of the new object, and our mixed emotion of the novelty and beauty combined will obtain the name of admiration"[87] (LIII, p.346).

(A.4) *Uneasy Languor when the same Unvaried Feelings have long continued*: the "uneasiness" which "arises from the uniformity of impressions" (even though these impressions "may have been originally pleasing") (LIII, p.349).

These are the opposite of the emotions generated by "unexpected novelty" is the "emotion of weary or languid uneasiness, which we feel from the long continuance of one unvaried object, or from a succession of objects so nearly similar, as scarcely appear varied" — e.g., "[even] the most beautiful couplet of the most beautiful poem, if repeated to us without intermission, for a very few minutes, would excite more uneasiness than could have been felt from a single recitation of the dullest stanza of the most soporific inditer [sic] of rhymes" (LIII, p.348).

(A.5) *Beauty*: "is necessarily an emotion that is pleasing".

Beauty, regardless of whether it is simple or complex, is an emotion that our mind projects onto objects; it is "the delight which seems imbodied in objects" (LVI, p.374).

And, moreover, "it is an emotion which we diffuse, and combine with our conceptions of the object that may have excited it" (LIII, p.351), rather than it being something "that [permanently] exists in objects independently of the mind that perceives them" (LVII, p.378).

Beauty "is an emotion of the mind, varying, therefore, like all our other emotions, with the varying tendencies of the mind, in different circumstances" (LVII, p.378).

And, indeed, "far from being uniform in its causes in all mankind, the emotion is not uniform in a single individual for a single year, or even, in the rapid changes of fashion, for a few months of a single year" (LVII, p.376):

> The feeling of beauty, according to my view of it, is not a sensation, but an emotion, a feeling subsequent to the perception or conception of the object termed beautiful; and which, like other emotions, may, or may not, follow the particular perception or conception, according to the circumstances in which those primary feelings, to which it is only secondary, may have arisen. (LV, p.365)

(A.6) *The Opposite of Beauty*: the emotion for which we have no name (Brown remarks that, whilst we do have words such as *deformity* and *ugliness*, quite unlike the word *beauty*, those words are "usually applied only to external things, and not to the intellectual or moral objects of our thought") (LVII, p.379):

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[87] Brown (LIII, p.345) further notes that "the simple primary emotion, that we term surprise or astonishment, being in all theses cases the same, and being only modified by the feelings of various kinds that arise, and coexist with it".

> As certain forms, colours, sounds, motions, works of art, and moral affections, are contemplated with delight; the contemplation of certain other forms, colours, sounds, motions, works of art, and affections of our moral nature, is attended with disagreeable emotion. (LVII, p.379)

(A.7) *The Feeling of Sublimity*: "the sublimity that we feel, like the beauty which we feel, is an affection of our mind, not a quality of anything external" (LVII, p.379).

However, "sublimity is not, by its nature of a class of feelings essentially different from beauty" (LVII, p.381) it is far more a case that "as [our emotions of beauty] gradually rise, from object to object, a sort of regular progression may be traced from the faintest beauty to the vastest sublimity" (LVII, p.380):

> In the moral scene the progression is [as] equally evident [as in the works of nature]. By adding virtue to virtue, or circumstance to circumstance, in the exercise of any virtue, we rise from what is merely beautiful to what is sublime. (LVII, p.381)

(A.8) *Ludicrousness (the Opposite of Sublimity)*: whilst "the ludicrous, an emotion of light mirth, …may be considered as opposite to that of sublimity, [it is] not opposite in the strict sense, in which beauty and ugliness are opposed" (LVIII, p.385), and it is "found to originate in some mixture of congruity and incongruity, suddenly and unexpectedly perceived" (LVIII, p.391).

For Brown, "the unexpectedness is an important element; since, when we have become completely familiar with the [peculiarly incongruous] relation, we cease to have the emotion which it before instantly excited".

Yet, at the same time, despite them not arousing these emotions in us, "[we continue] to call the objects or images ludicrous… because we speak of them, or think of them, in reference to other minds, in which we know that they will excite the same emotion that was originally excited by them in ourselves" (LVIII, p.391).

Again Brown emphasizes the rôle of unrealized expectation:

> Nothing is felt as truly ludicrous, in which there is not an expected congruity developed in images that were before supposed to be opposite in kind, or some equally unexpected incongruity in images supposed to be congruous; and the sudden perception of these discrepancies and agreements may be said to be that which constitutes the ludicrousness; the gay emotions being immediately subsequent to the mere perception of the unexpected relation.
>
> The congruities and incongruities which give rise to this emotion may be either in mere language or in the thoughts and images which language expresses, or, in many cases, in the very objects of our direct perception. (LVIII, p.386).

In his extended discussion, Brown specifically excludes "the case of scientific truths",[88] other cases

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[88] Brown explains his point about "scientific truths" as follows:

> When it is discovered in chemistry, or in any other physical science, that there have truly been relations of objects or events, which were not suspected by us before, there is no feeling of ludicrousness, though the substances found to have some common property should be opposite in every other respect.

where the mind is not attuned to "mirthful emotion" — "during the prevalence of affliction, or any strong passion, in which there is no point in jest" (such as "the friend returning from the funeral of his friend") — and those figures of speech that have become so over-used, so familiar, so tired, and so hackneyed that their original impact has disappeared to the extent that "we feel no tendency to laugh in such a case" (LVIII, pp.387-388).

He then proceeds to distinguish between three significantly different sorts of ludicrous relation (i.e., those relations which, "in every instance involve some unsuspected resemblance of objects or qualities before regarded as incongruous, or some equally unsuspected diversity, when the resemblance was before supposed to be complete" (LVIII, p.388)):

(1) Those comprised of "the class of those in which":

(a) "objects are brought together that are noble and mean" (i.e., "the burlesque,[89] in which objects, noble in themselves, are made ridiculous by the meanness of phrases and figures"), or

(b) "the forms of language commonly employed in treating subjects high and low, are transferred from one to the other" (i.e., "the mock-heroic, in which, by a contrary process, the mean is rendered ridiculous by the magnificent trappings of rhetoric with which it is invested"[90] (LVIII, p.389).

And, moreover, "these instances of artificial combination of the very great, and the very little" are precisely the same as those "circumstances which occur in nature, exactly of the same kind, and productive therefore of the same emotion", wherein "the incongruities [are] not in mere thought and image, but in objects directly perceived":

> When any well-dressed person, walking along the street, falls into the mud of some splashy gutter, the situation, and the dirt, when combined with the character and the appearance of the unfortunate stumbler, form a sort of natural burlesque or mock-heroic, in which there is a mixture of the noble and the mean, as much as in any of the works of art, to which those names are given.[91] (LVIII, p.389)

> What could be more unexpected, or more incongruous with our previous conceptions of the specific gravity of metals, than the discovery that the lightest of all substances, which are not in the state of an aerial fluid, is a metal, the base of another substance, with which we had been long acquainted? Yet, though we were astonished at such a discovery, we felt no tendency whatever to laugh. The relation, in short, did not seem to us to involve anything ludicrous. (LVIII, p.387)

Whilst Brown does not identify this metal by name, it would seem logical that, in the context of 1820, he is referring to the element Lithium (Atomic Number 3) which was discovered during an analysis of the mineral petalite [i.e., $LiAl(Si_2O_5)_2$], by the Swede, Arfvedson in 1817.

[89] That is, burlesque, meaning "an unsuccessful attempt at serious impressiveness in action, speech, or manner", rather than burlesque, meaning "a derisive imitation".

[90] Namely, the congruities and incongruities "in the mere arbitrary signs of language" (LIX, p.392).

[91] Brown's example is highly reminiscent of an Edinburgh-gutter-centred event in the life of David Hume:

> By the autumn of 1770 Hume was engaged in the building of "a small House", as he informed Strahan; "I mean a large House for an Author: For it is nearly as large as Mr. Millar's in Pall-mall. It is situated in our new Square", that is, St Andrew Square, one block north of Princes Street. During the following winter and spring, Hume actively supervised the erection of the dwelling-house, coach-house, and stables. As the

(2) Those "which derive their ludicrousness, not from the objects themselves, but from the mind of the hearer or reader, which has been previously led to expect something very different from what is presented to it" (LVIII, p.389); viz., this entire class is comprised of the congruities and incongruities "in the relations of thoughts and existing things" and, specifically "in the disappointed anticipations of the hearer or reader" (LIX, p.392):

> To take a very trite example of this sort; If the question be asked, what wine do you like best? One person, perhaps, answering Champagne, another Burgundy, a third says, the wine which I am not to pay for. We laugh, if we laugh at all, chiefly because we expected a very different answer; and the incongruity which is felt has relation, therefore, to our own state of mind more than to the question itself. It is this previous anticipation of an answer, with which the answer received by us is partially incongruous, that either forms the principal delights of many of the bon moots of conversation, or at least aids their effect most powerfully; and by the contrast which it produces, it adds, in a most mortifying manner, to the painful keenness of an unexpected sarcasm.[92] (LVIII, p.389)

(3) These "derive their ludicrousness from our consideration of the mind of the speaker, or writer, or performer of the action… because we are aware of that which the effort was intended to perform, and we are struck with the performance itself" (LVIII, p.390); viz., this entire class is comprised of the congruities and incongruities "in the relations of thoughts and existing things" and, specifically "in the difference in the obvious meaning of the expression of the speaker or writer, or performer of some action, compared with their real meaning which we know him, in his awkward blunder, to have intended" (LIX, p.392). As part of this class, Brown identifies outright genuine blunders.

However, as he indicates, the nature of these errors is such that "the consideration of the mind of the speaker firms an essential part of the ludicrousness"; and, therefore, there

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North Bridge was not yet open, he customarily took the short cut to the New Town left by the draining of the Nor' Loch. On one of his daily trips to St Andrew Square during this period, Hume slipped from the path and fell into the bog, where he struggled in vain to extricate himself. In time, he was able to attract the attention of an old fishwife who, as she recognised "Hume the Atheist", doubted the propriety of helping him.

"But my good woman", expostulated the helpless man, "does not your religion as a Christian teach you to do good, even to your enemies?"

"That may well be", she replied, "but ye shallna get out o' that, till ye become a Christian yoursell: and repeat the Lord's Prayer and the Belief". Much to her astonishment Hume readily complied and was forthwith pulled out of the bog. Henceforth he was ever ready to acknowledge that the Edinburgh fishwife was the most acute theologian he had ever encountered. (Mossner, 1970, pp. 562-3)

[92] Categorizing this "feeling of ludicrousness" as being a case of "our previous anticipation… [being] disappointed by difference where we expected agreement", Brown (LVIII, p.390) noted that the opposite state of affairs (viz., "our previous anticipation… [being] disappointed by agreement, where we expected difference") also belonged to this class.

As an example of this "agreement, where we expected difference", Brown cites the recreation diversion of "the cross readings of newspapers, where, without paying regard to the separation into columns, we read what is in the same line of the page through the successive columns, as if continuous, there is little agreement of sense to be expected, and we smile accordingly at the strange incongruities which such readings may sometimes discover".

Two of the (dual-column) examples provided by Brown are "A fine turtle, weighing upwards of eighty pounds/Was carried before the sitting alderman", and "One of his majesty's principal Secretaries of State/Fell off the shafts, being asleep, and the wheels went over him" (LVIII, p.390).

A random search of four-column articles in a recent issue of the *New Scientist* revealed a "cross reading" which seemed to scan across the entire page: "one knows when adolescence/things go haywire in old age/forcing teenagers to get to school/by the weekend" (Coghlan, 2005).

can be "no ludicrousness unless we are able to distinguish what the speaker meant, and thus discover some strange agreement of his real meaning with the contradictory meaning which the words seem to convey".

In other words "we must have before us, in conception at least, the speaker himself, and contrast the well-meaning seriousness of his affirmation with the verbal absurdity which he utters, of which we are at the same time able to discover the unexpected tie" (LVIII, p.391).

Although he doesn't speak of them, it's certain that this would include *malapropisms*; those grotesque verbal blunders that usually arise from an individual speaking above and beyond their language strength (and, yet, despite their vocabulary mistakes, their syntax is usually correct):

> "I will marry her; that I am freely dissolved [resolved], and dissolutely [resolutely]" (Slender in Shakespeare's *The Merry Wives of Windsor*, Act I, Scene I);
>
> "our watch, sir, hath indeed comprehended [apprehended] two auspicious [suspicious] persons" (Dogberry in Shakespeare's *Much Ado about Nothing*, Act III. Scene V);
>
> "He is the very pineapple [pinnacle] of politeness!" (Mrs. Malaprop in Sheridan's *The Rivals*, Act III, Scene III); and
>
> "Sure if I reprehend [apprehend] anything in this world, it is the use of my oracular [vernacular] tongue, and a nice derangement [arrangement] of epitaphs [epithets]" (Mrs. Malaprop in Sheridan's *The Rivals*, Act III, Scene III).

Summary of this Section



The Place of this Section within the System



(B.) The Immediate Emotions in which some Moral Affection is Necessarily Involved

This is "the order of our emotions in which some moral relation is involved". These moral relations are not "[treated] ethically, in their elation to conduct", "but merely as mental phenomena"; i.e., "feelings or affections indicative of certain susceptibilities in the mind of being thus affected" (LX, p.398).

(B.1) *Emotions distinctive of Vice and Virtue*: As a preliminary comment Brown states that he is ignoring "the discussion of the great questions connected with the doctrine of obligation, as either presupposed or involved in our consideration of such actions" (LIX, p.394).

Rather than treating this class of "moral affections" on the *ethical* basis of whether they involve "the fulfilment or violation of duties" or not, Brown deals with them on a strictly *physiological* basis as "parts of our mental constitution" — as "feelings [which exist]… as states or affections of the mind indicative of certain susceptibilities in the mind, of being so affected" (LIX, p.394) — and reserves dealing with them as "principles of conduct… [in] future discussions of the nature and obligation of virtue" (LIX, p.397):

> [In relation to] the feelings distinctive of vice and virtue,— emotions that arise on the contemplation of certain actions observed or conceived…
>
> Whether we have reason to approve and disapprove, or have no reason whatever, in the nature of their actions, to regard with a different eye, those whom… we now feel ourselves almost necessitated to love or abhor, …still the fact of the general approbation and disapprobation, we must admit, even in reserving for ourselves, the privilege of indifference.

> They are phenomena of the mind, as much as our sensations or remembrances,— illusions to be classed with our other illusions,— or truths to be classed with our most important truths. (LIX, pp.394-395)

(B.2) *Emotions of Love and Hate*: The complex emotion of love is "always [comprised of] at least two elements,— a vital delight in the contemplation of the object, and the desire of good to that object".[93]

It is obvious that "the love of that which is pleasing, but which is loved only for those intrinsic qualities which the pleasure accompanies" is very different from "the love of pleasure" (LIX, p.397).

It is also quite clear that, in the same way that "we love, …not for the pleasure of loving, but on account of the qualities which it is at once delightful for us to love, and impossible for us not to love" (i.e., "the delight of loving is not the cause of love"), we also "despise without any pleasure in despising, certainly, at least, not on account of any pleasure that can be imagined to be felt in despising" (LX, p.399):

> The moral affections which lead to the infliction of evil, are occasionally as necessary as the benevolent affections. If vice exist, it must be loathed by us, or we may learn to imitate it. If an individual have injured another individual, there must be indignation to feel the wrong which has been done, and a zeal to avenge it. The malevolent affections, then, are evidently a part of virtue as long as vice exists…
>
> We are made capable of a malevolence that may be said to be virtuous when it operates; for the terror of injustice, that otherwise would walk, not in darkness, through the world, but in open light, perpetrating its iniquities without shame or remorse, and perpetrating them with impunity. (LX, p.399)
>
> If the benevolent affections be so important, as sources of happiness, the malevolent affections, we found, were not less important parts of our mental constitution, as the defence of happiness against the injustice which otherwise would every moment be invading it; the emotions of the individual injured being to the injurer a certainty that his crime will not be without one interested in avenging it; and the united emotions of mankind, as concurring with this individual interest of retribution, being almost the certainty of vengeance itself. If vice can perform these ravages in the moral world which we see at present, what would have been the desolation, if there had been no motives of terror to restrain the guilty arm; if frauds and oppressions, which now work in secret, could have come boldly forth into the great community of mankind, secure of approbation in every eye, or at least no look of abhorrence, or shuddering at their very approach. It is because man is rendered capable of hatred, that crimes, which escape the law and the judge, have their punishment in the terror of the guilty. "Fortune", it has been truly said, "frees many from vengeance, but it cannot free them from fear. It cannot free them from the knowledge of that general disgust and scorn which nature has so deeply fixed in all mankind, for the crimes which they have perpetrated. Amid the security of a thousand concealments, they cannot think themselves sufficiently concealed from

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[93] Observing (LIX, p.397) that our "vocabularies of love and hate… are [far] richer in terms of contempt and dislike than in terms of admiration and reverence", and noting that the terms used vary widely according to both the level of the emotions' intensity, and "the objects to which they are directed", Brown provides the following examples of labels for various qualities and degrees of love: affection, regard, esteem, respect, veneration, friendship, patriotism, and devotion.

> that hatred which is ever ready to burst upon them; for conscience is still with them, like a treacherous informer, pointing them out to themselves.[94] (LXI, p.406)

(B.3) *Emotions of Sympathy*: the general affections of sympathy are the emotions "by which, instantly, as if by some sort of contagion, we become partakers of the vivid feelings of others, whether pleasing or painful"[95] (LXI, p.406).

Moreover, "there is a peculiar susceptibility of this reflex emotion, in certain minds, by which… sympathy, as a subsequent emotion, is more or less vivid" (LXI, p.409):

> We rejoice with those who rejoice, merely because they are rejoicing; and, without any misfortune of our own, we feel a sadness at the very aspect of affliction in those around us, and shrink and shudder on the application to them of any cause of pain which we know cannot reach ourselves. (LXI, p.408)

Given that we have an equal propensity to participate in grief and joy, Brown postulates that the reason we misleadingly attribute the term *sympathy* "[to the] feelings of that sadder kind",[96] and routinely deny any connexion "of this sympathy with happiness" (LXI, p.406), is due to the fact that "we seem to sympathize less with the pleasures of others than we truly do; because the real sympathy is lost in that constant air of cheerfulness which it is part of good manners to assume" (LXI, p.408):

> The state of happiness is a state which we are so desirous of feeling, and so readily affect to feel, even when we truly feel it not, that our participation of it becomes less remarkable, being expressed merely in the same way as the common courtesies of society require us to express ourselves, even when we are feeling no particular satisfaction. If the face must, at any rate, be dressed in smiles at meeting, and retain a certain number of these smiles, with an occasional smile more or less, according to the turn of the conversation, during the whole of a long interview, the real complacency which is felt in the pleasures of others is not marked, because the air of complacency has been assumed before. All this is so well understood, in that state of strange simulation and dissimulation which constitutes artificial politeness,[97] that a smile of

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[94] The piece in quotation marks is Brown's own translation if the last section of Seneca's *Moral Epistle XCVII*.

[95] Hume expressed very much the same view:

> No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own. This is not only conspicuous in children, who implicitly embrace every opinion propos'd to them; but also in men of the greatest judgment and understanding, who find it very difficult to follow their own reason or inclination, in opposition to that of their friends and daily companions. To this principle we ought to ascribe the great uniformity we may observe in the humours and turn of thinking of those of the same nation; and 'tis much more probable, that this resemblance arises from sympathy, than from any influence of the soil and climate, which, tho' they continue invariably the same, are not able to preserve the character of a nation the same for a century together. A good-natur'd man finds himself in an instant of the same humour with his company; and even the proudest and most surly take a tincture from their countrymen and acquaintance. A chearful [sic] countenance infuses a sensible complacency and serenity into my mind; as an angry or sorrowful one throws a sudden damp upon me. Hatred, resentment, esteem, love, courage, mirth and melancholy; all these passions I feel more from communication than from my own natural temper and disposition. (Hume, 1739-1740/2000; 2.1.11.2, p.206)

[96] Whilst it truly applies to "both species of feelings", Brown notes that, "in common language", the term sympathy "is usually applied more particularly to the interest which we take in sorrow" (LXI, p.406).

[97] Here, the implication is that this "artificial politeness" is a construct of two factors: the pretence of what does not exist ("simulation"), and the concealment of what does exist ("dissimulation").

> welcome is as little considered to be a certain evidence of gratification at heart, as the common forms of humility which close a letter of business, are understood to truly signify, that the writer is the very humble and most obedient servant of him to whom the letter is addressed. Joy, then,— that is to say, the appearance of joy,— may be regarded as the common dress of society, and real complacency is thus as little remarkable as a well-fashioned coat in a drawing-room. Let us conceive a single ragged coat to appear in the brilliant circle, and all eyes will be instantly fixed on it. Even beauty itself, till the buzz of astonishment is over, will for the moment scarcely attract a single gaze, or Wit a single listener. Such, with respect to the general dress of the social mind, is grief. It is something, for the very appearance of which we are unprepared. A face of smiles is what we meet constantly; a face of sorrow, the fixed and serious look, the low and faltering tone, the very silence, the tear, are foreign, as it were, to the outward scene of things in which we exist. We see evidence, in this case, that something has happened to change the general aspect; while the look, and the voice of gaiety, as they are the look and the voice of every hour, indicate to us only the presence of the individual, and not any particular affection of his mind. It is not wonderful, therefore, that the appearance of grief, as the more unusual of the two, should absorb to itself, in common language, a name which may have been originally significant alike of the participation of grief and joy. It must be remembered, too, that joy, though delighting in sympathy, does not stand in need of this sympathy so much as sorrow. In diffusing cheerfulness, we seem rather to give to others than receive; while in the sympathy of grief which we excite [in others], we feel every look and tone of kindred sorrow as so much given to us. It is as if we were lightened of part of our burden; and we cannot feel the relief without feeling gratitude to the compassionate heart that has lessened our affliction, by dividing it with us. It is not merely, therefore, because the appearance of grief is more unusual, that we have affixed to this appearance a peculiar language, or at least apply to it more readily the terms that are significant also of other appearances; but in some degree also because the sympathy of those who sorrow with us, is of far more value than the sympathy of those who merely share our rejoicing, and therefore dwells more readily and lastingly in our remembrance. (LXI, p.406-407)

Brown also identifies an interlinked and associated complex moral affection: pity.

> What is commonly termed pity… is not one simple state, but two successive states of the mind: the feeling of the sorrow of others, and the desire of relieving it. The former of these is that which leads me to rank pity as an immediate emotion; the latter, which is a separate affection of the mind, subsequent to the other, and easily distinguished from it, we should rank, if it were to be considered alone, with our other desires, which, in like manner, arise from some view of good to be attained, or evil to be removed.[98] (LXI, p.409)

Having linked pity and compassion — which is "so ready to soothe our sorrows, and without which, perhaps, to awaken and direct or pity to others, we should scarcely have known that the relief of misery was one of our duties" (LX, p.404) — Brown stresses the importance of recognizing compassion as a *reflex* emotion, i.e., rather than a *considered* emotion:

> If compassion were to arise only after we had ascertained the moral character of the sufferer,

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[98] Brown (LXI, pp.409-410):

> Pity, however complex the state of mind may be which it expresses, is one of the most interesting of all the states in which the mind can exist, and affords itself as an example of the advantage of treating our emotions as complex, rather than elementary…

> and weighed all the consequences of good and evil which might result to society from the relief which it is in our power to offer, who would rush to the preservation of the drowning mariner, to the succour of the wounded, to the aid of him who calls for help against the ruffians who are assailing him? Our powers of giving assistance have been better accommodated to the necessities which may be relieved by them. By the principle of compassion within us we are benefactors almost without willing it; we have already done the deed, when, if deliberation had been necessary as a previous step, we should not have proceeded far in the calculation which was to determine by a due equipoise of opposite circumstances, the propriety of the relief.[99] (LXI, p.410)

(B.4) *Emotions of Pride and Humility*: Pride, "the particular emotion that rises at any moment on the contemplation of some virtuous excellence attained" (LXII, p.416), and humility, "the feeling arising from a sense of inferiority or failure in the same great pursuit" (LXII, p.416), are the "vivid feelings which attend the belief of our excellence or inferiority, in any circumstances, internal or external" (LXIII, p.418).

Also, they are "the vivid feelings of joy or sadness, which attend the contemplation of ourselves, when we report our superiority or inferiority, in any qualities of mind or body, or in the external circumstances in which we may be placed" (LXII, p.412).

> Pride and humility… are always relative terms; they imply a comparison of some sort, with an object higher or lower; and the same mind, with actual excellence exactly the same, and with the same comparative attainments in every one around, may thus be either proud or humble, as it looks above or looks beneath…
>
> Yet this habitual tendency to look beneath, rather than above, is the character of mind which is denominated pride; while the tendency to look above, rather than below, and to feel an inferiority, therefore, which others perhaps do not perceive, is the character which is denominated humility. (LXII, pp.416-417)

Pride, "the mere pleasure of excellence attained", is an essential part of a natural human existence.[100]

However, in certain individuals, this natural propensity for taking simple pleasure in whatever excellence we may have attained becomes greatly exaggerated; and, in these cases, the "emotion which attends the contemplation of our excellence… may lead us to impress others as much as possible with our superiority" (LXII, p.412) with either of two modes of conduct:

(1) *Vanity*: "in which we studiously bring forward any real or supposed advantages which we possess" and we do this "by presenting to them, at every moment, some proofs of our

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[99] Brown also comments that the "inestimable benefit" of "that instant participation of grief" and of our "consequent eagerness to relieve it" is that "which procures for the sufferer assistance in situations in which he is incapable even of imploring aid" (XLII, p.412).

[100] The pleasure we gain from any success is relative. Our pleasure "is not to be estimated only by the real value of that which is attained, but by this value combined with the doubtfulness of the attainment, when it was regarded by us merely as an object of desire". Furthermore, whilst being able "to gain what we considered ourselves sure of gaining, is scarcely a source of any very high satisfaction", it is also true that "to gain what we wished to gain, but what we had little thought of gaining, is a source of lively delight" (XLII, p.415).

advantages, mentally, bodily, or in the gifts of fortune"[101] (LXII, p.412); or

(2) *Haughtiness*: "in which we wish to make more directly felt, the real or supposed comparative meanness of others" and we do this "by bringing to their mind directly, their inferiority, by the scorn with which we treat them" (LXII, p.412); or

Clearly, unadulterated, simple pride "involves nothing that is worthy of censure" (LXII, p.412):

> In the circumstances in which it is truly praiseworthy to desire to excel, it must be truly noble to have excelled. It is impossible to be desirous of excelling, without a pleasure in having excelled; and where it would be culpable to feel pleasure in the attainments that have made us nobler than we were before, it must, of course, have been culpable to desire such excellence.
>
> It is not pride, therefore, or the pleasure of excellence, as a mere direct emotion, that moral error exists, but in those ill-ordered affections which may have led us to the pursuit of excellence that is unworthy of our desire, and that cannot, therefore, shed any glory on our attainment of it. If our desires are fixed only on excellence in what is good, it is impossible for us to feel too lively a pleasure in the gratification of these desires…
>
> What renders the feeling of delight in excellence attained, not excusable merely, but praise-worthy, is then a right estimate of those objects in which we are desirous of excelling. (LXII, pp.412-413)

Summary of this Section



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[101] Brown comments that whilst "our vanity in displaying our attainments" may lead to us "becoming ridiculous", it can also involve us "[exercising] a sort of cruelty in reminding others by our scorn [of just] how inferior we consider them to ourselves" (LXII, p.413).

The Place of this Section within the System



The Retrospective Emotions

These "relate to objects as past"; and they are "complex feelings" for which "the conception of some object of former pleasure or pain [is] essential" (LXIII, p.418). Brown subdivides these retrospective emotions according to whether they relate to others or to ourselves:

> Our retrospective emotions which relate to others are, anger for evil inflicted, and gratitude for good conferred; to which emotions, as complex feelings, in all their variety, the conception of evil, as past, or of good, as past is, you will perceive, essential.
>
> Those which relate to ourselves are either simple regret or satisfaction that arise from the consideration of any circumstances or events, which may have been productive of joy or sorrow, or may promise or threaten to be productive of them, or that moral regret or satisfaction which have reference to our own past conduct or desires; of the former of which, the regret that is felt by us when we look back on our moral delinquencies, remorse is the common name; while the latter, the satisfaction with which we review our past actions or wishes has no strict appropriate name … it is easily understood, as that emotion which bears to our remembrance of our virtuous actions the relation which remorse bears to the remembrance of our actions of an opposite character. (LXIII, pp.418-419)

(C.) The Retrospective Emotions: as they relate to Others

(C.1) *Anger*:

> Anger is that emotion of instant displeasure, which arises from the feeling of injury done, or the discovery of injury intended; or in many cases from the discovery of the mere omission of the good offices to which we conceived ourselves entitled, though this very omission may itself be regarded as a species of injury. It is… almost universally followed by another emotion, which constitutes the desire of inflicting evil of some sort in return…
>
> The evil felt,— the dislike,— the desire of retaliation, however rapidly they may succeed, and however closely and permanently they may continue afterwards to coexist, in one complex state of mind, are still originally distinct. The primary emotion of anger involves the instant displeasure merely with the notion of evil done or intended, and is strictly retrospective; the resentment or revenge, which is only a longer continued resentment, if we were to consider it without any regard to this primary displeasure which gives birth to it, would be… termed prospective. It is a desire as much as any other of our desires. …[Consequently, I shall] consider the instant displeasure itself, and the desire of returning evil as one emotion. (LXIII, p.419)

The value of anger is that it provides great physical strength; and, as well "when anger rises, fear is gone" — "there is no coward, for all are brave".

The value of resentment is that it endures ("resentment is of every place and every time") and, thus, allows an aggrieved individual to bide their time and gain support from others ("time and space, which otherwise might have afforded impunity to the aggressor, are thus no shelter for his delinquency"): "the just resentment of a single individual may become the wrath and the vengeance of an entire nation" (LXIII, p.420). Brown notes that this feeling of others is usually termed indignation, rather than resentment:

> …but though the name [viz., indignation] be different [from that of resentment], and though the accompanying notions of personal or foreign injury be also different, the emotion itself may be considered as similar. It certainly is not the mere feeling of moral disapprobation, but combined with this moral disapprobation, a vivid dislike, which all who have felt it may remember to have resembled the vivid dislike felt by them in cases in which they have themselves been injured, and a desire of vengeance on the offender as instant, and often as ardent, as when the injury was personal to themselves. (LXIII, p.420)

In fact, "some vivid feeling of resentment there must be, that the delays that may occur, in the infliction of vengeance, may not save the guilty from punishment" (LXIII, p.421).

Brown also draws attention to a number of significant "moral errors" with respect to resentment:

(1) *Too Soon*: "Reflection" is essential, because it is easy to confuse "[that which] simply gives us pain" with "that which was intended to give us unnecessary pain". Resentment "may arise when a little reflection would have shown that it ought not to have arisen"; and there is a significant difference between the emotion of anger "[that] precedes or follows this due reflection". "The disposition which becomes instantly angry, without reflection, on the slightest semblance of injury, is… termed passionate" (LXIII, p.422).

(2) *Disproportionate to the Offence*: Another consequence of a "passionate disposition": "he who does not pause, even to weigh the circumstances, cannot be supposed to measure the extent of injury".
Thus, "he feels that he is injured, and all his anger bursts out instantly on the offender"; "it is this disproportion, indeed, which is the chief evil of [passion]" (LXIII, p.422).

Brown (LXIII, p.422) offers three possible answers to the question "To what cause, or causes, are we to ascribe this quickness of anger, on small occasions, when, if the occasion had been greater, the resentment would have been less?", noting that whilst each may "operate singly", "their influence… is far more powerful when they operate… together":

> (a) "any great injury is felt by us immediately as an injury" and, therefore, "as an important event in our life"; and "the importance of the injury" makes us remember the extent to which we ought to respond virtuously and ethically.
>
> (b) "great offences seldom occur without some little warning or suspicion, which puts us on our guard, and prevents, therefore, sudden exasperation. But what warning is there that a cup is to be broken, or a pair of spectacles mislaid?"
>
> (c) "any great offence is of course a great evil, and… the magnitude of the evil, therefore, occupies us as much as our resentment, and thus lessens the vividness of the mere feeling of resentment, by dividing, as it were, its interest with that of other intermingled feelings. But when a servant… has negligently suffered the newspaper to catch fire, which he was drying for us, the evil is not sufficiently great to occupy or distract us; and we see, therefore, the whole unpardonable atrocity of the neglect itself".

(3) *Transfer from the Guilty to the innocent*: Noting that this disposition is termed *peevish* or *fretful*, Brown speaks of how, in these cases, "some trifling circumstance, of disappointed hope or mortified vanity, has disturbed that serenity which was before all smiles" and how "for half a day, or perhaps for many days, if the provocation have been very little more than nothing, no smile is again to be seen", and although "he whose unfortunate speech or action produced this change may already be at a distance of many miles", "he is represented by every person, and every thing that meets the eye of the offended"; meaning that "the wrath which he deserved, or did not deserve, is poured out perhaps in greater profusion than if he were actually present" (LXIII, p.423):

> To a disposition of this sort, no voice is soft, no look is kind; the very effort to soothe it is an insult; every delightful domestic affection is suspended; the servants tremble; the very children scarcely venture to approach, or steal past in silence, with a beating heart, and rejoice in having escaped; the husband finds business to occupy him in his own apartment, the instant and urgent necessity of which he never discovered before; and all this consternation and misery have arisen perhaps from the negligence of a waiting-maid who has placed a flower, or feather, or a bit of lace, a quarter of an inch higher or lower

than it ought to have been. (LXIII, p.423)

(4) *Too Long Protracted*: Far extended beyond the dispositions to be peevish or fretful, is the disposition to be *revengeful*.

Unlike the fretful (where, if the cause of "[their] obscurity could be removed, so that the might see things as they are, they probably would cease to express, and even to feel, their petty displeasure"), "the revengeful have not, indeed the folly of punishing the innocent for the offence of the guilty; but they punish the guilty, even when the guilt has been expiated with respect to them, by every atonement that the injurer could offer" (and, even, "they punish as guilt what implied no malicious intention") and, moreover, they do this "not unreflectingly and blindly, but with an understanding as quick to discern as it is vigorous to execute." (LXIII, p.423).

Finally, Brown warns of the pernicious nature of unchecked and unending resentment:

> Nature… has formed man susceptible of resentment, that the wicked, who fear only man, may have something to fear; but she has formed man to be placable, because long continued resentment would be itself an evil more sever than that which it avenges. He, therefore, who knows not how to forgive,— whose gloomy heart preserves, even in age, the resentment of youth, unsoftened by the penitence of the offender, by his virtues, by his very misery, is to us like some dreadful being of another race, that walks the earth, cursing and accursed; we shun him as we would fly from some malignant spirit, who, by looking upon us, could transfuse into us the rancour which he feels; we have no sympathy for him; our only sympathies are with the object of his vengeance; with that very object on whom, in other years, we could have delighted to see the vengeance fall. (LXIII, pp.423-424)

Brown also notes, in his discussion of the extent to which unbridled avarice is evil, "that form of implacable or disproportioned resentment which exclusively we call revenge, is evil" (LXX, p.468).

(C.2) *Gratitude*: This is "the emotion opposite to resentment": "that delightful emotion of love to him who has conferred a kindness on us, the very feeling of which is itself no small part of the benefit conferred" (LXIII, p.424).

> So ready is gratitude to arise in almost every mind, that ingratitude to a benefactor, in every age of the world, has been regarded almost with the same species of abhorrence as the violation of the dearest duties of consanguinity itself. He who could plunge a dagger into the heart of one who had conferred on him any signal service, would be viewed by us almost with the same fearful astonishment with which we gaze on the parricide who plunged the dagger into the heart that gave him life. (LXXXIX, p.601)

Summary of this Section



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

D. The Retrospective Emotions: as they relate to Ourselves

Brown again emphasizes the differences from individual to individual:

> The same events, therefore, in external circumstances exactly the same, may be productive to the mind of emotions that are very different, according to its constitutional diversities or acquired habits, or even according to slight accidents of the day or of the hour. We may rejoice, when others would grieve, or grieve when others would rejoice, according as circumstances arise to our reflection, different from those which would occur to them. Nor is the influence necessarily less powerful on our views of the future, than on our views of the past. We desire often, in like manner, what is evil for us upon the whole, by thinking of some attendant good; as we fear what is good, by thinking only of some attendant evil. The vanity of human wishes is, in this way, proverbial. We do not need these memorable instances which Juvenal has selected, to convince us, how destructive, in certain circumstances, may be the attainment of objects, that seem to us, when we wish for them, to comprehend all that is desirable. The gods, says that great moralist, have overwhelmed in ruin whole multitudes,

merely by indulging them with every thing for which they prayed.

Evertere domos totas optantibus ipsis
Di faciles.[102]

What is shown, in such cases, only in the fatal result, to those whose scanty discrimination sees only what is or has been, and not what is to be, may in some respects be anticipated by discerning minds, that would feel sadness, therefore, at events which might seem to others to be subjects only of congratulation. Sagacity, when it exists in any high degree, is itself almost that second sight in which the superstitious of the wilder districts of this country put so much confidence. It looks far before, into the futurity that is closed to common eyes. It sees the gloom in which gaiety is to terminate, that happiness that is to dawn on affliction, as, by supposed supernatural revelation, the Seer's quick but gloomy eye views in the dance and merriment of the evening the last struggles of him who is the next morning to perish in the waves, or when a whole family is weeping for the shipwrecked son or brother, beholds on a sudden, with a wild and mysterious delight the moment of joy when the well-known voice of him who is lamented with so many tears, is to be heard again, as he returns in safety to the cottage door.

It is not the nature of the mere event, then, that the gladness or regret which it excites wholly depends, but in part also on the habits and discernment of the mind which considers it; and we are thus, in a great measure, creators of our own happiness, not in the actions merely which seem more strictly to depend on our will, but on those foreign events which might have seemed at first to be absolutely independent of us. (LXIV, pp.427-428)

(D.1) *Simple Regret and Gladness, Arising from Events we can not Control*: These are the "emotions of simple regret or gladness with which we look back on past events, as mere events of advantage or disadvantage, without including and notion of our own moral propriety or impropriety of conduct" (LXIV, p.425):

> What we term chance or fortune, in all those events of our life, which we characterize as fortunate or unfortunate, is only a shorter term for expressing the actions of others in their unintended relation to us; and in the friendships and thousand rivalries of life, how much of intentional good or evil is to be added to what is casual! There is perhaps scarcely a single success, of which we give the praise to our own prudent conduct, that if others had acted differently, might not have been adverse to us, rather than prosperous. (LXIV, p.426)

We are often melancholy or cheerful "without knowing why we are more [melancholy or] cheerful at one particular time than at another"; yet, "[whenever] we feel regret, we know what it is we regret", and "[whenever] we feel a joyful satisfaction, we know what it is that gladdens us".

In these cases, our emotions of regret or gladness "have a direct reference to their causes, the conception of which coexists with them in one complex state of mind"; thus, despite any apparent similarity, the immediate emotions of melancholy/cheerfulness can be clearly distinguished from the retrospective emotions of regret/gladness "by that reference to the past, the retrospective feeling which does or does not attend them" (LXIV, p.425).

And, moreover, this "retrospective reference is so important a part of the complex whole, that the

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[102] *Evertere* is, more often, written as *euertere*. This quotation is from Juvenal's *Satires*, X ("The Vanity of Human Wishes"):7-8: "The gods ruin whole households for a foolish prayer".

[separate consideration of the emotions of regret and gladness which involve] this reference [brings considerable advantage to any examination of the emotions]" (LXIV, p.426).

It is also quite clear that past events offer a productive source of counterfactual thinking:

> How few events are productive only of advantage or disadvantage! By far the greater number are productive of both, of advantage which, if it existed alone, would excite gladness, of disadvantage which, if it existed alone, would excite regret, and of which, as existing together, the resulting emotion is different, according to the preponderance of the opposing causes of regret or gladness, that is to say, according as more or fewer images of regret or gladness spontaneously arise to our mind, or according as we examine and analyze, more or less fully, the one or the other of these sources of mingled joy and sorrow. (LXIV, p.426)

Reminiscent of Epictetus' assertion, in *The Encheridion*, that we are not disturbed by the events that happen, but by the way that we choose to view them, Brown argues that, although the past cannot be altered, we certainly can control how we choose to think about it:

> We cannot change events, indeed, in many instances; but in all of these, the aspect of events, at least, may be changed as our attention is more or less turned to the consequences that may result from them. To wish is, in this case, almost to produce what we wish. Our very desire of tracing the consequences that are favourable to our happiness, will be followed by the suggestion of these, rather than of others in the same manner as our other desires are always followed by the suggestion of images accordant with them. (LXIV, pp.426-427)

(D.2) *Moral Regret and Gladness, Arising from our own Actions*: Whilst the emotions of "simple gladness and regret… depend in some measure on the peculiar tendencies of the mind, the emotions ["which attend our moral retrospects of our past actions"] …depend on them still more".

Noting the significant difference between "the emotions with which we regard the virtues and vices of others" and "those with which we regard the same vices and virtues as our own", Brown specifies "the remorse which arises on the thought of our guilt, [and] the opposite emotion which attends the remembrances of what is commonly termed a good conscience" as those comprising this class (LXIV, p.428).

> Man, indeed, is too frail not to yield occasionally to temptations; but he yields to temptation because he is stupefied by passion, and forgets, at the moment, the differences of the state of the vicious and the virtuous, that in calmer hours are present to him, with an influence of which he delights to feel the power. If these differences, the mere contrast of the feeling with which the pure and the guilty look back on the years of their glorious and inglorious life, could be made constantly present to the mind, there is little reason to think that all the seductions of power and momentary pleasure could prevail over him who sees what the good are, even in those adversities which the world considers as most afflicting, and what the guilty are, even in the midst of their enjoyments, without taking into account what they must be when those short and palling enjoyments have ceased… (LXIV, p.431)

Summary of this Section



The Place of this Section within the System



The Prospective Emotions: Comprehending all our Desires and Fears

This is the class of emotions that "[have] reference to objects as future"; and, clearly, "[from] its immediate consequences", and "its direct influence on action", "it is the most important [order] of all our emotions"[103] (LXV, p.432).

The class is comprised of:

(1) "All our desires": these are complex feelings which always involve both "the conception of the object which seems desirable" and "the vivid feeling that arises on the prospect of good" (LXV, p.435), "which arise equally from the prospect of what is agreeable in itself, or from the prospect of relief from what is disagreeable in itself" (LXV, p.432); and

(2) "All our fears": "which arise equally from the prospect of what is disagreeable in itself, or from the prospect of the loss of what is in itself agreeable" (LXV, p.432).

It is important to recognize that, very often, hope and fear relate to precisely the same object:

> The same external object, agreeable or disagreeable, may give rise to both emotions, according as the object is or is not in our possession, or is or is not producing any present uneasiness; or when it is equally remote in both cases, according as the probability of attainment of the agreeable object, or of the freedom from the disagreeable object, is greater or less… We fear to lose any source of pleasure possessed by us, which had long been an object of our hope; we wish to be free from a pain that afflicts us, which, before it attacked us, was an object of our fear. We fear that some misfortune, which seems to threaten us, may reach us; we hope we shall be able to escape. The hope and fear in these cases, opposite as the emotions truly are, arise, you perceive, from the same objects; the one or the other prevailing according to the greater or less probability on either side. (LXV, p.432)

Furthermore, whilst it is true that our hopes and fears "vary with different degrees of probability", it is also true that there is much more to it than just "a mere comparison of probabilities":

> They arise, or do not arise, in some measure, also according to the magnitude of the object; our hope and our fear awaking *more readily*, as well as operating *more permanently* and *strongly*, when the object we wish to attain, or of which we fear to be deprived, is very important to our happiness, though the probabilities on either side may be exactly the same as in cases of *lesser importance*, where desire and fear, if they arise at all, are *comparatively feeble*, and when often not the slightest emotion of either species arises… (LXV, p.432; emphasis added)

In support of his argument, Brown offers the following scenario: there are two travellers, each riding in the same sort of carriage; and, because each carriage has the same external appearance, each is equally inviting or repulsive to the same potential robber.

One carries "so much booty as would impoverish him if it were lost", whilst the other "[carries] little of which he can be plundered".

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[103] Brown also remarks that "under this comprehensive and most interesting class of our mental affections, might be considered every thing which has immediate reference to the whole ample field of moral conduct" (LXXII, p.484).

Even though the "probabilities" of each being beset by robbers is equal, the "fear of attack" in the two individuals is very different: one is terrified at the approach of nightfall, and will, "with his own eye… watch suspiciously every horseman who approached, and would feel a sort of relief when he observed him pass carelessly and quietly along at a considerable distance behind", whilst the other is quite carefree.

The significant issue here is not just that, predictably, the intensity of the fear is proportional to the size of the purse each traveller carries; but that, "there is a greater belief of probability of attack" (LXV, p.432).

This irrationally increased fear of attack has a simple explanation:

> The loss of what is valuable in itself, is of course a great affliction. The slightest possibility of such an evil makes the evil itself occur to us, as an object of conception, though not at first, perhaps, as an object of what can be termed fear. Its very greatness however makes it, when thus conceived, dwell long in the mind; and it cannot dwell long, even as a mere conception, without exciting, by the common influence of suggestion, the different states of mind, associated with the conception of any great evil; of which associate or resulting states, in such circumstances, fear is one of the most constant and prominent. The fear is really thus readily excited as an associate feeling; and when the fear has once been excited, as a mere associate feeling, it continues to be still more readily suggested again, at every moment, by the objects that suggested it, and with the perception or conception of which it has recently coexisted…
>
> [For example,] in the case of the traveller, the liveliness of the mere conception of evil that may be suffered, gives a sort of temporary probability to that which would seem to have little likelihood in itself, and which derives thus from mere imagination all the terror that is falsely embodied by the mind in things that exist around.
>
> It is not, then, any simple ratio of probabilities which regulates the rise of our hopes and fears, but of these combined with the magnitude or insignificance of the objects. (LXV, p.433)

Brown is emphatic that it is not necessary to create a separate classification for "the passions":

> Our wishes, when they exist with little force and permanence, are termed simply desires; when they rise more vividly, and occupy the mind more exclusively, they are termed passions. The vividness, and permanence, therefore, are only the circumstances which distinguish our passions; not any essential difference in the particular nature of the desires themselves. The slightest wish, which we scarcely feel as a very vivid emotion, becomes a passion when it affects us strongly and lastingly. The most ardent passion, which may have occupied our whole soul for half our life, if it were to rise only slightly and faintly, would be termed a mere desire. (LXVI, p.440)

> …our passions are truly no separate class [of our emotions], but merely a name for our desires, when very vivid, or very permanent… (LXV, pp.438)

> [For example, in relation to "a slight desire of a higher station"] it is when the wish of worldly power and splendour is not the emotion of a single minute, but the exclusive or almost exclusive wish of the heart, when it allows other desires occasionally to intervene, but recurs still with additional force, as if to occupy again what is its own possession, and to feed on new wishes of advancement, or new projects of obtaining what it wished before; it is then when the desire is vivid and permanent that we term it a passion, and look perhaps with pity on him who

is the victim. (LXV, pp.438)

In relation to "the objects that excite our desires", "we may often feel that we are desiring what is inconsistent with moral rectitude, and yet continue to desire it"[104] (LXV, p.433):

> The good, therefore, which is synonymous with desirableness, is not necessarily and uniformly, however generally it may be, consistent with our own greatest advantage, or with moral propriety in our choice. It can be defined in no other way than simply as that which appears to us desirable, the desire itself being the only test, as it is the only proof of tendency in objects to excite desire…
>
> But, though we desire what seems to us for our advantage, it does not therefore follow that we desire only what seems to us advantageous; and that what is desirable must therefore imply, in the very moment of the incipient desire, some view of personal good. It implies, indeed, that satisfaction will be felt in the attainment of our desire, and uneasiness in the failure of it; but the satisfaction is the result of the attainment, not the motive to the desire itself, at the moment when the desire arose; as the uneasiness is the result of the failure, not a feeling preceding the desire, and prompting it. The desire, in short, must have existed primarily, before satisfaction could have been felt in the attainment of its object, or regret when the object was not attained. (LXV, pp.434-435)

In Brown's opinion, this sense of "desirability" is *projective*.

It is "the very nature of our mind", that was "originally constituted with certain tendencies", which predisposes it to feeling "that some objects should seem to it immediately desirable"; and this is just as instinctive as our immediate feeling that the very nature of the objects in the series of numbers 2, 4, 8, and 16 appear to be symmetrically related to one another (and this occurs "without any conception of the pleasure which we may feel in discovering the relation").

Thus, anything that is immediately desirable to us, is desirable, just as much from its very nature, "as four is immediately perceived by us to be the double of two, and eight of four" (LXVI, p.443):

> Pleasure, indeed, attends the discovery [of the relation between the members of the series 2, 4, 8, and 16]; but it is surely very evident, that there must have been curiosity before the pleasure, or no pleasure would have been felt. Pain or disquietude attends the ungratified curiosity. But, in like manner, there must have been a previous desire of knowledge, or if there was no previous desire of knowing any thing, there could be no pain in the ignorance. The pleasure and pain, in short, however early, presuppose always a desire still earlier, or they must have been effects that arose from neither. (LXVI, p.443)

Because all objects have an equal potential for generating hope and fear, there is no point in acting "to consider all our desires in a certain order, and then to consider all our fears in a certain order, since we would only repeat, as to one set of feelings, the observations previously made on the feelings that are contrasted with them" (LXV, p.433).

Consequently, "the consideration of our desires will be sufficient, of itself, to illustrate both sets of emotions" (LXV, p.433); and, based on "the degree of probability of the attainment of its object", all

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[104] He also quotes Ovid: "Video meliora, proboque;/Deteriora sequor" (I see the right way, approve it, and do the opposite).

of our desires are capable of existing in four substantially different forms (LXV, pp.435-436):

(1) "a mere wish": "when there is little if any probability [of its attainment]";

(2) "hope": "when the probability [of its attainment] is stronger";[105]

(3) "expectation": "with still greater probability [of its attainment]"; and

(4) "confidence": "with a probability [of its attainment] that approaches certainty".

In the context of later representations of Brown's work, it is significant that the highly respected Bain comprehensively and misleadingly misrepresents Brown's treatment of the "desires" quoted above. His misrepresentation of Brown's position on (a) there being no need to discuss desires and fears separately, and (b) the extent to which our desires are capable of existing in four substantially different forms, is immediately obvious in his summary of Brown's classification of the "emotions" (Bain, 1884, Appendix, p.90):

THOMAS BROWN

I. IMMEDIATE, excited by present objects. 1.*Cheerfulness* and *Melancholy*; 2.*Wonder*; 3.*Languour*; 4.*Beauty*; 5.*Sublimity*; 6.the *Ludicrous*; 7.*Moral feeling*; 8.Love and *Hate*; 9.*Sympathy*; 10.*Pride* and *Humility*.

II. RETROSPECTIVE. 1.*Anger*; 2.*Gratitude*; 3.*Simple Regret* and *Gladness*; 4.*Remorse* and its opposite.

III. PROSPECTIVE. 1.The *Desires* (Continued Existence, Pleasure, Action, Society, Knowledge, Power, Affection, Glory, the Happiness of others, Evil to others); 2.*Fears*; 3.*Hope*; 4.*Expectation*; 5.*Anticipation*.

Having distinguished the order of prospective emotions, that "which comprehends our desires and fears", from the immediate and retrospective orders of emotion on the basis of their "relation to objects as future", Brown claims that these prospective emotions are both "the immediate directors of our conduct",[106] and "the most important of all the affections of our mind" (LXVI, p.439).

Then, having established that the (a) same objects can give rise either hope or fear, depending upon "[the] different circumstances of our relation to those objects, present or absent", and (b) that an object's "desirability" may not always be determined by the concerns of "personal advantage",

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[105] Although hope is essential for our happiness, Brown argues that it should not be treated as "a distinct emotion"; but, simply, "as one of the forms in which all of our desires are capable of existing" (LXV, p.436):

> There is, then, no happiness which hope cannot promise, no difficulty which it cannot surmount, no grief which it cannot mitigate. It is the wealth of the indigent, the health of the sick, [and] the freedom of the captive.

[Brown's statement reminds me of a remark made, 25 years ago, by one of my teachers — whose specialty was using hypnosis, mental imagery, and hypnotherapy to treat people with cancer — when commenting on a criticism levelled at those doing such work by ill-informed practitioners of conventional western medicine: "They accuse me of giving these people false hope!", he said. "They don't understand one simple fact: hope is never *false*; it is either *realized*, or it is *not realized*. My work is specifically designed to banish the *false despair* that the oncologists routinely implant along with their diagnosis and treatment".]

[106] In this context, Brown also notes that "our other mental affections, of whatever species, influence [our conduct] only indirectly through our wishes" (LXVI, p.439).

"worldly prudence", or "moral propriety", Brown argues that "the objects of desire" (which "are not are not limited even to the infinity of existing things, but [also] comprehend whatever the wildest imagination can conceive") are "so various to different persons", that it is quite possible that "no two objects are regarded with the same interest and choice by any two individuals" (LXVI, p.439).

Thus, of course, one cannot make an exhaustive list of "the whole boundless variety of human wishes"; and, moreover:

> …everything we desire must have seemed to us desirable, as the very fact of the desire denotes; and though the attainment of every such desire must be attended with pleasure, it does not therefore follow that the pleasure which truly attends this fulfilment of desire, was the primary circumstance which excited the desire itself. We may feel happiness from exertion of every kind, from society, from the discovery of truth, from the good fortune of our friends. And yet have desired those without any view at the moment of the beginning desire to this resulting happiness, and merely from the constitution of our nature, which leads us to desire knowledge, simply as knowledge, because there is something of which we are ignorant, and which we may readily learn, society simply as society. Nature, indeed, has attached pleasure to these, as she has attached pleasure to many of our functions [such as the pleasure s mother derives "from loving her new-born infant"] which we do not exercise on account of that pleasure…
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> The emotion arises and is attended with pleasure; but it does not arise on account of the pleasure. On the contrary, the pleasure is felt, because the emotion has previously arisen, and could not have been felt but for the previous emotion that is gratified.
>
> …it is not the pleasure which was the circumstance that prompted our desire [for these objects] when it arose, it was the desire previously awakened which was accompanied by pleasure, or was productive of pleasure, the pleasure being, in all these cases, the effect of the previous desire, and necessarily presupposing it.[107] (LXVI, pp.442-443)

Constantly stressing his view that "in considering the origin of our desires, we are only to think of what is contemplated by the mind at the very moment when the emotion arises, of the circumstances antecedent to the desire, and not of circumstances which may or may not be its consequents" (LXVI, p.442), Brown tenders a classification of the "principal objects [of desire] that seem in their nature to involve… desirableness" ("those objects which cannot, in ordinary circumstances of our nature, be contemplated by us without exciting the emotion of desire"), noting that all the desires classified "may exist in different forms ["a simple wish, hope, expectation, confidence"], according to the different degrees of probability of attainment" (LXVI, p.439).

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[107] In support of his view that "the pleasure is felt, because the emotion has previously arisen", Brown offers the following elaboration:

> It is, as in journeying to some distant scene, at the call of business or friendship; the language may be beautiful, and may delight us, therefore, in every stage of our journey, the very exercise itself may be pleasing. Without the journey, it is evident that we could not have enjoyed this beauty of the scene, and this pleasure of the exercise; but we do not journey on account of these delights. At the same call, we should have traversed the same road, though the landscape had been dreary and desolate on every side, and though fatigue had converted the exercise itself into uneasiness. (LXVI, p.442)

The Ten Prospective Emotions

It is significant that this class of desires, and each of the nine which follow it, are designated "*a desire of…*", rather than "*a desire for…*".

This terminology clearly delivers the meaning that, in each of these contexts, the *desire* is an abstract entity (almost like a *faculty*), rather a substantial action.

This seems to be a parallel to the term *heat-seeking missile*. When we use this expression, we are speaking of a device that is actively selective to an external heat source, rather than speaking of a cooler-than-it-ought-to-be device that is constantly seeking to raise its own temperature.

(E.1) *The Desire of Continued Existence*: Quite apart from the universal wish for happiness and dread of misery and, despite the fact that our life may be dreadfully unhappy, "we have a wish to exist".

Despite the fact that death "implies the impossibility of uneasiness of any kind", it is "to our conception almost like a species of misery"; and, not only is it true that, regardless of the circumstances of one's life, "the desire of continuation of this earthly existence remains", very often, "[it] is perhaps still stronger in those years when death might seem to afford only the prospect of a ready passage to a better world" (LXV, p.438).

Brown presents a suggestion-based explanation for the apparently irrational "increased love of life that is so frequently observed in old age", despite the fact that, with old age, "the means of enjoyment are diminished":

> …we must remember that, by the influence of the suggesting principle, life, as a mere object of conception to the old, retains still many charms which in reality it does not possess. The life, of which they think, is the life of which they have often thought; and that life was a life full of hopes and enjoyments. The feelings, therefore, which were before associated with the notion of the loss of life, are those which still occur, on the contemplation of its possible loss, with the addition of those enjoyments which a long series of years must have added to the complex conception, and the loss of which, as one great whole, seems to be involved in the very notion of the loss of that life of which the enjoyments formed a part. It must be remembered, too, that if life be regarded as in any degree a blessing, the mere circumstance of the increased probability of its speedy termination must confer on it no slight accession of interest. This is only one of many instances of the operation of a very general principle of our nature; the likelihood of loss being itself almost a species of endearment, or at least producing, in every case, a tenderness that is soon diffused over the object which we contemplate, that seems thus to be more lovely in itself, merely because, from its precariousness, we love it more. (LXV, p.438)

Furthermore, argues Brown, "to desire the continuation of life, is to fear the loss of it; and to fear the loss of it, is to fear everything which may bring it into danger" (LXVI, p.440).

(E.2) *The Desire of Pleasure*: "Our desire of pleasure" is something "to which the fear of pain may be regarded as opposed".

To the extent to which "we love the continuance of our *being*, we love still more our *well-being*";

and, because of this, it can be said that "existence is valuable to us chiefly as that which can be rendered happy" (LXVI, p.440; emphasis added).

However, "the pleasures that attend virtue", or "the pleasures… which virtue approves", "are not the only pleasures which man is capable of feeling" (LXVI, p.441):

> He may have a sort of dreadful satisfaction in the fulfilment of the most malignant desires, or he may become the self-degraded slave of his own appetites. There are sensual gratifications, of which, though virtue may not forbid the temperate use, she forbids the intemperate excess; not because they are pleasures, but because they render us incapable of discharging duties which we have to perform; or, which is a still greater evil, deprive us even of the very wish of discharging our duties. (LXVI, p.441)

Continuing, Brown argues that "the desire of relief from pain may be regarded only as another form of the desire for pleasure"; and, "besides its relation to every accidental pain" (LXVI, p.442):

> [this "species of emotion"] comprehends all the desires that are involved in our bodily appetites… from the mere uneasiness which gives occasion to the desire; the desire of food or drink, for example, as distinguished from the mere pain of hunger or thirst, which must exist before any such desire that are subsequent to the sensations can be felt. (LXVI, p.442)

(E.3) *The Desire of Action*: In order to be happy, "it is necessary that we be occupied" with either "labour of our limbs" or "labour of our mind" (LXVI, p.444); and "the important advantage of this desire [of action is that it] prompts man incessantly to rise from the indolence in which he might otherwise lie torpid" (LXVIII, p.453).

It is also quite clear that we have "a constant desire of occupation", "without our thinking of the happiness which results from it"; and, indeed, "what fretfulness do we perceive [on the brows of man] …if a few successive days of wet and boisterous weather have rendered all escape into the open air, and all the exercises which this escape would afford, impossible!" (LXVI, p.444):

> In beginning to exert ourselves, or to take interest in the exertions of others, we have no thought either of misery to be avoided, or of happiness to be obtained. We are already busy before we have felt the happiness; we are already idle before we have felt the misery of being idle. Nature does not wait for our reflections and calculations.
>
> …man is formed to contribute his share of service to the general labours of mankind, to be active even where this propensity of our nature can have no excitement from individual wants, and to minister, in some sort, to the happiness of others, if he does not choose to be the willing minister of his own unhappiness. (LXVI, pp.445-446)

(E.4) *The Desire of Society*: Man depends on society "for the preservation of his infant being"; and "he is not less dependent on it for the comfort and happiness of his existence in other years".

"There is not one of his actions which may not, directly or indirectly, have some relation to those among whom he lives", and "there is scarcely a moment of his existence, in which the social affection, in some one of its forms, has not an influence on some feeling or resolution, some delightful remembrance of the past, [or] some project of future benevolence or resentment" (LXVII, p.446).

Also, without any time spent "thinking of the profit it affords", man has an active desire of society (LXVII, p.447): "even the most unjust and malignant of mankind… do not lose their love of society"; "they have their friends", and "they would hate to be alone, as much as other people" (LXVII, p.449).

Quoting Seneca, Brown speaks of the advantages of human society:[108]

> Make us single and solitary, and what are we? The prey of other animals and their victim, the prey which it would be most easy for them to seize, the victim which it would be most easy for them to destroy. Those other animals have, in their own strength, sufficient protection, If they be born to live apart, each has its separate arms to defend it. Man has no tusks or talons to make him terrible. He is weak and naked; but weak and naked as he is, society surrounds him and protects him. It is this which submits to his power all other living things, and not the earth merely, which seems in some measure his own by birth, but the very ocean, that is to him like another world of beings of a different nature. Society averts from him the attack of diseases, it mitigates his suffering when he is assailed by them, it gives him support and happiness in his old age, it makes him strong in the great combat of human life, because it leaves him not alone to struggle with his fortune. (LXVII, p.446)

(E.5) *The Desire of Knowledge*: Reflecting Aristotle's view that "*all men by nature desire to know*" (*Metaphysics*: Book A.1: 980a) and, for example, Gopnik's view that all humans naturally possess a "special kind of explanation-seeking curiosity" (Gopnik, 2000, p.300), Brown viewed our desire of knowing as a consequence of our *curiosity*:

> We have a desire of knowledge which nothing can abate,— a desire that, in some greater or less degree, extends itself to every thing which we are capable of knowing, and not to realities merely, but to all the extravagances of fiction. We are formed to know; we cannot exist without knowledge; and nature, therefore, has given us the desire of that knowledge which is essential not to our pleasure merely, but to our very being. (LXVII, p.452)

Yet, despite the fact that it is, indeed, driven by curiosity, our desire of knowing is far more than just curiosity in and of itself. Edmund Burke (1757/1990: I.I., p.29), for example, emphasizes the ephemeral and transient nature of curiosity alone:

> The first and the simplest emotion which we discover in the human mind, is Curiosity. By curiosity, I mean whatever desire we have for, or whatever pleasure we take in novelty. We see children perpetually running from place to place to hunt out something new; they catch with great eagerness, and with very little choice, at whatever comes before them; their attention is engaged by every thing, because every thing has, in that stage of life, the charm of novelty to recommend it. But as those things which engage us merely by their novelty, cannot attach us for any length of time, curiosity is the most superficial of all the affections; it changes its object perpetually; it has an appetite which is very sharp, but very easily satisfied; and it has always an appearance of giddiness, restlessness and anxiety.

The delight we have in knowing, and our disquiet whenever we "know only imperfectly" (where it *is* within our power to "make [our] knowledge more accurate or comprehensive"), is not consequent upon us "[reflecting] on the pleasure which we are to enjoy [when our curiosity is gratified], or the pain that we are to suffer [when it is ungratified]". "It is sufficient that there is something unknown which has a relation to something that is known to us" (XVII, p.451).

> How many nights of sleepless expectation would be given to the chemist, if he could be

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[108] This is Brown's own translation of Seneca's *de Beneficiis* ("On Benefits"), Book IV, Chapter 18.

> informed on authority which he could not doubt, that in some neighbouring country a discovery had been made which threw a new light, not merely on what had before been considered obscure, but on all, or almost all the phenomena which had been considered as perfectly well-known; that in consequence of this discovery, it had become easy to analyse what had before resisted every attempt of the analytic art, and to force into combination substances which had seemed before incapable of any permanent union! With what eagerness would he await the communication that was to put into his own hands this admirable power. It must be a distress, indeed, of no common sort which could at such a period withdraw his mind wholly for any length of time from that desire which every thing that met his eye would seem to him to recall, because it would be in truth forever present in his mind. (LXVII, pp.451-452)

(E.6) *The Desire of Power*: In many ways an extension of the "general desire for action"' yet, rather than being the "negative power" of "[the] mere freedom from constraint" alone, this class also includes the "positive power which one individual may exercise over another" (XVIII, p.453); and, "so universal is the desire of power over the minds of others, that there is perhaps no one who is wholly exempt from it" (XVIII, p.454):

> [Our desire of power] begins with the pleasure of our mere bodily energies, long before we are capable of conceiving the very thought of operating on other beings like ourselves. But the passion, which is at first so easily and so simply gratified, without the mastery or the attempted subjugation of other minds, learns afterwards to consider those minds as almost the only objects on which it is at all important to operate; they are instruments of the great game of human ambition; and in that great game, independent of all patriotic feelings, the passion which is not new, though its objects be new, takes pleasure in playing with the interests of nations, and managing whole subject multitudes, as it before took pleasure in wielding a racket at tennis, or a [cue] at the billiard table; or as, at a still earlier period [of our life], it occupied us with a sort of proud consciousness of command in running over a field, for the mere pleasure of moving limbs that were scarcely felt by us to be our own unless when they were in motion. (LXVIII, p.454)

Brown cites a number of examples in which "the power which mind exercises over mind… is an intellectual or moral agency, underived from any foreign source, and wholly personal to the individual who exercises it".

This is exercised, "not for the mere self-approbation of our action as virtuous", and "not from the pride that our name would be long remembered", but simply from the view that our actions "had been beneficial to mankind"; and this includes (a) the persuasive power of the skilled and eloquent orator "[who asserts], against the proud and the powerful, the right of some humble sufferer, who has nothing to vindicate his right but justice and the eloquence of his protector", (b) "the gentle and benevolent power" that parents exercise over their new-born, and (c) the intellectual power of the philosopher (LXVIII, pp.454-455):

> The gravest and most retired philosopher, who scarcely exists out of his library, in giving to the world the result of many years of meditation, delights indeed in the truths which he has discovered, and in the advantage which they may directly or indirectly afford to some essential interests of society; but though these are the thoughts on which, if his virtue be equal to his wisdom, he may dwell with the greatest satisfaction, there still comes proudly across his mind,

> a feeling of pleasure in the thought of the power which he is exercising, or is soon to exercise over the minds of others. He is certainly far more pleased, that the truths which are to effect the general change of opinion, are truths discovered by him, than if exactly the same beneficial effect had flowed from discoveries made by any other person; and though the chief part of this pleasure may unquestioningly be traced to the love of glory, and the anticipation of the glory which is loved, much of it as unquestioningly flows from the internal feeling of the power which he exercises, and which he has the trust of being able to exercise again in similar circumstances,— a power which is more delightful to him indeed when accompanied with celebrity, but of which the very secret consciousness is itself a delight that is almost like glory to his mind. (LXVIII, p.455)

A "far more extensive" sort of power is "coveted by minds which are incapable of feeling and appreciating the intellectual or moral excellence" of this individual sort of power: "the power which high station confers" ("the power of forcing obedience even upon the reluctant, and, in many cases, of winning obedience, from that blind respect which the multitude are always sufficiently disposed to feel for the follies as for the virtues of those above them") (LXVIII, pp.455-456).

Obviously, it is far more than just wishing for the glory and the prestige that are concomitant with high social station:

> To know that there are a number of beings, endowed with many energies which nature seemed to have made absolutely independent of us, who are constantly ready to do whatever we may order them to do, in obedience to our very caprice, is to us, …very nearly the same thing, as if some extension to our faculties had been given to us, by the addition of all their powers to our physical constitution. If these instruments of power were mere machines, which subservience to us could not in any degree debase, and which could be kept in order without any great anxiety on our part, and, without occupying that room which the living instruments occupy, we should all probably feel the desire of possessing these subsidiary faculties, since not to wish for some of them at least would be like indifference whether we had two arms or only one, distinct or indistinct vision, [or] a good or bad memory.[109] (LXVIII, p.456)

"But", warns Brown, "the parts of the machinery of power are living beings like ourselves; and fond as we are of the purposes which we may be desirous of executing by means of them, we have, if we be virtuous, moral affections that preclude the wish". Consequently, if we really do have "these moral affections for the liberty and happiness of others", "we so much prefer their freedom to our personal conveniences that we never encroach on it" (LXVIII, p.456).

Brown then goes on to discuss modifications of the desire of power based on whether the power sought is direct (as in the case of ambition) or indirect (as in the case of avarice):

(1) *The Desire of Direct Power (as in Ambition)*: In the extreme, rather than involving "he who feels within himself the talents which must render his exaltation eminently useful to

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[109] "But", warns Brown, "the parts of the machinery of power are living beings like ourselves; and fond as we are of the purposes which we may be desirous of executing by means of them, we have, if we be virtuous, moral affections that preclude the wish".

Consequently, if we really do have "these moral affections for the liberty and happiness of others", "we so much prefer their freedom to our personal conveniences that we never encroach on it" (LXVIII, p.456).

mankind, and who wishes for power, that there may be more virtue and more happiness in the world, than if he had not been elevated" (LXVIII, p.456).

This is the hunger for the power of the authority of an exalted social position "as an immediate object of desire"; this hunger commonly termed ambition (LXIX, p.459).

(2) *The Desire of Indirect Power (as in Avarice)*: Rather than seeking the power through which one obtains "the direct command [of others]", this seeks power by virtue of one's wealth and possessions ("the means by which the command may be indirectly exercised"): it is "[the] form of ambition which is commonly denominated avarice"[110] (LXIX, p.459).

> We obtain a command over ["the minds of others"], which, though less direct, is not less powerful [than that which comes per medium of "the authority of public station"], by the possession of those things which they are desirous of possessing, and for which, accordingly, they are ready to dispose of their personal services, or to transfer to us some of those means of enjoyment which they possess, and of which we in our turn are desirous. To have what all men wish to have, with the power of transferring it to them, is to have a dominion over every thing which they can transfer to us, equal to the extent of the wishes on their part.
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> Of the power of gratifying these wishes, wealth is the universal representative, or rather the universal instrument. To possess it, is to exercise a sway less obvious indeed, but, in its extent far more imperial than that which ever rewarded or punished the successful arms of the most illustrious conqueror,— a sway as universal as the wishes of mankind,— a sway, too, which is exercised in every case without compulsion, and even with an eagerness, on the part of him who obeys, equal to that which is felt by him who is obeyed…
>
> [Unlike the conqueror's empire,] the empire which a rich man exercises… commands the services of man wherever man can be reached, because it offers to the desires of man the power of acquiring whatever objects of external enjoyment he is most eager to acquire…
>
> Since the possession of wealth is thus the possession of indirect power over the labour of millions, it is not wonderful that our desire of every gratification, which the labour of millions can afford, should be attended with desire of that by which the labour that is to minister to our gratification can be commanded. When viewed in this light, the desire of wealth is only another form of those very desires to which wealth can be rendered instrumental, by affording them the means of indulgence. (LXIX, pp.459-460)[111]

Perhaps the three sorts of power Brown discusses can be thought of as being:

(a) individual power: power by virtue of one's personal excellence;

(b) direct power: a sort of *ex officio* power, solely by virtue of one's social status; and

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[110] Brown (LXIX, p.460) cites a maxim of Publius Syrus, *Desunt inopiae multa, avaritiae omnia*, which he translates as "poverty has many wants, but avarice is the want of every thing".

[111] Perhaps the three sorts of power Brown discusses can be thought of as being:

(a) individual power: viz., power by virtue of one's personal excellence;

(b) direct power: viz., a sort of *ex officio* power, solely by virtue of one's social status; and

(c) indirect power: viz., power solely by virtue of one's wealth.

(c) indirect power: power solely by virtue of one's wealth.

Commenting that there would be no mystery at all "if avarice consisted merely in the desire of obtaining the wealth by which we might command the gratification of our direct desires" — because then "it would be only another form of these very desires" — Brown notes that "this strange passion arises only when the enjoyments which it would command are sacrificed to the mere possession of the means of commanding them".

It is also quite obvious that, in these cases (LXIX, p.461):

> …the avarice does not arise from any essential quality of the wealth itself as a mere substance. You cannot suppose that, independent of the relative value which the comparative scarcity of these two metals has produced, a mass of gold would be much more desirable than a mass of iron. It must originally, then, in the eyes of the miser, as of every other person, have derived its high value from the command over the labour of others, or the actual possessions of others, which it was capable of transferring to every one into its hands might pass, or from the distinction which the possession of what is rare and universally desired always confers.
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> The common theory of the value attached by the miser to the mere symbol of enjoyment, is that the symbol, by the influence of the general laws of association, becomes representative of the enjoyment itself. (LXIX, p.461)

According to Brown, the problem with the miser is not so much with the value that he attaches to gold, but it is with "the high value with which he alone discovers in it" — which is "a value so far surpassing that of the quality of enjoyment which it may command", and of such a magnitude "that the miser seldom thinks of spending" (i.e., "exchanging the mere symbol of enjoyment for the enjoyment itself") — and that he continuously "thinks with insatiable avidity of accumulating what is not to be spent" (LXIX, p.461).

The problem lies with the *heightened* value and "comparative permanence" of "the symbol or instrument" over "the very fugitive nature" of "the enjoyment itself" (LXIX, p.461).

Brown is careful to note that, despite the fact it clearly *must* be present in the case of all misers, the fact of the novelty and the exclusiveness of their actual possession of something unique to misers, and that is something which others simply do not have — i.e., an abundant mountain of great wealth (something that is "possessed only by a few, and which all, or nearly all, are desirous of possessing") — and "the influence of this mere distinction as an object of satisfaction and desire to the miser" plays no significant part whatsoever in the generation of such a character and outlook (LXIX, p.464).

Brown then engages in a complex and intricate argument, concluding that, whilst the "avarice in a few" is, obviously, an extension of the "frugality in all" (LXX, p.468), the true cause of avarice is not the *pleasure* that is associated with any accumulation of goods (i.e., "the remembrances… of those few moments of some agreeable purchase"), but is the *regret* that is associated with expenditure of any kind (i.e., "the remembrances… of the more lasting wish that the purchase had not been made") (LXIX, p.463). In part, the heightened value and comparative permanence of the money over the

transient and ephemeral nature of the enjoyment itself explains it all:

> [When the thoughts of the mind] have turned chiefly to the agreeable object which it wishes to acquire, as, where the object is very pleasing, it will naturally do, unless counteracted by opposite suggestions it will gladly make the purchase; but if, when any such wish arises, its thought be turned, in consequence of former feelings of regret, chiefly to that which it must give to obtain the object, and if the principal reflection be, "How many other things as valuable, or more valuable, could the money procure, and what regret, therefore, shall I afterwards feel if I have parted with it for this one", the very desire of making the purchase may disappear altogether, from the mere suggestion of the various other agreeable objects, the acquisition of which the purchase of this one would preclude. (LXIX, p.462)

Brown then goes on to speak of those who "are [now] misers merely because they once were poor, not because they are indifferent to [the] distress [of others]", in a way that is surprisingly similar to Allport's notion of "functional autonomy":[112]

> It is very difficult for those who, in early youth, have struggled with extreme penury, and who have been suddenly raised to affluence, not to have at their heart what may seem like original constitutional avarice to those who do not reflect on its cause,— a love of money, when the love of money seems so little necessary to them,— a terror of expense which was once only economy, but which is economy no more. (LXIX, p.464)
>
> […and, it is clearly evident] that an accession of wealth, however great, to that which was perhaps only a competence before, will have little chance of lessening avarice, but may, on the contrary, as we see with surprise in many cases of the strange moral anomaly, increase the very avarice that was before scarcely marked as sordid, by rendering more valuable that rich amount which it would be painful to diminish by such ordinary expenses as even frugality allows. (LXIX, p.464)

Brown comments that this, which is "one of the most seemingly anomalous of human passions", is directed at "a mass of cumbrous matter, which it is difficult to acquire, and anxious to keep, [and] of no more value in itself, when stamped with the marks of the national currency, than when it was buried, with other dross, in the original darkness of the mine". Therefore, argues Brown, it is "a passion that has for its object what is directly valuable only in relation to other desires, that disregards, however, the gratification of these very desires to which its object may be considered only as instrumental, and that yet continues, with mad avidity, to labour to accumulate what, but for the enjoyments which are despised and viewed almost with terror, is a burden, and nothing more" (LXX, p.466).

By contrast, Brown reflects on how somewhat nobler individuals respond to similar changes in their fortune:

> When, in such circumstances of sudden change of fortune, the heart readily adapts itself to the change, it may be considered as a proof, that he who is now rich has, even in indigence,

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[112] The term *functional autonomy* was coined by G.W. Allport (1897-1967), circa 1955, to denote behaviours that had become independent of any (or all) of the outcomes they were originally intended to achieve.

Allport observed that much human behaviour simply did not seem to be closely related to primary human needs. He noticed a tendency for behaviour, specifically initiated by a particular physiological need at some earlier time, to persist, quite independently of that need, at some later stage of life (e.g. an originally poor individual continuing to accumulate money long after they had already amassed a considerable fortune).

> been accustomed to look to wealth chiefly as an instrument of gratifying those generous wishes which he now, therefore, delights to gratify; unrestrained in his bounty by any feeling of regret, because the chief regret which he felt before was that of not being able to bestow a relief, the power of bestowing which he now feels to be so inestimable a part of riches. (LXIX, p.464)

In closing his argument, Brown comments that whilst he never thinks of himself as one, the prodigal is, also, a type of miser. Because "he is constantly throwing away the money which he obtains", he overlooks the simple fact that he, too, is driven by extreme greed; and, along with his absence of accumulated gold, "he forgets the rapacity of his desires themselves".

And, whilst "[his particular] avarice is not, indeed, the avarice of him who lives and dies in rags and wretchedness", it is just as much a desire that can only be satisfied *with* money. (LXIX, p.466).

In his review of the second half of Brown's *Lectures*, Gilman (1825, p.23), who is otherwise thoroughly approving of Brown and his views, takes exception to Brown's representation of (a) avarice as "only a modification of our desire of power", and (b) the miser:

> Avarice is often exercised without regard to the attainment of any kind of power whatever. It loves money and property purely *as* such, and not for the gratifications they can purchase. Dr Brown was aware of this phenomenon, and felt its inconsistency with the above classification of the desire. He labours at great length, and quite unsuccessfully, to account for this obvious anomaly in his system. He falls into a maze of this own creating, by first ranking avarice as an indirect desire of power, and then finding that it is not always a desire of power. He wonders, through a whole lecture, why the miser would be so eager to deny himself all kinds of gratifications for the sake of that money, whose only real value is, that it can purchase, and is the very representative of those very renounced gratifications! Would not our author's perplexity and inconsistency have been very easily prevented, by only adding an *eleventh* class of desires to the ten already laid down? Does not avarice flow from a distinct, original, and independent emotion, namely, a love of hoarding, or, as our author would have called it, *the desire of acquisition*? The child hoards its shells and pebbles, the virtuoso[113] his curiosities, the collector his books, and the miser his gold, almost for the gratification of this simple and separate propensity, with comparatively a faint and fortuitous influence of other motives…
>
> Were it not for the strong operation of the instinctive propensity we are suggesting, man must often have perished through want, the consequence of carelessness and improvidence. We were not left to calculate the benefits resulting from frugality, nor to wait until we should smart from privations, occasioned by lavishness and inexperience. A desire of mere acquisition, therefore, seems to be a compensation as beautiful as it is indispensable, in this fluctuating and precarious world. A too great indulgence of the feeling, of course, becomes, like an abuse of all our other desires, criminal and mischievous.
>
> It was probably in consequence of not adverting to this indubitable law of our mental constitutions, that Dr Brown, in endeavouring to account for the unreasonable excesses of avarice, which are sometimes witnessed, was led to lay a very disproportionate stress on the *regret*, that arises from early prodigality. Indeed he would seem at times to regard this regret, as the original foundation and main ingredient of the passion. We are constrained to question the correctness of this theory. Who has not known instances of a decided bent for avarice,

[113] In this case, virtuoso meaning "a collector of antiquities, natural curiosities or rarities".

> which could be traced up to the earliest period after infancy, where it was impossible that the little miser could have felt any inconvenience, or regret, arising from prodigality or extravagance? Fasten down the cover of a box, perforate it for a small aperture, persuade your child to convey to it every coin that is given him, tell him to search for money on the parade ground early in the morning after each muster day, instruct him to bargain away his cake and his toys for cash, deliver to him, perpetually, short solemn lectures and cautions on the propriety of saving and hoarding his money, and such discipline, acting on the native desire for which we have been contending, will soon convert him into a sordid wretch, long before he shall have experienced one feeling of pain at the destruction of his cake, which in fact he never devours. Regret for squandered means, we allow, is often one, among the many other circumstances, which Dr Brown has so happily enumerated, as enhancing and aggravating the force of the avaricious principle, and may sometimes awaken and develope [sic] it, when it has slept for a long time. But we cannot believe it is the mainspring of the passion itself, nor sufficient, especially to remove the embarrassment, which the author has encountered in the exposition of his theory. Even should the separate desire, on which we insist, be denied, still we would account for most of the workings of avarice on far different principles from this regret. (Gilman, 1825, pp.23-24)

(E.7) *The Desire of the Affection or the Esteem of Those Around Us*: This is "the desire of the love of others as an object of happiness to ourselves".

Whilst it is clear that the "delightful emotion which constitutes love itself" ("that feeling of affection for the object that is or seems to us amiable") "in the various states in which it may exist… is itself, as a mere state of mind, distinct from the desires which may instantly, or almost instantly, succeed it" — and, moreover, it is also "a complex state of mind, including a delight in the contemplation of its object, and a wish of good to that object".

Brown's legal and medical training seems to have driven him to the "scientific" position of accepting Ockham's razor, and taking great care never to multiply entities beyond necessity; and here, he, once again, bases his distinctions on the generally accepted referents for words; i.e., the commonly accepted meanings as they routinely motivated in everyday discourse amongst native speakers of the English language — in fact, he speaks precisely of "what in common language is termed love" (LXX, p.469).

It is also clear that "our feeling of regard, whether simple or complex, is itself different from the desire of that regard which we wish to be reciprocally felt for ourselves" (LXX, pp.468-469); i.e., the "progressive and mutual agency": "the wish of reciprocal interest which attends affection, and the gratification of which is so delightful a part of affection" (LXX, p.470). Despite the fact that "the affection and the benevolent wishes which we …feel for others", and "the want or necessity of our heart" ("that those whom we love should feel for us a reciprocal regard"), "usually exist together [in nature]", Brown has separated them for the purposes of his "philosophic analysis" (LXX, p.469).

(E.8) *The Desire of Glory*: Whilst an extension of the desire of reciprocal affection of those we love, the desire of glory involves far more than "this narrow circle"; not only is it connected "with

every human being that exists" but, also, "with every human being that is to exist in the long succession of ages" (LXX, p.470):

> To have even our earthly being extended in everlasting remembrance; to be known wherever the name of virtue can reach; and to be known as the benefactors of every age, by the light which we have diffused, or the actions which we have performed or prompted, who is there that does not feel some desire of this additional immortality?…
>
> [How] delightful must be the certainty, that the name which we leave is never to be forgotten indeed; but is never to be forgotten, only because it is to be an object of eternal love and veneration; and that when we shall be incapable ourselves of benefiting the world, there will still be actions performed for its benefit, which would not have been conceived and performed, if we had not existed! (LXX, pp.470-471)

Noting that there is a significant difference between the state of mind concomitant with "the desire of glory", which "all may feel", and the state of mind concomitant with "the consciousness of the glory itself, as attained", that "which only few attain", Brown observes that, "in its general influence on action", "it is not the attainment of glory, accordingly, which adds to the amount of happiness in the world, so much as the desire itself" (LXXI, p.477).

Brown distinguishes between:

(a) the contemptible pursuit of glory "in unworthy objects" ("it is… truly contemptible… when we seek to be distinguished for qualities, to excel in which, though it may be what the world counts glory, is moral infamy"), and

(b) the far more contemptible infamy of the individual "[who] is incapable of feeling the excellence of true glory, and has the melancholy power of seeking, in the misery of others, a hateful celebrity, still more miserable than the misery amid which it is sought!" (LXX, p.471).

Noting that "the complex delight of glory", "which is evidently not a simple pleasure", has two forms, (a) "the delight of contemporary glory" and (b) "the delight of… posthumous glory", Brown proceeds to discuss the four, different "complex pleasures" that may be involved in the delight of contemporary glory (in which "the praise which we hear, or which we are capable of hearing, may… be justly regarded by us as desirable") (LXXI, pp.472-473):

(1) Pleasure in the "simple esteem" of others: this desire is "a modification of that general desire of affection", and it can be satisfied "even though one individual only were to feel it for us" (LXXI, p.472).

(2) "Pleasure in the approbation of others": this approval from others "confirms our own doubtful sentiments".

It also acts to independently and objectively calibrate the dictates of our conscience and, in cases where we are uncertain, makes us far more confident of what is vicious and what is virtuous (LXXI, pp.472-473).

(3) Pleasure in "a superiority gained over others": To the extent to which "life is a competition, or a number of competitions", "we are continuously measuring ourselves with others in various excellencies".

Despite our tendency towards "internal measurement" — and it is precisely because we

are so driven by our desire to appear superior in the eyes of others, that we are so extremely sensitive to own "internal measurement": "[our] internal measurement …when it is unfavourable, is painful chiefly because it is considered by [us] as representing or corresponding with that which others too will form" — which provides "some degree of joy or sorrow", depending upon "[whether] the measurement is or is not in our favour", "it is in the eyes of others, however, that the competitors for honour wish to distinguish themselves" (LXXI, p.473):

> The voice of glory, then, the most delightful of all voices to their ear, is, at every stage of their progress, a proof that the distinction which they sought has been, to a certain extent, obtained; that they are recognised as superiors,— that they have risen above the crowd,— and that they have now among their enviers those to whom the multitude beneath are looking with envy, only because they dare not, in their very wishes, look so high as that prouder eminence which they have reached. (LXXI, p.473)

(4) Pleasure "in the feeling of a sort of extension which glory gives to our being": based on the view that "he who thinks of us is connected with us" (because "we seem to exist in his heart"), this pleasure is "less obvious"; and, whilst it is certainly "founded only on an illusion", it is, nonetheless, "real in itself" (LXXI, p.473) — and this "illusion" is evident "in the vivid interest which we attach to widespread praise" (LXXI, p.473):

> The common theory of the illusion is, that we merely believe ourselves to be where we are praised, and to hear what is said of us. The illusion, however, appears to me to extend to something which is far more than this, to a momentary extension of our capacity of feeling, as if enlarged by that of every one in whose mind and heart we conceive our thought to arise. We have gained, as it were a thousand souls, at least we seem for the moment to live in a thousand souls; and it is not wonderful that such an expansion of our being should not seem to us delightful, when the emotions through which it is expanded are those of admiration and love. (LXXI, p.473)

Whilst it clearly entails "the absurdity of seeking that which must, by its nature, be beyond the reach of our enjoyment" (LXXI, p.474), the delight of posthumous glory is "the [universal] desire of a praise that is not to terminate with the life that is capable of feeling it" (LXXI, p.473).

Brown argues that "consciousness forms an essential part" of "the complex notion of ourselves"; and, quite distinct from our thoughts of others, "we cannot think of what we call self, but as that which is the subject of the various feelings that form to us all which we remember of our life, as the living and sentient being that is capable of hearing praise, and of feeling delight in praise" (LXXI, p.475):

> To think of ourselves in the grave, is not to think of a mere mass of matter, for our notion of ourselves is very different. It is to think of that which, without some capacity of feeling, is not, in our momentary illusion, recognised by us as ourself,— that self which we know only as it is capable of feelings, and which divested of feelings, therefore, would be to our conception like any other individual.
>
> In these cases, the feeling of our own reality blends itself with the ideas of imagination, and thus gives a sort of present existence to the objects of these ideas however unexisting and remote. We are present in future ages, in the same way that we are present in distant

> climates, when we think of our own glory as there; because to the conception of our glory, the conception of that being whom we call self is necessary; and the being whom we call self is known to us only as that which lives and feels. We do not delight in the contemplation of our posthumous glory then [as others have supposed] because we imagine ourselves present; but considering the glory as our glory, it is impossible not to imagine ourselves present, and therefore impossible not to feel, in some degree, during the brief illusion, as if the praise were actually heard and enjoyed by us. (LXXI, p.475)

(E.9) *The Desire of the Happiness of Others*: The last two desires, happiness in those we care for, and unhappiness in those we hate, flow so readily from some of the emotions already examined that they "appear almost parts of them, rather than distinct emotions" (LXXII, p.479).

Whilst the desire of the happiness of others is an essential aspect of the complex emotion commonly termed love (along with, say, the desire of reciprocal affection), it is not exclusively so.

Brown remarks (LXXII, p.480) on the general principle that, with one exception, the intensity of our desire of the happiness of others, depends upon the extent to which the individual(s) concerned are dear to us, and "live in our domestic circle", or do not. The single exception to "this gradual scale of importance, according to intimacy" is "the case of one who is absolutely a stranger", in which our benevolence is extended to them simply because of their foreign, unknown status:

> [The stranger] is a foreigner, who comes among a people with whose general manners he is perhaps unacquainted, and who he has no friend to whose attention he can lay claim, from any prior intimacy… [yet, specifically because he is a stranger,] he is received and sheltered by our hospitality, almost with the zeal with which our friendship delights to receive one with whom we have lived in cordial union, whose virtues we know and revere, and whose kindness has been to us no small part of the happiness of our life. (LXXII, p.480)

(E.10) *The Desire of the Unhappiness of Those We Hate*: this "desire of evil to others… bears the same relation to hatred in all its forms, which the desire of happiness to others bears to all the diversities of love [in that] it is an element of the complex emotion, not the mere hatred itself, as the desire of diffusing happiness is only an element of the complex affection, which is usually termed love", and "it is not of less importance that man should be susceptible of feelings of malevolence on certain occasions, than that he should be susceptible of benevolence in the general concerns of life; and man, accordingly, is endowed with the susceptibility of both" (LXXII, pp.480-481).

This is a complex, prospective emotion, which "[can be] separated by internal analysis from those immediate emotions of dislike which constitute the varieties of simple hatred" (LXXII, p.483).

We may also, when performing supposedly beneficial actions, quite inadvertently "produce evil… to those we wish to benefit, and may produce it in consequence of our very desire of benefiting them"; and, therefore, "by misdirection or excess", even the "most benevolent" of "all our desires" may

very well "occasion no slight amount of evil to individuals and society"[114] (LXXII, p.481).

In this case, there is, at least, a small, minor benefit: "at least the desire was one which it was happiness to feel" (LXXII, p.481). By contrast, in the case of "malevolent wishes", there is no concomitant "addition to the general happiness of the world".

Also, these malevolent wishes clearly entail "a double evil": "not merely the evil that may be inflicted on others, who are the objects of the malevolence, but that which may be said to have been already inflicted on the mind itself, which has had the painful wish of inflicting evil" (LXXII, p.481).

Whilst, in order to "think ourselves morally justifiable" in circumstances where "we wish evil to those we hate", "we must be certain that the hatred which we feel is itself morally justified", "the desire of evil to others" may be permissible when necessary to protect "all that beautiful expanse of security and happiness which forms the social world" (e.g., to the extent to which "it is virtuous… to feel indignation at oppression", "it is [also] virtuous… to wish that the oppressor, if he continue to be an oppressor, may not finish his career without punishment"); however:

> To take a case of a very different sort, however, it is not virtuous to wish, even for a moment, evil to some successful competitor, who has outstripped us in any honourable career; and the desire of evil in this case is not virtuous, because there is no moral ground for that hatred in which the desire originated, when the hatreds was not directed to any quality that could be injurious to general happiness, but had for its only object an excellence that has surpassed us, by exhibiting to the world qualities which are capable of benefiting, or at least of adorning it, still more qualities of which we are proudest in ourselves. (LXXII, p.481)

Brown "unpacks" his concept as follows:

> We are eager for distinction in that great theatre of human life, in the wide and tumultuous and ever-varying spectacle of which we are at once actors and spectators; and when the distinction which we hoped for is preoccupied by another of greater merit, our own defect of merit seems to us not so much a defect in ourselves as a crime in him. We are, perhaps, in every quality exactly what we were before; but we are no longer to our own eyes what we were before. The feeling of inferiority is forced upon us; and he who has forced it upon us has done us an injury to the extent of the uneasiness which he has occasioned, and an injury which, perhaps, we do not feel more as it has affected us in the estimation of others, than we feel it in the mode in which it has affected us in our estimate of ourselves. An injury, then, is done to us; and the feelings which heaven has placed within our breasts as necessary for repelling injury, arise on this instant feeling of evil which we have been made to suffer. But what were necessary for repelling intentional injury arise, where no injury was intended; and though the minds in which they thus arise must be minds that are in the highest degree selfish, and incapable of feeling that noble love of what is noble, which endears to the virtuous the excellence that transcends them, there are still minds, and many minds so selfish, and so incapable of delighting in excellence that is not their own. (LXXII, pp.481-482)

Yet, as well as the minds "of which the chief wishes of evil are… to those whom it is virtuous to view with disapprobation" (LXXII, p.481) — i.e., "the virtuous malevolence of those who are malevolent only to cruelty and injustice" (LXXII, p.483) — there are other minds "of which the chief

[114] This is a symmetrical with warnings of Merton (1936) of the risk of "unanticipated consequences of purposive social action" and Norton (2004), who spoke of "the law of unintended consequences".

wishes of evil are… to those whom it is vice not to view with emotions of esteem and veneration" (LXXII, p.481).

Describing them as being "a wish of evil to the excellent", Brown identifies two identical forms of "the malevolent affection with which some unfortunate minds are ever disposed to view those whom they consider as competitors", which are different only in their temporal orientation (LXXII, p.482):

(1) *Jealousy*: this is "when the competitor, or supposed competitor, is one who has not yet attained their height"; here, "it is the future that is dreaded" (LXXII, p.482).

(2) *Envy*: this is "when [the mind] regards some actual attainment of another"; here, the cause of vexation is in the present (LXXII, p.482).

In the case of both jealousy and of envy, "the wish is a wish of evil"; and, as Brown remarks, that "by a sort of anticipated retribution", "[any] wish of evil to the excellent… is itself evil to the heart that has conceived it" (LXXII, p.482).

Brown invites us to think on the following:

> If we were to imagine present together, not a single small group only of those whom their virtues or talents had rendered eminent in a single nation, but all the sages and patriots of every country and period, without one of the frail and guilty contemporaries that mingled with them when they lived on earth, if we were to imagine them collected together, not on an earth of occasional sunshine and alternate tempests like that which we inhabit, but in some still fairer world, in which the variety of the seasons consisted in a change of beauties and delights, a world in which the faculties and virtues that were originally so admirable, continued still in their glorious and immortal progress, does it seem possible that the contemplation of such a scene, so nobly inhabited, should not be delightful to him who might be transported into it? Yet there are minds to which no wide scene of torture would be half so dreadful an object of contemplation as the happiness and purity of such a scene, minds that would instantly sicken at the very sight, and wish, in the additional malevolence of the vexation which they felt, not that all were reduced to the mere level of earthly things, but that every thing which met the eye were unmixed weakness, and misery, and guilt. (LXXII, p.482)

Summary of this Section



The Place of this Section within the System



The Secondary Laws of Relative Suggestion

In the same way that, in the case of simple suggestion, given a particular suggesting idea, there is an extremely wide range of suggested ideas in various individuals at the same moment (or within the same individual at different times), it is clear that the same sorts of secondary *modifying* laws work to modify the peculiar influence of the laws of relative suggestion at different times in each of those different individuals:

> [In the same way] as there are, in different minds, different tendencies of different tendencies of simple suggestion, there are also, in different minds, peculiar tendencies to different relative suggestions, from the contemplation of the same objects, Any two objects may have various relations, and may, therefore, suggest these variously…
>
> In different minds, there is a tendency to feel some of these relations, more than others,— a tendency which may be traced, in part, to original constitutional diversities; but which depends also, in part, on factitious habits, and on transient circumstances of the moment, intellectual or bodily. In short, there are secondary laws of relative suggestion, constitutional, habitual, and temporary, as there are secondary laws of simple suggestion, in like manner, constitutional, habitual, and temporary; and those secondary laws, as well as those of simple suggestion, …vary the relations which are felt by individuals, and, therefore, the results of [the] reflective thought, which [these] different individuals present to the world… (XLIX, p.320)

Brown completes his description of his "physiological view of the mind, in all the aspects which it presents to our observation" with some final comments (LXIII, p.485):

> We have reviewed, then, all the principal phenomena of the mind; and I flatter myself that now, after this review, you will see better the reasons that have led me, in so many instances, to deviate from the order of former arrangements [of "the nature and composition of our feelings" made by other philosophers]; since every former arrangement of the phenomena would have been absolutely inconsistent with the results of the minuter analysis into which we have been led…
>
> In reducing to two generic powers or susceptibilities of the mind, the whole extensive tribe of its intellectual states, in all their variety, I was aware that I could not fail at first to be considered by you as retrenching too largely that long list of intellectual faculties to which they have been commonly referred. But I flatter myself that you have now seen that this reference to so long a list of powers has arisen from an inaccurate view of the phenomena referred to them, and particularly from inattention to the different aspects of the phenomena, according as they are combined with desire, in the different processes of thought, that have thence been termed inventive, or creative, or deliberative.
>
> In like manner, when I formed one great comprehensive class of our emotions, to supersede what appeared to me to have been misnamed, by a very obvious abuse of nomenclature, the active powers of the mind, as if the mind were more active in these than in its intellectual functions, I may have seemed to you at the time to make too bold a deviation from established arrangement. But I venture to hope, that the deviation now does not seem to you without reason. It is only now, indeed, after our comprehensive survey of the whole phenomena themselves has been completed, that you can truly judge of the principles which have directed our arrangement of them in their different classes… [Yet, despite the fact that it is my own arrangement] if all the various phenomena of the mind admit of being readily reduced to the

classes under which I would arrange them, the arrangement itself, I cannot but think, is at least more simple and definite than any other previous arrangement which I could have borrowed and adopted.

In treating of the extensive order of our emotions, which comprehends all our moral feelings, you must have remarked that I did not confine myself to the mere physiology of these feelings, as a part of our mental constitution, but intermixed many discussions as to moral duty, and the relations of the obvious contrivances of our moral frame to the wisdom and goodness of its Author,— discussions which you might conceive to be an encroachment upon other parts of the course, more strictly devoted to the enquiries of ethics and natural theology. These apparent anticipations, however, were not made without intention; though, in treating of phenomena so admirably illustrative of the gracious purposes of our Creator, it would not have been very wonderful if the manifest display of these had of itself, without any further view, led to those very observations which I intentionally introduced. It was my wish, on a subject so important to the noblest feelings and opinions which you are capable of forming, to impress you with sentiments which seem to me far more necessary for your happiness than even for your instruction, and to present these to you at a time when the particular phenomena we were considering, led most directly to those very sentiments. It was my wish too, I will confess, to accustom your minds as much as possible to this species of reflection,— a species of reflection which renders philosophy not valuable in itself only, admirable as it is even when considered in itself alone, but still more valuable for the feelings to which it may be made subservient, I wised the great conceptions of the moral society in which you are placed, of the duties which you have to perform in it, and of that eternal Being who placed you in it, to arise frequently to your mind, in cases in which other minds might think only that one phenomenon was very like another phenomenon, or very different from it; that the same name might, or might not, be given to both; and that one philosopher, who lived on a certain part of the earth at a certain time, and was followed by eight or ten commentators, affirmed the phenomena to be different, while another philosopher, with almost as many commentators, affirmed them to be the same. Of this at least I am sure, that your observation of the phenomena themselves will not be less quick, nor your analysis of them less accurate, because you discover in them something more than a mere observer or analyst, who inquires into the moral affinities with no higher interest than he inquires into the affinity of a salt or a metal, is inclined to seek; and even though your observation and analysis of the mere phenomena were to be, as only the ignorant could suppose, less just on that account, there can be no question that if you had learned to think with more kindness of man, and with more gratitude and veneration of God, you would have profited more by this simple amelioration of sentiment, than by the profoundest discovery that was to terminate in the accession which it gave to mere speculative science. (LXXIII, pp.485-486)

Finally, and just before viewing the last of my graphical representations of Brown’s entire system, it is important to recognize that this physical representation may be far more of a map of Brown’s thinking than may be readily apparent at first glance.

His biographer, David Welsh, was a long-time friend of Brown and had innumerable discussions with Brown, on many different matters, over an extended period. He speaks of Brown’s view on the desirable internal structure of a piece of “philosophical disquisition”, which involves nesting concepts

within concepts, within concepts, and within concepts. This strongly indicates that Brown recognized that he was dealing with a complex of qualitative patterns that could only be correctly understood through a style of representation that emphasized the symmetrical nature of those patterns and the rhythms of transfer from one level of the description to another.

It is certain that his *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind* meet his stated criteria.

Welsh had often heard Brown express these views over the years (Welsh, 1825, p.335):

> [Brown] conceived that every [piece of] philosophical writing ought to resemble a system of pyramids, each part a whole in itself, portions of which are to be grouped into larger pyramidal forms, which ought to be arranged so as to constitute one great pyramid. In every sentence there ought to be a principal idea complete in itself, but forming an element of all the ideas that are joined into one paragraph. The idea of the paragraph is still one, which is to be grouped with all the other paragraphs into a section; the sections in their turn form larger divisions, which altogether form one mighty hole. To have a distinct view of all the particulars each in itself, and at the same time in their mutual references and in their united reference to the great whole, constitutes, as he perceived, an essential element of the philosophic genius. This was what Dr. Brown himself constantly aimed at, and the effect of his system is to be observed in all his works. (Welsh, 1825, pp.335-336)

Summary of the Entire System



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> *But hitherto I have not been able to discover the cause of the properties of gravity from phenomena, and I feign no hypothesis for whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is to be called a hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, have no place in experimental philosophy.* (Newton, *Principia*, III, *General Scholium*)

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